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Abstract 
 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in the health sector are essential in light of the 
challenges the public sector is facing in healthcare finance, provision and 
management. Recognizing the need to provide insurance coverage to those below the 
poverty line (BPL), Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) was introduced in 
2008 by the Ministry of Labour and Employment in India. RSBY is a social health 
insurance scheme for the informal sector, where health care delivery and management 
involves a multitude of stakeholders from both public and private sectors who are 
governed by contractual agreements. A family of up to five pays INR 30/- (£0.30) 
annually for enrolment for a coverage of INR 30,000/- (£302). The balance of the 
premium is subsidized and shared by the Central (75%) and the State (25%) 
governments.  
This research aims to evaluate the availability, provision and management of health 
services under RSBY Public-Private Partnership contracts and factors that might 
influence them in order to inform policy makers on how to improve scheme 
implementation for the BPL beneficiary. The study was conducted in the districts of 
Patiala and Yamunanagar, in the States of Punjab and Haryana respectively. The 
study has both qualitative and quantitative components using primary and secondary 
data. The results of the study can be broadly categorized under the main pillars of 
scheme design and implementation. These include political, regulatory and 
institutional capacity; stakeholder contracting; enrolment of beneficiaries; 
empanelment of health facilities; and finally provision and utilization of services.  
RSBY has clearly attempted to address the existing gaps in the provision of health 
services by offering a balanced Public-Private Partnership model that provides some 
degree of financial protection to the end user. Despite the weaknesses identified, it is a 
robust and evolving model that needs to be continuously developed, on the basis of 
lessons learnt from implementation of the scheme.   
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In view of the challenges governments are facing in the provisioning, financing and 
managing health care (Department of Economic Affairs, 2010), public–private 
partnerships (PPPs) in the health sector are both important and timely. Development 
of infrastructure and delivery of basic health services are important roles of any 
government; in some countries, these roles are even mandated by their Constitution. 
However, with the pressures of increasing population and urbanisation, and the ability 
of governments to adequately address these needs through traditional means has been 
severely constrained. This has led governments across the world to increasingly look 
to the private sector to supplement public investments and provide health services 
through PPPs. Engagement with the private sector, when appropriately structured and 
executed, can help address specific cost and investment challenges and increase 
efficiency through improved service provision and management at reduced costs. It 
can also enhance service quality through enhanced expertise, more rapid and 
substantial investments in infrastructure and latest medical technologies, which have 
the potential to attract and retain better-performing staff (Nikolic and Maikisch, 
2006).  
For the purpose of this research, a broad definition of PPP has been adopted, similar 
to that of the United Kingdom (UK) government where PPPs are defined as 
‘Arrangements typified by joint working between the public and private sector’ (HM 
Treasury, 2008). According to the Government of India (GoI), PPPs can cover all 
types of collaboration across the interface between the public and private sectors to 
deliver policies, services and infrastructure.  
A study by Perrot is of the view that with the increasing complexity of health systems, 
there was a realization that they could not function in isolation. The need to forge 
partnerships in a multi-sectoral environment became clear to the diverse stakeholders 
involved in health care (Perrot, 2006). The simplest way to do that was through 
interaction. This interaction took various forms and could be on different levels. This 
resulted in various types of contractual relations-some based on the nature of the 
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contract (public or private), others on the parties involved and yet others on the scope 
of the contract (Perrot, 2006).  
Various studies/surveys have proposed conflicting views on the efficacy and cost–
effectiveness of the PPP model in health care. Palmer reviewed theories and evidence 
relating to public–private contracts for the delivery of primary care services in low- 
and middle-income countries, and concluded that reform packages in these countries 
promote the use of contracts to make publicly funded services more accountable, 
transparent and efficient, despite the weak capacity of governments and markets to 
manage them (Palmer, 2000). 
A questionnaire survey among public and private stakeholders in Malaysia, which 
aimed to capture the perceptions of the public and private sectors on the rationale for 
implementation of  PPPs concluded that ‘to enhance private sector involvement in 
economic development was the only rationale rated (for PPP implementation) as most 
important by all respondents’ (Ismail and Haris, 2014). There is an increasing interest 
in the model of Australia, Spain and the UK, where a public authority contracts a 
private company to design, build and operate an entire hospital.  
On the basis of round-table discussions held in Nigeria, Stallworthy et al. concluded 
that the private sector is a pragmatic necessity in a government-dominant system 
(Stallworthy et al., 2014). Van Den Heever agreed that private markets for health care 
are inevitable (Heever, 2012). Ejughemre sees the private sector as a key player in 
delivering health services through supplementing scarce resources of the public sector 
(Ejughemre, 2014). Shin recommends the right balance between private health 
insurance and a publicly funded system (Shin, 2012). 
However, McKee et al. concluded that ‘a PPP further complicates the already difficult 
task of building and operating a hospital’ (McKee et al., 2006). In its analysis of 45 
countries, the Independant Evaluation Group (IEG)  of the World Bank concludes that 
‘there was not much evidence whether private sector involvement was the best option’ 
(Romero, 2014). Oxfam estimated that PPP hospitals in Lesotho consumed more than 
half of the total government health budget and at least three times of what the old 
public hospital would have cost today (Chefa, 2014). The European Network on Debt 
and Development (Eurodad) surmised that ‘PPPs are by far the most expensive way to 
fund projects’ (Romero, 2014). 
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Sood and Higgins reviewed inititives in payment reform in the public and private 
sectors, and concluded that the optimal role of the public sector in such reforms is 
debatable (Sood and Higgins, 2012). Mills believes that ‘the debate continues on the 
best mix of financing mechanisms outside the formal employment sector’ (Mills et al., 
2012). 
Amid all the conflicting evidence as detailed above, the GoI was of the view that there 
was significant untapped potential for the use of a PPP model in the health sector; and 
towards that end developed enabling tools and activities to encourage private sector 
investment (Government of India, 2011). The PPP India database indicates that 758 
PPP projects costing INR 3833 billion (GBP 38.6 billion) are operational, under 
construction or in stages where implementation is imminent (Department of 
Economic Affairs, 2012). The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been assisting the 
GoI through a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in mainstreaming PPPs in the 
health sector since 2007 in 15 states and six line ministries through creating ADB PPP 
cells with the objective of providing equity, quality and sustainability in health 
services (Barua, 2012). 
India spends 3.7% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health care. Over 60% of 
health expenditure is private, of which 61.7% is financed out of pocket, making this 
one of the highest out-of-pocket spending rates globally (World Health Organization, 
2013). High out-of-pocket expenditure indicates a lack of consumption smoothing; a 
one-time high expenditure on health care can deplete resources dramatically to induce 
impoverishment (Gertler and Gruber, 2002). Cohen estimated that medical costs 
impoverished 24% of hospitalized Indians (Cohen, 2006).  
To redress this situation, inter alia, the GoI adopted a health insurance programme 
called the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) in 2008. The RSBY is a national 
health insurance scheme under the Ministry of Labour and Employment for below 
poverty line (BPL) families in the unorganized sector, to provide protection from 
financial liabilities arising out of health problems that involve hospitalization. Every 
BPL family, which can include five persons - the head of the household, spouse and 
three dependent children or parents, holding a ration card, is eligible for this scheme. 
On paying INR 30 (£ 0.30) annually, the family gets a biometric-enabled smart card 
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containing their fingerprints and photographs. This makes them eligible as inpatients 
for more than 700 health-care packages specified under 15 categories.  
RSBY is India’s first social security scheme for BPL families. It involves a multitude 
of stakeholders from both the public and private sectors who are governed by 
contractual agreements. The insurer is contracted by the government and is paid a 
premium (by the Central Government and state governments) for each household 
enrolled under RSBY. A hospital (public or private) is contracted by the insurance 
company to provide inpatient services to the enrolled beneficiaries as and when 
required. For these services, the insurance company reimburses a fixed amount per 
service type to the hospitals. The scheme also has provision for contracting private 
partners, i.e. third party administrators (TPAs) to help in smart card implementation 
and other intermediaries, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that assist 
in enrolment and awareness generation. This is an unprecedented development in the 
Indian health-care financing market for providing financial protection to vulnerable 
groups.  
Although RSBY was introduced in 2008, there is little independent evidence on 
whether the use of contracts and the PPP model has necessarily led to better service 
delivery for the poor. Criticisms of RSBY relate to inadequate and ineffective 
awareness campaigns, power inequity among stakeholders, weak governance structure 
and poor implementation of the scheme (Narayana, 2010, Das and Leino, 2011, 
Seshadri et al., 2011). The Centre for Policy Research and Reddy et al. (2011) have 
supplemented the issues of low enrolment, poor hospitalization, inadequate uptake of 
the scheme, empanelment and accessibility, as well as noting positive out-of-pocket 
expenditure incurred by the beneficiaries (Das, 2011, Reddy et al., 2011b). 
Those in support of the scheme are of the view that RSBY has catered to the health 
needs of millions of BPL persons in the unorganized sector. The scheme has enabled 
households to choose between private and public health-care services for inpatient 
services of up to INR 30,000 (£ 302) per year, which has not varied since its inception 
in 2008. As the scheme is cashless, it has the potential of being relatively corruption 
free; and more importantly, the poor do not have to make payments upfront. 
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1.1 Aim 
The research aims to study the provision, availability and use of health services under 
PPP contracts in the implementation of RSBY and the factors that can influence such 
health services, in order to inform policymakers on how to improve the scheme design 
for the BPL beneficiary.  
 
1.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this research were: 
1) to analyse the external environment (regulatory, institutional, political, etc.) 
and the contract design of the RSBY scheme in order to understand  strengths 
and weaknesses of the scheme design and the incentive structures created by 
the assigned roles, responsibilities and relationships within the contracts; 
2) to evaluate the availability of services by mapping the health-care providers 
including the packages offered by the empanelled health-care providers, and 
analysing the utilization patterns; 
3) to compare the provision of health care across both public and private 
providers for RSBY beneficiaries and between RSBY and non-RSBY 
beneficiaries for a specific type of provider; 
4) to inform policy on the findings and make recommendations in order to 
address any problems in the scheme and help improve provision of health care 
to the target population.   
 
1.3 Methodology 
The study was conducted in the districts of Patiala and Yamunanagar in the states of 
Punjab and Haryana, respectively. The study population comprised both RSBY and 
non-RSBY beneficiaries (used as control group for RSBY beneficiaries). The study 
had both qualitative and quantitative components.  
To study the first objective, 20 in-depth interviews of various key stakeholders of the 
RSBY scheme were conducted. These included policy-makers, state representatives, 
representatives from insurance companies, representatives from TPAs, and public and 
private providers.  
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For the second objective, mapping of empanelled and non-empanelled facilities 
within the districts was undertaken to assess the availability of services in each 
district. ArcGIS was used as the mapping software. Primary data were collected on 
availability of services from almost all empanelled facilities. Secondary data analysis 
was also conducted to address the second objective. Secondary data included the 
database containing the BPL census data of the population eligible for RSBY and the 
data on enrolment of households under RSBY sourced from the State Nodal Agency 
(SNA). Secondary data also included claims data, which contain information on 
claimants, diseases, transaction details and transaction amounts. This was sourced 
from the insurance companies via the SNAs.  
For the third objective, a total of 12 facilities were selected, with three public and 
three private facilities in each of the two chosen districts, Patiala and Yamunanagar. 
An observational and health provider checklist (self-assessment) was prepared and 
piloted. This checklist was used to address the structural evaluation of provision of 
care in the 12 selected facilities. Another source of primary data was the exit 
interviews of RSBY and non-RSBY participants from selected empanelled hospitals. 
This group mostly comprised poor people, who visited the empanelled hospitals for 
their health needs. Consecutive interviews (consecutive sampling) were conducted in 
the selected empanelled hospitals till the desired sample size was achieved in each 
hospital. Standardization was not actively addressed at the time of planning the study. 
As the standard comparable group would have been BPL population not enrolled 
under the scheme, this would have required huge resources in terms of funds and 
time. However, it was assumed that recruiting participants (RSBY and non-RSBY) 
from the same facility and same time would yield recruitment of almost similar 
participants. Socio-economic status of RSBY and non-RSBY participant cannot be 
matched and this would certainly vary because the classification of RSBY and non-
RSBY is based on SES only. A total of 751 exit interviews were conducted with 399 
participants interviewed in Patiala district and 352 in Yamunanagar district. These 
comprised 387 RSBY beneficiaries and 364 non-RSBY beneficiaries. All statistical 
analyses were performed with STATA Version 9.0. Appropriate tests of significance 
(chi-square test, student t-test) and linear regression analysis were used at places 
where required.  
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1.4 Layout 
Present thesis is divided into nine chapters. In this first chapter, an attempt has been 
made to sequentially set a background of PPPs in health care and in India, taking 
RSBY as a case study. The second chapter consists of a literature review where 
various articles have been reviewed in the context of New Public Management – 
historical perspective, PPPs, health insurance and various aspects of health insurance 
such as adverse selection, cream skimming, moral hazard, risk pooling, equity etc. 
The third chapter focuses on India and its background. It deals with the health status 
of India as well as health economics, health systems and the insurance sector in India. 
The chapter contains a comprehensive review of RSBY – its need, partnerships, 
regulatory framework, private partners, contracting and scheme design. The chapter 
ends with a section elaborating the need for research on PPPs using management or 
contracts for delivery of health services. The fourth chapter details the methodology 
of the present research. It specifically focuses on the conceptual framework of the 
study and individual methodology adopted for each objective. It also describes the 
amendments made in the study protocol during the process of data collection. The 
fifth chapter presents the results of the first objective of the study, which is to review 
the external environment looking at, inter alia, the regulatory, institutional and 
political aspects of the RSBY scheme. It also analyses the contract design and its 
implementation in order to understand the incentive structures created by roles, 
responsibilities and relationships within the contracts. The sixth chapter deals with the 
second objective of the study, which is to evaluate the availability of services by 
mapping the health-care providers, packages offered by the empanelled health-care 
providers and analyse the utilization patterns. Chapter seven details the third 
objective, which is to evaluate the delivery of services across both public and private 
empanelled facilities for RSBY and non-RSBY beneficiaries. This chapter primarily 
deals with evaluating the provision of care as adapted from the Donabedian 
Framework (Donabedian, 2005, Donabedian, 1988). Chapter 8 gives an objective 
wise overview of the findings. Next chapter, chapter 9, is on discussion of the 
findings of the present study with regard to their practical feasibility. This is followed 
by conclusions and policy recommendations derived from the findings of the present 
study.   
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The aim of the literature review is to understand the evolution, development and 
factors affecting PPPs, both in general and in the context of health insurance in India. 
The search engines used for the literature review were Google Scholar, PubMed and 
Embase. The keywords used for the review in this chapter are listed in Table 2.1. 
Articles were filtered based on their title and abstract. Various peer-reviewed articles, 
reviews, reports and letters were studied. Apart from using search engines, cross-
references were also used to find relevant literature. Contact with experts, and 
snowballing technique was adopted to identify the grey literature.  
Table 2.1: Keywords used for literature review 
Sections Keywords used 
New Public Management  – 
historical perspective 
Public management, historical perspective, health, 
government 
Public–private partnership Public–private partnership, PPP, definition, models, 
contract, theories, advantages, disadvantages, India 
Health insurance Health insurance, revenue, risk pooling, purchase, 
PPP, public–private partnership 
Note: Keywords were used in various combinations. 
 
2.1 New Public Management – a historical perspective 
2.1.1 Role of the State 
The role of the State in the provision of public goods and services has long been a 
source of debate. The roots of this debate can be traced back to the need for 
improvement in ways in which governance is managed and services delivered, with 
an emphasis on efficiency, economy and effectiveness (Metcalfe and Richards, 1987). 
In this section, evolvement of new public management in some of the countries has 
been discussed.  
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United Kingdom 
The period 1945–1980 is considered as the classical period of the welfare state in the 
UK (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002) where the government was expected to meet all 
the needs of its citizens ‘from the cradle to the grave’ (Beveridge, 2000) by providing 
at least a minimum standard of living and service to all. The basic argument for 
government production of goods and services is that in certain circumstances, the 
market fails; and that planning, collective decision and public provision are more 
effective in carrying forward certain social purposes than processes of individual 
exchange (Walsh, 1995). However, dissatisfaction with the welfare model, especially 
with its inefficient and ineffective public officialdom, brought about a change in the 
UK from the late 1970s onwards (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002).   
People’s Republic of China 
China’s health-care system has also witnessed several transitions since the early 
1950s. From the 1940s to the 1980s, in a command economy, the Ministry of Health 
financed and managed Chinese health service facilities, which basically performed a 
social welfare function (Hu et al., 2013). In urban areas, health care was administered 
through two publicly financed schemes, the Labor Insurance System (LIS), which 
covered workers in state-run enterprises, and the Public Insurance System (PIS), 
which looked after employees in government, academic and political institutions. In 
rural areas, a three-tier health-care system operated under the Rural Cooperative 
Medical System (RCMS), which relied on contributions from the welfare funds of the 
brigade and the commune (Lennart et al., 1996). Over-utilization and abuse of free 
medical care was widespread (Guo, 2003). There was no control over costs, either on 
the supply side or on the demand side. As a result, health-care spending under LIS 
and PIS increased 28 times between 1978 and 1996, while the fiscal income of the 
government increased only 6.6 times (Wang, 1999). This disproportional increase in 
expenditure imposed considerable fiscal burden on government treasuries. 
Consequently, funding for hospitals from the government declined.  
China launched its economic reforms (which included the health institution reforms) 
in 1978 through the introduction of market competition. The medical establishments 
were decentralized. The Ministry of Health (MoH) no longer ‘managed’ hospitals. 
Instead, it ‘supervised’ hospitals. The new health-care insurance system consolidated 
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PIS and LIS into one insurance programme where government, employer and 
employee share the cost of health care (Peng, 1996). In rural areas, under the new-
style Cooperative Health Care System (CHCS), individuals, economic entities in 
villages as well as the Central Government contribute to the fund and the local 
treasury manages the trust fund (Wong et al., 2006). The reform shifted part of the 
health-care financing burden to individuals. The poor were hit the hardest. In this 
context, the World Bank commented that ‘Health is a sector that cannot simply be left 
to market forces’ (William et al., 1997). Government needs to intervene in health care 
to address the so called ‘market failure’ (Smith et al., 2005). However, there has been 
very substantial growth in the private medical sector in China.  
Myanmar and Mongolia 
In the past 20 years, due to the government’s failure in provision of health-care 
services, Myanmar and Mongolia have transitioned from the first category of 
centralism
1
 to the third category.
2
 Previously, their administrations were highly 
centralized, with no civil or private sector space for operations and limited 
engagement with the international community (Grundy et al., 2014).  
 Over time, health-care costs seem to have an unsustainably increasing trajectory, 
which can be attributed to growing technology, ageing and demographics, health 
status of the population, rising personal income, administrative costs, increasing 
health-care costs and medical malpractice and liability (Schieber et al., 2009). With 
such increasing health-care costs, it is unlikely that governments will be able to 
finance health care in totality on a long-term basis. Therefore, the trend now is 
towards more decentralized models of governance with multiple funding sources to 
include the civil and private sector, and a corresponding trend of moving away from 
monolithic and centralized models of administration (Grundy et al., 2014). 
 
                                                          
1
 This is at one end of the continuum of health system classification, where leadership, management, 
decision-making and financing are all restricted functions of central-level planners. 
2
 In this category, reforms have moved beyond concept and policy commitment to nationwide scale-up 
and implementation, but with limited levels of middle-level decentralization and delegation, and 
limited development of private and civil society constituencies. 
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2.1.2 Theoretical perspective 
From a theoretical perspective, two main theories that seek to explain government 
failure in providing services to its citizens are public choice theory and property 
rights theory (Bennett et al., 1997). Public choice theory rests on the belief that public 
sector bureaucrats have no incentive to promote technical efficiency (Bennett et al., 
1997). They are self-seeking, motivated only by such factors as ‘salary, prerequisites 
of the office, public reputation, power, and patronage. ’ (Niskanen, 1973). As a result, 
the public sector is wasteful. The property rights theory rests on the belief that the 
source of inefficiency in the public system is the weakening of property rights and the 
lack of any obvious threat to the employment of the staff, resulting in a lack of 
incentive for efficient performance.  
In contrast, in the private sector, the basic motivation of the stakeholders is profit, 
resulting in a strong thrust on the efficient use of resources (Bennett et al., 1997).  
2.1.3 New Public Management 
Over the years, the organization of health systems has changed significantly. Most 
countries initiated reforms that resulted in major institutional changes, such as 
decentralization of health services, autonomy for public service providers, 
advancement of the profit and non-profit private sectors, separation of funding entities 
and service providers and expansion of health financing options. These institutional 
reshuffles led to multiplication and diversification of the actors involved and greater 
separation of service provision and administrative functions (Perrot, 2006). The vision 
of the enabling state emerged, where the state, at the central and local levels, planned 
and (at least partly) financed public services, but where provision was located within 
the ‘independent sector’ comprising both voluntary and community sectors and the 
for-profit sector (Rao, 1991). The state also retained the role to regulate, oversee 
quality and standards, and provide stewardship and oversight (Kula and Fryatt, 2014).  
According to Osborne and Gaebler, the key to reinventing government is changing the 
incentives that drive public institutions, or changing the markets that operate within 
the public sector. They use the phrase entrepreneurial government to describe this 
concept (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). This new approach adopted competition as 
central to the provision of public services (Walsh, 1995) and laid greater emphasis on 
standards and measures of performance (Osborne et al., 1995). Increasing pressure to 
34 
 
improve health services led to a trend towards contracting the private sector to 
provide traditionally government-run services. Such contracting is perceived as an 
opportunity to combine the advantages of contracting with the efficiency of the 
private sector (Heard et al., 2011).  
This wave of reforms that has engulfed public sector management in certain parts of 
the world has conventionally been labelled as the New Public Management (NPM) or 
the new managerialism (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994, Ferlie, 1996, Hood, 1991, Pollitt, 
1993). As Moore et al. point out, ‘The central feature of NPM is the attempt to 
introduce or simulate, within those sections of the public service that are not 
privatized, the performance incentives and the disciplines that exist in a market 
environment’ (Moore et al., 1995).  
Critics argue that this approach is concerned more with economy and cost cutting than 
with effective service provision, and that it assumes the superiority of the private 
sector and private sector management techniques above those of the public sector and 
public administration (Metcalfe, 1988). Supporters of the approach have claimed that 
the movement towards NPM ‘has been striking because of the number of nations that 
have taken up the reform agenda in such a short time and because of how similar their 
basic strategies have been’ (Kettl, 2000). Others suggest that there are dangers 
associated with ‘viewing NPM as a coherent and unified set of ideas and practices’ 
(Newman, 2001) when research on the implementation of NPM reforms illustrates 
diversity and a complex body of ideas and practices (Lowndes, 1997).  
2.1.4 Key elements of New Public Management   
New Public Management (NPM) is currently the most dominant paradigm in the 
discipline of public administration (Arora, 2003). It conjures up an image of a 
minimal government, debureaucratization, decentralization, market orientation of 
public service, contracting out, privatization, performance management, etc 
(Kalimullah et al., 2012). These features signify a marked contrast with the traditional 
model of administration, which embodies a dominant role of the government in the 
provision of services, hierarchical structure of organization, centralization and so forth 
(Kalimullah et al., 2012). The key elements of NPM have been detailed in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: Key elements of NPM 
Doctrine Meaning Justification 
Hands-on professional 
management of public 
organization. 
Visible managers at the top 
of the organization, free to 
manage by use of 
discretionary power. 
Accountability requires clear 
assignment of responsibility, 
not diffusion of power. 
Explicit standards and 
measures of 
performance. 
Goals and targets defined 
and measurable as indicators 
of success. 
Accountability means clearly 
stated aims; efficiency 
requires a ‘hard look’ at 
objectives. 
Greater emphasis on 
output controls. 
Resource allocation and 
rewards are linked to 
performance. 
Need to stress results rather 
than procedures. 
Shift to disaggregation 
of units in the public 
sector. 
Disaggregate public sector 
into corporatized units of 
activity, organized by 
products, with devolved 
budgets. Units dealing at 
arm’s length with each 
other. 
Make units manageable; 
split provision and 
production, use contracts or 
franchises inside as well as 
outside the public sector. 
Shift to greater 
competition in the 
public sector. 
Move to term contracts and 
public tendering procedures; 
introduction of market 
disciplines in public sector. 
Rivalry via competition as 
the key to lower costs and 
better standards. 
Stress on private-sector 
styles of management 
practice. 
Move away from traditional 
public service ethics to more 
flexible pay, hiring, rules, 
etc. 
Need to apply ‘proven’ 
private sector management 
tools in the public sector. 
Stress on greater 
discipline and 
economy in public 
sector resource use. 
Cutting direct costs, raising 
labour discipline, limiting 
compliance costs to 
business. 
Need to check resource 
demands of the public 
sector, and do more with 
less. 
Source: (Hood, 1994) 
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2.2 Public–Private Partnerships 
2.2.1 Definition 
The principles of NPM encouraged the establishment of PPPs as a new tool. There 
has been much confusion around the use of the term PPP. Linder noted that there 
exists multiple grammars of PPPs, with governments avoiding the terms 
‘privatization’ or ‘contracting out’ in favour of ‘partnerships’ (Linder, 1999). 
However, Mitchell-Weaver and Manning point out that ‘privatization is privatization 
and subsidies are subsidies; public private partnerships they are not’ (Mitchell-
Weaver and Manning, 1991). They define PPP as ‘primarily a set of institutional 
relationships between the government and various actors in the private sector and civil 
society’. Dutch public-management scholars van Ham and Koppenjan define PPPs as 
‘co-operation of some sort of durability between public and private actors in which 
they jointly develop products and services and share risks, costs and resources which 
are connected with these products’ (Van Ham and Koppenjan, 2001). The World 
Bank (Independent Evaluation Group - IEG) looks at PPPs as ‘long-term contracts 
between a private party and a government agency for providing a public asset or 
service in which the private parties bear significant risks and management 
responsibility’ (Stallworthy et al., 2014, Romero, 2014). For the Canadian Council for 
Public-Private Partnerships, PPPs are ‘a cooperative venture between the public and 
private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner that best meets clearly defined 
public needs through appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards’ 
(Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships, n.d., Ejughemre, 2014). The 
European Commission defines PPPs as ‘the provision, finance, long-term operation 
and maintenance of public infrastructure and/or provision of public services by the 
private sector. A PPP should have been initiated by the public sector, involve a clearly 
defined project with specification of outputs or outcomes, the sharing of risks with the 
private sector, be based on a contractual relationship which is limited in time, and 
have a clear separation between the public sector and the borrower’ (European 
Commision, 2013, Mitchell, 2000). The European Union (EU) is of the view that 
‘PPP can provide effective ways to deliver infrastructure projects, to provide public 
services and to innovate more widely in the context of recovery efforts.’  
There is thus no single definition of PPP. For the purpose of this research, a broad 
definition of PPP has been adopted, similar to that of the United Kingdom (UK) 
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government where PPPs are defined as ‘Arrangements typified by joint working 
between the public and private sector’ (HM Treasury, 2008). The Government of 
India (GoI) also defines PPPs as all types of collaboration between public and private 
sectors to deliver policies, services and infrastructure. 
2.2.2 PPP models 
A PPP arrangement consists of three main elements - the participating partners; the 
different roles these partners might play, depending on their different interests; and 
the different forms of partnership from among the spectrum of forms that the 
partnership may take, due to the differing roles each might want to play. The 
following roles are usually common (Jütting, 1999):   
a. Provision and management: Partners supply the desired service or facilitate 
management of activities, e.g. provision of health care, management of funds, 
facilities, etc. 
b. Financing: In the health sector, public financing means financing by the 
central or local government and state-owned enterprises. Private financing 
includes private out-of-pocket payments, private insurance premiums and 
services provided by the private corporate sector. 
c. Regulation and monitoring: The setting of standards regarding price, buildings 
and quality in the provision of services is a precondition for a functioning PPP.  
Choosing among various roles that partners might play, the resulting PPP arrangement 
could depend on a number of factors, including (a) the degree of control desired by 
the government; (b) the government’s capacity to provide the desired services; (c) the 
capacity of private parties to provide the services; (d) the legal framework for 
monitoring and regulation; and (e) the availability of financial resources from public 
or private sources (Gentry and Fernandez, 1998). Ideally, a PPP model would 
constitute shared responsibility between the parties involved, along with an 
appropriate distribution of the assumed risk.  
2.2.3 Contracting 
In the health sector, PPPs can take a variety of forms, with varying levels of 
distribution of responsibilities and risks between the public and the private sector. 
However, they are characterized by the sharing of common objectives, as might be 
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defined in a contract or manifested through a different arrangement so as to 
effectively deliver a service or facility to the public (Nikolic and Maikisch, 2006). 
From an economic perspective, the replacement of direct, hierarchical management 
structures by contractual relationships between purchasers and providers is said to 
promote increased transparency of prices, volumes and quality in trading, as well as 
managerial decentralization, both of which should enhance efficiency (Mills and 
Broomberg, 1998). International development agencies have been advocating for an 
open competitive contracting of goods and services. With the increase in funding for 
the health sector for Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), contracting private 
purchasers and providers of health services could help provide an alternative option to 
channel funds when the government’s absorptive capacity is weak and there is local 
resistance to changing resource allocation patterns (Mills and Palmer, 2006). It can 
also be argued that resources already exist within the private sector that can be rapidly 
mobilized through contracts. 
Perrot believes that ‘contracting is one of the tools increasingly being used to 
enhance the performance of health systems in both developed and developing 
countries’ (Perrot, 2006). Experience from around the world shows a growing 
tendency in the public sector in both developed and developing countries to 
contract the non-state sector to improve access, efficiency and quality of health 
services. Mills and Palmer are of the view that this is more so in developing 
countries, where contracting may act less as an enabling agent to promote 
competition and more as a resource to fill in a functional gap, that in its absence 
could not have been filled by the public sector. Evidence indicates that the 
majority of care-seeking behaviour in developing countries such as India, Sri 
Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh is within the private sector, therefore involving these 
existing resources through the use of contracts may help improve health outcomes 
(Mills and Palmer, 2006). 
2.2.4 Contracting theories 
Contracting is inherently an issue of changing organizational form; and much of 
neoclassical economics fails to comprehensively analyse the effects of contracting, 
given its standard assumptions of costless transactions, perfect foresight and complete 
information (Hart and Moore, 1990). This realization that neoclassical economics is 
insufficient to accommodate a number of important economic phenomena has resulted 
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in economists turning to other approaches to study contracts that might offer a better 
understanding of how economic institutions and incentives inherent in such structures 
can affect performance and efficiency. Other ‘conscious’ factors of institutional 
arrangement and organizational integration are important in bringing about 
coordination besides the price mechanism. The term new institutional economics 
affords recognition to factors such as uncertainty and bounded rationality, giving rise 
to a more useful analysis of markets, hierarchies and networks as alternative modes of 
economic organization.  
MacNeil classified contracts as classical, neoclassical and relational contracts 
(MacNeil, 1974). Classical contracts are discrete transactions between strangers 
brought together by chance, who may never see each other again. Such an event could 
involve only a barter of goods. All that is of relevance to the transaction will be 
contained within the act of exchange, implying that discrete transactions can be 
planned with complete accuracy. Neoclassical contracts face some limitations in their 
planning for different contingencies (third party determination of performance and 
single party control of terms) and therefore utilize a range of techniques and processes 
within the contract to create flexibility over the long term. Relational contracts move 
beyond the bounds of both classical or neoclassical contracts and the primary need is 
of harmonizing conflict and preserving the relationship. The reference point ceases to 
be the contract itself and becomes the entire relationship as it has developed through 
time (MacNeil, 1974, MacNeil, 1978).  
The principal–agent theory is a theory that helps shed light on contractual 
relationships. The argument for contracting to the private sector hinges on the issue of 
whether it is better to produce goods and services within the public sector 
organization or to purchase them in the market, which, in the industrial context would 
be seen as a ‘make or buy’ decision (Walsh, 1995). It involves a move from the 
hierarchical to a market based approach in the organization of public services, 
wherein the roles of the principal and agent are clearly separated and property rights 
are more explicit (Walsh, 1995).  
The role of the public sector or the principal is to define what is needed and to 
monitor the implementation, whereas the role of the non-state agent is to deliver the 
goods and services. But a standard problem for principal agent theorists is how to 
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incentivize the agent (informed) to act in the best interests of the principal 
(uninformed) when the agent has an informational advantage over the principal and 
often has conflicting interests over the latter (Walsh, 1995, Mills and Broomberg, 
1998). Solutions usually involve a self-enforcing mechanism which relies on 
observable actions by the economic agents and which can be verified by each actor or 
by a court of law. The conditions under which self-enforcing contracts are possible 
may not always hold, as relationships are usually complex and the focal point solution 
may require unrealistic assumptions about the economic agents (Hart and Moore, 
1990). The problem of asymmetry of information lends itself to an emphasis on the 
degree of trust between the principal and the agent as a factor of how efficiently 
asymmetries of information are dealt with. The distribution of risk and responsibility 
between the principal and the agent, the role of incentives as a means of remuneration 
and the level of trust lead to variations in contractual design. According to Walsh, 
contracts can be grouped into two broad categories: outcome/performance based and 
methods based. Outcome based contracts lay more emphasis on specifying the final 
outcomes rather than the process adopted in achieving that output. In other cases, 
outcomes can be far less specific and more difficult to articulate. Therefore, in such 
scenarios the purchaser may choose to design a contract that lays more emphasis on 
the method to be adopted in delivering the service (Walsh, 1995).  
The price of the contract can depend on various factors, including the kind of service 
to be contracted and uncertainty of the workload. Similarly, payment methods and 
incentives put in place for the agent can vary from solely salary (little incentive to 
apply effort), to fee-for-service, to capitation/block contracts. Block and capitation 
approaches have the advantage from the point of view of the purchaser of placing a 
cap on total contract cost, unlike cost per case or per unit of service which may 
represent an open-ended commitment and thus shift the financial risk to the contractor 
and lead to higher risk premiums (Mills, 1995). However, this is a double-edged 
sword, and by placing a cap on the total contract cost, the incentive is reduced and the 
quality of service or products could suffer (Walsh, 1995). The contract design will 
depend partly upon who can most effectively bear the risks that are involved, and also 
upon the relative power of the purchaser and provider in addition to the nature of the 
service being delivered (Walsh, 1995).  
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The work of Williamson (Williamson, 1985) went one step further in recognizing the 
costs of writing, monitoring and managing contracts and observing that transactions 
that are not costed, as often assumed in neoclassical theory, are a logical construction 
rather than something encountered in real life. Contracting out services will increase 
transaction costs, e.g. costs involved in negotiating and monitoring contracts and 
servicing of contractual commitments (Saltman and Otter, 1992, Robinson, 1990). 
Relational contracting is seen as a response to the increasing duration and complexity 
of contracts where the idea of a sharp firm-based hierarchy has become blurred and is 
being modified towards network relations, which are neither markets nor hierarchy, 
but rather hybrids.  
2.2.5 The contracting milieu  
The cooperation implied by increasingly complex and relational contracts relies upon 
the presence of a social, institutional and organizational framework within which to 
operate, and to some extent the nature of contracts will be determined by this 
framework. In the case of developing countries, where well-functioning judiciary 
systems are usually absent, some argue that NPM could lead to higher corruption 
rather than greater accountability, because the tendering for service delivery and 
separation of purchasers from providers may lead to increased rent-seeking 
behaviours (Batley, 1999).  
MacNeil termed this as ‘socio-economic support’, or the ‘social matrix’, noting that it 
may be moral, legal, economic, social or otherwise. Norms and conventions 
embedded in the social, institutional and organizational arrangements of the 
contracting environment allow the generation of trust, enhance the operation of the 
system and may determine how widespread and successful the use of contracts is 
(Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997, Deakin and Wilkinson, 1995). 
Sources of institutional norms include the legal system, mechanisms of economic 
management directly available to the state (taxation, public spending, industrial and 
macro-economic policy), other forms of regulation and non-state bodies of various 
kinds, including trade associations. Organizations, including firms, network relations 
and also markets themselves are less stable and operate within the general framework 
set by institutional norms, while themselves also operating as structures for the 
governance of exchange (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1995). 
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The classical theory of contract places legal enforcement at centre stage. However, 
both Williamson and McNeil comment on the assumption in classical contracting 
theory that every contract is accompanied by effective laws which will be resorted to 
where necessary (Williamson, 1985, MacNeil, 1974). While some studies argue that 
the role of the legal system in underpinning relational contracting is arguably greater 
than has been previously allowed for (Arrighetti et al., 1996), many theoretical and 
empirical studies question any emphasis on the role of the law in underpinning 
contractual relations. This is both on account of the difficulty for the courts to be able 
to assess the values of parties’ ex-ante contractual expectations and, more 
importantly, because taking recourse to court orders is very harmful to long-term 
relations (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1995, Arrighetti et al., 1996, Williamson, 1985).  
There are also other institutional factors that influence the contracting environment. 
These include those related to labour legislation, norms of employment, income 
protection and the activities of trade associations and other professional bodies 
(Deakin and Wilkinson, 1995). The norms established by these means serve to 
minimize the risk to firms in trusting other firms and in entering into long-term asset-
specific relationships. Efficiency and effectiveness of the regulatory environment is 
another key influence upon the contractual environment. Mackintosh (Mackintosh, 
1997) highlights the desirability of a cooperative rather than controlling approach to 
regulation, as well as the importance of social and professional norms and reputation 
in influencing contractual behaviour. 
It has been argued that the key role of external factors determining a contractual 
environment is the role which they play in fostering and maintaining trust between 
contracting parties (Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997). Trust plays an essential role in 
underpinning efficient contractual relationships, reducing the need for complex and 
expensive information and monitoring inherent in principal–agent relationships 
(Arrow, 1974, Deakin and Wilkinson, 1995). Therefore, the capacity of the 
contractual environment to engender trust is vital to the success of long-term 
cooperative relationships. Mackintosh emphasizes the learning process in the 
development of trust and the important link between the expectations of another’s 
behaviour and the determination of one’s own (Mackintosh, 1997).  
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2.2.6 Evidence on contractual relationships 
Evidence on existing contractual relationships in health systems in developing 
countries and the advantages and disadvantages of the approach are still scarce. Some 
potential difficulties with contracting in the health sector in developing countries 
include concerns that: (i) contracts will not be feasible on a sufficiently large scale to 
make a difference at the country level; (ii) contracts will be more expensive than 
government provision of the same services, partly because of greater transaction 
costs; (iii) contracts might increase inequities in health service delivery; (iv) 
governments will have limited capacity to manage contracts effectively; and (v) even 
if successful, contracting will not be sustainable (Loevinsohn and Harding, 2005).  
According to a recent report by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), the experience of governments and sub-national governments in developing 
countries that have contracted services demonstrates a widespread lack of capacity on 
the part of governments to handle relatively new and complex functions such as 
making contracts, regulating private providers and making relationships (Batley and 
Scott, 2010). In the case of contracting private health providers, a delicate 
combination of trust and the ability to monitor and control are also needed (Batley and 
Mcloughlin, 2010). Additionally, a strong legislative framework and guidelines and 
tools for managing partnerships are important (Kula and Fryatt, 2014). Moreover, 
without adequate capacities such as budgeting, raising and managing resources, basic 
administration, information gathering and analysis, together with a lack of transparent 
governance and a proper degree of oversight by other parts of government, local 
contracting can slip into cronyism (Batley and Scott, 2010). A study in South Africa 
by Palmer and Mills states that organizational and institutional capacity are likely to 
influence a contractual outcome (Palmer and Mills, 2005). Another consideration is 
that the notion of contracting being superimposed on an existing hierarchy of 
traditional relationships and interdependency can also influence outcomes (Palmer, 
2000). A study in South Africa on scaling up of public–private relationships by Kula 
and Fryatt concludes that even though there is a long-standing relationship between 
the public and private sector, experience is still limited and poorly documented (Kula 
and Fryatt, 2014). Reform packages often promote the use of contracts despite the 
weak capacity of markets and governments to manage them (Palmer, 2000). 
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Sall et al., who contributed significantly to the development and implementation of 
national policies on contracting in their own countries, namely Chad, Madagascar and 
Senegal emphasized the need for regulation in contracting practices (Sall et al., 2006, 
Kadaï et al., 2006, Mills, 1998). The review of literature confirms the need for the 
state to have effective regulation in order to oversee quality and to provide oversight 
(Kula and Fryatt, 2014). 
Lönnroth reviewed 15 initiatives of private providers engaged through contractual 
arrangements in tuberculosis control efforts and concluded that for-profit providers 
can be effectively involved in TB control through informal, but well defined drugs-
for-performance contracts (Lönnroth et al., 2006). The drugs-for-performance 
contracts minimized the complexities of handling the legal and financial aspects of 
classical contracting. However, contractual relationships, their operation, and the 
nature of cooperative behaviour within them get influenced by the degree of market 
competition. It may lead to cooperation within contractual relationships due to lack of 
alternative providers, or a higher degree of competition may encourage purchasers to 
move away from relational contracting to a more transactional approach.  
The World Health Organization (WHO) conducted a multi-country study in countries 
of the Eastern Mediterranean Region to assess the range of health services contracted 
out, the process of contracting with the private sector and its influencing factors 
(Siddiqi et al., 2006). While Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia outsourced hospital and 
ambulatory care services, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran and Pakistan outsourced primary 
care services and Bahrain, Morocco and Syria outsourced non-clinical services. The 
findings reveal that most countries promoted contracting with the private sector, with 
governments looking at it as an opportunity to have greater control over the private 
sector and the private sector being content with the regular source of revenue and 
enhanced credibility (Siddiqi et al., 2006). It also identified three main risks in 
contracting: the limited number of providers in rural areas, parties with vested 
interests gaining control over the contracting process and poor monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms (Siddiqi et al., 2006). 
Although the channels through which contracting out increases service delivery are 
unclear, it seems to be an effective option in settings where the government is unable 
to reach populations adequately (Ekman et al., 2008, Lagarde and Palmer, 2009). A 
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number of other experiences, including some reviewed here, underline the usefulness 
of contracting out to private providers where the public sector is absent or too weak. 
This is the case for under-served areas or post-conflict settings (Marek et al., 1999). In 
such settings, it might be quicker to re-deploy public funds to private providers than 
to build up a public health system (Ekman et al., 2008, Lagarde and Palmer, 2009). 
There is limited understanding of the preconditions for the successful use of 
contracting and the resources needed for their appropriate use and sustainability. A 
study of large-scale contracting of NGOs in Pakistan (Zaidi et al., 2012) concluded 
that the origin and implementation of contracting was an inherently political process 
affected by the wider policy context. This necessarily needed to match the capacity of 
the partner, which was an important determinant in contract implementation. Another 
study in India provides valuable information on large-scale contracting which can 
guide policy of other governments choosing to contract for such services (see 
following chapter). A careful approach is needed in contracting of NGOs (Tuan et al., 
2005, Zaidi et al., 2012), taking into account acceptance of contracting NGOs, local 
NGO capacities and potential distancing of NGOs from their traditional attributes 
under contracts (Zaidi et al., 2012).  
2.2.7 Challenges in partnerships 
While the health system as a whole has common objectives of equity, efficiency, 
quality and accessibility, public and private providers interpret the contents of these 
objectives differently (Wagstaff, 2010, Raman and Björkman, 2008). The intention 
of the government is usually to provide health-care services to all, but this cannot be 
done by the government alone. Moreover, the private sector can be present in the 
form of non-qualified rural practitioners, not-for-profit private organizations, e.g. 
NGOs and for-profit private organizations. 
Bennett et al. and Rosenthal reported problems associated with delivering of public 
health services by private for-profit organizations. Some of the issues they identified 
were unethical means to maximize profit, less concern about public health goals, lack 
of interest in sharing clinical information, creating ‘brain drain’ among public sector 
health staff and lack of regulatory control over their practices (Bennett et al., 1994, 
Rosenthal, 2000). However, Bloom et al. suggested that the private sector is neither 
so easy to characterize nor easy to neglect (Bloom et al., 2000). The strength of the 
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private sector lies in its innovativeness, efficiency and learning from competition. 
Management standards are generally higher in the private sector. The private sector 
can play an important role in transferring management skills and best practices to the 
public sector.  
 
2.3 Health insurance 
Financial constraint is one of the major barriers of access to health care for 
marginalized sections of the society in many countries (Peters et al., 2002, Ranson 
and John, 2002, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003, Garg and Karan, 2009, Pradhan 
and Prescott, 2002, Xu et al., 2003). It has been estimated that a high proportion of the 
world’s 1.3 billion poor have no access to health services simply because they cannot 
afford to pay for the needed health services (Dror and Preker, 2002). Many of those 
who do use services and pay for them suffer financial hardship, or even 
impoverishment (WHO, 2010). Over the past decades, many low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) have found it increasingly difficult to sustain sufficient financing 
for health care, particularly for the poor. As a result, international policy-makers and 
other stakeholders have been recommending a range of measures, including 
conditional cash transfers, cost-sharing arrangements and a variety of health insurance 
schemes, including social health insurance (SHI) (Ekman et al., 2008, Lagarde and 
Palmer, 2009). 
Moving away from out-of-pocket payments for health care at the time of use to 
prepayment (health insurance) is an important step towards averting the financial 
hardship associated with paying for health services. Financing a basic package of 
health services is accomplished through revenue collection, pooling of revenue and 
risk and purchasing services; while the role of policy-makers is to ensure that these 
financing mechanisms are efficient, equitable and sustainable (Gottret et al., 2008). 
Health insurance can be defined as a way to distribute the financial risk associated 
with the variation of individuals’ health-care expenditures by pooling costs over time 
through prepayment, and over people by risk pooling (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2004). For classifying health insurance models, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) taxonomy 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004) uses four broad 
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criteria: i) sources of financing; ii) level of compulsion of the scheme; iii) group or 
individual scheme; and iv) method of premium calculation in health insurance, i.e. the 
extent to which premiums may vary according to health risk, health status or health 
proxies, such as age. Based on the criteria of ‘main source of financing’, there are 
principally two types of health insurance - private and public. Both have further sub-
classifications. According to this criterion, public schemes are those mainly financed 
through the tax system, including general taxation and mandatory payroll levies, and 
through income-related contributions to social security schemes. All other insurance 
schemes that are predominantly financed through private premiums can be defined as 
private.  
2.3.1 Revenue generation, risk pooling and purchasing 
To expand coverage to promote health outcomes and to ensure financial protection, 
countries need to raise sufficient and sustainable revenues efficiently and equitably 
and manage these revenues to pool health risks (Gottret et al., 2008). They also need 
to ensure the purchase of health services in an allocative and technically efficient 
manner (Gottret et al., 2008, World Health Organization, 2000). 
In many countries, revenue collection is often challenging because of their large rural 
and informal sector population which limits the taxation capacity of their 
governments (Preker and Carrin, 2004). For the health system as a whole, out-of-
pocket payment as a percentage of total health spending offers a rough estimate of 
financial protection (Gottret et al., 2008). However, the extent of out-of-pocket 
financing alone does not give a complete picture because the distribution of out-of-
pocket payments among population income groups, the severity of catastrophic 
spending and the impoverishing effect of out-of-pocket payments on households are 
all also important to assess (Gottret et al., 2008). According to the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), ensuring financial protection means that no household 
should spend so much on health that it falls into a level of poverty that it cannot 
overcome (Baeza et al., 2002).  
Purchasing is a process by which pooled funds are paid to providers in return for 
delivering services. This can be performed passively or strategically. Passive 
purchasing implies following a predetermined budget or simply paying bills when 
presented, whereas strategic purchasing involves a continuous search for the best 
48 
 
ways to maximize health system performance by deciding which interventions should 
be purchased, how, and from whom (World Health Organization, 2000).  
The different types of health insurance schemes include voluntary health insurance or 
private health insurance (PHI), social health insurance (SHI) and community-based 
health insurance (CBHI) or insurance offered by NGOs. In PHI, buyers are willing to 
pay a premium to an insurance company that pools risk and insures them for health 
expenses. The key distinction is that the premiums are set at a level based on an 
assessment of the risk status of the consumer and the level of benefits provided, rather 
than as a proportion of the consumer’s income (Sein et al., 2004). SHI, which is often 
government run, could include an earmarked fund set up by the government with 
explicit benefits in return for payment of premium. It is usually compulsory for 
certain groups in the population with premiums determined by income (and hence 
ability to pay) rather than related to health risk (Sein et al., 2004). The benefit 
packages are standardized and contributions are earmarked for spending on health 
services. In CBHI schemes, members usually prepay a set amount each year for 
specified services and the premium is usually a flat rate (not income-related) (Sein et 
al., 2004).  
2.3.2 Aspects of Voluntary Health Insurance 
Health Insurance can thus be of varying types depending on risk sharing, financing, 
benefits, premium and nature (voluntary or mandatory). Details of different types of 
health insurance (Social, Voluntary, Employer-based, Community-based, and State-
subsidized Health Insurance) are given in the next chapter.  This section provides a 
review of the various aspects of voluntary health insurance such as adverse selection, 
cream skimming, moral hazard, risk pooling, etc. followed by aspects of social health 
insurance.   
Adverse selection 
Adverse selection can be defined as strategic behavior by the more informed partner 
in a contract against the interest of the less informed partner(s) (Belli, 2001). In the 
health insurance field, this manifests itself through healthy people choosing managed 
care with lower premia and less healthy people choosing more generous plans (Belli, 
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2001). Adverse selection is a situation where an individual's demand for insurance is 
positively correlated to the risk of loss associated with it. 
In health insurance markets, with regard to adverse selection, asymmetry of 
information lies between the consumer (patient) and the seller, where the consumer, 
rather than the seller, has an advantage of having more information pertaining to the 
quality of their own health. If the clients hide their poor health status from the insurer, 
the actual number of claims and payouts will be higher than presumed by the insurer, 
thus leading to a loss to the insurer. In order to ensure profit, the insurer increases the 
premium. Further, an increased premium would inhibit a healthy population from 
getting insured, thus increasing the average risk of those remaining in the insured 
pool. This would further force the insurer to increase the premium and thereafter a 
vicious circle of increasing average risk and increasing premia ensues (Belli, 2001).  
To summarize, adverse selection is likely to be a problem in all health insurance 
schemes based on voluntary membership, whether motivated by profit or social 
concerns. In a private market, the insurer may eventually go out of business if adverse 
selection is not dealt with and, typically, will further price discriminate in response. In 
non-profit schemes, such discrimination is rarely used as a policy tool, often creating 
pressures for greater public subsidy (Belli, 2001).  
Adverse selection is perceived to be a major source of market failure in insurance 
markets. Adverse selection may also lead to three classes of inefficiencies, i.e. on a 
benefit-cost basis individuals select the wrong health plans; desirable risk spreading is 
lost; and health plans manipulate their offerings to deter the sick and attract the 
healthy (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998). 
Dynamic Adverse selection 
Dynamic models of adverse selection differ in a way that the passing time is 
introduced in the model and its effect is also modelled (Zryumov, 2014). In health 
insurance, dynamic adverse selection can be stated as - over the time, the low risk 
individuals opt out (lapse) from the health insurance (as they perceive premium to be 
high for them) and high risk individuals are more inclined towards health insurance, 
which increases adverse selection over time. Dynamic adverse selection primarily 
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occurs in social health insurances where the premium is not dependent on the risk and 
in long term care insurance (Konetzka, 2014).  
Cream Skimming 
The provision of health care services is characterized by uncertainty and asymmetry 
of information with regard to cost of treatment. Asymmetry of information exists 
where the purchaser and the provider share the same information set, but the 
purchaser can find some relevant information (free or at a cost) before taking a 
decision. On the other hand, the ability to observe patients’ severity can be used for an 
advantage by the hospital (principal-agent) through two alternative behaviours: 
- They can choose to treat only patients with specific diseases (‘horizontal’ 
cream skimming) 
- They can affect the state-of-the-world probability distribution opting for 
specific ‘patient type’ within the same ailment group (‘vertical’ cream 
skimming) 
These behaviours, defined as ‘market cream skimming’, alter the competition among 
hospitals causing relevant effects in the whole market system (Ellis, 1997, Lewis and 
Sappington, 1999). Horizontal cream skimming arises because of poor regulations, 
i.e. the regulator or policy makers have not capped the prices of services correctly and 
the hospital finds it convenient to specialize in some specific outputs (which may 
produce profit). Vertical cream skimming, on the other hand, offers health care only 
to the patients that have low cost. It is an illegal behavior which might be solved 
through control and sanctions rather than incentives.  
In health systems where private hospitals coexist with tax-funded public hospitals, 
cream skimming arises not just because of their different roles but also of differences 
in how work in the public and private sectors is remunerated (Gonz´alez, 2005). 
Consequently, a high risk patient will be rejected by the private hospitals and will 
have to be treated by the public hospitals. Consequences of vertical cream skimming: 
- Public hospitals will usually have a deficit since they will treat a higher 
proportion of patients with higher cost; 
- Welfare is reduced; 
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- Private hospitals make a surplus that is not related to a higher degree of 
efficiency; 
- The cost to provide health care is higher than in first-best. 
The empirical evidence of cream skimming is relatively thin. Duggan (2000), for 
example, exploits a policy change in Californian hospitals where the reimbursement 
of poor patients became more generous, and finds evidence that private non-profit and 
for-profit hospitals cream skim profitable patients, leaving unprofitable patients to 
public hospitals. In a UK study, Street et al. (2010) investigate whether patients 
treated in English public hospitals differ in complexity compared to those in (private) 
treatment centres and find that patients in the former setting are more likely to be 
from deprived areas, have more diagnoses, and received significantly more medical 
procedures (Street et al., 2010). Using Italian hospital data, Berta et al. (2010) 
quantify the extent of treatment selection by developing a cream skim index, and find 
that private hospitals cream skim at a much higher intensity than public or non-profit 
hospitals (Levaggi and Montefiori, 2003, Berta et al., 2010).  
Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard is the tendency of an individual to behave differently with regard to a 
particular event depending on the presence of insurance (Arrow, 1974). In the context 
of health insurance, moral hazard is manifested in the tendency of individuals to 
increase utilization of medical services paid for by insurance compared to those 
services not covered. As insurance coverage increases, demand for services covered 
by such insurance likewise increases. Specifically, moral hazard has been shown to 
vary with copayment, or portion of the medical bill paid by the insured-patient. 
There are several economic principle theories for moral hazard. First, economic 
theory is based primarily on the assumption that individuals act in their own best 
economic interest. It is, therefore, completely rational that for insured services, as the 
marginal cost of medical services is reduced the patient will tend to consume more. In 
fact, studies have consistently shown that those who have health insurance consume 
more medical services than those without insurance. A second cause of moral hazard 
in health insurance is the inequity of information between patients and providers. By 
the nature of their specialized training and experience, physicians have an enormous 
amount of information regarding treatment options, risks, and prognoses, none of 
52 
 
which is completely shared with patients. Patients may not possess sufficient 
information to even determine whether an episode of care is appropriate or whether 
self-care will be adequate. This contributes to moral hazard in that patients who are 
understandably ignorant regarding their options must put substantial trust in the 
physician (Glied, 1992). The third related cause of moral hazard in health insurance is 
the inequity of information between the insurer and individual insured. The insurer 
cannot know going in, the risks involved with insuring a given individual (Vera-
Hemandez, 2003). The insurer may, and generally does, have greater information 
relating to which providers have better medical outcomes for specific diagnoses and 
treatments, as well as which treatment options have proven most successful (French 
and Kamboj, 2002). A fourth cause of moral hazard is the fact that insured patient is 
insulated from the costs involved with treatment decisions. Even if there was perfect 
information sharing regarding the treatment options and their efficacy, the insured 
patient is not price-sensitive to these options (Cheah and Doessel, 1985). 
Risk Pooling 
The extent to which health risks are pooled varies, based on the type of health 
insurance purchased. The first distinction is between (1) large group coverage and (2) 
individual and small group coverage (Monahan, 2008). Large group coverage, offered 
by an employer, provides a high level of risk sharing (Abraham, 1986). In such plans, 
all eligible employees typically pay identical premiums, regardless of age or health 
status (HIPAA, 1996). With respect to covered benefits, risks are both pooled and 
cross-subsidized (Abraham, 1986). The extent of the risk pooling and cross-
subsidization varies based on the size of the group. The larger the group, the more 
heterogeneous it is likely to be in terms of risk, providing a greater amount of risk 
pooling and cross-subsidization (Hyman and Hall, 2001). Individuals and small 
groups are susceptible to two related risk-pooling problems. The individual market is 
particularly susceptible to adverse selection. Small groups are at a disadvantage in 
risk-pooling because they lack a diversified pool of purchasers (Brennan, 1993). 
Small groups, while endogenous, do not have size sufficient to reflect community-
wide risk levels and therefore are susceptible to poor experience rating and resulting 
high premiums (Enthoven and Singer, 1995). 
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Health insurance protects against two primary types of risks: macro level risk and 
micro-level risk. Macro-level risk is the risk associated with medical expenses 
generally (Aaron et al., 2005), while micro-level risk is the risk associated with 
incurring losses associated with particular medical treatments or services (Monahan, 
2008). While individuals with health insurance pool their macro-level risks, the 
particular scope of their insurance contracts determines which micro level risks are 
pooled. For example, if an individual’s health insurance policy does not cover cancer 
treatments, risk of loss associated with cancer treatments is retained at the individual 
level and not pooled.    
At the macro-level, the goal is easy. As the coverage increases, the risk-sharing and 
therefore social solidarity increases. But with increase to macro-level risk sharing, it is 
important to guard against stripping away the micro-level coverage provisions 
(Monahan, 2008). To decrease the cost of coverage, there may be a temptation to 
exclude more and more services from health insurance contracts. Even if such efforts 
do increase health insurance coverage, they will reduce social solidarity by 
eliminating the sharing of risk associated with the treatments at issue. We therefore 
cannot have effective macro-level risk pooling without effective micro-level risk 
pooling (Monahan, 2008). 
Enrolment 
Adequate enrolment is a major concern in social health insurance schemes. For 
voluntary social health insurance schemes, even an enrolment rate of two-thirds is 
considered to be a fair enrolment (Acharya, 2012). In most of the voluntary social 
health insurance schemes in the LMICs, low enrolment rate is noticeable.  
The Vietnamese insurance offered before 2002 with co-payment of 20 percent had a 
very low uptake of about 20% (Jowett et al., 2004). However, the insurance offered 
after 2002, the Vietnam Health Care Fund for the Poor (VHCFP), had no co-payment, 
and was seen to have varied rates of enrolment, varying from 20-60% across areas 
(Axelson et al. 2009; Wagstaff 2007). In Mexico (King et al., 2009) and Nicargua 
(Thornton and Field, 2010), the enrolment was again poor, and even educating the 
public did not result in better enrolment.  
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The factors that play a role in enrolment are the degree of risk aversion, education, 
wealth and trust. Families headed by the more educated head of households are the 
ones that are more likely to participate in insurance schemes (Chankova et al., 2008, 
Xavier et al., 2008). Also, families with higher per capita expenditure (richer families) 
are more likely to get enrolled in insurance schemes (Acharya et al., 2012). Acharya 
et al. (2012) reported that the families residing in villages at a distance from health 
facilities are not likely to get enrolled, nor are individuals from hard to reach areas.   
Scheme Utilization 
Social Health Insurance does not necessarily mean higher scheme utilization (Acharya 
et al., 2012). Evidence from social health insurance schemes of Mexico (King et al. 
2009) and Georgia (Bauhoff et al., 2011) do not show higher scheme utilization when 
compared to non-insured. A study by King et al. (2009) on a large sample in Mexico 
found no difference in utilisation between those insured under Seguro Popular (SP) 
and uninsured for a period of 10 months after the insurance was rolled out through a 
campaign. Bauhoff et al. (2011) report no effect on utilisation from the Georgian 
insurance for the poor.  
However, there are several evidences of increased health care utilization by the 
insured in Egypt, Ghana, Vietnam and other LMICs. Egyptian insurance for children 
yielded higher usage of medical care for the insured among the lower income groups 
(Yip and Berman, 2001). Similarly in the Ghanaian SHI, Mensah et al. (2010) find 
higher utilization for the insured. For the earlier Vietnamese insurance, pre-2002, with 
co-payment as a feature of the insurance, Jowett et al. (2004) report that insurance 
yields higher usage of inpatient services; this value is lower for the wealthier insured. 
Overall, the result for SHI scheme utilization is mixed among various countries.  
Out-of-pocket expenditure 
It is not always the case that insurance is able to reduce OOP expenditure for the 
insured (Acharya et al., 2012). The results are highly mixed for social health 
insurance schemes from LMICs. Significantly, two large studies, one from China and 
other from Mexico, show a decline in OOP expenditure (refs) Yip and Berman (2001) 
from Egypt report higher utilization rates across income class and savings in OOP 
expenditure was reported for only the middle classes. In Vietnam, Axelson et al. 
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(2009) and Wagstaff (2010) show lower OOP expenditure for the insured. It is 
difficult to conclude that SHIs have helped uniformly in reducing OOP expenditure, 
neither has it always engendered higher utilization. Acharya et al. (2012) reported that 
both OOP expenditure and healthcare utilization could be higher for the insured. They 
further stated that increase in utilization may not be an indicator for better health 
(Acharya et al., 2012). 
Equity 
Guaranteeing equity for the poor is a major challenge for health care systems in 
developed countries. Overall, equity is an ethical issue related to judgments about 
health care accessibility. At the same time, an economic concept of horizontal equity 
deals with “an equal treatment for equal need” (Wagstaff et al., 1991, Culyer and 
Wagstaff, 1993) and “means that persons in equal need of medical care should receive 
the same treatment, irrespective of whether they happen to be poor or rich” (Wagstaff 
et al., 1991b). In practical terms, there is a general agreement about striving for 
“minimal variation of [health care] use with income” (Newhouse et al., 1981) and 
ensuring equity for the poor (Cutler, 2002). According to theoretical predictions, a 
well-designed social health insurance system may provide an equitable redistribution 
of medical care between the rich and the poor (Zweifel and Breyer, 2006). 
Equity has different dimensions, such as equity in access, financing, and health 
outcomes. A report published by DFID in 2004 reports that equity can be effectively 
addressed with three strategies (1) establishing contractual arrangements that 
specifically encourage providers to serve the poor and underserved; (2) contracting 
with private providers in areas that are predominantly poor (geographic targeting); 
and (3) contracting out services that are of most benefit to the poor and underserved 
(England, 2004). Many countries consider health insurance to be a useful component 
of social protection policies designed to achieve UHC. However, there is need for 
caution against taking a too narrow focus on health insurance as the sole means for 
reducing financial risk, and as the lynchpin for achieving UHC. Ridde and Haddad 
(2009) note that protection against household impoverishment, catalyzing more 
equitable distribution of social welfare benefits across society, and complementary 
effects to education and other welfare measures from health maintenance are all 
equally valuable outcomes. 
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Liu et al. (2004) assessed 18 different contractual arrangements of government with 
the private sector to deliver primary health services in LMICs and amongst them only 
three had the clear objective of improving the poor’s access to basic health care (Liu 
et al., 2004). All these three projects showed significant improvement in access by the 
targeted poor, indicating improvement in equity in access. In Georgia, the case study 
indicates that it is feasible to set up a contract for specified services and to target the 
poor with a larger subsidy than for the non-poor.  
Liu et al. (2004) have concluded that contracting out has the potential to improve 
equity in both access to care and financing if the poor and the services that mostly 
benefit the poor are well targeted in the contracting-out initiative. 
Some findings also suggest that policies intended to promote equity can lead to a 
reduction in quality of services and that adverse selection (of higher risk participants) 
is often a feature due to the voluntary nature of CBHI (Carrin et al., 2005). 
Quality of care 
Perceptions of quality have been increasingly accepted as valid and important 
measures of health care quality (Blendon et al., 2007, Cleary and Edgman-Levitan, 
1997).
 
Furthermore, perceptions of quality have been associated with health outcomes 
(Cleary and Edgman-Levitan, 1997, Cleary, 1999). Perception of quality of care 
depends on various aspects. Presumably, consumers are more likely to perceive a 
lower quality of care if they experience inadequate care due to their inability to cover 
medical care costs, or if they have other pressing financial obligations that must be set 
aside to cover these costs (Schoen et al., 2008).  
A considerable body of health policy research has documented differences in hospital 
characteristics as contributing factors to differences in the quality of care (Parson, 
2013). An article by Gaskin et al., (2009) examines the extent to which a patient’s 
type—or lack—of insurance may play a role (Gaskin et al., 2009). Authors had 
compared hospital quality for patients according to their insurance status using pooled 
2006-08 State Inpatient Database records from the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ). They concluded that within-hospital differences in quality exist 
across payer types.  In particular, patients with Medicare appear to receive notably 
worse care than patients with private insurance on the majority of Inpatient Quality 
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Indicators. Mortality rates are also influenced by the characteristics of both hospitals 
and patients, which suggests that specific policy interventions should vary by 
Inpatient Quality Indicator, type of hospital, and type of payer (Parson, 2013).  
Another study from Latin America examines the effects of insurance on perceptions 
of quality of care received using a national Latino population sample.  The results 
conclusively demonstrated the consistent effects of health insurance for improving 
perceived quality of care in Latino patients (Perez et al., 2009). However, Devadasan 
et al. (2011) from India showed that user satisfaction was almost similar between the 
insured and uninsured group. The main reason for satisfaction was the outcome of the 
treatment. Patients who were cured or healed had a higher probability of being 
satisfied (Devadasan et al., 2011). 
Conclusively, it can be said that perception of quality of care is multi factorial and 
examples from across the world show that insurance status may or may not affect user 
satisfaction. 
Capacity Challenges 
SHI schemes should provide assurance of promised health insurance benefits to the 
insured. In order to achieve this, healthcare facilities should not only be part of the 
health insurance benefit package but these should be created by the authorities where 
these do not exist. This is possible only with the availability of adequate human 
resources, healthcare services infrastructure, and the other essential basic elements of 
provision of health services. These are vital to the success of an SHI scheme. In their 
absence, government can lose trust of the people which can result in reluctance to pay 
health insurance contributions (Carrin, 2002). Also, there may be a situation where 
services are existent in principle but providers do not comply with the new SHI 
scheme (Carrin, 2002). The chief reason for such a situation may be the uncertainty of 
the providers about the impact of health insurance on their income.  This lack of 
collaboration was initially observed in Vietnam, where a few doctors refused to 
provide health services to beneficiaries (Axelson et al., 2009; Wagstaff, 2010). It was 
mainly because the doctors were hoping to continue to receive under-the-table 
payments keeping in mind the meagre level of their official salaries. On the contrary, 
the beneficiaries thought that after making their contributions, there was no need to 
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give such payments to doctors. When doctors observed this behavior, some of them 
did not want to treat the insured patients (Axelson et al., 2009). 
Governments may neither have the required level of managerial or administrative 
capacity to design a suitable health insurance scheme nor thereafter implement the 
same (Ron and Adlung, 2001). Moreover, the chances of success to manage health 
insurance schemes are greater with better knowledge of the fundamental principles of 
health insurance. This enables the government to explain these principles to the 
people (Carrin, 2002). The scheme should explain well that those healthy now may 
not get immediate or regular benefit from the scheme now but they may need these 
facilities later when they suffer from any serious illnesses or accident.  At times it is 
difficult for the governments to introduce compulsory membership for all population 
in one go and it is easier to start insuring the salaried working class in public and 
private sectors (Carrin, 2002). Normally, health insurance contributions are levied on 
wages. Information on wages should in principle facilitate the collection of these 
contributions. However, there always remains the risk of low compliance with agreed 
contribution rules and other arrangements, certainly at the start of a health insurance 
scheme (Carrin, 2002). This is why monitoring by the scheme itself of members’ 
wages and contributions is indispensable. In one province in Vietnam, a chapter of a 
bank stated that all employees, from the senior manager to the janitor, had the same 
nationally defined minimum wage (Axelson et al., 2009). Obviously this led to a 
serious underestimation of the contributions that were due. One explanation for this 
behaviour is that the required solidarity and the level of health insurance contributions 
exceeded what the population would accept, which made both employers and 
employees misrepresent reality. Still, enrolment of the population in the agricultural 
and informal sectors is likely to be even more difficult. Income for this population 
fluctuates and spontaneous willingness to declare true income and pay regular 
contributions is low (Axelson et al., 2009). Often, then, health insurance remains 
voluntary for this group. This means that in order to secure or increase enrolment, 
extra marketing efforts are needed (Carrin, 2002). 
2.3.3 The role of PPPs in health insurance  
The partnership between for-profit bodies and the government has been widely 
discussed (Mitchell, 2000, Bennett, 1991). PPPs have been used in health insurance 
for a variety of roles ranging from service provision to financing and management. 
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The role of a majority of PPPs in developing countries is service provision. We take a 
look at PPP arrangements within health insurance schemes, or those that have a 
component for the benefit of low-income individuals 
Country experiences 
Vietnam introduced a Health Care Fund for the Poor (and other underprivileged 
groups) at the taxpayers’ expense in 2003. The poor were fully subsidized and made 
no copayment (Dao, 2012). In 2005, Vietnam reformed its health insurance 
programme to improve private sector participation to achieve universal coverage by 
2020 (Dao, 2012). Initially, health care under the HCFP scheme could be obtained at 
public facilities including public hospitals and commune health centres, but following 
a 2005 government directive, the social health insurance agency contracted private 
providers giving HCFP beneficiaries access to private providers (Wagstaff, 2007). 
HCFP increased both outpatient and inpatient utilization and substantially increased 
inpatient care. It has also succeeded in reducing out-of-pocket health spending among 
the insured group (Wagstaff, 2010). In 2009, Vietnam passed the Health Insurance 
Law (HIL) which created a national SHI program thus making a policy choice to 
finance health care primarily through SHI (Rousseau, 2014). It was an important law 
because it integrated the existing health insurance program with the program for the 
poor, thus bringing together all groups in one program. In June 2014, Vietnam made 
participation compulsory by categorizing membership of health insurance into 5 
groups based on contribution responsibility (Rousseau, 2014). The revenues of HI 
funds come from employee, employers, social health insurance fund, and state budget. 
The government is responsible for fully subsidizing the health insurance premium for 
children under six, the elderly, and the poor, and for partially subsidizing premiums 
for the near-poor (70% of the premium) and students.(Rousseau, 2014). Health care 
providers include public and non-public providers. All public providers had been 
automatically approved to participate in social health insurance prior to November 
2011, while private providers needed certification and permission (Rousseau, 2014).  
In Philippines, National Health Insurance Programme (NHIP) and PhilHealth as the 
corporation that managed the Social Health Insurance programme was established in 
1995. Its charter was to provide all citizens of the Philippines with the mechanism to 
gain financial access to health services. The government would spend for public 
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health and the essential health package; the other remaining services would be 
financed privately or by social insurance (Republic of the Philippines, 1995). Since 
government resources were limited, diversity and competition in provision of health 
services and insurance was encouraged through social or private insurance for clinical 
services outside of the essential package. A distinction was made between public 
health services and personal health services with the government being responsible 
for providing public health services for all groups such as women, children and 
indigenous people, while PhilHealth focused on the provision of personal health 
services. Within PhilHealth, eligibility was limited to households whose members 
have a per capita income of US$ 250 per annum or lower. In the absence of an 
accredited public health service provider, indigent families could avail services at 
private sector facilities (Tobe et al., 2013). In June 2013, the president of the 
Philippines signed a law (Republic Act 10606) that mandated PhilHealth enrollment 
for all Filipinos, including workers in the informal sector (Chiu, 2013). This is 
considered a move from social health insurance towards universal healthcare 
coverage(Viswanathan and Avanceña, 2015). 
After the 1993 health sector reform, Colombian citizens are entitled to health care 
access via mandatory health insurance through a benefits plan. (Vargas-Zea et al., 
2012). In Colombia, the role of the private sector is more expansive. It includes 
management as well as service provision for the subsidized health insurance scheme 
for the poor, referred to as the ‘subsidized regime’. The identification of beneficiaries 
is through a six-level scaled system called Sistema de Selección de Beneficiarios 
(SISBEN), and households classified at the first or second level (considered poor) are 
eligible to receive total subsidies to health insurance paid by local governments 
(Vecino-Ortiz, 2008). Local governments contract not-for-profit insurance companies 
(Vecino-Ortiz, 2008). Insurers can avail medical services from both public and private 
providers based on their ability to offer the government-defined health package at the 
lowest costs. There are also supplementary (voluntary) health insurance schemes 
known as prepaid medicine, all of which offer additional coverage to the basic 
benefits plan. These plans are completely funded from private spending (Vargas-Zea 
et al., 2012). 
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In South Africa, the private sector doctors are efficiently and effectively used to treat 
public sector patients to target key populations, address specific health concerns, 
serve as a stop-gap measure to meet urgent health needs or maintain treatment 
outcomes over time (Igumbor et al., 2014). Van den Heever studied South Africa’s 
private health systems to ascertain the role of health insurance in deepening health 
coverage through mobilizing revenue from wage earners (Heever, 2012). He was of 
the view that measures to enhance risk pooling expands coverage and becomes 
increasingly fair and sustainable. Without such risk pooling, the system becomes less 
stable and fair as costs rise and people with poor health status are systematically 
excluded from cover. Therefore health insurance ‘presents an opportunity to 
policymakers to achieve social protection objectives through the strategic 
management of markets rather than exclusively through less responsive systems based 
on tax-funded direct provision. This is especially relevant as private markets for 
health care are inevitable, with policy discretion reduced to a choice between 
functional or dysfunctional regimes’ (Heever, 2012).  
South Africa is in the process of introducing an innovative system of healthcare 
financing (Department of Health, 2015) - the National Health Insurance. This is a 
health financing system that is designed to pool funds and will ensure that everyone 
has access to affordable, efficient and quality health services for their health needs, 
irrespective of their socioeconomic status. The government’s white paper was 
released in December 2015, which proposed that NHI would be implemented over a 
period of 14 years. 11 Pilot districts were established in all nine provinces (Matsoso 
and Fryatt, 2013). National Health Insurance (NHI) proposes a single, 
compulsory medical scheme for all, with private medical schemes being reduced to 
offering “complementary services” only (Department of Health, 2015). Possibilities 
of raising these funds, according to reports from 2012, include a pay roll levy for all 
employed South Africans, and increase in VAT, or an income tax surcharge. A central 
NHI Fund will buy health services from accredited healthcare providers, both public 
and private (Department of Health, 2015) 
The Government of Ghana established a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 
2003 to provide a basic package of services to the poor. It covers both public and 
private health-care providers at all levels of the health system. NHIS has yielded some 
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verifiable positive outcomes such as higher utilization of health-care services by the 
insured population (Mensah et al., 2010). Seddoh et al., while highlighting the aspect 
of equity, state that the NHIS has ‘brought on board private sector participation and 
allowed it access to government funding’ (Seddoh et al., 2011). The Ghanaian 
government has made it known that it would like the share of private health-care 
provision in total provision to increase from 35% to 65% by 2017 (Gyapong et al., 
2007). In the medium to long term, enforcement of the National Health Insurance Act 
which makes membership in the NHIS mandatory for residents of the country would 
be a positive step towards achieving universal coverage (Kusi et al., 2015).  
Netherlands has a dual-level health system. All primary and curative care (i.e. the 
family doctor service and hospitals and clinics) is financed from private obligatory 
insurance. Long term care for the elderly, the dying, the long term mentally ill etc. is 
covered by social insurance funded from earmarked taxation. It is a socially organized 
system with substantial private involvement and stringent regulations. Private 
insurance companies must offer a core universal insurance package for the universal 
primary curative care, which includes the cost of all prescription medicines. The same 
premium is paid whether young or old, healthy or sick. Risk variances between 
private health insurance companies due to the different risks presented by individual 
policy holders are compensated through risk equalization and a common risk pool. 
Funding for all short-term health care is 50% from payroll taxes paid by employers, 
45% from the insured person and 5% by the government. Those on low incomes 
receive compensation from government to help them pay their insurance.  All 
insurance companies also receive additional funding from the regulator's fund.  It is 
illegal in The Netherlands for insurers to refuse an application for health insurance or 
to impose special conditions (e.g., exclusions, deductibles, co-payments, or refuse to 
fund doctor-ordered treatments). Therefore, in Netherlands, a compulsory insurance 
package is available to all citizens at affordable cost without the need for the insured 
to be assessed for risk by the insurance company. The public insurance system is 
implemented by non-profit health funds, and financed by premiums taken directly out 
of the wages (together with income taxes). Hospitals in the Netherlands are mostly 
privately run and not for profit, as are the insurance companies. Most insurance 
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packages allow patients to choose where they want to be treated. To help patients to 
choose, the government discloses information about provider performance.  
In Netherlands, given the system of managed competition in which market forces play 
an increasingly important role, policy makers are facing new challenges regarding 
quality, costs and access (Berg et al., 2010). Insurance companies mainly compete on 
the price of health insurance policies and the cost of health care services and not on 
the quality of care. One of the underlying problems is that quality of care lacks 
transparency. Easy access to health services is an important achievement. However, 
there might be a trade-off between access and quality (Berg et al., 2010). There is 
evidence that concentration of especially highly complex surgery improves quality 
and critical purchasers of care are looking for high quality providers and may 
selectively contract with those providers, which are few, that may lead to access 
issues for the insurers. The same is true for the tradeoff between prices and access. 
Health insurers can offer cheap policies that restrict freedom of choice. By contracting 
only a limited number of health care providers, health insurers are able to negotiate 
for cheaper care for many services, thus leading to access issues (Berg et al., 2010).  
 
2.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the evolution, development and factors affecting PPPs and their role in 
health insurance have been reviewed. With the increasing complexity of health 
systems, there is a realization that the public sector can no longer fulfil the needs of 
the population by itself. The need to forge partnerships is clear. These partnerships 
can take different forms and be at different scales, depending on the needs of a 
country. Each country, therefore, has to look for its most optimal solution based on 
the nature and scope of the need.  
New Public Management points to contracts as an efficient tool for implementation by 
introducing elements of increased competition, managerial decentralization and an 
increase in transparency and accountability. However, there is limited evidence to 
support the above, especially in the case of developing countries; and examples where 
introduction of contracts has led to genuine competition among health service 
providers are rare. New institutional economics helps us to understand the motivation 
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for the tendency towards relational contracting as opposed to a purely market-driven 
competitive approach. 
A review of the literature points to the fact that while policymakers are focused on 
discussion of competition and choice, empirical findings on contractual relationships 
tell a different story, reflecting the existence of an infinite variety of contract forms in 
a myriad of settings. Moreover, with respect to empirical studies on contracts for 
health-care provision, review of the literature has highlighted the lack of clarity on the 
nature of contracts and their implementation in terms of classical contracting. This is 
usually the basis of policy reforms and actual relationships that emerge, which lean 
more towards relational contracting. 
Review of the literature on contractual theory, new public management and new 
institutional economics points to the use of contracts as a potentially effective method 
to improve performance of public health systems. However, empirical evidence to 
support its use in insurance arrangements is limited and the results have been mixed, 
especially for developing countries where the regulatory frameworks are weak and 
there is a constraint on the resources available.  
The contracting milieu is mainly governed by the social, institutional and 
organizational framework within which to operate. In the case of service delivery, 
specifically for health care, there are a number of factors that make information 
asymmetry particularly acute on the part of the beneficiary. Therefore, long-term 
contractual arrangements and other external factors such as trust are important in 
delivery of health services. The institutional and organizational environment also 
plays a vital role in determining the nature of contracts and their implementation.  
PPPs have been used in health insurance primarily for service provision, and to a 
much lesser extent for financing and management. The PPP model has been used for 
service delivery by a number of countries like Vietnam, Philippines, Colombia, South 
Africa, Ghana, and Netherlands, as described earlier. Colombia and Philippines, 
however, have also used the model for health-care management. Although there is 
some description of the role of PPPs within state-sponsored health insurance, there is 
very little evaluation of their role, especially where the private sector acts as financial 
intermediary rather than just a health-care provider. Further analysis would help to 
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determine the equity of utilization and the impact of reforms on fairness of the health-
care system.  
There is insufficient literature to understand the dynamics of PPPs in social health 
insurance, especially where enrolment is voluntary. Adverse selection, cream 
skimming, risk pooling, moral hazard, equity and out of pocket expenditures may lead 
to undue profit and market failure. From the limited evidence observed in the review, 
the case for social health insurance for the poor in developing countries is mixed. 
Further research would be required to understand the nature of PPP, the contracting 
milieu and how it affects accessibility and utilization. Specifically, it is important to 
explore the distribution of roles, responsibilities and risks among stakeholders of PPPs 
with management or service delivery contracting.  
Against this backdrop, RSBY is therefore a very apt topic for further research. 
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This chapter looks at India in the context of PPPs and health insurance. It summarises 
the health-care status, financing and infrastructure of India. It looks at health 
insurance in its historical context and in the context of the existing health regulatory 
framework. The chapter then examines the RSBY scheme, its design, the use of 
contracts in its implementation, the challenges faced, what is currently known about 
the functioning of the scheme, and the need for further research. Google India was 
used as a search engine. The keywords used for the literature review are given in 
Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Keywords used for literature review 
Domains Keywords used 
India – background and 
context of the RSBY scheme 
India – health status, health economics, social 
factors, expenditure, insurance, government, 
private, PPP, public–private partnership, history, 
commercial, situational analysis, ESI, employee 
state insurance scheme, Rashtriya Swasthya Bima 
Yojana, RSBY, community-based health insurance, 
CBHI,  private providers, contracts, scheme design 
Note: Keywords are used in various combinations 
 
Over the past several years, India has made considerable progress in improving the 
health status of its people. The current death rate stands at 7 per thousand, birth rate at 
21.4 per thousand, infant mortality rate at 40 per thousand live births (Registrar 
General of India, 2013) and life expectancy for men at 67.3 years and women at 69.6 
years (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2014). However, many challenges 
remain - elimination/eradication of communicable diseases; increasing incidence of 
non-communicable diseases; neglect of maternal and neonatal health and 
environmental degradation. Only 35% of the people use improved sanitation facilities 
(WHO and UNICEF, 2013). All this is marked by considerable regional variations.  
India spends about 3.7% of its GDP on health. Government expenditure on health is 
1.04% of its GDP. Government expenditure on health as a percentage of total health 
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expenditure is 28.2%. The OOP expenditure on health as a percentage of total health 
expenditure is as high as 61.7% (World Health Organization, 2013). The high level of 
OOP expenditure often leads to financial impoverishment of the people, trying to 
meet their health-care needs. Public funding is focused on preventive, promotive, 
curative and rehabilitative care, while private expenditure is primarily for curative 
care. Despite a significantly higher gross national income than other countries in the 
region, India’s ranking remains low in the Human Development Index (Malik, 2014). 
Health finance and delivery in India has developed along four main co-existing lines – 
out-of-pocket expenditures, tax-financed public delivery, social insurance and 
voluntary private insurance. The first and by far the largest is OOP spending by 
households. Nearly all this spending is directed to fee-for-service private providers, 
but some is for user fees collected at public facilities (La Forgia and Nagpal, 2012). 
In the latest Human Development Report 2014 released on 24 July 2014, India stands 
at 135 in Human Development Index (HDI) out of 187 countries (Malik, 2014). 
Smaller countries like Sri Lanka (73) and Maldives (103) are above India in their 
rankings. Among all the BRICS countries, India has the lowest HDI with its life 
expectancy higher only than South Africa (which is still grappling with second 
generation HIV/AIDS patients). Russia, Brazil and China are in the high HDI 
category with rankings of 57, 79 and 91, respectively (Malik, 2014). The Human 
Development Report 2014 shows that while human development levels continue to 
rise globally, they do so at a slower pace than before. This deceleration is due to a 
slowdown in economy, slow growth in expected years of schooling and declining 
growth rates of life expectancy, particularly in Asia (Ghosh, 2014). 
The Gender Inequality Index (GII) (which measures gender disparity, using three 
dimensions – reproductive health, empowerment, and labour market participation) 
ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 representing 0% inequality, indicating that women 
fare equally in comparison to men, and 1 representing 100% inequality, indicating 
that women fare poorly in comparison to men (Malik, 2014). At 0.563, India’s GII is 
the highest in South Asia. In HDI, India fares even worse once adjustments are made 
for all inequalities that are a result of social and economic disparities (Malik, 2014). 
Discounted for inequality, India’s HDI falls to 0.418 – a loss of 28.6%. The average 
loss for inequality for medium HDI countries is 25.6% (Malik, 2014). For South Asia, 
the average loss is 28.7%. Among Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
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(BRICS), Brazil comes second in terms of inequality losses with its HDI reduced by 
26.3%(Malik, 2014). Among 145 countries, India ranks 98 in inequality-adjusted HDI 
as against 95 for Brazil and 45 for Russia (Malik, 2014). 
During the past six decades, India has developed a large public health infrastructure 
with 355 medical colleges (Medical Council of India, 2012) and 605 district hospitals. 
As of March 2012, there were 605 district hospitals, 4,833 community health centres 
(CHCs), 24,049 primary health centres (PHCs) and 148,366 sub centres functioning in 
the country (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2012). In addition, there exists a 
large number of private health facilities scattered throughout the country.  
The growth in infrastructure in the last few years can be assessed from the 
comparative figures of 2005 and 2012:  
 At the national level, there was an increase of 1,487 CHCs between 2005 and 
2012. The number of CHCs functioning in government buildings has 
increased from 91.6% to 97% during the same period.  
 PHCs have increased by 813. The percentage of PHCs functioning in 
government buildings has increased significantly from 78% to 90.2%. 
 The number of sub centres has increased from 146,026 to 148,366. 
There is ample information on the predominance of the private for-profit health-care 
sector in India (Raman and Björkman, 2009). The private sector dominates service 
provision of high-end curative services (Selvaraj and Karan, 2009). Evidence from 
national household surveys demonstrates the expanding role of the private sector over 
the last two decades and its emergence as the predominant provider of inpatient care 
(Selvaraj and Karan, 2009). About 63% of the total beds for inpatients are with the 
private sector, which created over 70% of the new beds during the period 2002–2010 
(Gudwani et al., 2012). Data from the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) III also 
confirms that the private medical sector remains the primary source of health care for 
the majority of households in urban (70%) as well as those in rural areas (63%). The 
number of government hospital beds in urban areas is more than twice the number in 
rural areas (Central Bureau of Health Intelligence, 2010), and the rapid development 
of the private sector in urban areas has resulted in an unplanned and unequal 
geographical distribution of services (De Costa et al., 2009). The doctor-to-population 
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ratio in India is 1:1,800 (Deo, 2013) in contrast to other neighbouring countries such 
as Thailand (4:2500) or Sri Lanka (1:1250) (World Bank, 2010). 
A study led by a World Bank economist Jishnu Das published in Health Affairs 
(2012) examined the quality of primary care delivered by private and public health-
care providers in rural and urban India. The study found that many providers do not 
have medical degrees; the quality of medical training is low; and less than half of 
them provide correct diagnoses (Das et al., 2012).  
Against this backdrop, government intervention in making health-care available, 
accessible and affordable is essential to meet the objectives of universal coverage and 
effective health-care delivery. The Government is also focusing on strengthening the 
rural health architecture, especially through the National Rural Health Mission 
(NRHM) and the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY). 
The NRHM was launched in April 2005, aimed at strengthening public health 
management and enhancing service delivery to provide accessible, affordable and 
quality health care to the rural population, especially the vulnerable and underserved 
groups. The mission is intended to adopt a synergistic approach by relating health to 
determinants of good health such as nutrition, sanitation, hygiene and safe drinking 
water. The Mission attempts to achieve these through a set of core strategies including 
enhancement in budgetary outlays for public health, decentralized village- and 
district-level health planning and management, appointment of accredited social 
health activists (ASHAs) to facilitate access to health services, strengthening the 
public health service delivery infrastructure – particularly at village, primary and 
secondary levels, improved management capacity to organize health systems and 
services in public health, promoting the non-profit sector to increase social 
participation, community empowerment, inter-sectoral convergence, upgrading public 
health facilities to Indian Public Health Standards (IPHS) and reduction of infant and 
maternal mortality through the JSY (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2005, 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2015). 
JSY was given emphasis as its objective is to reduce maternal and neonatal mortality 
by promoting institutional deliveries among poor pregnant women. A cash incentive 
is provided to mothers who deliver their babies in public or private health facilities 
rather than at home. There is also a provision for cost reimbursement for transport and 
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incentives to ASHAs to encourage mothers to go in for institutional deliveries. JSY is 
a 100% Centrally-sponsored scheme, which integrates cash assistance with delivery 
and post-delivery care (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2015). 
 
3.1 The insurance sector in India – historical context 
In India, insurance has a deep-rooted history. It finds mention in the ancient writings 
of Manu (Manusmrithi), Yagnavalkya (Dharmasastra) and Kautilya (Arthasastra) 
(Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority, 2007b). These writings mention 
pooling of resources that could be redistributed in times of calamities such as fire, 
floods, epidemics and famine (Newar, 2013). This was probably a precursor to 
modern day insurance. It evolved over time, drawing from other countries’ 
experiences, particularly the United Kingdom. It came to India as a legacy of the 
British occupation. 
Formal insurance in India commenced in 1850 with the establishment of the Triton 
Insurance Company Ltd. in Calcutta by the British (Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority, 2007b). In 1907, the Indian Mercantile Insurance Ltd. was 
set up. This was the first company to transact all classes of general insurance business. 
The General Insurance Council, a wing of the Insurance Association of India, was 
formed in 1957 (Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority, 2007b). The 
General Insurance Council framed a code of conduct for ensuring fairness and sound 
business practices. 
The General Insurance Business (Nationalization) Act, which was notified in 1972, 
nationalized the insurance market. A total of 107 existing insurers were amalgamated 
and grouped into four companies—the National Insurance Company Ltd., the New 
India Assurance Company Ltd., the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., and the United 
India Insurance Company Ltd. In 1993, the Government set up a committee under the 
chairmanship of RN Malhotra, former Governor RBI to propose recommendations for 
reforms in the insurance sector in keeping with the reforms in the financial sector. The 
committee submitted its report in 1994 wherein it recommended, inter alia, that the 
private sector be permitted to enter the insurance industry by floating Indian 
companies, preferably joint ventures with Indian partners (Law Commission of India, 
2003). 
72 
 
Following the recommendations of the Malhotra Committee report of 1994, the 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) was constituted in 1999 as 
an autonomous body to regulate and develop the insurance industry. The IRDA was 
incorporated as a statutory body in April 2000 (The Gazette of India, 2001). The key 
objective of the IRDA was enhancement of competition so as to improve customer 
satisfaction through increased consumer choices and lower premiums, while ensuring 
the financial security of the insurance market. 
Once approved by Parliament, insurers including health insurance companies will be 
able to raise the much-needed capital from foreign partners and expand their business. 
According to estimates, the raising of the cap could bring in as much as US$ 6 billion 
in funds to the country (Singh, 2014a). 
The term ‘insurance’ is primarily associated with life insurance – the most popular 
form of insurance in India (around 570 million insured lives in 2011) (Ministry of 
Finance, 2011). There are two reasons for this – first, with the low life expectancy (37 
years in 1951) and a tightly knit family structure, people primarily sought financial 
security. Second, life insurance has been traditionally positioned as a tax-planning 
tool. Health insurance evolved slowly in tandem with general insurance, with both 
sharing key landmarks. The historical development of insurance and health insurance 
is summarized in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2: Comparison between general insurance and health insurance 
 General insurance Health insurance 
P
re
-i
n
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
 
1818: Life insurance in its current form was 
introduced in 1818 when the Oriental Life 
Insurance Company began its operations in 
India. 
1850: General insurance was however a 
comparatively late entrant in 1850 when the 
Triton Insurance Company set up its base in 
Calcutta. 
1912: Health insurance introduced when the 
first insurance act was passed.  
1947: In 1947, the Bhore Committee Report 
made recommendations for the improvement 
of health-care services in India. 
1948: The Central Government introduced the 
Employees’ State Insurance Scheme (ESIS) 
for blue-collar workers employed in the 
private sector. 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
za
ti
o
n
 
1956: Life insurance was the first to be 
nationalized in 1956. Life Insurance 
Corporation of India was formed by 
consolidating the operations of various 
insurance companies. 
1973: General Insurance followed suit and 
was nationalized in 1973. General Insurance 
Corporation of India was set up as the 
controlling body with New India, United 
India, National and Oriental companies as its 
subsidiaries. 
1954: The Central Government Health 
Scheme (CGHS) was set up for Central 
Government employees and their families. 
1986: Mediclaim was introduced by 
government insurance companies in 1986. 
 
L
ib
er
a
li
za
ti
o
n
 
1991: The process of opening up the 
insurance sector was initiated against the 
background of the economic reforms process. 
Malhotra Committee was formed during this 
year that submitted its report in 1994. 
1999: Insurance Regulatory Development 
Act (IRDA) was passed. 
2001: Indian insurance was opened for 
private companies and private insurance 
companies effectively started operations. 
1999: Marked the beginning of a new era for 
health insurance in the Indian context. With 
IRDA, the insurance sector was opened to 
private and foreign participation. 
2003: Introduction of UHIS – early attempts 
by government to introduce health insurance 
for informal sector. Universal Health 
Insurance Scheme (UHIS) was a 
hospitalization indemnity product voluntarily 
purchased from any state-owned insurer at a 
heavily subsidized price (INR165, less than 
US$ 4 a year). 
Source: Health Insurance Evolution in India: An Opportunity to Expand Access (Shetty, 
2014) 
 
3.2 Health insurance in India 
The health insurance industry was launched in 1986 and has grown significantly, 
mainly due to the liberalization of the economy and general awareness of the 
population (Jacob, 2013).  
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The Indian health insurance scenario is a mixed bag. The existing schemes can be 
categorized as follows: 
 SHI schemes, which are mandatory or government-run schemes;  
 voluntary health insurance schemes or private for-profit schemes; 
 employer-based schemes; 
 community based health insurance (CBHI) or insurance offered by NGOs;  
 subsidized voluntary health insurance schemes for the poor. 
3.2.1 Social health insurance 
SHI is based on income-determined contributions from the mandatory membership 
and can be an effective risk-pooling mechanism that allocates services according to 
need and distributes the financial burden according to the ability to pay (thereby 
ensuring equity in access). As Rao points out, in India with its large rural and 
informal sector accounting for 90% of the population, lack of cohesion and solidarity 
and poor institutional capacity, such schemes are difficult and expensive to implement 
(Rao, 2005). The existing mandatory health insurance schemes in India such as the 
Employees’ State Insurance Scheme (ESIS) and the Central Government Health 
Scheme (CGHS) were first started as pilot projects in 1948 and 1954, respectively in 
the context of achieving universal coverage via the SHI.  
Under the ESI Act, 1948 the ESIS provides protection to employees against loss of 
wages due to inability to work because of sickness, disability or death due to an 
employment-related injury. It also provides medical care to employees and their 
family members without any fee for service. The Employee’s State Insurance 
Corporation (ESIC) is a corporate semi-government body headed by the Union 
Minister of Labour and Employment as its Chairman. The Act compulsorily covers 
(1) all power-using non-seasonal factories employing 10 or more persons; (2) all non-
power using factories with 20 or more employees; and (3) service establishments like 
shops, hotels, restaurants, cinemas, road transport and newspapers. The scheme is 
compulsory and contributory in nature and provides a uniform package of medical 
and cash benefits to the insured persons. The scheme is implemented through special 
ESI hospitals and diagnostic centres, dispensaries and empanelled doctors.  
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3.2.2 Voluntary health insurance schemes or private for-profit schemes  
The IRDA legislation in 2000 served as a key milestone in health-care insurance. It 
opened up the health insurance industry to private players. Health insurance 
membership quadrupled between 2007 and 2011 (300 million in 2011) and is 
expected to be 600 million by 2015 (Shetty, 2014). There are stand-alone health 
insurers (private for-profit) along with government sponsored health insurance 
providers. To improve awareness, the General Insurance Corporation of India and the 
IRDA have held several awareness campaigns for all segments of the population 
(Jacob, 2013).  
In private insurance, buyers are willing to pay premiums to an insurance company that 
pools people with similar risks and insures them for health expenses. Premiums are 
based on an assessment of the risk status of the consumer (or of the group of 
employees) and the level of benefits provided, rather than as a proportion of the 
consumer’s income (Sein et al., 2004). Prior to liberalization, the insurance sector 
consisted of the government-owned Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) that 
had a monopoly on life insurance business and the General Insurance Corporation of 
India and its four non-life subsidiaries namely, National Insurance Co., New India 
Assurance Co., Oriental Insurance Co. and United India Insurance Co. Health 
insurance was first introduced in November 1986 under a product called Mediclaim, 
offered by the General Insurance Corporation of India and its four non-life 
subsidiaries (BearingPoint, 2008). As a part of its financial sector reform agenda, the 
GoI liberalized the Indian insurance industry through the enactment of the Insurance 
Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999 which led to the opening up of the 
sector to private insurance companies (BearingPoint, 2008). According to the IRDA 
Annual Report 2009, IRDA has licensed 36 private insurance companies and eight 
public sector insurance companies.  
3.2.3 Employer-based schemes 
Employers in both the public and private sector offer employer-based insurance 
schemes through their own employer-managed facilities by way of lump sum 
payments, reimbursement of employee’s health expenditure for outpatient care and 
hospitalization, fixed medical allowance (monthly or annual, irrespective of actual 
expenses), or covering them under the group health insurance policy (Sein et al., 
2004). The population coverage under these schemes is minimal, about 30–50 million 
people in all (Sein et al., 2004). 
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3.2.4 Community-based health insurance  
CBHI schemes are small-scale, voluntary health insurance programmes, organized 
and managed in a participatory manner, which are designed to be simple and 
affordable and to draw on resources of social solidarity and cohesion to overcome 
problems of small risk pools, moral hazard, fraud, exclusion and cost-escalation 
(Tabor, 2005). The efficacy of the programme is based on two implicit principles: 
one, that the community has adequate homogeneity or social coherence that gets 
easily translated to a capacity to mobilize resources; and two, that the willingness to 
prepay will be influenced by self-interest when each individual perceives his marginal 
benefit exceeding his costs, i.e. accessing something of value which can be obtained 
easily and better in quality through prepayment (Rao, 2005). Often, there is a problem 
of adverse selection because of a large number of high-risk members whose premiums 
are not based on an assessment of individual risk status. Exemptions made as a means 
of assisting the poor might also have an adverse effect on the ability of the insurance 
fund to meet the cost of benefits (Conn and Walford, 2002). There are two types of 
CBHI schemes in India. In the first type, an NGO acts as an intermediary between a 
formal insurance provider and the insured community, e.g. Self Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) in Ahmedabad. In the second type, the NGO itself provides 
insurance to the target community (Ahuja, 2004).  
3.2.5 State-subsidized voluntary health insurance schemes for the poor 
India has a few examples of state-subsidized voluntary health insurance schemes for 
the poor. The largest of them is the RSBY, which is considered separately later since 
it is the subject of this thesis. A few other examples are mentioned below. 
The Government of Andhra Pradesh has set up the Aarogyasri Health Care Trust and 
formulated a voluntary health insurance scheme for BPL families called the Rajiv 
Aarogyasri Community Health Insurance Scheme. The Star Health and Allied 
Insurance Co. Ltd., a private insurance firm which was selected through a competitive 
bidding process, has been contracted to implement the scheme and a MoU was signed 
with the company in April 2008 (Mallipeddi et al., 2009). The scheme began as a pilot 
in the three most backward districts of Andhra Pradesh and now covers the entire 
State. It provides coverage for meeting the expenses of hospitalization and surgical 
procedures of beneficiary members up to USD 4,000 per family per year in any of the 
network hospitals (Mallipeddi et al., 2009). Moreover, the network hospitals provide 
the following additional benefits to the BPL beneficiaries: (i) free outpatient 
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consultation; (ii) free tests and medical treatment for beneficiaries who might not 
avail any surgery or therapy procedures; (iii) a minimum of 24–26 free health camps 
per year in villages for screening of the BPL suffering from identified ailments; and 
(iv) free transport to the patient identified for surgery or therapy. The Government 
covers the insurance premium and the entire scheme is cashless for the patients. As of 
May 2009, this scheme has covered over 250,000 operations, over 1.5 million patients 
have been screened and US$ 168 million have been claimed (Mallipeddi et al., 2009). 
In 1988, the Government of Goa along with the New India Assurance Company 
developed a medical reimbursement mechanism. This scheme can be availed by all 
permanent residents of Goa with an income below INR 50,000 (£ 504) per annum for 
hospitalization care, which is not available within the government system (Sein et al., 
2004). The non-availability of services requires certification from the dean of the 
hospital or Director Health Services. The overall limit is INR 30,000 (£ 302) for the 
insured person for a period of one year (Sein et al., 2004). 
The Government of Jharkhand launched a health insurance scheme in April 2008, 
targeting BPL families. The scheme has no exclusion clauses. It is an all-disease 
inclusive scheme and extends its coverage to people living with HIV. It was designed 
to be a mandatory scheme for BPL families and covers the whole family without any 
age bar. One of the innovative features of the scheme is to involve, on a long-term 
basis, all industrial groups in the financing of the insurance component under the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) principle. Figure 3.1 shows the financing 
structure and the benefits under the scheme.  
Fig. 3.1: Financing and benefits under the health insurance scheme (Jharkhand) 
 
Source: India: State government sponsored health protection programme (ILO Subregional 
Office for South Asia, 2008) 
The premium to be paid by each member of the family is INR 20 (£ 0.2) per year, 
with an INR 170 (£ 1.8) subsidy (ILO Subregional Office for South Asia, 2008). The 
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scheme is managed by a public–private trust and engages both public and private 
providers in delivery of care.  
The Government of Kerala started the Comprehensive Health Insurance Scheme 
(CHIS) in 2008 to cover the non-BPL population. This complements the RSBY 
scheme (Government of Kerala, 2008). The non-RSBY population is divided into two 
categories: (i) those belonging to the BPL list of the State Government but not to the 
list as defined by the Planning Commission,
3
 and (ii) the above poverty line (APL) 
families that belong neither to the State Government list nor to the list prepared as per 
guidelines of the Planning Commission (Government of Kerala, 2008). In the case of 
families of the first category, the beneficiaries pay INR 100 (£ 1) per annum per 
family as beneficiary contribution, and the State Government meets all the remaining 
expenses including the cost of the smart card. In the case of families of the second 
category, the beneficiary contribution covers the entire amount of the premium plus 
the cost of the smart card. In other words, the beneficiary contribution is INR 30 (£ 
0.3) per family per annum for RSBY families, INR 100 (£ 1) for families belonging to 
category (i) and the entire amount for families belonging to category (ii) (Government 
of Kerala, 2008). 
The Chief Minister's Relief Fund in Madhya Pradesh was set up to provide immediate 
financial assistance to the victims of natural calamities such as flood, fire, earthquakes 
and accidents, and also to people suffering from various ailments. The Rajasthan 
Chief Minister's Relief Fund gives assistance to accident victims. 
Gujarat has the Mukhyamantari Amrutam Yojana, which addresses the key 
vulnerability faced by the BPL population, that of catastrophic health expenditure. 
Kerala has the Chief Minister’s Distress Relief Fund which provides financial 
assistance for distressed people affected by major natural calamities such as flood and 
drought. It also provides financial assistance to individuals in need of treatment for 
major diseases such as cancer, cardiac surgery, kidney transplant, brain tumour, liver 
disease and multi organ failure. 
In Tamil Nadu, the Chief Minister's Comprehensive Health Insurance Scheme is an 
insurance scheme launched by the Tamil Nadu State Government through the United 
India Insurance Company Ltd. (a public sector insurer headquartered at Chennai) 
                                                          
3
 Since replaced by NITI Aayog 
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which provides free medical and surgical treatment in government and private 
hospitals to the members of any family whose annual family income is less than INR 
72,000 (£ 725) (as certified by the Village Administrative Officer). 
3.2.6 National Universal Health Insurance Scheme 
The national UHIS was launched by the GoI in July 2003 for providing financial risk 
protection to the poor. The scheme offered health insurance via four public insurance 
companies, and was managed with the help of TPAs (discussed later). It was initially 
designed as a group insurance scheme with membership of at least 100 families and 
only covered those who were members of some group such as cooperative societies, 
handloom weavers, etc. The premium for joining the scheme varied according to 
family size 1) Individual Person INR 365/- (£ 3.7) per annum; 2) Family (not 
exceeding five members) consisting of Insured, Spouse and first 3 dependent children 
Rs.548/- (£ 5.5) per annum; 3) Family not exceeding 7 members consisting of 
Insured, Spouse, first 3 dependent children and dependent parents Rs.730/- (£ 7.4) per 
annum.  In case of hospitalization, the scheme provided medical expenses up to INR 
30,000 (£ 302) per family and the Government provided a fixed subsidy of INR 100 
(£ 1), irrespective of family size. Due to poor enrolment in the first nine months 
(Ahuja, 2006), the scheme was redesigned in May 2004 with a higher subsidy 
(increased to INR 200 (£ 2), INR 300 (£ 3) and INR 400 (£ 4) to individuals, families 
of five and seven, respectively) and restricting eligibility to BPL families only (Rao, 
2005).  
Building on the experience of UHIS in 2008, the GoI launched yet another state-
managed national health insurance scheme targeting the BPL informal sector workers 
called Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) with certain design changes from 
the UHIS. This scheme is the focus of the present research. Under RSBY, the role of 
the private sector is much wider and a lot of the responsibility for scheme 
implementation rests outside the public sector.  
3.3 Current status of health insurance 
It is estimated that only 25% of the Indian population is under some form of health 
insurance (Reddy et al., 2011a). Currently, Centre-funded insurance schemes cover an 
estimated population of 181 million through the following schemes: ESIS – 60 
million, CGHS – 3 million, and RSBY – 118 million (World Health Statistics 2013) 
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(Figure 3.2). While ESIS and CGHS provide for comprehensive health care, RSBY 
only provides for hospitalization cover with a benefit limit of INR 30,000 (£ 302) per 
enrolled household per year (United Nations, 2014). In addition, 110 million people in 
the southern states (70 million in Andhra Pradesh, 35 million in Tamil Nadu and five 
million in Karnataka) receive coverage under health insurance schemes funded by the 
state governments. However, most of these schemes cover only inpatient care, and 
mainly at the tertiary level. 
Fig. 3.2: Population coverage under various health schemes in India 
 
Source: World Health Statistics 2013 (http://www.in.one.un.org/task-teams/universal-health-
coverage) 
Most health insurance products offered by private entities are similar to the 
government-defined product, Mediclaim, and are indemnity-based. Given its high 
premiums, most Mediclaim and similar policy holders belong to the middle and upper 
classes.  
While the urban population has witnessed a proliferation in the means of health-care 
financing and delivery over the past two decades, the rural population lacks basic 
health-care delivery and financing. Though community health insurance schemes 
managed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are evolving to cater to the 
needs of the rural population, health-care delivery and finance still leave much to be 
desired (Planning Commission, 2011). 
3.4 Identifying below poverty line population 
The Planning Commission defines poverty lines on the basis of monthly per capita 
consumption expenditure (MPCE). The parameters used for estimating poverty are - 
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land holdings, type of house, availability of clothing, food security, sanitation, 
ownership of consumer durables (TV, electric fan, kitchen appliances, cooker, radio, 
etc.), literacy status of highest literate, status of household labour, means of 
livelihood, status of children, type of indebtedness, reasons for migration and 
preference for assistance. For each of these parameters, households are awarded 
scores. A low score indicates a higher level of poverty and deprivation and vice-versa. 
The Planning Commission decides on a cut-off score for identifying the BPLs. 
However, the states have also been given the liberty to decide on the cut-off score of 
their own for determining the total number of BPL households, either uniformly 
across the districts or even below the district level, depending on their budget 
allocation. It is the responsibility of the state to identify the households who fulfil the 
BPL criteria. Table 3.3 shows the poverty ratio and number of poor in India. 
In December 2005, the Planning Commission constituted an expert group under the 
Chairmanship of Prof. Suresh D. Tendulkar to review the methodology for estimation 
of poverty. This was the basis on which estimates of poverty for 2009–10 were made. 
Based on the Suresh Tendulkar panel's (Tendulkar et al., 2009) recommendations, in 
2011–12, the poverty line was fixed at INR 27/day for rural areas and INR 33/day for 
urban areas. 
Another expert group was constituted in June 2013 under the Chairmanship of Dr. C. 
Rangarajan (ex-Governor, Reserve Bank of India) to once again review the 
methodology for the measurement of poverty. The report by the Rangarajan 
Committee came up with a new BPL criteria, according to which those spending over 
INR 32 (£ 0.3) a day in rural areas and INR 47 (£ 0.5) in urban areas should not be 
considered as BPL (Singh, 2014b). 
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Table 3.3: Poverty ratio and number of poor in India 
 Poverty ratio (%) Number of poor (million) 
Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
1. 1993–94 50.1 31.8 45.3 328.6 74.5 403.7 
2. 2004–05 41.8 25.7 37.2 326.3 80.8 407.1 
3. 2011–12 25.7 13.7 21.9 216.5 52.8 269.3 
Annual average decline: 
1993–94 to 2004–05 
(percentage points/annum) 
0.75 0.55 0.74 – – – 
Annual average decline: 
2004–05 to 2011–12 
(percentage points/ annum) 
2.32 1.69 2.18 – – – 
Source: Press note on poverty estimates (2011–12). Planning Commission, GoI; 2013 
(accessed 30 December 2014) 
 
3.4.1 Regulatory framework 
Health regulation in India encompasses a variety of actors and issues. These include 
promulgation of legislation for health facilities and services, disease control and 
medical care, human resources (education, licensing and professional responsibility), 
ethics and patients’ rights, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, radiation protection, 
poisons and hazardous substances, occupational health and accident prevention, 
elderly, disabled and rehabilitation, family, women and child health, mental health, 
tobacco control, social security and health insurance, environmental protection, 
nutrition and food safety, health information and statistics, custody and civil and 
human rights, to enumerate a few. However, given the scope of this research, the 
focus is on the regulatory environment around private providers/clinical 
establishments and the insurance companies/TPAs, keeping in mind the PPP 
arrangements under the RSBY scheme design.   
The preamble to the Constitution of India, coupled with the Directive Principles of 
State Policy, enjoins the State to make ‘improvement of public health’ its primary 
responsibility. Furthermore, Articles 38, 42, 43 and 47 of the Constitution provide for 
promotion of health of individuals as well as health care (Planning Commission, 
2006). The Constitution of India also enumerates the separate and shared legislative 
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powers of Parliament and state legislatures in three separate lists—the Union List, 
State List and Concurrent List. For the Concurrent List, which includes criminal law, 
marriage, divorce and all other personal law matters, economic and social planning, 
population control and family planning, social security and social insurance, 
employment, education, legal and medical professions, and prevention of transmission 
of infectious or contagious diseases, the Parliament and state legislatures share 
authority. However, laws passed by Parliament with respect to matters on the 
Concurrent List supersede laws passed by state legislatures. The Parliament generally 
has no power to legislate on items from the State List, including public health, 
hospitals and sanitation. However, two-thirds of the Rajya Sabha may vote to allow 
Parliament to pass binding legislation on any state issue if ‘necessary or expedient in 
the national interest’. In addition, two or more states may ask Parliament to legislate 
on an issue that is otherwise reserved for the states. Other states may then choose to 
adopt the resulting legislation (Planning Commission, 2006). Thus, for RSBY 
stakeholders, the regulatory frameworks that influence social security, social 
insurance and the medical profession are under the Concurrent List, though public 
health and hospitals are under the State List.  
3.4.2 Private providers and clinical establishments regulation 
The private health sector in India consists of, on the one hand, private general 
practitioners, consultants of different systems [allopathic medicine and AYUSH 
(Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy)] and a variety 
of non-qualified practitioners; and on the other hand hospitals, nursing homes, 
maternity homes, specialty hospitals, etc. (Duggal and Nandraj, 1991). Besides this, 
there are the pharmaceutical and medical equipment manufacturing industries, which 
are overwhelmingly private and predominantly multinational. There are also 
laboratories, which conduct tests from the basic blood testing to CAT scans (Duggal 
and Nandraj, 1991). 
Post-independence, the private health sector in India has grown greatly and is 
thriving. At the time of Independence, the private health sector accounted for only 5% 
to 10% of total patient care (Rao, 2012). In 2004, the share of the private sector in 
total hospitalized treatment was estimated at 58.3% in rural areas and 61.8% in urban 
areas (Planning Commission, 2008). Data from the National Family Health Survey 
(NFHS) III confirms that the private medical sector remains the primary health-care 
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source for the majority of households in urban areas (70%) as well as in rural areas 
(63%) (Rao, 2012).  
Legislation exists with respect to licensing of medical professionals such as doctors, 
nurses, dentists and pharmacists with a view to control their entry into the market. 
Important among these national level laws are the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956; 
the Indian Nursing Council Act, 1947; the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 
1970; the Homoeopathy Central Council Act, 1973 and the Pharmacy Act, 1948. 
Almost all of these laws mandate establishing of statutory regulatory councils to 
monitor the standards of medical education, promote medical training and research 
activities and oversee the qualifications, registration and professional conduct of 
doctors, dentists, nurses, pharmacists, and practitioners of other systems of medicine 
such as ayurveda, yoga, unani, siddha and homoeopathy (AYUSH). In addition, each 
statute directs establishment of a central registry for individuals certified to practice in 
the field of medicine. Councils also often prescribe standards of professional conduct 
and determine which actions amount to professional misconduct (Planning 
Commission, 2006).   
As regulation of clinical facilities is a state subject, some state legislation was 
introduced by union territories/states for regulation of clinical establishments such as 
The Bombay Nursing Homes Registration Act, 1949; Delhi Nursing Homes 
Registration Act, 1953 and the Tamil Nadu Private Clinical Establishments Act, 1997. 
In 1996, the death of a patient in a private hospital due to medical negligence was 
reported to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). This led to the 
Planning Commission directing the GoI, Medical Council of India and the Delhi 
Government to examine the registration of private hospitals to ensure availability of 
minimum facilities, with violation to be made a cognizable offence (Planning 
Commission, 2006). Thereafter, the Central Council of Health and Family Welfare at 
its Fifth Conference held in January 1997 recommended that the National Institute of 
Health and Family Welfare be assigned the responsibility of drafting model 
legislation. At its Sixth Conference held in 1998, the Central Council examined the 
matter afresh and resolved that the Central Government may frame norms and 
standards for ensuring proper health care for different categories of institutions in 
consultation with the state governments for private hospitals/nursing homes/clinical 
establishments, to be followed by all the state governments. These norms would 
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prescribe the minimum standards of staff and infrastructure for all such institutions. 
The Central Council further resolved that state governments may enact laws to 
provide for compulsory registration of private hospitals, nursing homes and clinical 
establishments in order to ensure minimum facilities for different forms of treatment. 
Since it would also be necessary to regulate fees charged by the private health 
institutions, the laws could also provide for compulsory exhibition of fees, 
qualification of doctors, equipment available, etc. To implement the above mandate, a 
national workshop was organized by the GoI at New Delhi in 1999 with the assistance 
of WHO and the Medical Council of India. The aim was to provide a platform for 
discussion among the service providers of nursing homes and hospitals for the 
purpose of presenting the minimum standards for their registration. It was, however, 
felt that uniform enforcement of minimum standards would require Central 
legislation. Therefore, in 2000, another draft bill was prepared, called Clinical 
Establishments Regulation and Accreditation Bill. During this entire period, various 
states also enacted their own legislations for regulating clinical establishments.  
The Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010 was passed by 
the Parliament of India amidst much opposition from the Indian Medical Association 
(IMA), which proposed that the regulatory powers rest in the hands of the 
autonomous Hospital Authority of India. The primary reason for this was the 
perception in the medical community that licensing of health-care institutions by the 
Government will lead to harassment, corruption and nepotism (Indian Medical 
Association, 2013). In 2012, the Act was notified by the Union Government which 
made it mandatory for all clinical establishments to provide medical care and 
treatment necessary to stabilize any individual who comes or is brought to the clinical 
establishment in an emergency medical condition, particularly accident cases and 
women who come for deliveries (The Hindu, 2012). It provides for mandatory 
registration of all clinical establishments including diagnostic centres and single-
doctor clinics across all recognized systems of medicine, both in the public and 
private sector, except those run by the defence forces. The Act lays down standard 
treatment guidelines for common disease conditions. All states were asked by the 
MoHFW to adopt the law by passing resolutions in their respective assemblies. 
National Council for Clinical Establishments, which is a multi-member body under 
the Chairmanship of the Director General of Health Services with representatives of 
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various stakeholder institutions, is under notification. Work on the categorization of 
clinical establishments and development of minimum standards has been initiated in 
association with the Quality Council of India and the Indian Medical Association. A 
committee has also been formed for the development of standards for electronic 
records maintenance systems, to be adopted in the hospitals. 
3.4.3 Insurance regulations 
The IRDA was constituted by an Act of Parliament  called the Insurance Regulatory 
and Development Authority Act, 1999 (The Gazette of India, 1999) and duly passed 
by the GoI (Rediff News, 1999). IRDA regulates and promotes the insurance industry 
in India and protects the interests of holders of insurance policies.  
One of the main responsibilities of the Authority is to regulate, promote and ensure 
the proper growth of the insurance business in India. The Authority has been entrusted 
with several powers and functions relating to regulations on investment of funds by 
insurance companies, regulating maintenance of the margin of solvency, settlement of 
disputes between insurers and intermediaries, overseeing the functioning of the Tariff 
Advisory Committee, specifying the percentage of premium income of the insurer, to 
finance schemes for promoting and regulating professional organizations and 
identifying the percentage of life insurance business and general insurance business to 
be undertaken by the insurer in the rural or social sector. The Authority provides a 
certificate of registration to life insurance companies and is responsible for the 
renewal, modification, withdrawal, suspension or cancellation of this certificate of 
registration. It also specifies the requisite qualifications, code of conduct and practical 
training for insurance intermediaries and agents (Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority, 2007a, Nagree-Mahtani, 2002). 
The IRDA opened up the market in August 2000. Foreign companies were allowed 
ownership of up to 26% of the total market. From 2000 onwards, the IRDA has 
framed various regulations ranging from registration of companies for carrying on 
insurance business to protection of policyholders’ interests under Section 114A of the 
Insurance Act 1938. 
In December 2000, the subsidiaries of the General Insurance Corporation of India 
were restructured as independent companies. At the same time, GIC was converted 
into a national reinsurer. In 2002, the four subsidiaries of GIC were delinked from 
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GIC by an Act of Parliament. GIC with its four subsidiary companies and Life 
Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) provide various health insurance products. In a 
decision of the Cabinet Committee on 25 July 2014, the GoI cleared 49% foreign 
direct investment in the insurance sector from the earlier 26%. 
The IRDA, which licenses and regulates the TPAs, has specified that a TPA should be 
a commercial entity with a minimum capital of INR 10 million in equity shares and a 
working capital amounting to INR 10 million. One of the directors of the TPA should 
be a qualified medical doctor registered with the Medical Council of India. A 
participating foreign company’s equity shares cannot at any time exceed 26% of the 
paid-up equity capital of the TPA. The licence is usually granted to a TPA for a 
period of three years and the licence fee is INR 30,000 (£ 302). A TPA whose 
application has been once rejected by the Authority cannot apply again for a period of 
two years from the date of such rejection. 
The other bodies, which also play roles in regulation of insurance schemes, are the 
Tariff Advisory Committee and the Life Insurance and General Insurance Council. 
The Tariff Advisory Committee is a body corporate that controls and regulates the 
rates, advantages, terms and conditions offered by insurers in the general insurance 
business. It has the authority to require any insurer to supply such information or 
statements necessary for discharge of its functions. The Life Insurance and General 
Insurance Council conducts examinations for individuals wishing to qualify as 
insurance agents (Nagree-Mahtani, 2002). 
 
3.5 Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) 
Despite the expansion in health facilities, illness remains one of the most prevalent 
causes of human deprivation in India. About 94% of the Indian workforce or 400 
million people are working in the informal sector (Birdsall, 2015). The informal or 
unorganized sector in India refers to those enterprises whose activities or collection of 
data are not regulated under any legal provision, or those who do not maintain any 
regular accounts (Bhardwaj et al., 2004).  
Apart from deteriorating infrastructure, a lack of awareness and low literacy levels, 
and a widespread lack of health insurance as outlined above compounds the health-
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care challenges that India’s poor face. The rapidly increasing gap between demand 
and availability of affordable health care makes health care an expensive proposition 
and insurance a pertinent need. As at present, the majority of the informal sector lacks 
access to effective social protection systems. The vulnerability of the poor in the 
informal sector increases when they have to pay fully for their medical care, with no 
subsidy or support. On one hand, such workers do not have the financial resources to 
undertake medical treatment; and on the other, the health infrastructure leaves a lot to 
be desired.  
Thus, there is ample justification for introducing health insurance (Ahuja, 2004). 
Firstly, even low-income people can make small periodic contributions, thereby 
taking some financial burden off from the already strained state revenues. Secondly, 
the insured individuals could be given the option of going to either public or private 
service providers, which in turn would generate competition among providers for 
better services. Finally, health insurance can be used to promote certain desirable 
behaviour such as family planning, immunization, reduction of tobacco and alcohol 
consumption, etc. 
In December 2008, the Indian Parliament passed a legislation called the Unorganised 
Workers Social Security Bill that mandated the Union Government to ‘formulate, 
from time to time, suitable welfare schemes for the unorganized workers.’ This 
legislation has a schedule which includes the RSBY as a new scheme (Department of 
Labour & Employment and Jharkhand State Labour Welfare Society, 2010).  
RSBY is a GoI initiative that uses contracts as a PPP tool. The objective of RSBY is 
to provide protection to BPL households from financial liabilities arising out of health 
shocks that involve hospitalization. Every BPL family holding a ration card is eligible 
for this scheme and can include in the scheme up to five family members – the head 
of the household and four others who may be the spouse, children and parents. The 
family is issued with a biometric-enabled smart card on a payment of INR 30 (£ 0.3). 
This card contains their fingerprints and photographs and entitles them to inpatient 
services consisting of more than 700 packages under 15 categories, up to a limit of 
INR 30,000 (£ 302). 
The RSBY is a flagship programme of the Central Government. It aims to increase 
the scope and extent of coverage of the scheme, so that ultimately UHC is achieved. 
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The focus of the scheme is specifically on the BPL population. At the same time, by 
covering over 700 hospitalization packages, RSBY aims to protect the poor from 
major health shocks and increase the depth of coverage. Finally, by introducing a 
cashless mechanism through a smart card, the number of beneficiaries is also 
enhanced as the poor will not have to pay OOP at the time of hospitalization 
(Narayana, 2010, Das and Leino, 2011, Seshadri et al., 2011). RSBY is thus a big step 
towards UHC.  
A systematic review was conducted to study and analyze the RSBY documents. The 
search strategy is given in detail in Figure 3.3. Various peer reviewed articles, 
reviews, reports and letters were considered for the review. The review was conducted 
through electronic search, contact with experts and manual search in libraries. The 
objective of this review was to identify all documents (published and unpublished) 
that could provide some insight into the background, launch and sustainability of the 
RSBY scheme, its situational analysis, contract design, contract milieu, external 
environment, stakeholders and implementation. 
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Fig. 3.3: Literature review search strategy for RSBY documents 
 
$ – Wild card; MoHFW – Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; MoLE – Ministry of 
Labour and Employment 
 
3.5.1  RSBY and partnership with the private sector 
Health care is one of India’s largest sectors, which had a total worth of more than 
US$ 34 billion before the launch of RSBY (Pate et al., 2007). The private sector 
accounts for more than 80% of total health-care spending, providing about 60% of all 
outpatient care and as much as 40% of all inpatient care (Pate et al., 2007). It is 
estimated that nearly 70% of all hospitals and 40% of hospital beds in the country are 
in the private sector (Pate et al., 2007). In the Indian market, these private sector 
providers contribute to provider competition, which may help enhance efficiency. A 
resource-rich and expanding private sector in health care makes it an important 
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source to be partnered by the public sector. From the public sector point of view, 
there are certain benefits and challenges in partnering the private sector (Table 3.4).  
Table 3.4: Pros and cons of collaborating with the private sector in health 
Sub-sector Pros Cons 
Informal*  
Accessible  
Client-oriented  
Low cost  
Poor quality of care  
Difficult to mainstream  
Poorly educated  
Not-for-profit**  
High quality  
Targeted to the poor  
Low cost  
Involves the community  
Small coverage  
Lack of resources  
Cannot be scaled up  
Ad hoc interventions  
 
For profit  
High quality (in select 
disciplines)  
Huge outreach/coverage  
Innovation  
Ad hoc interventions   
High cost  
Variable quality  
Clustered in cities  
Source: World Bank India Report (Patel et al., 2004) (accessed on 30 December 2014)   
* – Non-qualified medical practitioners in the informal private sector; ** – non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) 
 
Partnership with the private sector for health care in India had hitherto been primarily 
in the form of management and/or service contracts. However, in the RSBY scheme, 
private stakeholders participate in enrolment, management and provision of health-
care services. The RSBY scheme contracts private insurance companies, private 
hospitals, TPAs and NGOs for assisting in enrolment and insurance management. 
Policymakers of RSBY have given a choice to the beneficiary to avail benefits from 
either public or private facilities, thus shifting the financing from the health-care 
supply side to the demand side. By including public facilities, RSBY may be able to 
push and direct insurance funds into the existing resource-constrained public health-
care system. This in turn could mean that insurance might not just be viewed as a 
financing instrument but also a tool for governments to fund their own systems.  
3.5.2 Use of contracts in the implementation of RSBY 
Contractual relationships take various forms in the RSBY scheme implementation 
(Figure 3.4). 
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Fig. 3.4: Use of contracts in the implementation of RSBY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contracts between the states and insurance companies: State governments set up a 
competitive bidding process and select a public or private insurance company licensed 
to provide health insurance by the IRDA. An insurance company that fulfils technical 
criteria and has the lowest premium is usually chosen (officials at the Ministry of 
Labour and Employment (MoLE) and MoHFW) . While more than one insurer can 
operate in a particular state, only one insurer can operate in a single district at any 
given point in time. The period of the contract with the successful bidder is three 
years from the effective date subject to renewal on a yearly basis, based on parameters 
(performance indicators) fixed by the state government/nodal agency. 
Contracts between the insurance companies and TPAs: According to the GoI 
guidelines, the process is required to be completely cashless for the beneficiary, which 
in turn requires the use of smart cards that need to be issued to all members. Thus, the 
insurance company needs to arrange sub-contracts with qualified smart card providers 
who are referred to as TPAs. The role of the TPAs can also include establishing 
provider networks, collection and analysis of data, negotiating rates for procedures 
with providers, contracting providers, processing claims and making direct payments 
to them. They can arbitrate on any dispute between the subscriber and the provider. 
For the services provided by a TPA, the insurance companies pay between 5.2% to 
5.4% of the total amount of premium collected under the policy (BearingPoint, 2008). 
The insurer also engages intermediaries with local presence (such as NGOs) in order 
to provide grass roots outreach and assist members in utilizing the services after 
enrolment. The insurance company is tasked with empanelling/certifying both public 
and private care providers. The process is based on prescribed criteria that the service 
providers need to possess, such as specified basic facilities. For example, the service 
PPP INSTRUMENT – CONTRACTS  
States and 
districts  
Insurance 
companies 
NGOs, SHGs, etc. 
Private & public 
providers 
TPAs Contracts 
Contracts 
Contracts 
Contracts 
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provider may be required to have at least 10 inpatient medical beds, or have specified 
medical, surgical facilities and diagnostic facilities, etc. 
3.5.3 RSBY Scheme design and implementation 
Figure 3.5 helps identify the various partners involved in the implementation of the 
RSBY scheme. The arrows represent the interaction between partners. 
Fig. 3.5: Partners involved in implementation of RSBY 
 
Benefits: RSBY provides the beneficiary a total benefit of up to INR 30,000 (£ 302) 
per BPL family per annum, on a family floater basis, whereby the total benefit can be 
availed individually or collectively by a maximum of up to five enrolled members of 
the family. The ‘family’ would comprise of the household head, spouse and up to 
three dependents. The scheme covers pre-existing conditions subject to minimal 
exclusions, coverage of health services related to hospitalization and services of a 
surgical nature that can be provided on a day care basis. Though OPD facilities are 
not covered under the scheme, OPD consultation fees are almost negligible in public 
hospitals. There is also a provision for pre- and post-hospitalization expenses for one 
day prior to and five days after hospitalization. The scheme includes a transport 
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allowance (actual, limited to £ 1.65 per visit) but subject to an annual ceiling of £ 16.5 
(Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2010).  
Funding: The GoI contributes 75% of the estimated annual premium of £ 12.5, 
subject to a maximum of £ 9.2 per family per annum. Additionally, the cost of a smart 
card (see below) is also borne by the Central Government at £ 1 per card. 
Contribution by the state governments is 25% of the annual premium, as well as any 
additional premium in cases where the total premium exceeds £ 12.5. The beneficiary 
pays £ 0.5 per annum as registration/renewal fee. Any administrative and other related 
costs of administering the scheme in each state, not otherwise included in the 
premium cost, are borne by the state governments (Ministry of Labour and 
Employment, 2010). 
State nodal agency: The scheme as designed at present has a number of stakeholders. 
At the apex is the Union Government represented by the Ministry of Labour and 
Employment (MoLE), followed by the concerned state government as the next tier 
which sets up an independent state nodal agency (SNA) for implementation of the 
scheme. Different state governments have chosen different departments under which 
to place the SNAs. Therefore, the impact of RSBY may vary from state to state, 
depending on the efficiency of the SNA and its controlling department (Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5: Nodal agency for RSBY implementation 
Name of state State nodal agency 
Delhi, Goa, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Maharashtra, Manipur, Nagaland, Orissa, 
Tamil Nadu, Tripura  
Department of Labour 
Arunachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh Department of Rural Development 
Assam, Uttarakhand National Rural Health Mission 
Bihar, Haryana, West Bengal Directorate ESI 
Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Meghalaya, Punjab 
Department of Health and Family 
Welfare 
Jammu and Kashmir Directorate of Family Welfare 
Himachal Pradesh H.P. Swasthya Bima Yojana Society 
Mizoram Mizoram State Health Care Society 
Source: Based on RSBY’s official website http://www.rsby.gov.in (Ministry of Labour and 
Employment, n.d.) (accessed on 15 February 2015) 
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Management of the scheme and smart cards: There are many stakeholders involved in 
the oversight and execution of RSBY at national, state and district levels. One key 
stakeholder for administrative functions is the insurance company. The nodal agency 
seeks bids from registered public or private insurance companies. Each contract is 
district specific, with the insurer agreeing to establish a separate project office for 
implementing the scheme and coordinating activities with the state nodal agency in 
the state capital. The insurer must agree to cover the benefit package prescribed by the 
Central MoLE through a cashless facility. Annually, an electronic list of eligible BPL 
households is provided to insurers by each participating state’s MoLE. The insurance 
company prepares an enrolment schedule for each village, along with dates, with the 
help of district officials. The insurance companies are provided a maximum of four 
months to enrol BPL families in each district. Insurers are compensated on the basis 
of the number of smart cards issued, i.e. households covered. Smart cards enable 
foolproof biometric identification of the beneficiary and make the scheme completely 
cashless. The eligible beneficiary, whose information is included in the district BPL 
list, needs to come to the enrolment station (in remote areas the insurance company 
travels to the beneficiaries to make the card) and the identity of the household head 
needs to be confirmed by the authorized official in order to issue the smart card. The 
card is personalized and delivered on the spot, along with an information packet 
describing the benefits, hospitals in the network and other relevant information. There 
is also a provision for insurance coverage across states by providing split cards under 
the scheme at the time of first issue, or subsequently at the district kiosk. The split 
value can be decided by the head of the family, provided the total amount on both the 
cards is equivalent to the total amount available on the primary card before the split. 
This could prove useful to a large number of unorganized sector workers in India who 
migrate from one state to the other in search of employment.  
Insurance companies: The unit of implementation under RSBY is a district. There can 
be more than one insurance company operational within a state. Under the IRDA, 
there are 27 health insurance companies listed for the year 2013–14 (Insurance 
Regulatory and Development Authority, 2014). Some of these health insurance 
companies are providing health insurance under RSBY scheme. The list of insurance 
companies contracted in various states of India in 2013–14 is at Table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6: List of insurance companies contracted in various states (2013–14) 
S 
No. 
State Insurance companies (districts) 
No. of districts 
for which data 
was available 
1 Andhra Pradesh Reliance General Insurance (1) 1 
2 Arunachal Pradesh Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance (10) 10 
3 Assam National Insurance Company (23) 23 
4 Bihar 
 ICICI Lombard(10); HDFC (5); Cholamandalam MS General 
Insurance (6); National Insurance (1); Tata AIG General Insurance 
(4); Max Bupa Health Insurance (2); United India Insurance (5); 
Reliance General Insurance (1); Apollo Munich Health Insurance (2) 36 
5 Chandigarh ICICI Lombard 6 
6 Chhatisgarh Oriental Insurance Company (27) 27 
7 Delhi Oriental Insurance Company (9) 9 
8 Goa New India Insurance (2) 2 
9 Gujarat 
Oriental Insurance Company (8); National Insurance Company (3); 
Tata AIG General Insurance (6); Star Health Insurance (5) 22 
10 Haryana National Insurance Company (9); United India Insurance (12) 21 
11 Himachal Pradesh New India Assurance (12) 12 
12 Jammu and Kashmir United India Insurance (1) 1 
13 Jharkhand 
IFFCO-TOKIO General Insurance (1); Tata AIG General Insurance 
(2); Cholamandalam MS General Insurance (7); Star Health and 
Allied Insurance (8); ICICI Lombard (6) 24 
14 Karnataka 
IFFCO-TOKIO General Insurance (14); Tata AIG General Insurance 
(10) 24 
15 Kerala Reliance General Insurance (13) 13 
16 Madhya Pradesh IFFCO-TOKIO General Insurance (3) 3 
17 Manipur New India Assurance (6) 6 
18 Meghalaya ICICI Lombard (10) 10 
19 Mizoram National Insurance Company (8) 8 
20 Nagaland  New India Assurance (11) 11 
21 Orissa 
Star Health Insurance (5); IFFCO-TOKIO General Insurance (8); 
ICICI Lombard (4) 17 
22 Punjab Reliance General Insurance (18); Star Health Insurance (3) 21 
23 Rajasthan National Insurance Company (22); Land T (8) 30 
24 Tamil Nadu United India Insurance (2) 2 
25 Tripura Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance (7) 7 
26 Uttar Pradesh 
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (13), National Insurance Company 
(10); ICICI Lombard (13); Religare Health Insurance Company 
Limited (6); The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (7); Royal Sundaram 
Alliance Insurance (8); HDFC ERGO General Insurance (17);  74 
27 Uttarakhand United India Insurance (13) 13 
28 West Bengal 
United India Insurance (4), National Insurance Company (8); ICICI 
Lombard (1); Cholamandalam MS General Insurance (3); The New 
India Assurance (2) 18 
Source: Adopted from RSBY Website (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2014) (accessed on 20 March 2015) 
Note: Data was not available for the following states/UTs - Andaman and Nicobar, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, 
Daman and Diu, Lakshadweep, Maharashtra, Pondicherry and Sikkim 
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Management information system: The scheme’s management information system is 
built centrally for all state-led RSBY schemes to enable the collection of standardized 
information on all daily transactions at hospitals. This information is uploaded 
through an internet/phone line to a database on a district server. Data from all districts 
flow to the Central Government at periodic intervals. 
Service provision: The insurance company is tasked with empanelling/certifying both 
public and private care providers in the programme. The empanelled facilities must 
agree to set up a specific RSBY desk with smart card reader and trained staff. RSBY 
has negotiated a package rate for all expenses, e.g. medicine, tests, bed charges, 
materials, food etc. related to the treatment of covered services, and payments are 
made to the provider on a case‐based payment system. An empanelled hospital should 
not charge anything from the patient for treatment related to the list of diseases under 
package rates. Under RSBY, a list of 727 package rates has been developed 
(Annexure 1). To get empanelled under the scheme, a facility needs to sign a MoU 
with the insurance company.  
A prerequisite for empanelling is to have appropriate infrastructure for inpatient and 
day care services. This process is carried out by the insurer. However, states may 
assist to complete the task. 
All government hospitals (including PHCs and CHCs) and ESI hospitals can be 
empanelled. The criteria for empanelling private hospitals and health facilities are as 
follows: 
– at least 10 inpatient medical beds for primary inpatient health care; 
– fully equipped and engaged in providing medical and surgical facilities, 
including diagnostic facilities, i.e. pathology testing, X-ray, ECG, etc. for 
the care and treatment of injured or sick persons as inpatients; 
– fully equipped operating theatre where surgical operations are carried out; 
– fully qualified doctors and nursing staff under its employment round the 
clock; 
– maintaining of necessary records as required to provide necessary 
information on the insured patient to the insurer or his 
representative/government/trust as and when required; 
– registration with the Income Tax Department; 
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– telephone/fax and internet facilities;  
– machine to read and manage smart card transactions. 
As of October 2014, 10,311 hospitals (6,093 private hospitals and 4,218 public 
hospitals) were included in the RSBY delivery network (Ministry of Labour and 
Employment, 2014). To avail benefits, a RSBY beneficiary visits a provider and goes 
to the RSBY help desk where the patient’s identity is verified through fingerprints. 
The patient then visits the doctor who assesses his/her health condition and prescribes 
a treatment. The assistant at the RSBY help desk checks whether the procedure is in 
the list of pre‐specified packages. If the procedure is on the list, an appropriate 
prescribed package is selected, the patient is scheduled for the procedure, and the 
amount to be paid is blocked on the smart card. If the procedure is not on the list, the 
help desk checks with the insurer regarding the price and gets approval to conduct the 
procedure. At the time of discharge of the beneficiary from the hospital, the smart 
card is swiped again with fingerprint verification for the amount spent and the amount 
remaining and the beneficiary is paid INR 100 (£ 1.0) by the hospital as transportation 
expense. The pre‐specified cost of procedure is deducted from the amount available 
on the card and the hospital sends an electronic report and claim to the insurer/TPA. 
The insurer/TPA reviews the records and information and makes payment to the 
hospital (electronically) within a specified time period (agreed upon between 
insurer/TPA and hospital). The funds received get into the user fee revenue of public 
hospitals and are utilized as per the guidelines of the user fee and for private hospitals, 
the amount reimbursed is a fee for the service provided by the facility. 
3.5.4 Challenges associated with the RSBY scheme 
Several evaluations have been conducted by the state governments and various other 
organizations in recent years to assess the process and outcome of the RSBY scheme. 
As far as has been ascertained, these state-level evaluations have been conducted in 
Jharkhand, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Himachal Pradesh and Gujarat. 
The Centre for Development Studies in Trivandrum and the Amsterdam Institute for 
Social Science Research, with support from the Hivos Knowledge Programme, 
monitor the implementation of the scheme in the states of Punjab, Gujarat, Odisha, 
Andhra Pradesh and Kerala – states sufficiently distinct from each other in their 
political, economic and social configurations and also situated in different parts of the 
country (Kannan and Varinder, 2012). 
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The RSBY scheme is considered by some as a success (Swaroop, 2012). But 
according to other sources, the scheme offers limited financial protection, suffers 
from corruption, abuse and cost escalation; and has skewed public resources to 
curative rather than preventive care (Balooni et al., 2012, Sinha, 2012, Shivakumar, 
2013, La Forgia and Nagpal, 2012).  
Out of a total of 29 states and 6 UTs, 26 states and 3 UTs are implementing this 
scheme. A district-wise study in 2013–14 shows that out of a total of 505 districts (in 
the RSBY implementing states), 416 (82.4%) districts have been covered (Ministry of 
Labour and Employment, 2014). A total of 37.5 million (approximately 55% coverage 
of total poor households) card holders provide coverage to a total of 112.5 million 
beneficiaries at an average premium of approximately INR 400 (£ 4). For the year 
2013–14, a total of 2.5 million beneficiaries have availed hospitalization services at an 
average claim payout of approximately INR 5000 (£ 50.3) (RSBY Committee, 2014).   
The real test of coverage lies in the number of people actually enrolled. Even after the 
completion of about four years, the fact that eight states have achieved a coverage of 
less than half of the estimated BPL families should have been a matter of concern, 
both to the concerned states as well as the Union Government (Kannan and Varinder, 
2012). A review of the present status of RSBY reflects a huge disparity in uptake of 
RSBY at the state level. States like Delhi and Karnataka have less than 20% 
enrolment, while Himachal Pradesh has more than 85% of its BPL population covered 
under the scheme (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2012a). The overall 
enrolment coverage of the scheme in 2012 was around 42.2% of the BPL population 
(Kannan and Varinder, 2012). This has grown slowly and reached only 55% in 2014 
(Table 3.7). 
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Table 3.7: Enrolment and empanelment under the scheme in various states 
 BPL population Empanelled hospitals 
State BPL 
population 
(%) 
% BPL 
population 
Enrolled 
Private 
hospitals 
Public 
hospitals 
Total 
hospitals 
Share of 
public in 
total 
hospitals 
(%) 
Empanelled 
hospitals per 
10,000 RSBY 
cards 
Empanelled 
hospitals per 
10,000 RSBY 
poor 
households 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
9.2 - 3 4 7 42.9 - - 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 
34.6 - - 11 11 - 0.5 0.28 
Assam 31.9 52.4 28 134 162 17.3 2.4 0.27 
Bihar 33.7 54.6 865 100 965 89.6 1.12 1 
Chandigarh 21.8 61.3 4 4 8 50.0 - - 
Chhattisgarh 39.9 59.2 349 279 628 55.6 5.45 3.5 
Delhi 9.9 - 35 - 35 - - - 
Gujarat 16.6 42.3 937 487 1424 65.8 8.47 4.7 
Haryana 11.1 30.7 429 33 462 92.9 12.25 7.39 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
8 71.6 23 171 194 11.9 8.85 7.08 
Jammu and 
Kashmir 
10.3  5 15 20 25.0 2.31 0.14 
Jharkhand 36.9 50.8 217 220 437 49.7 4.38 2.15 
Karnataka 20.9  546 328 874 62.5 9.1 2.03 
Kerala 7 84.8 146 161 307 47.6 2.02 2.57 
Maharashtra*  - - 1181 15 1196 1.25 5.49 1.51 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
31.6 49.6 76 44 120 63.3 - - 
Manipur 36.8 48.2 6 - 6 100.0 1.25 0.28 
Meghalaya 11.8 40.9 10 188 198 5.1 10.81 10.29 
Mizoram 20.4 21.7 15 78 93 16.1 20.11 30.68 
Nagaland 18.8 20.7 6 1 7 85.7 1.03 2.57 
Orissa 32.5 65.0 137 408 545 25.1 3.3 0.86 
Pondicherry 9.6 34.5 4 - 4 100.0   
Punjab 8.2 51.6 175 161 336 52.1 23.54 5.41 
Rajasthan 14.7 72.1 229 453 682 33.6 - - 
Tripura 14 64.2 1 53 54 1.9 1.12 1.02 
Uttar Pradesh 29.4 37.8 1254 729 1983 63.2 4.99 1.81 
Uttarakhand 11.2 38.3 49 94 143 34.3 5.39 2.91 
West Bengal 19.9 55.3 544 62 606 89.8 1.08 0.85 
Total 21.9 55 6093 4218 10311 59.1 3.8 1.4 
Source: RSBY Website, and Kannan and Varinder (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2014, Kannan and 
Varinder, 2012)(accessed on 20 February 2015) 
*Recent data regarding hospitals empanelled was not available for Maharashtra on the RSBY website 
 
Physical access to hospital treatment is another important aspect of the assessment of 
the success or otherwise of RSBY. Card holders are entitled to get inpatient treatment 
only in empanelled hospitals, which could be either public or private hospitals, thus 
giving the beneficiaries a choice of selection of a health facility. Narayana (2010) in a 
review of the scheme states that the percentage of public hospitals out of those 
empanelled in the sample states varies from 45.8% in Kerala to 4.95% in Haryana to 
none in Maharashtra (a situation slightly different in 2014 as indicated above). 
Nationally, 70% of the empanelled hospitals are from the private sector while the 
remaining 30% are public sector hospitals (Narayana, 2010). Only eight out of 22 
states show a higher number of empanelled public hospitals than private hospitals in 
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more recent years than the Narayana study. However, the process of empanelment is 
not transparent and remains independent of the public domain. Hospitals with highly 
inadequate facilities were reported to be empanelled under the scheme (Nandi et al., 
2012). Distribution of the empanelled hospitals mainly in the urban areas makes 
accessibility a major concern for the RSBY beneficiaries. The absolute number of 
empanelled hospitals is not a sufficient condition to gauge the physical access to 
inpatient treatment (Table 3.7). There are many other details that need to be 
marshalled to make a proper assessment, some of which can only be gathered through 
case studies. In terms of the number of empanelled hospitals per 10,000 RSBY cards, 
most of the states are lagging behind (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2014, 
Kannan and Varinder, 2012) (Table 3.7).  
One of the pre-requisites for a scheme to function reasonably well is the level of 
awareness and capabilities of the persons who are entitled for inclusion in such 
schemes. Despite the scheme being managed from the state level, many beneficiaries 
are unaware of its benefits (Das and Leino, 2011). Ineffective information, education 
and communication (IEC) has been reported in the scheme (Trivedi and Saxena, 
2013).  The case of Punjab is aptly reported by Gill et al. (2013) who state that ‘most 
of the BPL families which the study team met did not know the benefits of RSBY’ 
(Gill et al., 2013). Das (2012) narrates the statement of a sarpanch of a village from 
Orissa: ‘although people have received the card, they do not know how to use it. 
Similarly, they do not have any information about the hospitals empanelled under the 
RSBY scheme and how money is to be claimed using this card’ (Das, 2013). In the 
absence of this important information, there was no effective communication of 
benefits. Two instances are quoted by Das and Leino to illustrate the ignorance of the 
beneficiaries. In one, the card holder did not get benefits due to non-empanelment of 
the hospital where he was rushed for treatment; and in the other, only partial benefit 
could be reimbursed as the smart card expired during the course of the treatment. Poor 
enrolment, limited empanelment and low hospitalization rates are indicative of the 
poor awareness of the scheme among RSBY beneficiaries. Research undertaken by 
Das and Leino in 2011 indicates that although spreading awareness through IEC did 
not have a major impact on scheme enrolment, it did nevertheless have an impact on 
the utilization rates for those who finally became enrolled (Das and Leino, 2011). 
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Surveys of the health-care industry in India have shown that the quality of service 
provided in different facilities varies considerably and that many hospitals do not 
follow standard operating procedures (SOPs). In a study by the National Labour 
Institute, only one third of the study population reported the services to be satisfactory 
while the remaining were not satisfied (Kannan and Varinder, 2012).  
A report by Amicus Advisory as well as several media reports have flagged the issue 
of a large number of ghost cards (Singh, 2010). There are also cases of suspect 
procedures being performed needlessly without treatment protocols. There is no way 
to judge if there is any truth in these charges (Shivakumar, 2013).  
It is reported by Kunhikannan and Aravindan (2012) that in the state of Kerala, there 
are cases where hospitals have retained patients for longer periods than necessary to 
claim a higher amount (Kunhikannan and Aravindan, 2012). It is understood that a 
usual practice of hospitals is to hold patients’ cards, which they can then freely 
manipulate until the transaction is completed in the system. Many of the hospitals 
keep their patients in the dark by not informing them of the amount availed from the 
card and the remaining balance, in spite of the stipulation of giving a printout of these 
details to the patients. Some of the malpractices give a clear indication of 
unreasonable rates being charged under the scheme. Kunhikannan and Aravindan 
point out several worrisome instances that clearly indicate the rigidity in operations, 
which negates the effective implementation of this scheme (Kunhikannan and 
Aravindan, 2012). 
The scheme is designed to be cashless at the time of utilization. However, not 
infrequently, the difficulties in using the card have resulted in cardholders paying for 
the treatment themselves (Seshadri et al., 2011). Lack of knowledge of procedures 
and services, with doctors and hospitals being guarded in accepting cards only for 
claims regarding which they are certain of the coverage, has led to many beneficiaries 
having to pay for their treatment themselves despite the fact that RSBY does indeed 
provide coverage (Seshadri et al., 2011). One of the major problems reported is that 
while the scheme incentivizes hospital treatment, it has no incentives for medical 
management since OPD costs are not covered. Many evaluations have reported high 
use of surgical packages when other options could have been taken (RSBY 
Committee, 2014). 
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An RSBY committee constituted by the MoLE, GoI reported that RSBY has been 
faced with multiple weaknesses on the operational front. Some of the key weaknesses 
pointed out were (RSBY Committee, 2014): 
– There is a conflict of interest with the insurance company conducting 
enrolments, empanelment/de-empanelment of hospitals as well as the 
insurance claims settlements, in some cases through the TPAs.  
– The transaction management software at the field level is flawed, leading 
to no data or inaccurate data being reported.  
– No key performance indicators were defined for monitoring the scheme.  
– Lack of checks and balances at the operational level has led to multiple 
frauds in the scheme. 
– The TPAs have been operating the scheme in various states whereas the 
contract was signed with the insurance company. This has led to instances 
where the states have had to coordinate with the TPAs, who have no direct 
stake in the RSBY.  
– Inadequate staffing of the SNAs is another issue. This has led to negligible 
or a low level of involvement of the SNAs in the states. 
 
3.6 Need for research 
RSBY affords the ideal setting for exploring the role of PPPs in insurance. It is an 
innovative health insurance scheme targeting the BPL beneficiary to the extent that it 
uses contracts with the private sector at different levels of implementation. Although 
RSBY was introduced in 2008, there is little independent evidence on how well the 
use of contracts has worked. Moreover, because this is a Central Government scheme, 
with the unit of implementation being the district within the states, the scheme design 
allows for flexibility in implementation to the states right down to the district level, 
which lends itself to different structures with a varying role of different elements in 
the design of contracts.  
Research should aim at providing data required by policy makers at all levels – 
Central, state and district, to decide between different mechanisms of scheme design. 
This research should directly address various data needs to help improve scheme 
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design and implementation. Particular areas that have been neglected and deserve 
attention are discussed below. 
3.6.1 Areas for research 
Four areas of research motivate this thesis. 
Firstly, in PPPs using management or service delivery contracts, it is crucial to 
understand the allocated roles and responsibilities of partners and the division of risk 
and responsibility between them, including the incentive structures for different 
partners that are built into the scheme design. It is also crucial to understand the role 
of external factors. 
Secondly, since insurance companies are one of the key stakeholders in the 
implementation of RSBY, it is important to understand their objectives and the 
incentives they function under. For example, insurance companies receive a fixed 
income from the premium; and if they are for-profit, they may wish to minimize 
expenditure by empanelling a limited number of facilities, empanelling facilities that 
offer a limited range of services/packages, or empanelling facilities which are not 
within close proximity to a high percentage of the BPL population in order to make it 
difficult for the beneficiaries to avail the benefits they are entitled to. Moreover, an 
initial review of the policy documents reveals the loose language used in contractual 
arrangements as is evident from statements of the following type: ‘The insurer shall 
empanel enough hospitals in the district so that beneficiaries need not travel very far 
to get the health-care services’, or ‘adequate network of hospitals/health facilities 
which meets minimum standards for service delivery and operation’, which leaves 
scope for variation in empanelment of facilities. The criterion for empanelment of 
facilities makes no mention of the packages to be offered at the facility or within the 
district. Additionally, the enrolment in the scheme currently stands at an average of 
3.5 members per family (as against the maximum permissible limit of 5 persons for 
the same fixed premium) and the marketing of the scheme rests with the insurance 
companies (personal communication with the RSBY policy unit in the Central 
Government). The insurance companies have an incentive to encourage enrolment of 
the family but it adds to their profit margin to minimize the number of members 
enrolled per family. 
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Thirdly, the scheme design entitles a RSBY beneficiary to a package of 727 number 
of treatments (the number of treatments for each package on the list being pre-
negotiated) but it is possible that the empanelled private sector facilities, for cost 
considerations, would take on only the simpler cases or chose to treat only selected 
packages (due to inadequate reimbursement through capitation for some of the 
treatments within the package).   
Fourthly, pre-negotiated capitation rates for treatments within the package could 
result in reduced provision of adequate services. This indicates a continuing trade-off 
between risk/responsibility and the price of the contract between the principal and the 
agent. Thus, an important question to address regarding the pre-negotiated payment 
for an RSBY beneficiary is whether the quality of care differs for RSBY patients from 
that delivered to non-RSBY patients. In addition, does this differ across different 
types of providers, both public and private, since motivation to maximize income 
from the contracts may vary by type of provider? 
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4.1 Aims and objectives 
4.1.1 Aim 
To study the provision, availability and use of health services under PPP contracts in 
the implementation of RSBY and the factors that can influence such health services, 
in order to inform policymakers on how to improve the scheme design for the BPL 
beneficiary.  
To meet this aim, all objectives have been examined through contractual 
arrangements in two different districts belonging to different states. The focus is not 
to look for attribution of findings to types of contracts, but to report on the use and 
provision of health services under contractual arrangements for factors such as range 
of services, patterns of utilization and provision of care; and to seek explanations for 
the patterns seen.  
4.1.2 Objectives 
The objectives of the study are: 
1) to analyse the external environment (regulatory, institutional, political, etc.) 
and the contract design of the RSBY scheme in order to understand  strengths 
and weaknesses of the scheme design and the incentive structures created by 
the assigned roles, responsibilities and relationships within the contracts; 
2) to evaluate the availability of services by mapping the health-care providers 
including the packages offered by the empanelled health-care providers, and 
analysing the utilization patterns; 
3) to compare the provision of health care across both public and private 
providers for RSBY beneficiaries and between RSBY and non-RSBY 
beneficiaries for a specific type of provider; 
4) to inform policy on the findings and make recommendations in order to 
address any problems in the scheme and help improve provision of health care 
to the target population.   
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4.2 Conceptual framework 
The RSBY scheme follows a top-down approach. Policies are decided at higher levels 
(Central Government, flowing down to state governments and districts) and are 
communicated to partners at subordinate levels who are then charged with the 
technical, managerial and administrative tasks of putting policy into practice (Figure 
4.1). Different partners such as insurance companies, TPAs, NGOs, self-help groups 
(SHGs) and private and public providers are contracted to deliver the services to the 
RSBY beneficiaries. It was expected that the contract design would have an influence 
on three elements - availability, utilization and service provision, which in turn would 
affect service delivery and equity and efficiency under the scheme. 
This research thus focused on studying service delivery in terms of availability, 
utilization and provision of health services under PPP contracts in the implementation 
of RSBY and the factors that might influence it. Means of influence include payment 
methods, incentive structures, stipulation for sanctions, etc. Other external factors 
such as organization and institutional capacity, and the political and regulatory 
environment that could influence implementation, were also studied. Transaction 
costs, the market and degree of competition, and degree of trust have not been 
formally considered as a part of the analysis due to constraints of resources and 
accessibility to information.  
4.3 Study setting 
The study focused on one district in the state of Haryana (Yamunanagar) and one 
district in the state of Punjab (Patiala) (Figure 4.2a, 4.2b, 4.2c).  
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Fig. 4.1: Conceptual framework 
 
TPA – third party administrator; NGO – non-governmental organization; SHG – self-
help group; PPP – public–private partnership 
Fig. 4.2a: Map of India showing the states of Punjab and Haryana 
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Fig. 4.2b: Map of Yamunanagar district (Haryana) 
 
Source: http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/haryana/railways/yamunanagar.htm (Yamunanagar) 
 
Fig. 4.2c: Map of Patiala district (Punjab) 
 
Source: http://www.jnvpatiala.org.in/MainMenu/Location.html (Patiala) 
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4.3.1 Choice of states/districts 
The reasons for selection of these states and districts were: 
 Buy-in from various stakeholders at the national and state level, including 
the TPAs and insurance companies involved in the implementation of the 
scheme. 
 Choosing two different states helped capture the various elements relating 
to capacity, governance, regulation, etc. across states, as states are the 
primary implementers of the RSBY scheme, with the unit of 
implementation being the district. 
 RSBY had greater than two years of implementation in the districts at the 
start of the study, which helped in collection of reliable data.  
 RSBY had a different set of partners involved in each district and it was 
hoped that choosing one district each in two different states would capture 
variations, if any. It also afforded the opportunity to explore various design 
and local (non-contract) factors that might influence implementation in 
terms of availability, utilization and provision.  
4.3.2 District profiles 
Yamunanagar, Haryana state (Government of Haryana, 2010) 
Yamunanagar district came into existence on 01 November 1989. It has an area of 
1,756 sq km, in which there are 655 villages, 10 towns, two subdivisions, three tehsils 
and three sub-tehsils. Before being named as Yamunanagar, it was known as 
Abdullapur. A large part of the district lies in the Shiwalik foothills. Sugarcane, wheat 
and rice are the main crops. Yamunanagar is an important industrial district and has 
metal, utensil and plywood industries.  
Patiala, Punjab state (Governmnet of Punjab, 2010) 
Patiala is an erstwhile princely state. It was the capital of Patiala and East Punjab 
States Union (PEPSU), which was a state of India between 1948 and 1956. It is a 
district headquarters and is situated in the Malwa region of Punjab. Malwa has the 
largest number of districts in the reorganized Punjab, and antiquity of some of the 
cities goes back to the ancient and early medieval period. Patiala is a relatively young 
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city, a few years more than two centuries old. It is surrounded by the districts of 
Fatehgarh Sahib, Mohali and the UT of Chandigarh to the north, Sangrur district to 
the west, Ambala and Kurukshetra districts of the neighbouring state of Haryana to 
the east and Kaithal district of Haryana to the south. Patiala is a predominantly rural 
district.  
 
4.4 Access and ethical approval 
The aim of the research was first shared with the policymakers in the GoI and state 
governments. Discussions were held with the TPAs and insurance companies at the 
state level. Thereafter, the proposal was submitted to the Ethics Committee at the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. In addition, the proposal was 
submitted to the Institutional Ethics Committee (IEC) at the Public Health Foundation 
of India (PHFI), which undertook a full review of the proposal as recommended in the 
Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) 2006 guidelines. Strict confidentiality 
was maintained for all the data collected including facility data, hospital claim data 
and exit patient interview data. 
The study used both qualitative and quantitative methods to study the use and 
provision of health services under contract. In addition, both primary and secondary 
data were used for quantitative research, with multiple methods employed to allow for 
the triangulation of data in order to enhance the rigour of the research and help 
improve the validity of the data. All data, both primary and secondary, were collected 
under the supervision of the principal investigator (PI) with the assistance of research 
assistants (RAs). Review of the existing documents and reports was carried out by the 
PI with support from the RAs.  
 
4.5 Methods for Objective 1 
Objective 1: To analyse the external environment (regulatory, institutional, political 
etc.) and contract design of the RSBY scheme in order to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of the RSBY scheme design and incentive structures created by 
roles, responsibilities and relationships within the contracts. 
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Research questions 
 What is the political environment in the selected states with regard to RSBY?  
 What regulations govern the contracts within and across different states? 
 What is the institutional capacity in the selected states for implementation of 
RSBY? 
 What is the allocation of roles and responsibilities to different partners within 
the states? How does this vary across states? 
 What is the contract design including the incentive structure for various 
partners/stakeholders? Do these vary across states? 
Data sources and study tools: Data for Objective 1 was collected using key informant 
interviews and review of key documents. The key informants included the key 
personnel at national, state and district levels, key personnel from insurance 
companies operating at district levels, NGO representatives, TPAs and public and 
private sector health-care providers (Table 4.1). Key documents reviewed included 
contracts, programmatic reports, policy documents, evaluations etc. These documents 
were retrieved through the RSBY and Ministry of Labour and Employment website. 
Other sources of these key documents were Government offices, including state nodal 
agencies of the studied states, and personal communication with the central level 
policy makers. The contract between the Central Government and the state 
government, and between the SNA and the insurance company were obtained from 
the SNA. The contracts between the providers and the insurance company were made 
available by the providers. In most cases, the actual signed contractual agreement was 
available; in some others, a draft contract was shared with the understanding that the 
signed document was exactly similar.   
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Table 4.1: In-depth interviews conducted 
SNo. 
Key personnel interviewed Number of 
interviews 
1 RSBY implementers at the national level 3 
 Punjab  
2 Special Secretary RSBY heading the SNA 1 
3 Representative of the SNA 1 
4 Representative of the insurance company  1 
5 NGO representative at the district level 1 
6 Third party administrators 1 
7 Public sector health-care providers 1 
8 Private sector health-care providers 1 
 Haryana  
9 
Director Employees State Insurance (ESI) heading the Nodal 
Agency (Nodal Agency: Directorate of ESI Health Care) 
1 
10 Representative of the insurance company  1 
11 Representative of the SNA 1 
12 NGO representative at the district level 1 
13 Third party administrators  1 
14 Public sector health-care providers 1 
15 Private sector health-care providers 1 
16 
Other stakeholders (key personnel involved in the 
implementation of the scheme) 
3 
 Total 20 
 
A semi-structured in-depth interview guide (for key stakeholder interview) was 
developed by the PI with valuable feedback from the Advisory Committee (Annex 2). 
The Advisory Committee included experts in various fields of study who, in addition 
to having knowledge of prevalent global and India-related issues relevant to RSBY 
specifically and social health insurance broadly, provided valuable feedback on 
design of the study tool. In addition, expert local advice was sought to ascertain the 
nuances in scheme implementation at district level. The interview guide was pilot 
tested on stakeholders. These stakeholders were subsequently not included among the 
study participants. The guide included questions on the political and regulatory 
environment, institutional and organizational capacity, roles and responsibilities and 
contract details. 
Methods 
Interviews were done in a mix of languages—English, Hindi and Punjabi, and lasted 
from 20 to 60 minutes. The interviews were conducted by the PI. Permission was 
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sought from key stakeholders to audio record the interviews for ease of reference and 
transcription. The audio recordings were reviewed and transcribed in English. A 
transcription agency was used in the initial phases to facilitate the process of 
transcription. However, due to the technical nature of the responses, requiring an 
understanding of the scheme design and the implementation process, transcription 
was later done by the PI.  
The data was evaluated using thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Two 
members of the research team (PI and one RA) coded each transcript independently, 
with discrepancies being resolved through consensus. The codes were generated 
based on data in relation to the research question. The codes for each interview were 
entered in the Microsoft excel sheet. Thereafter, identification of key themes was 
done based on various categories of questions in key stakeholder’s interview guide.  
The codes were then grouped together under appropriate themes and conclusions were 
drawn on the basis of the responses under each theme.  
Key documents (contracts between various stakeholders, programmatic reports, policy 
documents, ongoing or previous evaluations, bidding documents as well as the 
promotional material used by the insurance companies, TPAs and NGOs) were 
systematically reviewed by the PI and RA independently. Relevant data pertaining to 
the following themes were extracted: external environment (political and regulatory), 
institutional framework and capacity; policy and guidelines for implementation; and 
roles and responsibilities. Any discrepancy noted was resolved through consensus. . 
The PI and RA critically reviewed the contract documents under the following heads - 
ownership; objective; length of the contract; payment mechanism; completeness and 
comprehensiveness; monitoring mechanisms; specification of sanctions; and 
incentives structure. In case of any discrepancy, inputs from supervisors were sought.  
To assess the market competition, SNA of Punjab provided the list of insurance 
companies who had participated in the bidding process over the years (2008-12) under 
the RSBY scheme. A similar list was not available for Yamunanagar district.  
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4.6 Methods for Objective 2 
Objective 2: To evaluate the availability of services by mapping the health-care 
providers including the packages offered by the empanelled health-care providers, and 
analyzing the utilization patterns. 
Research questions 
 Is there a clustering of facilities within the district? 
 What is the range of services/packages offered by the empanelled facilities? 
 What is the utilization pattern including utilization by/from a specific 
population group (gender, medical condition), provider (public or private), 
patterns for imparting care, etc.? 
Data sources and study tools 
Primary data was used for assessment of availability of services and certain category 
of enrolment. While devising the methodology it was anticipated that secondary data 
on availability of services might be lacking, and hence it was planned that primary 
data be collected through personal interviews with the health-care providers. A 
checklist for availability of services in empanelled hospitals was used. This checklist 
consisted of availability of 20 services which were based on categories defined under 
the list of package rates of RSBY scheme.  
For assessment of access to services, a secondary database of empanelled facilities 
was sourced from the insurance companies. Information was also requested from the 
district medical officers regarding the total number of registered medical facilities in 
the chosen districts. Thereafter, a comprehensive list of facilities eligible for 
enrolment was compiled. Secondary data of BPL census (block-wise) was also used 
for assessment of access to services. This database was retrieved from SNAs of both 
the states. The BPL population is the population eligible for enrolment under the 
RSBY scheme. The SNA procured the data for eligible candidates (BPL population) 
from the office of Registrar General of India. Line listing of the individuals (BPL 
population) was available for both the districts and contained the following 
information – name, age, gender and address (blocks).  
For assessment of enrollment, a secondary database was analysed which was retrieved 
from the SNAs of both the states. SNA procured the enrolled data from the insurance 
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company. For Patiala district, line listing of enrolled individuals with the following 
information - name, age, gender was available. Also, line listing at household level 
with the following information - name, age and gender of HoH and number of 
individuals enrolled was available. However, in Yamunanagar district, line listing of 
enrolled individuals was not available though line listing at household level was 
available which included information on name, age and gender of HoH and number of 
individuals enrolled. To analyze off-target and leakages under the enrolment, primary 
data (Exit interview) was used. Information on BPL status and RSBY enrolment of 
the studied participants during the exit interviews was used to assess off-target and 
leakages. 
To assess the utilization pattern under the scheme, secondary data on claims made by 
the providers was used. This secondary data comprised of information on the 
claimant, disease, transaction details and transaction amounts. These were sourced 
from the insurance companies via the SNA. The SNA does not store claims data 
itself; hence, data for utilization of the scheme by beneficiaries for the selected study 
period was obtained from the empanelled insurance companies. Claims data set was 
sourced for one complete annual cycle of enrolment, from September 2011 to 
December 2012. However, extension for the enrolment cycle was sought in both 
selected states, which took the enrolment period to the beginning of 2013. A total of 
992 claims from Patiala district and 6,043 claims from Yamunanagar district were 
made during the study period. The claims data had the following information: 
 Unique identity of the smart card 
 Date of enrolment 
 Dates of admission and discharge 
 Amounts claimed and reimbursed 
 Relationship of the claimant with the head of the household 
 Diagnosis 
 Age and sex of the beneficiary 
 Type of hospital 
 Name of the hospital. 
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Methods 
Assessment of possible clustering of facilities to assess the level of access within the 
district was undertaken by mapping the empanelled and non-empanelled facilities 
within the district. Based on the criteria used for empanelment formulated by the state 
governments, a methodology was devised to only include facilities in the mapping 
that would be eligible for enrolment (as stated in chapter 3). For public facilities, 
CHCs, subdivisional hospitals and civil hospitals were considered. Primary Health 
Centres and Sub-centres were not included as they do not have sufficient in-patient 
facilities to make them eligible for empanelled under RSBY scheme. For private 
facilities, diagnostic centres were not included. Tele-communication was used to 
ensure the absence of in-patient facilities in these diagnostic centres. ArcGIS
®
, a 
geographic information system, was used as the mapping software and three types of 
maps were generated for both Patiala and Yamunanagar. These included maps of 
empanelled facilities (Public and Private), empanelled and non-empanelled facilities, 
and all eligible facilities (Private Empanelled, Private Non-empanelled, Public 
empanelled, and Public Non-empanelled).  In addition, available data on the volume 
of BPL enrolled families at block level was used to colour code blocks based on BPL 
family density. Four different categories were used: <50000, 50000-60000, 60000-
70000, and >70000.  
To assess the availability of services, the 20 sub categories included were - Neonatal 
care; Burns; Snake bite; Oncology; Urology; Endocrinology; Paediatrics; 
Orthopaedics; Ophthalmology; Neurosurgery; Hysteroscopy; Endoscopic procedures; 
Gynaecology; General surgery; ENT; Dental; Medical general ward – ICU; Medical 
general ward – nonsurgical; Medical general ward – surgical. The checklist was filled 
by trained interviewers in consensus with the providers. There were some instances 
where the provider refused to release information on availability of services within the 
agreed package and therefore had to be excluded from the data set. Data was collected 
in English and was entered into Microsoft excel sheet customized for this purpose. 
Descriptive analysis was performed for availability of services. An assessment was 
made of the total services available in the private and public hospitals by summing the 
total number of services available in each facility and dividing it by the maximum 
possible services available (20 multiplied by number of facility available for analysis 
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in the present study). Data for availability of services was entered in Microsoft excel 
and STATA was used for analysis.  
Descriptive analysis was performed for enrolment using STATA software. For both 
the districts, enrolment at individual level and family level was calculated. Apart from 
this, the average number of individuals enrolled per family and the gender of the HoH 
was also calculated. For Patiala district, age and gender-wise (individual level) 
enrolment status was also analysed, however, this could not be done for Yamunanagar 
district as line listing of enrolled individuals was not available. Exit interview was 
used for assessment of off-target and leakages under the scheme. Off target was 
defined as the BPL population which was not enrolled under the scheme while 
leakage was defined as RSBY enrolled population but not BPL. STATA was used to 
run binary logistic regression analysis to find the determinants for off-target and 
leakages. The factors (independent variables) which were adjusted were education 
status; caste; age; gender and district. All the information available in the exit 
interviews was studied carefully and possible factors which could determine off-target 
or leakage were identified for in discussion with supervisors. Correlation among these 
independent variables was assessed and finally put in the regression model. Amongst 
the selected independent variables; the exposed groups considered were illiterate or 
literate up to primary level; females; SC/ST population; and Yamunanagar. The 
association was represented in the form of p-value and adjusted odds ratio. A p-value 
of less than 0.05 was considered to be statistically significant. 
For assessment of utilization pattern, the claim data was analysed using STATA. 
Initially the data was screened and cleaned for any outliers. Outliers were noticed for 
amount claimed and reimbursed and duration of admission. Descriptive analysis was 
performed for volume of claims stratified over time, type of hospital, district, and 
gender. Clustering of claims over selected hospital was also assessed. Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) was used for assessment of clustering of claims in hospitals. 
It is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration, calculated by squaring 
the market share of each firm competing in a market, and then summing the resulting 
numbers. The HHI number could range from close to zero to 10,000. Mean and 
standard deviations were calculated for reimbursed and claimed amount. Kernel’s 
density diagram was also plotted for reimbursed and claimed amount for type of 
hospital and district. Multivariate regression analysis was done to assess the 
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determinant of reimbursement amount taking relationship to HoH, type of hospital, 
duration of stay, age, district and gender as independent factors. These factors were 
selected on the basis of their being possible confounder and was discussed with 
supervisors keeping in view all the information available in the claims data. Before 
running the regression model, correlation was assessed among these independent 
variables. Other factors analysed in the claims data were duration of stay, diagnosis 
and time taken to settle the claims. While running the regression model, each 
independent variable was entered in the regression model at each step and hence five 
models were created. 
 
4.7 Methods for Objective 3 
Objective 3: To compare the provision of health care across both public and private 
providers for RSBY beneficiaries and between RSBY and non-RSBY beneficiaries 
for a specific type of provider.  
Research questions 
 Does provision differ across both public and private providers for RSBY 
beneficiaries?  
 Is there any variation in user satisfaction between the private and public 
facilities, and between RSBY and non-RSBY patients, across the selected 
states? 
A total of 12 facilities were selected with three public and three private facilities in 
each of the two chosen districts (Patiala and Yamunanagar). Two key factors in 
selection of the facilities were the volume of RSBY patients coming to the facility, 
and the management’s willingness to participate in the research, i.e. a purposive 
sampling strategy was used for the selection of the RSBY empanelled facilities. In 
addition, an attempt was made to include both urban and rural facilities of each type 
in the selected districts to try and account for variations in delivery of care. One 
possible reason for variation could be a lower level of accountability on the part of the 
health provider in a less urban location due to remoteness from the district 
management (for public facilities) or a less aware patient from a lower socio-
economic background (for both private and public facilities).  
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Evaluation of provision of services was categorized into three sequential stages which 
were adapted from the Donabedian Framework (Donabedian, 2005, Donabedian, 
1988): 
1. Structure: Evaluation of structural aspects of care via a standard checklists (health 
provider checklist, and observational and facility record checklist) e.g. clinic opening 
hours, access for disabled people, adequacy and state of repair of buildings, adequate 
emergency equipment, adequacy of toilets, etc. 
2. Process: Evaluation of process of care via patient time spent in the clinic, adequacy 
and comfort of waiting area, patient privacy during the consultation, display of health 
education materials, etc.   
3. Outcome: User satisfaction/perceived quality assessed via patient exit interviews. 
Measurement of scheme outcome (effects of health care on the health status of 
patients and population) requires large sample size and long term follow up, which is 
beyond the scope of this study and hence quality of care provided in the scheme 
instead of scheme outcome has been selected.   
Technical quality of care usually included in the Donabedian Framework was 
excluded from evaluation due to resource constraints and difficulty in measuring the 
quality level. 
Data sources and study tools  
Observational and Facility Record Checklist (Annex 4) and Health Provider Checklist 
(Self-assessment) (Annex 5): These checklists addressed the structural evaluation of 
provision of care in the 12 selected facilities. Checklists were prepared by a group of 
experienced individuals in the field of hospital administration and RSBY 
implementation on the basis of the study objectives. The checklists were piloted by 
trained interviewers in hospitals that were not selected for the study.  
All observations on the observational and facility record checklist were documented 
by trained data collectors with a degree in medicine. The health provider checklist 
was completed by the providers (hospital staff) in the selected facilities. Responses to 
all the questions were in the format of the Likert scale. The information gathered in 
the observational checklists and health provider checklists mainly fell under the 
following headings: 
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o access and physical facilities;  
o patient rights; 
o health and safety; 
o operating department 
o radiology services; 
o labour room (if providing maternity services); 
o facility records. 
Exit interviews with patients (Annex 6): Patients from selected empanelled hospitals 
were interviewed during their discharge from the hospitals or during the follow-up 
visits on their inpatient experience. Consent was sought for participation in the study 
after which a semi-structured, pre-tested questionnaire was used by the trained 
interviewers. The information collected from the study participants belonged to the 
following heads: 
o socio-demographic characteristics of the study participants; 
o amount paid to be registered in the scheme; 
o RSBY help desk and signages in the selected empanelled hospital; 
o waiting time for being attended to by the hospital staff;  
o process for hospital registration;  
o cost of treatment; 
o diagnostics and medicines from outside the hospital; 
o food served in the hospital and its quality; 
o discharge from the hospital; 
o reimbursement of transportation cost; 
o expense reimbursement during post hospitalization period; 
o reason/s for choosing the particular health facility; 
o previous health facility contacted; 
o transportation to hospital; 
o family members accompanying the patient. 
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To assess user satisfaction during the hospital stay, a questionnaire was developed 
based on the structure of the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers 
and Systems (HCAHPS, 2012) questionnaire. A modified version of this 
questionnaire was adapted for the local settings. The HCAHPS survey is the first 
national, standardized, publicly reported survey of patients’ perspective of hospital 
care. This section of the exit interview questionnaire had seven categories to assess 
the quality of care given in the hospitals, viz. care during admission, care from the 
nursing staff, care from the doctors, hospital environment, experiences in the hospital, 
care during discharge and overall rating by the beneficiaries. There were several 
questions asked under each category, with various possible responses. The responses 
to the questions were mainly in an ordinal format.  
Sample size and Sampling Technique 
The estimated sample size for the exit interview was 752 (376 RSBY beneficiaries 
and 376 non-RSBY patients), considering it to be a case control study design, with 
95% confidence interval (CI), 80% power, expected frequency of exposure (scheme 
implementation) in the control group 20% and percentage exposure among the cases 
as 10%. Epi Info 6 was used for the estimation of sample size.  
Consecutive interviews were conducted (consecutive sampling) in the selected 
empanelled hospitals till the desired sample size was achieved in each facility. The 
exclusion criteria for the study were – being enrolled in any other insurance scheme, 
and patient not agreeing to give written consent for the study. A total of 751 exit 
interviews were conducted with 399 participants interviewed from Patiala district and 
352 from Yamunanagar district. A total of 387 RSBY beneficiaries and 364 non-
RSBY beneficiaries were interviewed. Private hospitals contributed with 398 exit 
interviews while 353 exit interviews were conducted in public hospitals (Figure 4.3). 
The initial aim of the study was to interview an equal number of RSBY and non-
RSBY patients at each facility; however, due to lack of volume of patients in certain 
facilities and due to financial and time constraints, a more pragmatic approach was 
adopted.  
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Fig. 4.3: Enrolled participants for exit interviews 
 
Data analysis  
Data collected in the format of observational checklists, health provider and facility 
record checklist, and exit interviews were entered in Microsoft excel sheet. All 
statistical analyses were performed with STATA. 
In the context of both the checklists, the responses were primarily in the form of five 
point Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, difficult to judge, disagree, strongly 
disagree) or in a few cases the responses were bivariate (Yes/No). For the purpose of 
analysis, scores were given to the responses. A score of one meant ‘strongly agree’ 
while a score of five meant ‘strongly disagree’. Extreme scores were given to 
bivariate responses, i.e. either one or five. Therefore, lower the score, the better was 
the structural aspect of health care. For each category mentioned under the checklist 
(stated above), mean score of all questions (within the category) were calculated so as 
to get a consolidated score for each category. Finally, mean scores were calculated for 
the consolidated score of each category and an intra-district comparison of public and 
private hospitals was conducted. Mann-Whitney U test was used, data being non-
parametric, to assess the statistical difference between the scores of public and private 
hospitals. However, this statistical test was not applied for intra-district comparison 
since the sample size of hospitals was very small (only three hospitals in each group). 
For exit interviews, descriptive analysis was performed for socio-demographic 
profile, process of services delivery and user satisfaction. Appropriate statistical tests 
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were used to assess the statistical difference between the variables. Chi square test 
was used where the comparisons were made between categorical variables and 
student’s t-test was used to compare continuous variables in two groups. The 
objective of this analysis was to compare the independent variables between RSBY 
and non-RSBY participants, between participants from private and public hospitals, 
and between participants from Patiala and Yamunanagar districts. Data was entered in 
Microsoft excel sheet and all the analysis were carried out using STATA. Data was 
cleaned and screened for outliers after the data entry. Determinants of out-of-pocket 
expenditure were also calculated through multivariate regression analysis (binary 
logistic regression). The factors adjusted in the regression analysis were gender 
(male/female), type of facility (public/private), age, district (Patiala/Yamunanagar), 
BPL status (Yes/No) and RSBY enrolment (Yes/No).  The association was 
represented in the form of p-value and adjusted odds ratio. A p-value of less than 0.05 
was considered to be statistically significant. 
For analysis of quality of care provided by the health facilities, two different type of 
analysis was done. Firstly, simple descriptive analysis was done in the form of 
proportions. Secondly the ordinal responses were converted to scores. The score of 
the converted responses ranged from one to five. For ordinal responses in the 
questionnaire a score of one was given to the worst response while a score of five was 
given to the best response. For the few questions with binary responses, a score of one 
was given for a negative response while a score of 5 was given for a positive 
response. The responses were scaled to a five-point scale for questions where the 
responses were in four-point scale with one being worst and four being the best 
response. Mean scores were calculated for each of the seven categories stated above 
so as to get a consolidated score for each category.  A comparison was made between 
the scores of private and public hospitals, between RSBY and non-RSBY 
beneficiaries, and between Patiala and Yamunanagar. Student’s t-test (comparison of 
means) was used for statistical comparison as the outcome was continuous and the 
data was parametric. 
4.8 Methods for Objective 4 
Objective 4: To inform policy based on the findings and make recommendations in 
order to address any problems in the scheme and to help improve provision of health 
care to the target population.   
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Data collection and method 
Data collected under other objectives was drawn together and related to the design of 
the arrangements and the motivation of partners. This helped to explore relationships 
between observed pattern and design in implementation of contracts as a PPP 
instrument under RSBY. Triangulation was used as a qualitative data tool by 
gathering different perspectives from various stakeholders involved in implementation 
of the scheme. An exploratory qualitative approach was adopted to capture the subtle 
nuances that might influence the long-term success of the scheme.  
 
4.9 Amendments in methodology 
Non-availability of certain information proposed in the initial protocol led to changes 
in the methodology of the study. Certain data could not be retrieved from the nodal 
offices, nor was not available with the primary source. The changes were made in 
consensus with all supervisors of the study. The amendments made in the methods 
section of the protocol consisted of a change in the number of exit interviews 
conducted in each facility due to a lack of volume in the number of patients, and 
financial and time constraints in finishing the data collection process. It was initially 
envisioned that a total of 752 exit interviews (376 RSBY and 376 non-RSBY 
beneficiaries) would be conducted. This had to be reduced to planning for 62 exit 
interviews in each facility, with consecutive patients being interviewed till completion 
of 31 RSBY and 31 non-RSBY patient interviews. Ultimately, exit interview numbers 
conducted at each facility varied slightly from this initial number proposed due to a 
lack in the requisite number of patients in the same facility. 
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the first objective of this study, i.e. to study the 
external environment (political, regulatory, institutional, etc.) of RSBY and to analyse 
the contract design and implementation in order to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of the RSBY design and the incentive structures created by 
roles, responsibilities and relationships within the contracts. 
The external environment relates to the contracting milieu at the time of the launch of 
RSBY. The roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders were assessed in order 
to better understand the incentive structures that are inherent in the scheme design and 
how these might affect implementation. The institutional framework and capacity was 
analysed at the central, state and district levels in light of these discussions; the 
regulatory framework was ascertained from key stakeholders. The key informants 
included the national, state and district level bureaucrats assigned to oversee the 
running of RSBY, personnel from insurance companies operating at the district level, 
NGO representatives, TPAs and public and private sector health-care providers.  
Data was drawn from the following sources –interviews with key stakeholders and 
review of key documents. Details of each database and the methodology adopted have 
been described in Chapter 4.  
The results are described under five headings: 
– external environment;  
– institutional framework and capacity;  
– policy and guidelines for implementation;  
– roles and responsibilities; and  
– contract analysis 
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5.2 External environment 
The external environment includes those factors that directly or indirectly influenced 
the launch and sustainability of the RSBY scheme. It includes opportunities and 
threats that are outside the organization and are not within the control of the 
management. As Babatunde and Abdebisi state, the management of any organization 
has little or no influence on the external environment (Babatunde and Adebisi, 2012). 
The external environmental factors considered are the political environment and the 
regulatory framework.  
5.2.1 Political environment 
It is important to understand the political environment under which the RSBY scheme 
was launched in 2008, considering that it was one of the flagship initiatives of the 
political party in power, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA). In May 
2004, the Government presented its National Common Minimum Programme 
(NCMP), which included a national scheme for health insurance for poor families 
(Bajpai and Sachs, 2004). Thereafter, the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) 
was formally introduced by the Prime Minister on 15 August 2007, aimed at 
providing health insurance to BPL families. The scheme was launched in April 2008 
under a PPP arrangement, driven primarily by formal and informal contracts with a 
variety of stakeholders. Central level policymakers were of the view that health care 
was being given this increasing importance mainly due to political reasons. This led to 
a significant push to launch the scheme without adequate planning, in view of the 
general elections in 2009. The Congress-led UPA won these elections.  
RSBY was projected as a state-managed national health insurance scheme targeting 
workers in the informal sector living below the poverty line, with certain design 
changes from the previous scheme, the UHIS. After the challenges faced by the 
MoHFW in implementing the UHIS scheme, the Ministry was hesitant to take the 
responsibility of implementing yet another health insurance scheme. Thus, RSBY was 
initially located in the Ministry of Finance. Considering the complexity of the task, it 
was later decided to place the scheme with the MoLE.  
An important difference between the UHIS and the RSBY is that in the latter, the 
responsibility for scheme implementation also rests with the private sector in addition 
to the public sector. Before formulating the scheme, the MoLE researched existing 
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health schemes in other countries such as the Philippines and Thailand, as well as 
insurance schemes operational in various states of India. A Central level policymaker 
stated that ‘Many NGO schemes like SEWA in Gujarat, Arogyashri in Andhra 
Pradesh, 30 Baht Scheme of Thailand and PhilHealth Scheme of Philippines were 
reviewed. It is not easy to specifically mention which scheme was taken the most into 
account…’ Several positive features from other schemes were included in the RSBY 
design, while also paying critical attention to the negative aspects of these schemes. 
The biggest challenge during the initial phase of the scheme was getting a buy-in from 
various implementation levels of government. It was difficult to run the scheme in the 
initial two years, the biggest hurdle being the government itself, since many people 
within the government perceived it as a politically-driven scheme with questionable 
sustainability.  
The scheme was designed to be implemented as a PPP. Since the design of the 
scheme required a high level of participation from the private sector, it was important 
to actively engage the private players. However, it was initially very difficult to 
convince the private sector to participate in the scheme, which questioned the 
sustainability of the scheme asserting that ‘the government keeps coming with weird 
ideas and after sometime they vanish’ (private provider). To get a buy-in from the 
private sector, the Central Government ensured a collaborative process so as not to 
impose the programme on the private sector.  
Support from other ministries and external agencies are crucial in launching and 
sustaining a mass-scale health insurance scheme like the RSBY. A Central-level 
policymaker stated that while the Planning Commission
4
 was not of much help during 
the launch of the scheme, the World Bank played a substantive role in providing 
technical assistance. The MoHFW was part of the approval committee for RSBY and 
was supportive in allowing the funds coming from the claims reimbursement under 
the RSBY to the empanelled public hospitals to be retained by the public health 
facilities under their user-fee fund. 
The opinion of policymakers at the Central level was sought to understand the role the 
political environment at the state level would play in the implementation of the 
scheme, and if having the same or different ruling parties at the Central and state 
                                                          
4
 Since superseded by the NITI Aayog 
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levels would have an effect on the success of the scheme. They felt that this would not 
make much of a difference in the implementation of the scheme. Examples were cited 
of Congress-ruled states like Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra which had not done 
well, while states such as Chattisgarh where the main opposition party (the Bharatiya 
Janata Party [BJP]) was in power had done well. Further, the state of Delhi, housing 
the national capital of India and led by the Congress party, had not adopted the 
Scheme. Over the years, the Scheme had transcended political boundaries, and 
different political parties at the Central and state levels had minimal or no impact on 
the success of the scheme in any particular state. However, as at the Central level, it 
was initially a challenge to convince the various implementers at the state levels to 
participate in the RSBY model. The primary reason for this was that the states did not 
take the responsibility and did not dedicate enough time to the implementation of the 
scheme, which is a fairly complex model involving a multitude of partners. Initially, 
at the state level, there was no ownership of the scheme and the partnership between 
the public and private sector was less collaborative. 
In the chosen states of Punjab and Haryana that this thesis examines, during the 
period from the latter part of 2011 to the beginning of 2013, Haryana had a Congress-
led government while the ruling party in Punjab was the Akali Dal, which was 
strongly in opposition to the Congress. Both the states decided to adopt the scheme in 
2008 in a phased manner by staggering the enrolment, starting with a few of the 
districts and progressively adding districts each year. Both the selected districts, 
Yamunanagar in Haryana and Patiala in Punjab, have been associated with the 
programme from the start of the implementation period. The design of the RSBY 
requires political commitment at the state level, since the state government is the key 
player in the implementation of the scheme and a variety of players from the public 
and the private sector need to be coordinated.  
The state-level implementers were also interviewed to understand their perspectives 
on the political environment and its impact on implementation. In Punjab, it was 
acknowledged that despite the ruling party having changed, the basic schemes and 
policies, especially the ones that relate to public welfare, often do not change. The 
policymakers at the SNA, which is the primary implementing authority at the state 
level and operates under the Department of Health and Family Welfare, affirmed that 
for a scheme of this kind to succeed, political support was critical. The MoLE at the 
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state level did not play much of a role in the progress of the scheme. There were a few 
hiccups in the phasing-in period of the scheme, but political support within the state 
helped.  
At the district level, the implementers were of the view that the scheme had improved 
over the years and that political support had facilitated its successful implementation. 
The insurance companies’ representative opined that as private players, the insurance 
companies had faced no political problems. This could be due to fact that they 
primarily dealt with the SNA; hence, their exposure to political bottlenecks was 
limited. A related factor is that a decision had already been taken at the Central level 
to engage the insurance companies in state-wide implementation of RSBY, thus 
rendering their work at the state level less exposed to political interference. He was of 
the view that engagement with the private sector was vital since the demand for 
quality health care was high and the government would not be able to address that 
solely through the public sector in a resource-constrained environment.  
In Haryana, an implementer from the SNA believed that because the scheme was 
formulated at the Central level, the State Government was initially unwilling to take 
responsibility for scheme implementation. In the pilot phase only a few districts were 
included. However, subsequently all districts in the State were covered. While 
political commitment for the scheme was present in Haryana, higher political 
engagement could have been possible if the Central Government had allowed the 
states to change the name of the scheme to get more political mileage, which the 
current model for RSBY did not allow. It was felt that the partnership arrangement 
with the private sector should continue, because in its absence ‘the 10% of RSBY 
work which is going on right now will also halt’. Haryana implementers were of the 
opinion that the Punjab Government was sceptical about the scheme since there were 
different political parties at the Centre and state. An official from the SNA in Haryana 
further commented that in Punjab ‘the present State Government is using RSBY to 
gain political mileage. They are trying to add 10 lakh (one million) BPL people in the 
scheme’. 
5.2.2 Regulatory framework 
To understand the regulatory environment, data collected from various sources was 
triangulated. The sources of data included key stakeholder interviews, and review of 
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documents Preker et al. believed that health-care services require a strong regulatory 
environment before governments can rely on obtaining services from the private 
sector (Preker et al., 2000). If private sector models are to succeed, there would be a 
need for a strong regulatory, managerial and information capacity (Regional 
Committee for Europe - WHO, 2002). As noted earlier in Chapter 3 (Sec 3.4.1), 
regulatory frameworks that influence social security and social insurance including 
medical professions is under the Concurrent List of the Constitution of India, while 
public health and hospitals are under the State List.  
Medical professionals, facilities and drugs 
One of the state nodal agency representatives was of the opinion that despite all 
legislation, there is hardly any regulation of practitioners’ clinics, nursing homes and 
hospitals even though the Medical Council of India (that sets the standards of medical 
practice) is mandated to 'discipline' the professionals, monitor their activities and 
check any malpractices. Doctors who set up clinics, hospitals, nursing homes, etc. 
have to register with the respective local bodies.
5
 However, the controlling bodies are 
virtually non-functional. This is not only due to lack of interest, but also weak 
provisions in the various acts, in addition to the heavy influence wielded by the 
private health sector as well as their political affinities. Representatives from state 
nodal agencies also pointed out that at present the national body is preoccupied with 
accreditation of medical colleges while the state bodies function primarily as 
registrars for issuing licenses for practicing medicine. The medical councils did not 
even update the lists of registered medical practitioners properly.  
Due to bureaucratic procedures, the public sector is forced to comply with some 
minimum requirements, e.g. employ qualified technical staff, follow certain set 
procedures for the purchase and use of equipment/stores, etc. and is subject to public 
audit. On the other hand, the private health sector operates without any significant 
controls and restrictions. There is a considerably large presence of private institutional 
providers in the country. However, information about their numbers, role, nature, 
structure, functioning, type and quality of care remains grossly inadequate. This has 
led to questions regarding the quality of care provided by private health-care services. 
Till recently, clinical establishments were not monitored in the vast majority of the 
                                                          
5
Municipalities, zilla parishads, panchayat samitis, offices of civil surgeons, etc. 
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states in India. Only a few states had requirements for registration of private facilities 
such as hospitals and nursing homes. However, with the passing of the Clinical 
Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010, it was hoped that things 
would change.  
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has the jurisdiction to control and regulate 
the manufacturing, trading and sale of all pharmaceutical products. Although this was 
the singular authority that had been provided some teeth by law, a private provider 
stated that its performance was much below expectations, besides being ridden with 
corruption.  
Key stakeholders in the SNAs in Punjab and Haryana were of the view that most 
medical practitioners of repute would have been registered with the Medical Council. 
However, it was difficult for them to conclusively state the thoroughness of the 
registration process, since it was outside the purview of their direct responsibility. At 
the district level as well, the necessity of registration with the Medical Council was 
confirmed. However, during data collection, when the study team requested for a 
comprehensive list of private sector providers at the district level, the response was 
that the list may not be comprehensive and up–to-date.  
Regulation of clinical establishments is directly under the purview of the states. Some 
States like Delhi, Tamil Nadu, Orissa and Manipur, among others, have successfully 
introduced regulatory legislation of clinical establishments. Punjab passed the Punjab 
Nursing Home Registration Act in 1991, which was later repealed due to the influence 
of the medical lobby. A review of the minutes of the Punjab Indian Medical 
Association (IMA) presidential address in early 2009 shows the cancellation of the 
Punjab Nursing Home Registration Act being mentioned as a major achievement of 
the IMA (Sharma, n.d.). In Haryana, a panel was constituted in 2005 to develop the 
Registration of Nursing Home Act to curb the mushrooming of illegal nursing homes 
and keep a check on the quality of health services being provided to the people of the 
State (Kapur, 2008). The Haryana clinical establishment (registration and regulation) 
Act was finally passed in 2014 (Haryana Government Gazette, 2014). 
Insurance Companies and TPAs 
State governments engage in a competitive public bidding process to select a public or 
private insurance company licensed to provide health insurance by the IRDA or 
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enabled by a Central legislation, for RSBY implementation. Unlike the regulations for 
providers, which appeared to be weak and had certain gaps, regulations for Insurance 
companies and TPAs exist. Both, the insurance companies and TPAs, are regulated by 
IRDA. There are specific guidelines mandated by the IRDA for insurance companies 
and TPAs to provide health insurance. Insurance companies can only participate in 
the bidding process by the state governments, once they have been licenced by the 
IRDA for provision of health insurance.  
 
5.3 Institutional framework and capacity 
To comprehend the impact of institutional capacity on contract implementation, it is 
imperative to first understand the institutional framework in place and analyse the 
functioning of various contracts and the role of different institutions in their 
implementation. The institutional and organizational structure was assessed at all 
levels – Central, state and district. 
According to Central-level policy makers, the RSBY was launched without putting in 
place any formal organizational structure. The existing structure of the Director 
General Labour Welfare at the Central level was used to roll out the scheme. It was 
believed that since RSBY involved a multitude of stakeholders, both public and 
private, the initial absence of institutional and organizational structures would provide 
the flexibility to build institutions suited to the needs of the scheme.  
5.3.1 Central level  
Core Group. Central-level policymakers affirmed that at the Central level the scheme 
was being driven by a Core Group consisting of representatives of Director General 
Labour Welfare (DGLW), World Bank, GTZ, MoHFW (in the initial phase of the 
scheme) and National Informatics Centre (NIC). The Core Group meets once a week 
and the agenda is need-based, focusing on conceptual and operational issues and the 
future course of action. A technical cell has been set up in the office of DGLW with 
the primary responsibilities of piloting projects at the state-level, conducting 
monitoring and evaluation and providing oversight for effective implementation of the 
scheme, for which it had an allocated budget.  
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Key Management System. A Key Management System (KMS) was set up by the NIC 
to ensure accountability of the beneficiary smart card – its issuance and usage. This 
entailed setting up a Central Key Generating Authority (CKGA) that regulates and 
issues keys for use by field key officers (FKOs), hospital functionaries and district 
kiosk functionaries. 
Approval and Monitoring Committee. The Approval and Monitoring Committee was 
the first formal institution to be set up at the Central level with member 
representatives from the Ministry of Finance, MoHFW and the Planning Commission, 
with the DGLW in the MoLE as the convener. The role of the Committee was to 
periodically monitor and review the progress of the scheme and approve proposals 
submitted by the state governments. 
Health Committee. A Health Committee, with the Secretary, Labour and Employment 
as its Chairman was the second formal institution created at the national level to 
deliberate upon and take decisions relating to health and insurance issues. This 
committee is supported by a group of experts to aid and advice in analysing various 
health-related technical issues. 
Information Technology Committee. A third committee, the Information Technology 
Committee, was constituted under the Chairmanship of the Secretary Labour and 
Employment with representatives from Ministry of Information Technology, Ministry 
of Finance (Smart Card Association of India) and several other experts. This 
committee gradually evolved as an authority on all technology-related issues. It deals 
with the implications of software- and hardware-related decisions. For the purpose of 
certifying various software prepared by the insurance companies, Smart Card Testing 
and Certification (STQC) was engaged as a testing agency. Certificates were issued 
by a sub-committee based on its reports. 
National nodal officers. Additionally, there are national nodal officers (NaNOs) who 
are nominees of the insurance companies for single-point interface with the Central 
Government. A joint meeting is held once a month with the Central Government for 
discussion and feedback. Quarterly dinner meetings with CEOs of insurance 
companies have been institutionalized. According to Central-level policymakers, 
NaNOs have evolved as an important instrument of review of implementation at the 
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field level and are gradually being empowered by the respective insurance company 
CEOs to take decisions on their behalf.   
Grievance Redressal Committee. In view of the possible frauds under the scheme and 
to resolve disputes between stakeholders, a Grievance Redressal Committee has been 
constituted under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Director General in DGLW. This 
institution, besides being the final reference point for disputes between various 
stakeholders, also undertakes field visits to take stock of the situation on the ground.  
Policymakers were of the view that as in the case of other institutions under the 
RSBY, the role of the Grievance Redressal Committee is also likely to evolve over a 
period of time.  
5.3.2 State level  
The policy guidelines issued by the Central Government to the state governments on 
setting up the SNA
6
 state that ‘there must be a clearly defined institution capable of 
organizing a health insurance programme. It can be an autonomous body, state 
government department, a cooperative society or even an NGO. The organization 
should have the technical skills to understand the concept of health insurance, should 
be able to design a programme that is technically sound, should have skills to be able 
to discuss with the community and should have the administrative capacity to 
organize the programme’ (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2011a). It is felt that 
the SNAs have facilitated the flow of premium-related funds from the Central 
Government to the insurance companies through these societies.  
Punjab 
In Punjab, the RSBY was launched on 19 July 2008 under the Department of Health 
and Family Welfare and is being implemented through the Punjab Health Systems 
Corporation (PHSC), which is the designated SNA under the scheme. PHSC was 
constituted through a Special Act in 1996 that provided for a corporation for 
establishing, expanding, improving and administering medical care in the State of 
Punjab. The Managing Director is the executive officer of the Corporation. He 
implements the decisions of the Board of Directors and exercises general control and 
supervision over the hospitals under PHSC. The Board of Directors consists of 
                                                          
6
The states implementing RSBY have either used an existing institution in the form of an independent 
legal entity, or have registered a new society that is wholly funded by the state government but operates 
independently. 
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secretaries of the Departments of Health and Family Welfare, Finance, Rural 
Development, Local Government and a representative of the MoHFW, GoI as well as 
six independent experts, chaired by a distinguished public or medical person. 
There are 176 health institutions under the PHSC, which include 21 district hospitals, 
two speciality hospitals, 34 subdivisional hospitals and 119 CHCs (Punjab Health 
Systems Corporation, n.d.). PHSC has a health management information systems 
(HMIS) division in addition to procurement, finance, civil work and IT divisions for 
implementation of the RBSY. In addition, PHSC has also been able to engage experts 
with assistance from the Central Government for the implementation of the scheme in 
the State. A State Coordination Committee has been set up at the state level, which 
includes members from the State Departments of Labour, Planning, Finance, Rural 
Development and Panchayats and Local Government. The committee mainly 
participates in the evaluation of the tender processes and reviews progress of the 
scheme.  
Haryana 
In Haryana, the scheme was launched under the MoLE and is being implemented 
through the Directorate of Employees’ State Insurance (ESI) Health Care, which is 
the designated SNA. As stated by state-level implementers in the SNA, the ESI 
Directorate and health institutions that fall under it are completely independent of the 
MoHFW. Policymakers at the state level informed that to facilitate the 
implementation of the RSBY, an RSBY Society had been registered under the 
Societies Registration Act, 1860 chaired by the Principal Secretary, Labour, with 
Director ESI as the Secretary and the Labour Commissioner as a member. The RSBY 
Society in turn hires consultants for effective implementation, based on need.  
The insurance company representatives stated that each insurance company is 
represented at the state level through its regional level office situated in Chandigarh, 
the capital city of both Punjab and Haryana and is responsible for implementation and 
overall coordination. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company is the contracted 
insurance company for both Patiala in Punjab and Yamunanagar in Haryana and has 
its regional office in Chandigarh. It was opined that it was easier to work in Punjab 
than in Haryana. This was because implementation was under the MoHFW in Punjab 
as against the ESI in Haryana, which was supervised by the MoLE. The latter 
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organization had limited authority over the entire health service delivery network in 
the State. 
5.3.3 District level 
State level policymakers in Punjab confirmed that at the district level, the Deputy 
Medical Commissioners (senior doctors) had been designated as district nodal 
officers, with managerial responsibility for the scheme. These district nodal officers 
were also the district key managers responsible for electronic security through the key 
management system (KMS) and the FKOs, who are government officials deputed to 
identify and verify the BPL families and issue smart cards.  
In Haryana, however, as stated by state level implementers, implementation was 
different. Under the ESI Directorate, there were four civil surgeons
7
 for the whole 
State, each responsible for a cluster of districts. For Yamunanagar, the civil surgeon 
was stationed in Yamunanagar and was also responsible for the four adjoining 
districts of Ambala, Karnal, Panipat and Panchkula. The district level policymakers 
were of the view that given the physical presence of the civil surgeon in the district, 
he was the de facto District Nodal Officer. They further mentioned that since ESI has 
hospitals and dispensaries dispersed around the State, the responsibilities of the 
district nodal officer were taken on either by civil surgeons stationed in a district or by 
medical officers posted in various ESI dispensaries.  
In addition, in both selected districts, there is a District Level Committee, which 
includes the Additional Deputy Commissioner (ADC), Civil Surgeon, Deputy 
Medical Commissioner, block development officers (BDOs), District Panchayati Raj 
Officer (DPRO) and an insurance company representative/TPA. The primary task of 
this Committee is to monitor enrolment and facilitate in local problem-solving on a 
day-to-day basis.  
The insurance company also reported the presence of an Insurance Company District 
Project Officer at the district level. ICICI Lombard had designated project officers 
catering to multiple districts within each state. On an average, each project officer was 
looking after three to four districts, depending on the volume. In addition, the 
insurance company had also hired TPAs in both selected districts to facilitate the 
                                                          
7
 Civil Surgeon is a senior medical doctor who is the head of the medical department at the district/state 
level and exercises supervisory and administrative control over all government medical institutions 
within the district/state.  
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implementation of RSBY. TPA representatives at the district level informed that at 
the district level there is an assistant director who reports to the TPA regional officer 
in Chandigarh who in turn reports to the head office in Delhi.  Their main duties 
include facilitating enrolment, supervision and conducting random reviews. 
Institutional and organizational structures at the Centre, Punjab State and Haryana 
State are given in Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. 
Fig. 5.1: Institutional and organization structures at Central level 
 
Fig. 5.2: Institutional and organization structures at state and district level – 
Punjab 
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Fig. 5.3: Institutional and organization structures at state and district level – 
Haryana 
 
5.4  Formulation of policy and guidelines for implementation 
The RSBY scheme delivered to the state authorities for implementation had a fixed 
all-India design. Although there was room for innovations and additions in the 
existing framework, this could only be done with the prior permission of the DGLW 
in the GoI. Designing the scheme, standardizing processes and preparing policy 
guidelines was the responsibility of the Central Government.  
State level implementers from both Punjab and Haryana confirmed that the state 
governments adopted the policy guidelines formulated by the Central Government. 
Though state governments had the flexibility to amend these and introduce 
innovations, this was rarely done, as it needed the prior approval of the central 
government. Since RSBY has been an evolving model, some of the policy guidelines 
have been formulated after its launch in April 2008. Depending on the feedback from 
the state level implementers, additional policy guidelines or changes to previous 
guidelines have also been introduced in subsequent years. One such example is the 
enrolment criteria where a household headed by a woman was originally not eligible 
to be included in the Scheme. State level implementers confirmed that policy 
guidelines were updated with each subsequent insurance cycle.  
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The policymakers at the Central level were of the opinion that state-level politicians 
recognised the political mileage the scheme provided since they could reach more 
people at a relatively low level of cost. State governments had to allocate a separate 
budget to fund the innovations that the states proposed. In Punjab, the SNA was of the 
view that RSBY was the best scheme for BPL families. The State was willing to carry 
it forward and added 1,500,000 families, which included 450,000 families that were 
blue-card holders (beneficiaries of the ‘Atta–dal’ scheme, launched in Punjab in 
August 2007).Teachers and domestic workers have also been included at the State's 
cost. The SNA of Punjab stated that ‘...Punjab piloted the scheme with new benefits in 
three districts – Firozepur, Bhatinda and Rupnagar, by introducing OPD services and 
free medicines apart from hospitalization…’(State Nodal Agency, 3).  
The Haryana Labour Commissioner indicated that in Haryana, there were issues 
related to the BPL list available for enrolment, in that the BPL list from the 2001 
census was differed from the list of beneficiaries in other schemes. A survey had to be 
conducted on behalf of the Central Government to identify the BPL families. The 
scheme has been extended to other segments of the unorganized population through 
the Health Insurance Plan for Building and Other Construction Workers (BoCW) in 
the State, where the premium for construction workers is funded by levying 1% tax on 
the construction cost. It has also been extended to the Anganwadi workers and to 
street vendors in nine districts of the State. The extension of RSBY is under 
consideration for beneficiaries of other schemes, although some of them may already 
be classified as BPL (The Hindu, 2013). 
 
5.5 Roles and responsibilities 
RSBY has a whole network of individuals who are experts in their own fields and 
who together manage the scheme. It was opined that RSBY is more a partnership 
model than a contractual model. 
In the initial stages of the scheme, there were organizations such as the World Bank 
and the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) that supported the 
development of the design and process. There are six primary stakeholders in the 
scheme - the Central Government, state governments, insurance companies, TPAs, 
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hospitals and NGOs. The roles and responsibilities of each of the stakeholders are 
clearly defined in the contract documents.  
5.5.1 Central level 
At the Central level, the Central Government has various responsibilities such as 
oversight of the scheme, financing the scheme, setting up parameters (benefits 
package, empanelment criteria, BPL criteria), hardware specifications (systems and 
smart card), financing management/training, setting rate schedules for 
services/reimbursement rates, developing clinical information, developing systems for 
monitoring/evaluation, monitoring state level use and other patient information and 
monitoring national RSBY information and training.  
Since the scheme was under the MoLE at the Central level, the Director General 
Labour Welfare, GoI has overall responsibility for the scheme. In addition, the holder 
of the post is the Chief Executive of the Employee ESI scheme.  
During an in-depth interview, the Director General Labour Welfare stated that his 
work was only to ensure the coordination of the scheme. He further clarified that the 
role of the Central Government was to design the scheme and standardize it for all 
states. The Ministry of Labour was supported by several other ministries, such as the 
Ministry of Rural Development which helped in recruiting field staff at the village 
level for information, education and communication (IEC) purposes and the MoHFW, 
which mobilizes government hospitals for the scheme.  
5.5.2 State governments and state nodal agencies 
The state government, along with the Central Government, also looks at the financing 
of the scheme and the setting up of parameters like the benefits package, 
empanelment criteria and BPL criteria. Additionally, the state government has the 
responsibility of setting up the SNA, which has the overall responsibility of 
implementing the scheme. The specific role of SNAs are—contract management with 
the insurer, enrolment, training outreach and marketing to beneficiaries, financial 
planning and management, setting rate schedules for services and reimbursement, 
developing clinical information systems for monitoring/evaluation, monitoring state 
level use and other patient information and training.  Some of these functions are done 
in conjunction with the Central Government.  
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The head of the SNA varies from state to state depending on which department of the 
government is implementing the scheme in that state. If the Health Department looks 
after implementation as in Punjab, then it is the Health Secretary who is the head of 
the SNA. If the Labour Department takes over implementation of the scheme as in 
Haryana, then it is the Labour Commissioner or the State Labour Secretary who is in 
charge. 
In Punjab, the SNA head indicated that he was so heavily occupied with the prime 
responsibilities of the Health Department that he could not devote much time to the 
RSBY scheme. In fact, according to him he spent only 5% of his time on RSBY. In 
RSBY his responsibilities included reporting to the Central level and attending to 
grievances within the State as the Head of the State Grievance Cell. His other 
responsibilities were related to IEC, enrolment and monitoring of the scheme. He 
further clarified that the Deputy Commissioner of Patiala district was in charge of the 
implementation of RSBY and enrolment at the district level.  
In Yamunanagar, the Civil Surgeon informed that at the district level, a District 
Committee is constituted which is chaired by the Additional District Commissioner, 
with the Civil Surgeon as secretary and the Nodal Officer, BDO and Panchayat as a 
member. The District Committee’s responsibility centred on overseeing, monitoring, 
enrolment, empanelment, data collection and data transfer. The role of the Nodal 
Officer is to monitor patients and hospitals, reporting, organizing workshops and 
assisting the insurance company in terms of enrolment.  
The Nodal Officer explained that his work lay exclusively with the RSBY scheme. He 
indicated that his responsibility included collecting data, organizing workshops and 
appointing FKOs such as ASHAs and auxiliary nurse midwives (ANMs).
8
  
The District Nodal Officer further informed that initially, much of the logistics 
required for interacting with the private provider were handled solely by the insurance 
company.  However, the state and district authorities have adopted a wider role and 
therefore now  health-care providers maintain the equipment (card reader, printer, 
computer, etc) as required for successful implementation of the scheme.   
                                                          
8
ANMs are regarded as the first contact persons between people and the organization. They are female 
multipurpose workers and are posted at sub-centres. 
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5.5.3 Insurance companies and third party administrators (TPAs) 
The roles and responsibilities of the insurance companies and TPAs were 
accreditation/empanelment of providers, collecting registration fees, enrolment, 
actuarial analysis, claims processing and payment, outreach/marketing to 
beneficiaries, monitoring at provider level and other patient information, customer 
service and training of hospital staff.  
The representative from the insurance company indicated that the role of the 
insurance company was to enrol participants under the RSBY scheme. While 
enrolling the participants, the insurance company was assisted by the FKOs such as 
ASHAs and ANMs. Other activities of the insurance company included customer 
services and monitoring. 
He further informed that the TPA was contracted by the management of the insurance 
company. Usually, there was one TPA for the entire state who covered all districts for 
the purposes of enrolment. However, ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company 
had contracted one TPA for the entire country. He also clarified that there was no 
bidding for TPA contracts; they were contracted on the basis of their previous 
association and reputation. During the contract agreement, TPAs are reminded that 
they need to provide good services at the agreed premium. Their major role is 
enrolment of participants in the district and processing claims. 
TPAs support the insurance companies during the process of enrolment and 
empanelment. They create awareness among beneficiaries and hospitals and assist in 
the claims settlement and billing processes, obtaining the essential medical documents 
and disseminating other relevant guidelines for trouble-free treatment of beneficiaries. 
They also supervise and monitor the treatment of the patient during hospitalization 
and conduct post-discharge audits by patient home visits to audit for transportation 
allowance and post-discharge medication. 
5.5.4 NGOs and providers of care 
The role of NGOs was primarily to assist the insurance company in raising awareness 
about scheme while the role of the health-care providers was customer service and 
service delivery.  
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5.6 Contract analysis 
Contract analysis was done in two phases. First, the contract documents between 
various stakeholders (Central Government, state governments, insurance companies, 
public and private providers) were reviewed and critically analysed. Thereafter, the 
key stakeholders’ interviews were analysed to assess the issues related to contract 
implementation.  
5.6.1 Contract design 
The RSBY is implemented through both formal and informal contractual 
arrangements between various partners. This section deals with the study of contracts 
in the two selected states of Punjab and Haryana at three levels of implementation: (i) 
between the centre and state; (ii) between the state and insurance company; and (iii) 
between the insurance company and service provider  
The contract between the Central Government and the state government and between 
the SNA and the insurance company were obtained from the SNA. The contracts 
between the providers and the insurance company were made available by the 
providers. In most cases the actual signed contractual agreement was available; in 
some others, a draft contract was shared with the understanding that the signed 
document was exactly similar.  
A critical appraisal of the contracts was conducted along the following parameters: 
 ownership  
 objective 
 length of the contract 
 payment mechanism 
 completeness and comprehensiveness 
 monitoring mechanisms 
 specification of sanctions 
 incentives structure. 
Contract between the Central Government and states 
The contractual agreement between the Central Government and the states was 
identical for Haryana and Punjab.  
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The signatories of the contractual arrangement were explicitly mentioned as the 
Central Government represented by the DGLW, MoLE, GoI and the state government 
represented by the state authority signing the contract, referred to as the SNA. The 
contract was not specific regarding which state authority would be signing the 
contract agreement and allowed flexibility to the states to assign a state implementing 
agency. 
The purpose of the contract was clearly outlined - to provide social security to the 
BPL workers and their families in the unorganized sector. The contract did not 
mention any additions or innovations on the part of the state government for either of 
the selected states that the scheme design allows.  
The period of contractual agreement is not mentioned in the contract document. 
However, it was stated in the contract document that the Central Government reserved 
the right to discontinue the funding at any stage on being satisfied that the funds 
sanctioned were not being utilized for the purpose for which they were granted.  
The contract states that the Central Government would pay a fixed sum per 
beneficiary as contribution to the health insurance premium for implementation of 
RSBY in the selected districts. This amount would be transferred to the SNA when 
the state government gave its contribution (of premium) to the SNA. The exact 
schedule of release of payments from the Central to the state government is not 
mentioned. 
The state government could pay a higher amount of premium to accommodate any 
additional beneficiaries that the state might wish to enrol in the scheme. In addition, 
the state would bear any administrative costs in implementing the scheme.  
The contract clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of both parties involved, the 
Central Government and the SNA. The Central Government would provide technical 
assistance to the SNA in facilitating implementation of the scheme. It would review, 
monitor and determine the information required from the states, though no reporting 
schedule and format has been prescribed. However, the monitoring mechanism and 
monitoring parameters of the central government have not been stated in the contract 
document.  
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The state government also has a wide mandate of responsibilities. This entails 
providing the insurance company with a complete list of BPL households (including 
details of household members) and providing assistance to the insurance company in 
the registration of scheme participants and the issuing of smart cards through joint 
visits to each location where smart cards are to be issued. It is also the responsibility 
of the state government to set up separate legal entities in the form of a 
society/trust/agency so as to enable them to administer funds in implementation of the 
scheme.  
The state government is required to facilitate, monitor and evaluate the 
implementation of the scheme as per the guidelines issued by the Central 
Government. They would also provide information as and when requested by the 
Central Government.  
There was no mention of the empanelment criterion of the health care providers in the 
contract document. Also there was no mention of the incentive structure under the 
scheme.  
Contract between the state government and the insurance company 
The contractual agreement between the state government and the insurance company 
for the chosen districts was almost identical. Coincidentally, the insurance company 
for the selected year of study in the chosen districts was ICICI Lombard General 
Insurance Company for both states.  
The contract between the state government and insurance company is the most formal 
and comprehensive contract in the RSBY scheme. This is due to the large share of 
responsibility that the insurance company undertakes in the implementation of the 
scheme. There are 32 articles listed in the contract document, supplemented by 16 
annexures. The contract is legally binding and goes into specific details regarding 
time periods of actionable steps.  
The ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company had a contract agreement in Punjab 
with the Department of Health and Family Welfare through the SNA, namely the 
PHSC; and in Haryana, with the Department of Labour and Employment through the 
Directorate of ESI Health Care, which was the nominated SNA.  
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The contract clearly cites the benefits to be provided on a cashless basis to the 
beneficiaries and the limit of their annual coverage, subject to other terms and 
conditions outlined in the contract. 
The contract duration is specified and the dates of commencement and termination of 
the policy are mentioned in the agreement. In case of renewal of contracts, the period 
of the insurance contract would be for two years, depending on the period for which 
the insurance company already had a contract with the SNA. Renewal of the policy at 
the end of the year would automatically happen only when both parties agreed to the 
same.  
The contract mentions the exact amount of payment of premium that the state 
government has accepted per enrolled BPL household, which includes the cost of the 
smart card issued to each household. The contract details the method of payment 
including the specific amount of payment to be released to the insurer under three 
defined instalment schedules. The premium is to be paid in three instalments - the first 
instalment of INR 30 (£ 0.3) is paid by the beneficiary, followed by a second 
premium by the SNA (25% of the total premium) and the last instalment (the 
remaining premium) by the Central Government. 
A coordination committee, under the chairmanship of the SNA, is formed within 
seven days of signing of the agreement to review performance on a periodic basis. 
District key managers (DKMs) and field key officers (FKOs) are then recruited. The 
insurer establishes a state and district project office, call centres and district kiosks 
within 15 days. 
Empanelment is the responsibility of the insurer who ensures that the eligible private 
health-care providers and government hospitals up to the level of CHCs are 
empanelled under the scheme. The empanellement criterion for the health care 
providers has been clearly stated in the contract document.  
The state government provides the insurer with the updated list of BPL households for 
enrolment. It is the responsibility of the insurance company to provide the smart cards 
to the beneficiaries. The SNA ensures the availability of a sufficient number of FKOs 
to accompany the enrolment teams. The insurance company is also responsible for all 
IEC activity at the time of enrolment. 
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The scheme provides coverage for meeting expenses of hospitalization for medical or 
surgical procedures including maternity benefit to the enrolled BPL families up to 
INR 30,000 (£ 302) per family per year on a floater basis. There is pre-authorization 
for cashless access in case no package is fixed. The scheme also covers pre-existing 
diseases.  
The insurance company conducts training and orientation programmes jointly 
developed by the SNA and the insurance company for health-care providers, members 
of the hospital management societies, district programme managers, doctors, General 
practitioner members, intermediaries and field agents. 
The monitoring strategy was loosely stated in the contract document and the monitoring 
mechanism and parameters were not defined. There was also no mention of the resources 
required for monitoring and supervision at district level.  
The agreement also refers to claims management, dispute resolution, grievance 
redressal and termination. There was no mention of the incentive structure for the 
insurance companies under the scheme. 
Contract between the insurance company and the health provider 
Two contracts were analysed (between the insurance company and the health 
provider), one for Patiala district in Punjab state and the other for Yamunanagar 
district in Haryana state. 
In both cases, the contract agreements were drawn between a public hospital and 
ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. The designation of the signatories 
was not mentioned in the contract document. The contract stated that the insurer had 
been registered under Section 3 of the Insurance Act, 1938 (Act 4 of 1938) and had to 
have an official license for functioning. 
The objectives of the contracts were not clearly stated. However, the contracts clearly 
mentioned the benefits for the purposes of the agreement as provided on a cashless 
basis to the beneficiaries up to the limit of their annual coverage, subject to other 
terms and conditions outlined in the contract. 
The duration of the contract was clearly mentioned in the contract document. In 
Haryana it was for a period of two years whereas in Punjab it was for a period of one 
year. Further, both parties reserved the right to inform the public at large of the date of 
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commencement as well as termination. This clause was mentioned in the contract for 
Punjab but not in the case of Haryana. 
There was no mention of the payment mechanism or the premium in the contract 
between the insurance company and the health provider. However, the ways that 
claims would be processed while admitting a RSBY beneficiary were stated clearly. 
Roles and responsibilities of both the parties and specifications of sanctions were 
clearly defined in the contract document. Monitoring and supervision strategy was  
absent and there was no mention of the incentive structure for the insurance company 
and the providers . In Punjab, the cost of hospital registration fees, documentation, TV 
and phone usage were to be charged from the beneficiary.
9
 No payment terms were 
mentioned in the corresponding contract in Haryana. 
5.6.2 Contract implementation 
Human resources 
It was reported in various key informant interviews that human resources were not 
sufficient for implementation of the scheme at the state and district levels. Starting 
from the higher administrative positions, which had various other responsibilities 
apart from the RSBY scheme, the state level nodal officers concurred that dedicated 
staff were lacking under the Scheme. A Haryana district nodal officer remarked that 
the only direct employee of the RSBY was the nodal officer. He alone does dedicated 
work for RSBY and hence was overloaded with work. There is no other permanent 
employee under the RSBY scheme. He further stated that at the grass roots level, the 
ASHAs (community workers) were the leading persons who coordinate with families 
(District nodal officer, 11). This was, however, a part-time activity for them and not 
their primary responsibility. At hospitals, 24/7 availability of support staff was 
necessary for RSBY work, but it was not available. Even the insurance companies 
lacked manpower, with just one officer at district level looking after 2-3 districts at a 
time, in addition to responsibility for other schemes. A representative of the insurance 
company confirmed ‘I am looking at other schemes also, apart from RSBY… I am in 
charge of the state and there are number of people reporting to me…’ (Insurance 
company, 4). 
                                                          
9
TV and Phone services are optional facilities available in in-patient private rooms or wards of the 
hospitals. Availing such facilities are chargeable. 
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Insurance companies and market competition 
A total of 27 health insurance companies are present in the market, providing health 
insurance coverage to the population of India. Of these, 21 are from the private sector 
and six belong to the public sector. To analyse the market competition in the RSBY 
scheme, a list of insurance companies involved in the bidding process (2008-12) was 
made available by the SNA for Patiala. Similar data was not available for 
Yamunanagar district. The analysis shows some degree of market competition in 
Patiala for recruitment of insurance companies. There were 12 (44.4% of total number 
of health insurance companies) insurance companies who had bid at least once during 
the five-year period 2008-12. The number of insurance companies involved in the 
bidding process has fluctuated over the years with seven, six, ten, seven and eight  
companies bidding in the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively. 
Looking at the bidding status of individual companies, it was observed that there were 
four companies who had bid for the scheme for all five years, of which three belonged 
to public sector. There was another insurance company, again from the public sector, 
who had bid for four years (2008-11). In terms of participation of the insurance 
companies from the private sector, there was one company that had bid for all five 
years, two companies that had bid for three years, three companies that had bid for 
two years, and two companies that had bid for one year only.  
From the above, we can conclude that some degree of market competition was present 
for the insurance companies in Patiala district and this competition, in terms of 
numbers, varied over the years. Though there were less public sector health insurance 
companies present in the market, their involvement in the bidding was comparable to 
the private sector in terms of number of bids made. Also, public sector insurance 
companies were more consistent in terms of their participation. 
Financial resources 
Premiums were paid by the Central and state governments in the ratio of 3:1. The 
premiums varied from state to state, depending on the insurance company. The 
premium collected by the insurance company from each family was INR 30 (£ 0.3).  
In both states, the total premium collected was around INR 750 (£ 7.6) per family.
10
 
                                                          
10
The premium for RSBY varies slightly in different states depending upon the bidding process. 
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The representatives of the insurance company stated that this INR 30 (£ 0.30) was 
used to pay the first instalment to the insurance company.  
A declining trend of premiums was observed in most of the states and national 
average fell from INR600 (£ 6) to INR350 (£ 3.5) (RSBY Connect, 2012). The reason 
could be that there is realistic premium now with availability of data on eligible 
families. Moreover, there is competition amongst insurance companies for bidding. 
Another significant reason could be the decrease in technology costs for smart cards. 
Furthermore, new insurance companies consider lower premiums as an entry point for 
participating in a national social health insurance scheme (RSBY Connect, 2012). 
Enrolment 
Enrolment is a prime responsibility of the insurance company. Insurance company 
representatives in Punjab mentioned that the insurance company contracts the TPA, 
which in turn looks after the enrolment. The TPA involves functionaries from 
panchayats, temples and gurdwaras to enrol eligible people in the scheme. The 
government also gets involved in enrollement by providing FKOs (ASHAs and 
ANMs), who facilitated enrolment. 
Enrolment of beneficiaries is done every year. Starting from the state level 
policymakers down to the district level officials, all expressed their dissatisfaction 
with this high frequency of enrolment. Policymakers at the state level suggested that 
the enrolment could be done once every three years. The district nodal officer of 
Patiala believed that yearly enrolment was a waste of human and financial resources. 
The district level officials from Yamunanagar believed that enrolment was a difficult 
task and was labour and finance intensive.  
Obtaining an accurate list of BPL families was also a challenge for the insurance 
companies. A representative from the SNA of Punjab stated that the updated list of 
BPL families was not available. The census 2001 list of BPL families, which was 
used for enrolment, was a decade old. It was a challenge to reach the beneficiaries, as 
the list did not have complete addresses. Another issue during enrolment was the lack 
of provision for addition of names in the families already enrolled.  
154 
 
Empanelment of health facilities 
Empanelment of health facilities is done by the insurance company in consultation 
with the state nodal officers. There were several issues raised by various stakeholders 
regarding the process of enrolment. A Central level policymaker stated that the 
health-care providers that were empanelled in the RSBY were not certified by any 
authority for their services and the quality of care provided by them before getting 
empanelled could not be assessed. He confirmed that ‘…right now we are not doing 
the certification. We need to do that…’ (Central level policymaker, 1). Moreover, 
empanelment of private facilities was difficult as the exact number of private facilities 
present in the district was not available with any authority. However, empanelment 
criterion was clearly defined in the contract document between the state and the 
insurance company.   
Fixed package rates 
Under RSBY, there is a fixed capitation for every treatment in a package of care. The 
rates within the package (package rates) are predetermined by the Central 
Government and are supposed to get revised from time to time. The state government 
has the authority to revise the rate at the state level after approval from the Central 
Government. However, such amendments were rarely practised.  
There were differences in opinion regarding the fixed package rates by different 
stakeholders. Central level policymakers, SNAs and insurance companies were of the 
view that the package rates were reasonable and also that the authority with the state 
government to modify them was sufficient. The private providers felt strongly that 
package rates were not realistic and were set far too low. They also suggested that it 
was unviable to have the same package rates across the entire country and that these 
should be based on the situation in each state. Both individual providers and 
representatives of the providers’ associations were of the opinion that package rates 
needed revision. Private providers in Yamunanagar emphatically stated that the set 
rates for high-cost procedures were too low, especially for complicated cases that 
entail a high cost to the provider. A private provider in Patiala district stated that ‘I 
think package rates should be more realistic…’ (Private provider, 8). For example, it 
was very difficult to treat a patient in the ICU for INR 1000(£ 10.1) per day and pay 
taxes as well. Public providers in Patiala indicated that private hospitals turned away 
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patients saying that INR 30,000 (£ 302) was not enough for certain treatments, 
suggesting that patients should claim RSBY benefits from government institutions. 
The representatives of the medical association agreed that due to low package rates, 
quality gets diluted. A representative from an NGO was however of the opinion that 
increase in package rates will not improve the quality of services. However, this 
would increase the participation of providers for empanelment.  
Payment mechanism 
The insurance company indicated that it processed and reimbursed claims to the 
provider within 14 days in most cases. In the contract between the SNA and the 
insurance company, a time limit of 21 days is indicated for the process to be 
completed. This, however, becomes 26 days or more for issues relating to claim 
processing. In Punjab and Haryana, the payment was made by the insurance company 
(after receiving the final docket from the provider) through a cheque/electronic fund 
transfer, since the contract between the SNA and the insurance company makes 
electronic payments mandatory. The interviewee from the insurer insisted that the 
provider recovers non-covered treatment/investigation costs from the beneficiary. It is 
stated in the contract document that the beneficiaries have to pay OOP for treatments 
that are not covered under the scheme.  
The Punjab SNA indicated that ASHAs were getting monetary incentives in order to 
bring up enrolment.  They were of the view that incentives should be given for other 
purposes as well but this was not done because of budget constraints. The district 
nodal officer confirmed that incentives were being given to field-level workers to 
encourage them to enrol families under the RSBY scheme. This incentive was raised 
from INR 2 (£ 0.02) per card to INR 5 (£ 0.05) per card during the course of the 
scheme. However, the district nodal officer in Patiala stated that incentives to ASHAs 
were never paid. 
Monitoring and supervision 
Monitoring and supervision plays a key role in the success of any scheme. However, 
in the RSBY scheme, monitoring and supervision appeared to be very weak. There 
were no financial or human resources allocated for these tasks nor was there any 
strategic framework for monitoring and supervision, specifically in the context of 
periodicity, accountability, task allocation, and performance indicators.  At central 
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level, a technical cell was engaged in overall monitoring and supervision including 
data handling and management. The Labour Commissioner from Haryana stated that 
‘…government doesn’t have resources for monitoring…’ (Labour Commissioner, 9). 
Monitoring and supervision was left to the insurance companies, which had their 
vested interests. The civil surgeon in Yamunanagar indicated that there were by-laws 
to monitor the expenditure of funds under RSBY. However, a separate management 
team for RSBY was necessary. ‘…there are internal checks and balances to look for 
fraudulent billing…’ (SNA, 11). One SNA indicated that there was no budget 
earmarked for monitoring in RSBY.  
In the contract between the SNA and the insurer, it is specified that the insurer will 
have qualified and experienced medical staff (as a part of its medical investigation 
services) who will ascertain the nature of ailment and verify the eligibility of the 
services. However, inadequately qualified staff was being used by the insurance 
company for monitoring of the scheme for private providers in Haryana. For example, 
doctors with a degree of Bachelor in Homeopathic Medicine and Surgery (BHMS) 
were being used instead of MBBS doctors. 
Training 
According to a Central level policymaker, training at the Central level was primarily 
learning by doing. He stated ‘Training is a weak point in RSBY. At the national level, 
the individuals were not trained initially in insurance. They had to learn on the job’ 
(Central level policymaker, 1). He further added that DGLW also learnt on the job 
while implementing RSBY. Technical assistance at central level was provided by the 
World Bank and GIZ. The situation was better at the state level where training was 
satisfactory and was aimed at specific aspects of RSBY. Inputs from the field proved 
useful while planning new training workshops ‘…consequent to this effort, we have a 
series of workshops at villages, at block level…’ (Central level policymaker, 1).  
The District informatics officer in Yamunanagar confirmed that state level workshops 
were organized to train staff regarding implementation of the scheme. The District 
nodal officer in Patiala stated that district and block level workshops had been 
conducted where staff of all hospitals had been trained. The district level workshops 
involved the business process outsourcing, public relations officer, deputy 
commissioner and sarpanch (village headman), all of whom corroborated that they 
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had been given training several times. The insurance company in Patiala stated that 
they had trained both private and public providers regarding scheme implementation 
and claim reimbursements.  
Issues with equipment 
The providers reported that there were several issues related to equipment at the 
health facilities provided by the insurance company for verification of RSBY 
beneficiaries. Frequent breakdown of the machinery was common and repairs were 
not immediate. Due to a lack of confidence in the equipment, some providers had a 
parallel system for record maintenance in the form of record registers. A private 
provider stated that in his facility, the insurance company did not rectify the faulty 
machine even after several complaints. Thus, they could not admit patients under 
RSBY scheme for several months.  
Awareness 
The state nodal agency of Patiala and Yamunanagar district reported that awareness 
among the beneficiaries regarding the services available in the scheme was not 
adequate. There were many instances where the beneficiary did not know how to 
locate the empanelled hospital. One of the providers also stated that private providers 
were not aware of the scheme and that is why they were not available for 
empanelment.  
5.6.3 Incentive structures 
Incentives for stakeholders are not specifically mentioned in the contract document. 
However, according to a senior policymaker at the Centre, the scheme had been 
designed as a business model for a social sector scheme with incentives built-in for 
each stakeholder. This business model was designed to be conducive to expanding the 
scheme as well as ensuring long-term sustainability. In fact, the scheme was moving 
forward because of the in-built incentives. He further added that ‘the scheme is 
working on autopilot. As each body involved benefits from the scheme, it forces them 
to keep a check on one another. They give their best as there is a sense of competition 
involved’. The SNA in Punjab agreed that RSBY, ‘… had to be a sustainable model, a 
proper business model so incentives are there…’ (SNA, 4).  
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Various stakeholders and implementers had different levels of incentives in different 
forms. Monetary incentives varied across stakeholders. For some, the incentives lay in 
enhanced reputation and recognition.   
Central and state governments 
A Central level policymaker stated that ‘By a BPL family paying only a maximum 
yearly sum of INR 750 (£ 7.5) per family, the Government is able to provide access to 
health care to the poorest of the poor’ (Central level policymaker). The single most 
important incentive for the Central Government was to design a scheme which would 
win the goodwill of the informal sector, which comprised a large proportion of the 
country’s population and hence a large vote bank. The Scheme was also a major step 
towards UHC to bring equity in health care, which is an important agenda for the 
Government. As far as the Central Government is concerned, contributing financially 
towards the payment of premium to provide health insurance for the beneficiaries 
gives it a say in various aspects of implementation, which would normally fall outside 
the Central mandate as health is a state subject in the Indian Constitution. 
State governments appeared pleased to be able to cover their BPL population (the 
poorest of the poor) with health insurance at a fraction of the cost. Providing social 
security to the BPL population in the state was expected to help in building political 
mileage for the ruling party. It would also help the state in building technical capacity 
for procurement, monitoring and training with support from the Central Government. 
Another key incentive for state governments is to tap human and financial resources 
and good business principles from the private and civil society sector to address 
service delivery challenges and extend services to the needy, especially in poor 
neighbourhoods. 
Insurance companies 
Insurance companies look at RSBY as an opportunity to penetrate a segment of the 
population which they had not netted before. A new market was created for them 
through providing health insurance coverage to the weakest section of the population. 
One Central level policymaker explained it as a ‘fortune lying at the bottom of the 
pyramid’. 
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The insurance companies were getting premiums at a single point. They organized 
insurance camps to which families came for insurance coverage. Such a strategy can 
also be considered as a cost-saving innovation initiated by the insurance company. 
Otherwise, the insurance companies would have had to go from house to house to 
approach each individual and this would not only incur transportation costs but would 
be time and manpower intensive. ‘The insurance companies saw it as a reduction in 
transaction costs and the cost-saving strategy is a strong incentive for them’     
(Central level policymaker).  
Since the premium is a fixed amount per household, insurance companies would like 
to enrol a large number of households as the number of persons enrolled in many 
households could be less than five. This would result in low utilization within a 
household while the insurers are still paid the fixed amount.  
Health-care providers 
A central level policy maker stated that the incentive for a health-care provider is to 
provide treatment to the maximum number of beneficiaries, as payment is made on 
the basis of the number of beneficiaries treated. This is a great incentive to the 
provider even at lower package rates, because of the economies of scale. He further 
stated that both public and private providers were part of the scheme, which result in a 
healthy competition between the providers, which in turn was expected to improve the 
functioning of the public health-care providers. 
The public providers see it as an opportunity to raise funds that could then be utilized 
to enhance the services in public hospitals. The private providers see it as an increase 
in business since the government is paying the premium for a poor section of society.  
Even if the number of RSBY patients visiting hospital is very low, still the providers 
have an incentive to be part of the scheme as this would help in capacity building of 
the staff member in management of health insurance. It would also help in publicity 
of the hospital.  Moreover, package rates are defined, so there is a margin of profit in 
every case. From the contract document, it can be assessed that there is no fixed cost 
to get empanelled under the scheme. 
A Central level policymaker was of the view that the private sector was not profit 
driven but did this with an altruistic motive. The district nodal officer in Patiala and a 
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private provider also had similar views. However, the SNA representative believed 
that private providers are business-oriented and public hospitals are charitable because 
they work for free. He further stated that the primary reason for high private provider 
engagement was their drive to build a reputation in the market to capture a new 
patient base. 
Beneficiaries 
A Central level policymaker was of the view that the scheme has given health-care 
access to the poorest of the poor. The scheme design provides a great incentive to the 
beneficiaries and that is the option to choose. It has afforded the poor an opportunity 
to select the type of provider (public/private) they want for treatment. They can go to 
a high-quality private provider (if empanelled) without having to pay anything. The 
scheme has planned a sum of INR 30,000 (£ 302) per year per BPL family for serious 
health care morbidities that could be life threatening. A representative from the SNA 
stated that the poorest of the poor can now live in the belief that in dire health 
situations they can protect themselves from catastrophic health expenditures and save 
their lives. The scheme is believed to be changing the health-seeking behaviour of the 
poor. As stated by a Central level policymaker, they are now making an effort to get 
treated for illness which they would ordinarily have neglected in the past.  
 
5.7 Discussion 
5.7.1 Methodological issues 
Contracts between the insurance company and TPAs could not be retrieved and hence 
a complete contract design analysis could not be done. The bidding and the 
negotiation process could not be evaluated while analysing the contract design 
because of the limitation in availability of information.  
5.7.2 Findings and discussion 
RSBY was launched just before the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. It appears that the 
programme was launched in a rush and was more a political expediency than a well 
thought out plan for improvement of the health of the poor. The developers of the 
scheme introduced an innovation through the PPP model. Including private health 
facilities to augment health services being provided by the public health facilities was 
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expected to enlarge the number of facilities providing health care as well as generate 
competition among public and private providers. 
As to whether experiences from other schemes had been reviewed during the 
preparatory phase of the RSBY scheme, it transpired that only schemes from Thailand 
and the Philippines had been reviewed. These schemes were not similar to the RSBY 
scheme. The RBSY scheme that was launched did not resemble other schemes and 
did not completely spell out the implementation process. However, with periodic 
feedback, ongoing changes have been made in the scheme. One such example is the 
enrolment criteria, where originally a household headed by a woman (for example a 
widow) was not enrolled in the scheme. Frequent changes in the programme led to 
confusion among the programme implementers. Changes specifying the treatment 
package to be offered have inconvenienced providers. On retrospect it is clear that the 
RSBY scheme required more careful and thoughtful planning at the initial stage 
before its launch. This was all the more necessary after the failure of a similar 
insurance scheme in India, namely, the UHIS. 
Weak regulatory framework 
In India, the regulatory framework in healthcare sector is still very weak, especially 
for the private providers. Although it is now compulsory for all private providers to 
get registered as mandated via the Clinical Establishments (Regulation and 
Registration) Rules, 2010, still there are gaps in registration. Previously it was not the 
case and this act was only notified in 2012 and hence as a result, a comprehensive list 
of all private practitioners or the private service delivery providers was not available. 
Further, the record of services being provided in these private hospitals is also not 
available.  
RSBY is a scheme that is heavily reliant on the private sector. It is a model that 
demonstrates a PPP at various levels. The success of the scheme depends on how well 
these private providers can be identified, enrolled and regulated. Currently, the model 
is failing at two levels - firstly, as an interviewee stated, the private sector is very 
reluctant to be part of the scheme as they do not have confidence in the functioning of 
the government; and secondly, there is no robust mechanism under which these 
private hospitals can be governed.  
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Supervision by ministries other than the Health Ministry 
The SNA in Punjab is the PHSC, which is supervised by the Department of Health 
and Family Welfare. In Haryana, the implementing body is the ESIC, which is 
supervised by the Department of Labour and Employment. Linkages between the 
Department of Labour and Employment and the Department of Health are negligible. 
With its level of expertise and experience, it would be easier for the Department of 
Health to manage the scheme as compared to the Department of Labour. An insurance 
company representative stated that it was easy to work in Patiala as Punjab had its 
own health system through which the scheme was being implemented but it was very 
difficult to work with the ESI in Haryana. Although the Ministry of Labour and 
Employment was enthusiastic at being involved in providing health care to the poor, 
the Ministry mostly likely lacked the insight to deliver services to the BPL population 
as it was not their prime responsibility.    
Weak monitoring and supervision 
Monitoring and supervision is one of the main pillars of any programme for efficiency 
and effectiveness. However, it appears that monitoring and supervision under the 
RSBY scheme is weak. In the initial contract documents for 2008 and 2009 (between 
the insurance company and TPAs), there was minimal mention of monitoring and 
supervision of the scheme. No extra budget was allocated for this component. The 
clauses mentioning monitoring and evaluation were not clear and were overlapping. 
Clear-cut roles and responsibilities for monitoring and supervision are required to be 
detailed in the contract agreement.  
Monitoring and supervision is chiefly carried out by the insurance companies; 
however, there is no strategy to monitor the insurance companies. The importance of 
monitoring and supervision is evident from an examination of other national health 
programmes. As stated by a senior public health expert in India, the programmes 
which have a very robust mechanism of monitoring and supervision have flourished 
and done very well, e.g. the Revised National Tuberculosis Control Programme 
(RNTCP), whereas schemes such as the Integrated Child Development Services 
(ICDS) are not able to produce the desired result because of poor monitoring and 
evaluation.  
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Poor IEC  
Awareness generation and IEC is the responsibility of the insurance companies, both 
at the time of enrolment and thereafter. It is evident from interviews of the officials 
that IEC activities are severely lacking, especially in regard to beneficiaries being 
aware of the contents of the packages and the location of empanelled hospitals. There 
appears to be a conflict of interest with regard to the insurance companies. They are 
responsible for IEC activities; however greater awareness could generate more 
demand for health care, resulting in increase in the number of claims as well as the 
claim amount. This is not in the interest of the insurance companies as lower numbers 
of claims and consequently claim amounts would make for higher profits.  
The states or the SNAs have to be in the forefront for creating awareness among the 
people regarding the scheme.  
Distribution of Roles and Responsibilities 
Most of the roles and responsibilities were lying with the central government and the 
insurance companies. There were various conflicts of interest in terms of distribution 
of roles for insurance companies; for example, they were responsible for IEC 
activities, however poor IEC activity will be an incentive for the insurance companies 
as it will lead to less utilization.  
Enrolment process 
As per the policy guidelines, enrolment of the eligible population should occur every 
year. This is not cost-effective as considerable manpower and time is invested during 
the process of enrolment. The process of enrolment takes three months to complete. 
The scheme is thus effectively providing protection to some of the families, who are 
enrolled in the later part of enrolment process by the insurance companies, for a 
period less than stipulated (i.e. less than 12 months).  The reasons given by the 
Central Government for yearly enrolment is that this will ensure improvement in the 
data quality, the people’s interest will be sustained regarding the existence of the 
scheme and also that INR 30 (£ 0.30) gets collected during the process of registration. 
This, however, defeats the very purpose for which the Scheme was created which was 
to provide effective health care to BPL beneficiaries.  
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Modification of Central Government policy by state governments 
India is a very diverse and heterogeneous country and therefore one size does not fit 
all. A single scheme with a standard implementation procedure may not be effective 
in all states. Hence, the Central Government had the provision for states to modify 
this scheme according to their requirements before implementing it in their respective 
states. However, the states under study implemented the scheme as envisaged by the 
Central Government without any change. The barrier in making modifications and 
introducing innovations could be that for doing so they have to take the permission of 
the Central Government.  
 
5.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the external environment, contract design and its 
implementation through in-depth interviews of key stakeholders of the RSBY scheme 
and analysing the key documents. Findings of the in-depth interviews relate to various 
issues dealing with the political environment, regulatory framework, empanelment, 
enrolment, monitoring and supervision. It was noted that initially the Scheme was 
politically motivated and initiated for political gain. Over time, frequent changes have 
been incorporated in the Scheme and now it is more robust, but there still are gaps 
that need to be addressed. Examples are the need for monitoring and supervision with 
specified timelines, clear distribution of roles and responsibilities among the 
stakeholders, and accountability. The regulatory framework is also very weak, 
especially for private health facilities. Even the line listing of the private health 
facilities in the district was not available. Roles and responsibilities of various 
stakeholders were clearly defined. Majority of the Scheme implementation activities 
were undertaken by insurance companies. State governments were mainly playing a 
facilitators’ role. For the Scheme to achieve its aim, state governments have to be 
more accountable for scheme implementation. Formal contract existed between 
central and state government, state government and insurance company, and insurance 
company and providers. However, contract between insurance company and TPAs 
was informal. The contract between the state government and insurance company was 
the most comprehensive contract of all. For renewal of contracts, the parameters have 
not been defined nor was there a ‘quality of service’ criterion. There were issues with 
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the annual enrolment procedure as it consumes a great deal of manpower and 
financial resources. Monitoring and supervision is not adequate as there is no strategic 
framework for monitoring and supervision, specifically in relation to periodicity, 
accountability, task allocation, and performance indicators.  
The scheme has in-built incentives for all stakeholders. The Central Government 
fulfils its larger objective of improving the health of the people, though the immediate 
objective at the time of launch had been political, i.e. to win a forthcoming general 
election. The state government is happy to cover its poor population, which hitherto 
would only visit public facilities for free health care where they would be treated with 
scant respect (Tandon, 2013, Clwyd and Hart, 2013). The insurance companies look 
at it as a profit-making business on the basis of premiums received, more so when 
there are fewer than five beneficiaries per family. The public provider can retain the 
extra amounts they receive which is a great augmentation in a resource-starved 
environment. Private providers can break into a segment of society that hitherto they 
could not reach. The success of the scheme depends on these incentives and the 
scheme caters to the interests of different stakeholders. However, incentive structure 
has not been mentioned in the contract document. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The second objective of the study is to evaluate the availability of services by 
mapping the health-care providers, the treatment packages offered by the empanelled 
health-care providers and analysing utilization patterns. This chapter describes the 
assessment of accessibility and availability of services under the RSBY scheme which 
was measured in terms of physical access to services and availability and range of 
services, i.e. the various departments available in the empanelled hospitals. 
Assessments of utilization patterns are based on the claims submitted by the 
empanelled hospitals under the scheme. The results of this chapter are presented 
under the following headings: 
– Access to services under RSBY – evaluating access by assessing the 
geographical distribution of facilities within the chosen districts; 
– Availability of services under RSBY empanelled hospitals – evaluating 
availability of services under empanelled providers by assessing the medical 
services offered at the facility; 
– Enrolment – assessing the coverage of the scheme beneficiaries; 
– Utilization patterns – assessing the utilization pattern of RSBY beneficiaries. 
The methodological issues are then discussed and the chapter ends with a discussion 
on findings and conclusions.  
Both primary and secondary data sets were analysed. Secondary data analysis was 
done to assess the access to services under the RSBY scheme. The secondary data 
included the database containing BPL census data of population eligible for RSBY 
and the data on enrolment of households under RSBY sourced from the SNA. 
Secondary database of empanelled facilities was sourced from the insurance 
companies and the district medical officers provided the data on the total number of 
registered medical facilities in the chosen districts. Evaluation of possible clustering 
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of facilities to ascertain access within the district was undertaken by mapping the 
empanelled facilities and the non-empanelled facilities within the district. To assess 
the utilization of the scheme by the RSBY beneficiaries, secondary data on claims 
was analysed, sourced from the insurance companies through the SNA. 
Primary data was collected on availability of services offered from almost all 
empanelled facilities. As a criterion for availability of services (RSBY scheme), at 
least one empanelled facility within the district should offer all pre-defined packages 
to RSBY beneficiaries.  
 
6.2 Access to services under RSBY 
RSBY beneficiaries are free to choose their preferred provider among private and 
public empanelled providers within the region where they live. The cost of care is 
likely to be a small factor in choosing a provider and factors other than cost may come 
into prominence. Among factors that determine their choice could be the perceived 
quality level, technical expertise and spatial location of the provider. In this chapter, 
the focus has been on evaluating access by assessing the geographical distribution of 
facilities within the chosen districts. 
The contract document between the insurance company and state government clearly 
states that the insurer shall ensure that the beneficiaries under the scheme are provided 
with the option of choosing treatment from a list of empanelled providers. The 
minimum criteria for empanelment of a facility are drawn by the SNA and are 
included in the contract. It is the responsibility of the insurer to ensure that all the 
eligible private health-care providers and all government hospitals up to the level of 
CHCs willing to get enrolled under the scheme are empanelled before the start of the 
enrolment process (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2011b).  
This research aimed at exploring two issues: the possibility that insurance companies 
could be empanelling a limited number of facilities out of the available health 
facilities in the district; and whether or not empanelled facilities are within close 
proximity to a high density of the BPL population. These questions are linked to the 
concern raised in the previous chapter that insurance companies have an incentive to 
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minimise the claims. By not empanelling hospitals in high-density BPL areas, poor 
people would find difficulty in accessing care.   
Evaluation was undertaken by mapping the empanelled facilities and the non-
empanelled facilities within the district. Sources of data included the database of 
empanelled and non-empanelled facilities as well as BPL census data of population 
enrolled under the RSBY, obtained from the SNA.  
Based on the criteria developed by the state governments that were used for 
empanelment, a methodology was devised to only include facilities in the mapping 
that would be eligible for enrolment. For public facilities, CHCs, sub-divisional and 
civil hospitals were included. For private facilities, diagnostic centres included in the 
list sourced from the Medical Council of India were excluded from mapping because 
they did not fit in the criteria for empanelment. Since the public facilities in India 
have clear guidelines for the services to be made available at each functioning level of 
service delivery, it can be concluded that all public facilities included in the analysis 
were eligible for empanelment. However, the same cannot be said for all private 
facilities. It could not be conclusively established that all private facilities included in 
the analysis were eligible for empanelment, since no personal contact was established 
to confirm the number of inpatient beds available at each facility. Table 6.1 lists the 
various types of health facilities in the selected districts. 
Table 6.1: Health facilities in the selected districts 
Provider Patiala Yamunanagar 
Private 95 104 
Public  20 19 
Private empanelled 7 33 
Private non-empanelled  88 71 
Public empanelled 10 4 
Public non empanelled 10 15 
Total facilities 115 123 
 
The geographic coordinates of each facility were calculated using Google Earth, as it 
was the most economical and user-friendly resource available. Three types of maps 
were generated for both Patiala and Yamunanagar - all possible eligible facilities, 
empanelled facilities and empanelled vs non-empanelled facilities in the district. In 
addition, available data on the volume of total BPL population residing at block level 
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was used to colour code blocks based on BPL density. It was assumed that the density 
of total BPL population at the sub-district level would be somewhat reflective of the 
density of the enrolled RSBY BPL population.  
6.2.1 Patiala 
Table 6.2: Block-wise total BPL population at sub-district level in Patiala 
District Sub-district Block Population 
Patiala 
Nabha Nabha 19,857 
Urban Nabha 23,444 
Patiala BhunerHeri 30,734 
Patiala 8,554 
Sanour 32,768 
Urban Banur 1,277 
Urban Ghaga 3,140 
Urban Patiala 13,760 
Urban Sanaur 4,631 
Rajpura Ghanaur 29,658 
Rajpura 20,813 
Urban Ghanaur 2,529 
Urban Rajpura 4,416 
Samana 
  
Patran 32,165 
Samana 15,646 
Urban Patran 2,878 
Urban Samana 1,728 
Total 247,998 
 
As seen from Table 6.2 and Figures 6.1–6.3, the sub-district with the least BPL 
population in Patiala is Nabha, followed by Samana, Rajpura and Patiala. Public 
empanelled facilities are more equitably distributed throughout the district as opposed 
to private facilities, which are geographically clustered around pockets at the sub-
district level. A majority of the private facilities are clustered around Patiala sub-
district.  
Many eligible facilities are not empanelled under the RSBY scheme. A majority of 
the non-empanelled private facilities are clustered in Patiala sub-district and some in 
other sub-districts. However, there are several public non-empanelled facilities that 
are dispersed around the district. The volume of empanelment of facilities seems to be 
aligned to BPL population density.  
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Fig. 6.1: Patiala – empanelled facilities – public and private 
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Fig. 6.2: Patiala – empanelled and non-empanelled facilities 
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Fig. 6.3 – Patiala: all facilities 
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6.2.2 Yamunanagar 
 
Table 6.3: Block-wise total BPL population at the sub-district level in 
Yamunanagar 
District Sub-district Blocks Population 
Yamunanagar Bilaspur Bilaspur 35,314 
Chhachhrauli Chhachhrauli 70,416 
Jagadhri Jagadhri 69,540 
MC Jagadhri 66,691 
MC Yamunanagar 88,555 
Mustafabad 23,585 
Radaur Radaur 25,589 
Sadhaura Sadhaura 13,614 
Total   393,304 
 
As reflected in Table 6.3 and Figures 6.4–6.6, sub-districts Bilaspur, Radaur and 
Sadhaura each have a BPL population of less than 50,000. Sub-district Chhachhrauli 
has a BPL population close to 70,000 but the majority of the BPL population in the 
district resides in Jagadhri sub-district. As seen from the maps, there are very few 
public facilities empanelled under the RSBY. Almost all the empanelled facilities in 
the district are from the private sector and are clustered around Jagadhri sub-district.  
There are several eligible facilities that are not empanelled under the RSBY scheme. 
The map shows that there are several public non-empanelled facilities that are 
dispersed around the district. The private non-empanelled facilities are again clustered 
around Jagadhri sub-district. The volume of empanelment of facilities seems to be 
aligned to population density with the highest BPL population and a majority of the 
empanelled facilities were in Jagadhri area.   
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Fig. 6.4: Yamunanagar – empanelled facilities – public and private 
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Fig. 6.5 – Yamunanagar: empanelled and non-empanelled facilities 
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Fig. 6.6 – Yamunanagar: all facilities 
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The above analysis points to the following findings and points of discussion: 
 The clustering of private facilities in the district could point towards 
Hotelling’s Law. This law states that in many markets it is rational for 
producers to make their products as similar as possible. This is also referred to 
as the principle of minimum differentiation as well as Hotelling's ‘linear city 
model’ (Hotelling, 1929). Application of Hotelling's Law in the current 
context would assume two private health facilities at opposite corners of the 
district with an invisible line drawn between them. If patients’ behaviour is 
assumed to be rational with enough demand along the invisible line, it would 
be plausible to assume that each facility would get half the patients divided 
along an invisible line equidistant from the facilities. But, each provider would 
be tempted to relocate his facility slightly towards the other, in order to move 
the invisible line so that it encompasses more than half of the distance. Thus, a 
street with two facilities will find both facilities right next to each other at the 
same halfway point. Each facility will serve half the market; one will draw 
customers from one direction, the other will draw customers from the other 
direction.  
Hotelling’s Law would predict the clustering of private hospitals according to 
the entire population and not just the BPL population, as private hospitals 
serve all populations.  Thus, whether or not an insurance company fails to 
empanel a private hospital to induce lower attendance by the insured 
population cannot really be answered, as there are very few private hospitals 
outside the densely populated areas.   However, it is shown here that reliance 
on the private sector leads to those in more remote areas being underserved.  
Hotelling’s Law predicts the clustering away from the remote areas; if the 
poor live in more remote areas then they are more likely to be underserved. 
 Besides the lack of sufficient empanelled public facilities in Yamunanagar, 
they are not widely dispersed across the district. This could create issues 
around access and increased transportation costs.  
 In Yamunanagar, there would most likely be more empanelled hospitals in 
sparse areas if more public hospitals were empanelled.  
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6.3 Availability of services under RSBY-empanelled hospitals 
Evaluating the availability of services under empanelled providers is done by 
assessing the medical services offered at the facility. An RSBY beneficiary is entitled 
to the whole list of pre-defined inpatient treatment packages included in the contract 
with the insurance company. However, the assumption is that not all empanelled 
facilities would offer all packages. This section explores the options available to the 
patient to seek treatment for a particular medical condition.  
Primary data was collected regarding the availability of services under all RSBY-
empanelled hospitals in the selected districts. Information was collected regarding the 
number of inpatient beds and the services enlisted under RSBY package rates, 
available in the hospitals. In Patiala district, out of 17 (seven private and 10 public) 
empanelled hospitals, only 12 (seven private and five public) hospitals agreed to 
provide the information while the remaining hospitals refused. In Yamunanagar 
district, out of 37 (33 private and four public) empanelled hospitals, only 19 (17 
private and two public) hospitals agreed to provide the information while the 
remaining hospitals were not forthcoming.    
6.3.1 Health facilities among RSBY-empanelled hospitals 
In both the districts, all the RSBY empanelled hospitals were surveyed regarding the 
availability of services. Table 6.4 shows facility wise total availability of services. It is 
to be noted that none of the facilities in Patiala provided all (20) services categorized 
under the RSBY package rates, though there were three private hospitals in 
Yamunanagar which provided all services. Another important finding is that there was 
no single public hospital in either Patiala or Yamunanagar district that offered the 
complete range of specified treatment packages to the beneficiary. 
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Table 6.4: Facility wise total availability of services 
Patiala Yamunanagar 
  
Hospital 
Type 
Total 
Services 
available   
Hospital 
Type 
Total 
Services 
available 
Facility 1 Public 13 Facility 1 Public  16 
Facility 2 Public 12 Facility 2 Public  15 
Facility 3 Public 11 Facility 3 Private 5 
Facility 4 Public 8 Facility 4 Private 20 
Facility 5 Public 6 Facility 5 Private 20 
Facility 6 Private 19 Facility 6 Private 20 
Facility 7 Private 18 Facility 7 Private 17 
Facility 8 Private 9 Facility 8 Private 17 
Facility 9 Private 15 Facility 9 Private 12 
Facility 10 Private 7 Facility 10 Private 1 
Facility 11 Private 11 Facility 11 Private 14 
Facility 12 Private 9 Facility 12 Private 19 
   
Facility 13 Private 14 
Facility 14 Private 13 
Facility 15 Private 12 
Facility 16 Private 12 
Facility 17 Private 13 
Facility 18 Private 4 
Facility 19 Private 4 
 
Table 6.5 shows the health services available in empanelled hospitals. The services 
shown in the table are the broad categories of all the packages under the RSBY 
scheme. Super-specialty services, e.g. cardiology, neurology, neurosurgery and 
urology were minimal in RSBY-empanelled hospitals in both the districts and were 
mainly present in private hospitals. Hardly any of the public hospitals had super-
specialty services. From the available information, the average number of beds in 
Patiala was 37 while complete information in this regard was not available for 
Yamunanagar district.  In Patiala district, out of 12 empanelled hospitals studied, only 
one hospital (private) had neurosurgery services. Medically managed diseases (MMD) 
general (surgical and non-surgical), obstetrics and gynaecology and paediatrics were 
the departments present in most of the empanelled hospitals.  
Adequate services were not being provided to the RSBY beneficiaries as the 
empanelled hospitals lacked many required services. This lack of several services 
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raises a question on the process of empanelment. Further, limited availability of 
super-specialty hospitals contributed to access issues. If all services are not being 
provided to the beneficiaries, those who are sick may not find it attractive enrolling 
into the scheme very attractive.  
Table 6.5: Facilities among hospitals empanelled under RSBY scheme and 
availability of care 
Symbol 
 
Patiala Yamunanagar 
Public 
hospitals 
Private 
hospitals Total 
Public 
hospitals 
Private 
hospitals Total 
A 
Number of empanelled 
hospitals 10 7 17 4 33 37 
B 
Number of hospitals which 
participated in the study 5 7 12 2 17 19 
C Total No. of beds available 300 146 446 NA 205 (8)* NA 
D Mean No. of beds per hospital 60 21 37 NA 25.6 NA 
E Neonatal care 4 6 10 2 15 17 
F Burns 3 3 6 2 6 8 
G Snake bite 3 3 6 2 12 14 
H Oncology 0 3 3 2 4 6 
I Urology 1 6 7 0 9 9 
J Endocrinology 0 2 2 0 13 13 
K Paediatrics 4 6 10 1 9 10 
L Orthopaedics 4 4 8 2 9 11 
M Ophthalmology 4 2 6 2 15 17 
N Neurosurgery 0 1 1 1 8 9 
O Hysteroscopy 0 4 4 0 7 7 
P Endoscopic procedures 0 6 6 1 12 13 
Q Gynaecology 5 6 11 2 13 15 
R General surgery 5 7 12 2 12 14 
S ENT 3 3 6 2 8 10 
T Dental 4 2 6 2 9 11 
U Medical general ward – ICU 0 5 5 2 12 14 
V 
Medical general ward –
nonsurgical 5 7 12 2 14 16 
W 
Medical general ward – 
surgical 5 7 12 2 16 18 
X Intensive care unit 0 5 5 2 13 15 
Y 
Total possible types of care  
(B x 20) 
100 140 240 40 340 380 
Z 
Actual total care 
sum E to X 
50 88 138 31 216 247 
 
Percentage of actual care 
available 
(Zx100)/Y 
50% 63% 58% 78% 64% 65% 
 
*Only eight hospitals reported the number of beds available 
The last row of Table 6.4 gives the percentage of actual care (packages) in relation to 
possible care available in the district. In Patiala there is a shortfall in the total 
availability of services by 42% (100% – 58%); the shortfall is greater in the public 
facilities. In Yamunanagar the shortfall is 35% and the public facilities fare better. 
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However, though there were four empanelled public facilities, data could be obtained 
from only two of them.   
 
6.4 Analysis of enrolment under RSBY 
Prior to analysis of utilization of services, enrolment under the RSBY scheme was 
assessed. Firstly, enrolment in the scheme was analysed as an initial measure of 
access under the RSBY. The data for the eligible BPL population and enrolled BPL 
population was retrieved from the SNAs of the respective states for the years 2011 
and 2012. For Patiala district, line listing of the eligible and enrolled population with 
age and gender was provided. However, for Yamunanagar district, the line listing of 
the eligible population along with their age and sex was available, but was not 
available for the enrolled population. Secondly, to assess the off-targeting and 
leakages in the scheme, the data set of the exit interviews from the selected 
empanelled hospitals was used.  
6.4.1 Eligible and enrolled participants 
In Patiala district of Punjab, of the 247,998 BPL population eligible for enrolment 
under the RSBY scheme, 38,278 (15.4%) were enrolled. In terms of families, 16,144 
(40.4%) of BPL families were enrolled. The average number of individuals enrolled 
per family was 2.37. Amongst the enrolled families in Patiala, 40% of them were 
headed by females (Figure 6.7).  
 In Yamunanagar district of Haryana, of the 393,304 BPL population eligible for 
enrolment under the RSBY scheme, 165,809 (42.2%) were actually enrolled. In terms 
of families, 46,546 (64.3%) of BPL families were enrolled. The average number of 
individuals enrolled per family was 3.56. Amongst the enrolled families in 
Yamunanagar, 23% of them were headed by females (Figure 6.7). 
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Fig. 6.7: Enrolment under RSBY scheme (Patiala and Yamunanagar) 
 
In Patiala district, amongst the total enrolled population, 51% were males and 49% 
were females. Table 6.6 shows the breakdown by age group and sex. The percentage 
of under-5 BPL children enrolled under the scheme (out of total under-5 BPL 
children) was very low. The highest enrolment occurred in the age group of 45 to 64 
years followed by the elderly group (>64 years), 25-44 years and 15-24 years. The 
elderly group was the second highest group in terms of enrolment. Looking at the 
enrolment rate in various age groups, it can be concluded that there was no adverse 
selection in Patiala district. While comparing the enrolment rates among males and 
females, it was seen that enrolment was slightly higher for females in the age groups 
25-44 years and 45-64 years. However, enrolment of females was slightly lower in 
age groups 5-14 years and >64 years. Age and gender-wise enrolment analysis could 
not be conducted for Yamunanagar as similar database was not present.  
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Table 6.6: Proportion of enrolled beneficiaries in RSBY Scheme in Patiala 
district (similar data for Yamunanagar district was not available) 
    Under-5 
5 to 14 
yrs 
15 to 
24 yrs 
25 to 
44 yrs 
45 to 
64 yrs 
>64 yrs 
Total 
population 
Male 1,101,207 188,359 187,462 299,791 164,773 62,894 
Female 975,969 147,421 161,995 283,727 158,504 58,282 
Eligible 
population 
(BPL) 
Male 9,200 50,013 18,785 26,349 11,787 6,219 
Female 9,400 49,880 18,802 26,420 11,758 6,227 
Enrolled 
population 
Male 184 3,601 3,156 6,403 4,102 1,984 
Female 235 2,494 3,140 7,292 4,292 1,395 
% enrolled of 
eligible 
population 
Male 2.0% 7.2% 16.8% 24.3% 34.8% 31.9% 
Female 2.5% 5.0% 16.7% 27.6% 36.5% 22.4% 
All 2.25% 6.10% 16.75% 25.95% 35.65% 27.15% 
 
In understanding the process of enrolment under the scheme, it is important to analyse 
data to discern any factors that may contribute to higher family coverage. This is done 
through examination of off-targeting and leakage.  
6.4.2 Off-targeting and leakage 
Since the coverage of RSBY scheme is still not 100%, there are BPL families that are 
not enrolled under the scheme. To assess the off-targeting and leakage, the exit 
interview data set was analysed.   
Under the off-target category, only the BPL population was analysed and a 
comparison was made between the RSBY-enrolled BPL participants and non-RSBY 
BPL participants. The data was extracted from the exit interviews of 751 participants 
from both the districts (Patiala and Yamunanagar). A total of 462 BPL participants 
were analysed in the off-target category (Table 6.7). Amongst the study participants 
who belonged to the BPL category, 331 were enrolled in the RSBY scheme while the 
remaining 131 (28%) were not enrolled. 
For leakage, only the RSBY-enrolled population was studied and the characteristics of 
the BPL population enrolled for the RSBY scheme and non-BPL population enrolled 
for the RSBY scheme were compared. As the RSBY scheme is only for the BPL 
population, those who are not BPL are not eligible for the scheme. But if they are 
enrolled under the scheme, it would be considered as ‘leakage’ from the scheme. The 
data was extracted from the exit interviews of 751 participants from the selected 
empanelled facilities in both the districts (Patiala and Yamunanagar). A total of 387 
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participants enrolled under the RSBY scheme were studied in this section (Table 6.7). 
Out of 387 RSBY participants, 331 belonged to the BPL category while the remaining 
56 were non-BPL; or 14.5% among the enrolled did not meet the eligibility criteria. 
The percentage for off-target is larger in comparison to that for leakage. 
Table 6.7: Off-target and leakage categories 
 
RSBY   
 Yes No Total 
 
BPL 
Yes 331 131 462 Off target (28%) 
No 56 233 289 
 Total  387 364 751 
 
  
Leakage 
(14.5%) 
    
6.4.3 Determinants of off-targeting 
Analysis was done to assess the determinants of off-targeting, i.e. BPL population not 
getting enrolled in the RSBY scheme. If a BPL person is identified among those 
enrolled in RSBY, it is referred to as proper targeting. If we examine only the BPL 
persons, we can determine why an off-targeting may have taken place. Binary logistic 
regression analysis was done using the relation below for only the BPL people in the 
sample, since off-targeting can occur only among the BPL populace. 
Off-target (Yes/No) = function (caste, education, district, age, gender) 
(Only BPL population was studied for determinants of off-targeting) 
 
Binary logistic regression analysis shows that off-targeting was more likely to occur 
in Yamunanagar, in the SC/ST population, and in the illiterate (or literate up to 
primary level). However, the latter was statistically non-significant. Off-targeting was 
also less likely to occur for females. The RSBY scheme was aimed at bringing social 
equity in the community by giving equal priority in health care to the underprivileged 
section of society. However, our analysis shows that the underprivileged section 
(illiterates or literate up to primary level and SC/ST) were still less likely to benefit 
from enrolment under the scheme (Table 6.8). 
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Table 6.8: Binary Logistic regression analysis for determinants of off-target 
population 
  
   
95% C.I. 
 Odds ratio Lower Upper P value 
District (Yamunanagar) 1.83 1.15 2.92 .010 
Gender (Females) 0.54 0.35 0.83 .005 
Caste (SC/ST) 1.90 1.23 2.92 .004 
Education  (Illiterate or literate up to 
primary level) 
1.45 0.87 2.40 .153 
Constant 0.43   .024 
 
6.4.4 Determinants of leakage from the scheme 
Determinants for the non-BPL population to be enrolled under the RSBY scheme, i.e. 
leakage were studied. Binary logistic regression analysis was done using the equation 
below for only those that were enrolled, to examine what factors led to BPL being 
properly enrolled or otherwise. ‘Yes’ in the equation indicates no leakage.   
Leakage (Yes/No) = function (caste, education, district, age, gender) 
(Only RSBY population was studied for determinants of leakage) 
Binary logistic regression analysis shows that leakage was less likely to occur in 
Yamunanagar.  This implies that leakage, i.e. non-BPL participants getting enrolled in 
RSBY, was more likely to occur in Patiala district when compared to Yamunanagar 
district. Amongst the 56 non-BPL population enrolled for RSBY, 48 were residents of 
Patiala while only 8 were from Yamunanagar district (Table 6.9).  
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Table 6.9: Binary logistic regression analysis for determinants of leakage 
  
  
 
95% C.I. 
Odds 
ratio Lower Upper 
P 
Value 
District (Yamunanagar) 0.12 0.06 0.27 .00 
Gender (Females) 1.19 0.61 2.31 .60 
Caste (SC/ST) 1.52 0.83 2.78 .17 
Education  (Illiterate or literate up to 
primary level) 
0.64 0.32 1.26 .19 
Constant .28   .01 
 
6.5 Utilization patterns 
This section primarily deals with analysing the utilization of services under the RSBY 
scheme by enrolled beneficiaries to explore trends in the utilization patterns. Claims-
related data of the selected districts for the period September 2011 to December 2012 
were analysed. During this period, a total of 992 claims were made in Patiala and 
6,043 in Yamunanagar.  
6.5.1 Volume of claims  
Claims made in Yamunanagar district were six times more than those made in Patiala 
district. However, claims per 1000 family enrolled in Yamunanagar were almost two 
times of Patiala (Table 6.10). The number of claims per 1000 individuals enrolled 
under the scheme was 25.9 for Patiala district while it was 36.4 for Yamunanagar 
district (total number of claims x 100/total population enrolled). 
Table 6.10: Utilization Pattern (Patiala Vs Yamunanagar) 
 Patiala Yamunanagar 
Claims in 14 months 992 6043 
Enrolment population 38278 165809 
Enrolled families 16144 46546 
Empanelled facilities 17 37 
   
Claims/month 70.9 431.6 
Claims/facility/month 4.2 11.7 
Claims/1000 family/month 4.4 9.3 
Claims/1000 population/month 1.9 2.6 
 
In terms of the trend of number of claims made per month, it was observed that in 
Patiala district the claims gradually increased from 1% (of the total claims in the 
district) in October 2011 and peaked to 13% in September 2012, but then declined to 
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2% in December 2012. In Yamunanagar district, initially the number of claims made 
per month was as high as 11% of total claims but declined to 4% over the next few 
months, though a second peak was observed in July 2012. Thereafter, the number of 
claims also declined in this district to 2.5% in November 2012 (Figure 6.8). Linear 
trend line showed an increasing trend of claims in Patiala while a declining trend in 
Yamunanagar.  
Fig. 6.8: Trend in number of claims per month made in Patiala and 
Yamunanagar districts 
 
6.5.2 Number of claims by private and public hospitals 
In Patiala district, seven private hospitals and 10 public hospitals were empanelled. In 
Yamunanagar district, 33 private hospitals and only four public hospitals were 
empanelled (Table 6.11). More private hospitals were empanelled in Yamunanagar as 
against more public hospitals in Patiala. In both the districts, more claims per hospital 
were made in private hospitals. However, this was significantly higher in 
Yamunanagar district. 
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Table 6.11: Claims distribution in private and public hospitals 
District 
Type of 
hospital 
No. of claims 
(%) 
Total No. of 
empanelled 
hospitals 
Average no. 
of claims per 
hospital 
(Claims/total 
No. of 
empanelled 
hospitals) 
Patiala 
Private 669 (67.4) 7 95.6 
Public 323 (32.6) 10 32.3 
Total 992 (100) 17 58.4 
Yamunanagar 
Private 5,658 (93.6) 33 171.5 
Public 385 (6.4) 4 96.3 
Total 6,043 (100) 37 163.3 
 
In both the districts, fluctuating trends were observed, both in public and private 
hospitals. In Patiala (both public and private hospital), claims started very low and 
gradually peaked in September 2012, thereafter they declined. In Yamunanagar 
district, a declining trend was observed in private hospitals. No definite trend was 
observed for public hospitals (Table 6.12).  
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Table 6.12: Distribution of claims in public and private hospitals over the year 
Month 
Patiala Yamunanagar Across districts 
Private 
(%) 
Public 
(%) 
Private 
(%) 
Public 
(%) 
Private 
(%) 
Public 
(%) 
(N=669) (N=323) (N=5,658) (N=385) (N=6,327) (N=708) 
Sep 11 0.0 0.0 11.5 4.9 10.2 2.7 
Oct 11 0.9 0.0 8.4 6.0 7.6 3.2 
Nov 11 2.1 0.0 7.5 11.2 6.9 6.1 
Dec 11 7.0 0.9 7.2 1.8 7.2 1.4 
Jan 12 5.2 4.3 6.1 0.5 6.0 2.3 
Feb 12 7.0 2.8 5.8 6.8 5.9 4.9 
Mar 12 6.6 4.6 5.5 4.7 5.6 4.7 
Apr 12 5.4 4.0 4.7 6.0 4.8 5.1 
May 12 9.4 8.4 5.2 12.7 5.6 10.7 
Jun 12 7.6 5.0 4.2 2.1 4.5 3.4 
Jul 12 6.4 10.5 8.1 11.4 7.9 11.0 
Aug 12 6.9 6.5 6.3 10.4 6.4 8.6 
Sep 12 11.1 8.4 7.2 6.0 7.6 7.1 
Oct 12 3.9 5.6 5.3 2.9 5.1 4.1 
Nov 12 4.9 6.8 3.0 2.1 3.2 4.2 
Dec 12 0.1 5.0 4.2 10.6 3.7 8.1 
 
6.5.3 Clustering of claims in selected hospitals 
During the claims analysis it was observed that there was a clustering of the number 
of claims in certain hospitals, i.e. number of claims was much more in some hospitals 
as compared to other hospitals. Figure 6.9 gives a stacked column diagram where 
every hospital has one colour and the height of the column is proportional to the 
number of claims. In both the districts, it can be observed that the height of a few 
colours covers most of the portion of the stacked column. In Patiala district, clustering 
was observed in private as well as public hospitals, whereas in Yamunanagar district 
clustering was more in private hospitals.  
Looking at the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), it appears that in Patiala district 
the claims were significantly concentrated in both selected private and public 
hospitals (when HHI was calculated individually for private and public hospitals). 
However, in Yamunanagar district, significant concentration of claims was observed 
in public hospitals only (Table 6.13). 
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Fig. 6.9: Distribution of claims in different hospitals empanelled in private and 
public sectors of Yamunanagar and Patiala districts 
 
 
Table 6.13: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index* of hospitals 
  Private hospitals Public hospitals Total 
Patiala 3,058 3,468 1,758 
Yamunanagar 1,078 5,222 967 
*Interpretation: Below 1500 – un-concentrated; 1500–2500 – moderately 
concentrated; above 2500 – highly concentrated 
 
In Yamunanagar district, about half of the claims were accounted for by four out of 37 
empanelled hospitals. All these four hospitals were private hospitals. In Patiala 
district, about two thirds of the claims were accounted for by three out of 17 
empanelled hospitals, two of which were private hospitals and one a public hospital. 
Background characteristics of these hospitals are given in Table 6.14. Looking at 
these, it appears that patients were more likely to visit hospitals that had maximum 
facilities under one roof or provided services that were in highest demand. For 
example cataract, which reportedly has a high burden in India (Murthy et al., 2008); 
and its correction is a low-cost procedure. The RSBY scheme appears to further 
192 
 
facilitate the dynamics. This might be the probable reason for high ophthalmological 
claims. 
Table 6.14: Background characteristics of hospitals where a majority of the 
claims were reported 
SNo. Name of the hospital Bed strength No. of 
claims 
Departments in the 
hospital 
Yamunanagar 
1 Private hospital 1 100 1539 All 20 services 
available 
2 Private hospital 2 11 608 Ophthalmology 
3 Private hospital 3 5 324 Ophthalmology 
4 Private hospital 4 NA 320 NA 
Patiala 
1 Private hospital 1 NA 299 Total services available 
were 19 
2 Private hospital 2 50 202 Total services available 
were 11 
3 Public hospital 3 100 172 Total services available 
were 12 
NA– not available 
6.5.4 Age and gender distribution of patients 
The number of claims for under-5 children were fewer as compared to other age 
groups.  Probably, this could be because the proportion of under-5 children enrolled 
under the scheme was small as compared to enrolment in other age groups. 
Most of the claims belonged to the age group 25–44 years followed by the 45–64 
years age group in both the districts (Table 6.15), which can be attributed to the major 
chunk of the population enrolled under the scheme belonging to this age group.  
While making a comparison between private and public hospitals, it is observed that 
more males were going to private hospitals (51.2% of total claims in private hospitals) 
whereas more females were going to public hospitals (53.2% of total claims in public 
hospitals). This difference is statistically significant (Table 6.16).  This could be 
because women found it easier to visit a facility close to home. 
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Table 6.15: Age and gender distribution of patients (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) by 
claims  
  
  
  
Patiala Yamunanagar 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Under-5 2 0.5 9 1.6 11 1.1 7 0.2 8 0.3 15 0.2 
5 to 14 yrs 22 5.2 45 8.0 67 6.8 232 7.4 154 5.3 386 6.4 
15 to 24 yrs 39 9.2 38 6.7 77 7.8 388 12.3 262 9.0 650 10.8 
25 to 44 yrs 135 31.7 260 45.9 395 39.8 1,020 32.4 1,116 38.5 2,136 35.3 
45 to 64 yrs 141 33.1 137 24.2 278 28.0 930 29.6 830 28.6 1,760 29.1 
> 64 yrs 87 20.4 77 13.6 164 16.5 568 18.1 528 18.2 1,096 18.1 
Total 426 100.0 566 100.0 992 100.0 3,145 100.0 2,898 100.0 6,043 100.0 
 
Table 6.16: Age and gender distribution of patients (private vs public facilities) 
by claims 
  
Private facilities Public facilities 
Male Female Male Female 
N % N % N % N % 
Under-5 8 38.1 13 61.9 1 20.0 4 80.0 
5 to 14 yrs 227 55.8 180 44.2 27 58.7 19 41.3 
15 to 24 yrs 376 58.9 262 41.1 51 57.3 38 42.7 
25 to 44 yrs 1,081 47.2 1,209 52.8 74 30.7 167 69.3 
45 to 64 yrs 946 52.1 870 47.9 125 56.3 97 43.7 
> 64 yrs 602 52.1 553 47.9 53 50.5 52 49.5 
Total 3,240 51.2 3,087 48.8 331 46.8 377 53.2 
 
6.5.5 Relationship of the claimant with the head of the household 
In both the districts, the highest number of claims were made by the head of the 
households followed by the spouse (Table 6.17). While comparing private and public 
hospitals, opposite trends were observed in Patiala and Yamunanagar district In 
Patiala,  significant difference was observed in terms of the claimant’s relationship to 
the head of the household except that in Yamunanagar district the heads of the 
households visited private hospitals more in comparison to public hospitals (Table 
6.18).  This could be because more private hospitals were enrolled in Yamunanagar. 
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Table 6.17: Relationship of claimant to the head of the household 
 
Relation to the head of the 
household 
Patiala Yamunanagar Total 
N=993 N=6,042 N=7,035 
Self 501 50.5% 2,826 46.8% 3,327 47.3% 
Spouse 195 19.6% 1,747 28.9% 1,942 27.6% 
Son 136 13.7% 779 12.9% 915 13.0% 
Daughter 111 11.2% 548 9.1% 659 9.4% 
Parent 6 0.6% 64 1.1% 70 1.0% 
Brother/sister 0 0.0% 18 0.3% 18 0.3% 
Grandchildren 3 0.3% 9 0.1% 12 0.2% 
Others 40 4.1% 52 0.9% 92 1.3% 
Total 992 100% 6,043 100% 7,035 100% 
 
Table 6.18: Relationship of claimant to the head of the household (private vs 
public) 
 
Relation to the 
head of the 
household 
  
Patiala – within 
district 
Yamunanagar – within 
district Overall both districts 
Private Public Private Public Private Public 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Self 333 49.8 168 52.0 2675 47.3 151 39.2 3008 47.5 319 45.1 
Spouse 122 18.2 73 22.6 1636 28.9 111 28.8 1758 27.8 184 26.0 
Son 96 14.3 40 12.4 712 12.6 67 17.4 808 12.8 107 15.1 
Daughter 88 13. 23 7.1 500 8.8 48 12.5 588 9.3 71 10.0 
Parent 2 0.3 4 1.2 61 1.1 3 0.8 63 1.0 7 1.0 
Brother/sister 0 0.0 0 0.0 17 0.3 1 0.3 17 0.3 1 0.1 
Grandchildren 3 0.4 0 0.0 9 0.2 0 0.0 12 0.2 0 0.0 
Others 25 3.7 15 4.6 48 0.8 4 1.0 73 1.2 19 2.7 
Total 669 100.0 323 100.0 5658 100.0 385 100.0 6327 100.0 708 100.0% 
 
6.5.6 Claimed amount and reimbursed amount 
The mean amount reimbursed to hospitals by the insurance company was more in 
Yamunanagar district as compared to Patiala district (Table 6.19). However, claimed 
amount was more in Patiala than Yamunanagar. The difference in mean (for both, 
claimed amount and reimbursed amount) between Patiala and Yamunanagar was 
statistically significant. It was further observed in Yamunanagar district that the 
amount reimbursed by the insurance company was almost equal to the amount 
claimed by the hospitals, whereas in Patiala district the reimbursed amount was much 
lower than what was lodged by the facilities with the insurance companies, i.e. 
insurance companies were reducing the amount when paying back to the hospitals. 
The difference of mean between the claimed amount and reimbursed amount 
(∑(Claimed amount – Reimbursed amount)/ Total number of claims) 
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 was INR 4,134 (£ 41.6)  in Patiala and only INR 2 (£ 0.02) in Yamunanagar.   
The mean reimbursed amount was higher for public hospitals in Patiala district while 
it was slightly higher for private hospitals in Yamunanagar (Table 6.20). Similar 
observations were also noted for the mean claimed amount (Table 6.21). During 
overall comparison of public hospitals and private hospitals, the mean reimbursed 
amount was more for public hospitals.  
In Patiala, the difference of mean between the claimed amount and reimbursed 
amount was INR 4,451 (£ 44) for private hospitals and INR 3,474 (£ 34) for public 
hospitals; whereas in Yamunanagar, this difference was only INR 3 (£ 0.03) in private 
hospitals and nil in public hospitals. (Table 6.20 and 6.21.) 
Kernel density estimates shows that the highest density for reimbursed and claimed 
amount (both, private and public) was around INR 3,000 (£ 30) (Figure 6.10 and 
6.13). Findings of Table 6.20 can be seen in kernels plot in Figure 6.11 and 6.12, 
where the highest density of reimbursed amount is high for public hospitals when 
compared to private hospitals in Patiala. In Yamunanagar, it was the opposite where 
the highest density for reimbursed amount was higher for private hospitals when 
compared to public hospitals. The difference between the density of private and 
public hospitals was more pronounced for the claimed amount (Figure 6.13) when 
compared to reimbursed amount (Figure 6.10). Similar to reimbursed amount, 
findings of claimed amount in Table 6.21 can be seen in kernels plot in Figure 6.14 
and 6.15, where the highest density of claimed amount is high for public hospitals 
when compared to private hospitals in Patiala. However, in Yamunanagar, it was the 
opposite where the highest density for claimed amount was higher for private 
hospitals when compared to public hospital The highest amount was reimbursed 
under the neurosurgery package followed by endocrine and oncology. Neurosurgery 
and orthopaedic packages had wide variations in terms of the amount reimbursed 
(Figure 6.16). 
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Table 6.19: Mean amount claimed by hospitals and reimbursed by the insurance 
company (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
District  —> 
Reimbursed amount Claimed amount 
Patiala Yamunanagar* Patiala Yamunanagar* 
N 992 5,903 992 5,903 
Mean (INR) 4,210 5,138 8,344 5,140 
Std. deviation 3,992 4,175 6,520 4,175 
P value, H0  - 
mean 0 0.001 0.001 
*140 claims were rejected in Yamunanagar district 
 
Table 6.20: Mean amount reimbursed by the insurance company to the hospital 
(private vs public) 
 
Hospital 
type    —
> 
Patiala Yamunanagar Both districts 
consolidated 
Private Public Private Public Private* Public** 
N 669 323 5,538 365 6,207 688 
Mean 
(INR) 
3708 5250 5,140 5,105 4,985 5,173 
SD 3793 4193 4,164 4,339 4,150 4,269 
Difference 
 
0.001 .005 0.39 
*120 claims from private hospitals were rejected 
**20 claims from public hospitals were rejected 
 
 
Table 6.21: Mean amount claimed from the insurance company by the hospitals 
(Private vs public) 
 
Hospital 
type       
 
Patiala Yamunanagar Both districts consolidated 
Private Public Private Public Private* Public** 
N 669 323 5,538 365 6,207 688 
Mean 
(INR) 
8,159 8,724 5,143 5,105 5,468 6,804 
SD 6,532 6,487 4,165 4,339 4,577 5,742 
P Value 0.287 0.005 <0.01 
*120 claims from private hospitals were rejected 
**20 claims from public hospitals were rejected  
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Fig. 6.10: Kernel density estimates for reimbursed amount (private vs public 
hospitals)
 
 
Fig. 6.11: Kernel Density estimates for reimbursed amount in Patiala district 
(private vs public hospitals) 
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Fig. 6.12:Kernel density estimates for reimbursed amount in Yamunanagar 
district (private vs public hospitals) 
 
 
Fig. 6.13: Kernel density estimates for claimed amount (private vs public 
hospitals) 
 
 
199 
 
 
Fig. 6.14:Kernel density estimates for claimed amount in Patiala district (private 
vs public hospitals) 
 
Fig. 6.15:Kernel density estimates for claimed amount in Yamunanagar district 
(private vs public hospitals) 
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Fig. 6.16: Mean amount reimbursed under various categories with ±2SD 
 
 
In Yamunanagar, the amount reimbursed for 5,900 (99.9%) claims was exactly the 
same as the claimed amount (Table 6.22). Only three claims were reimbursed a lesser 
amount than what was claimed by the health facilities. In Patiala district, 49% of the 
claims were reimbursed with a lesser amount than what was claimed by the hospitals 
(Table 6.22). The reimbursed amount was less than the claimed amount for about 5% 
of claims in private hospitals and 20% claims in public hospitals (Table 6.23). 
Table 6.22: Difference between claimed and reimbursed amount (Patiala vs 
Yamunanagar) 
Difference between 
claimed and reimbursed 
amount 
Patiala Yamunanagar Total 
No. % No. % No. % 
No difference 507 51.1 5,900 99.9 6,407 92.9 
<INR 1000 15 1.5 1 0.0 16 0.2 
INR 1,001 to 5,000 210 21.2 0 0.0 210 3.0 
INR 5,001 to 10,000 114 11.5 2 0.1 116 1.7 
INR 10001 to 15000 62 6.3 0 0.0 62 0.9 
>INR 15,000 84 8.5 0 0.0 84 1.2 
Total 992 100.0 5,903 100.0 6,895 100.0 
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Table 6.23. Difference between claimed and reimbursed amount (private vs public hospitals) 
 Patiala Yamunanagar Across districts 
  Difference between claimed 
and reimbursed amount 
Private hospital Public hospital Private hospital Public hospital Private hospital Public hospital 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
 No difference 327 48.9 180 55.7 5,535 99.9 365 100 5,862 94.4 545 79.2 
<INR 1000 10 1.5 5 1.5 1 0.0 0 0.0 11 0.2 5 0.7 
INR 1,001 to 5,000 142 21.2 68 21.1 
    
142 2.3 68 9.9 
INR 5,001 to 10,000 79 11.8 35 10.8 2 0.1 0 0.0 81 1.3 35 5.1 
INR 10001 to 15000 50 7.5 12 3.7 
    
50 0.8 12 1.7 
>INR 15,000 61 9.1 23 7.1 
    
61 1.0 23 3.3 
  669 100. 323 100 5,538 100 365 100 6,207 100 688 100 
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6.5.7 Determinants of reimbursed amount 
Multivariate regression analysis was carried out to assess the determinants of 
reimbursed amount (Table 6.24). The equation used for the regression analysis was: 
Reimbursed amount = function (Relationship to the head of the household,       
hospital type, duration of stay, age and gender) 
Each of the variables was added step wise. The highest R-square was observed for the 
model which had all the variables. The reimbursed amount in Yamunanagar district 
was significantly higher compared to Patiala district. The duration of stay is positively 
related to higher reimbursed amount. Low R-square is primarily due to binomial 
independent variable, and the estimations are suggestive.  
Table 6.24: Multivariate analysis for determinants of reimbursed amount 
  1 2 3 4 5 
  Reimbursed 
Amount 
Reimbursed 
Amount 
Reimbursed 
Amount 
Reimbursed 
Amount 
Reimbursed 
Amount 
Age -7.347** -6.359* -6.281* -7.185** -3.539 
 (-2.679) (-2.738) (-2.739) (-2.732) (-2.767) 
Female 194.7 -7.481 -14.48 135.1 141.3 
 (-100.2) (-153.4) (-153.6) (-154.4) (-158.2) 
Relationship with 
head of household 
(Other relatives 
[Except self and 
son]) 
 276 282.1 137.7 82.51 
 (-158.6) (-158.7) (-159.4) (-163.4) 
     
Type of hospital 
(private hospital) 
  -181.2 -569.2** 222.7 
   (-167.3) (-175.1) (-187.9) 
District 
(Yamunanagar)  
   1,093.7*** 1,396.9*** 
    (-151) (-175.4) 
Duration of stay    235.1*** 
     (-13.31) 
Constant 5,228.2*** 5,175.4*** 5,336.2*** 4,772.0*** 2,565.9*** 
 (-136.7) (-140) (-204.1) (-217.7) (-267.7) 
N 6,895 6,895 6,895 6,895 ,6530 
R-square 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.01 0.053 
Standard errors in parentheses    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    
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6.5.8 Premiums and amount reimbursed 
In Patiala district, the total amount reimbursed by the insurance company was INR 
4,177,006 (£ 42065), i.e. the average amount reimbursed per family enrolled was INR 
258.7 (£ 2.6). The premium collected per family by the insurance company in Patiala 
district was approximately INR 740 (£ 7.4). Thus, a huge gap of INR 482 (£ 4.9) 
(premium paid to insurance company but amount not utilized) existed in Patiala 
district (Table 6.25). 
In Yamunanagar district, the total amount reimbursed by the insurance company was 
INR 30,385,202 (£ 305993), i.e. the average amount reimbursed per family enrolled 
was INR 652.8 (£ 6.8). The premium collected per family by the insurance company 
in Yamunanagar district was INR 750 (£ 7.6). Thus, a gap of INR 98 (£ 1.0) 
(premium paid to insurance company but amount not utilized) existed in 
Yamunanagar district (Table 6.25). 
Table 6.25: Difference between premium collected and amount reimbursed  
 Patiala Yamunanagar 
Premium Collected INR 11946450 (£120306) INR 34909500 (£351555) 
Reimbursed INR 4,177,006 (£ 42,065) INR 30,385,202 (£ 305994) 
Premium-Reimbursed INR 77,69,554 (£78243) INR 4524298 (£45,561)  
Difference per family 
enrolled 
INR 740 (£ 7.4) INR 98 (£1) 
 
6.5.9 Frequency of claims by the same household 
In Patiala district, 298 beneficiaries used the service only once during the period of 
eligibility while 104, 67, 15 and 10 beneficiaries used the service twice, 3–4 times, 5–
9 times, and more than 9 times, respectively. In Yamunanagar district, 3,167 
beneficiaries used the service only once during the period of eligibility while 726, 
299, 42 and 11 beneficiaries used the claim twice, 3–4 times, 5–9 times and more than 
9 times, respectively (Table 6.26). 
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Table 6.26: Frequency of claims by the same household (Patiala vs 
Yamunanagar) 
Number of times the claim was 
utilized for the same beneficiary 
Yamunanagar Patiala Total 
Once 3167 (75%) 298 (60%) 3465 (73%) 
Twice 726 (17%) 104 (21%) 830 (18%) 
3 to 4 299 (7%) 67 (14%) 366 (8%) 
5 to 9 42 (1%) 15 (3%) 57 (1%) 
>9 11 (0.1%) 10 (2%) 21 (0.1%) 
Total 4245 (100%) 494 (100%) 4739 (100%) 
 
6.5.10 Diagnoses for the claims 
In both the districts together, most of the claims were made under the medically 
managed disease (general) package, followed by ophthalmology package and MMD-
ICU (Table 6.27). In Patiala district the most common package used was MMD 
(general) followed by MMD (ICU), general surgery and gynaecology. Whereas in 
Yamunanagar, the most common package was MMD (general) followed by 
ophthalmology and MMD (ICU) (Table 6.27).Almost all the claims categorized under 
ophthalmology and MMD-ICU were from private hospitals. Surprisingly, claims 
under paediatric ailments were almost negligible in both the districts. This may be 
because of lower enrolment of children.  
In Patiala district, there was only one claim where the diagnosis was not categorized 
under any package rate, while this figure was 275 in Yamunanagar district. Almost all 
such instances of non-packaged diagnoses were made by private hospitals (Table 
6.27). 
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Table 6.27: Distribution of claims in both the districts by diagnosis (Patiala vs 
Yamunanagar) 
Disease category 
Patiala Yamunanagar Total 
N % N % N % 
No package opted 1 0.1 275 4.6 276 3.9 
Dental 1 0.1 4 0.1 5 0.1 
Ear 12 1.2 5 0.1 17 0.2 
Endocrine 2 0.2 9 0.1 11 0.2 
Endoscopic 9 0.9 133 2.2 142 2.0 
General surgery 117 11.8 668 11.1 785 11.2 
Gynaecology 114 11.5 379 6.3 493 7.0 
Hysteroscopy 1 0.1 13 0.2 14 0.2 
MMD-general 445 44.9 1,916 31.7 2,361 33.6 
MMD-ICU 191 19.3 843 14.0 1034 14.7 
Neurosurgery 0 0.0 7 0.1 7 0.1 
Nose 9 0.9 11 0.2 20 0.3 
Oncology 1 0.1 2 0.0 3 0.0 
Ophthalmology 34 3.4 1,143 18.9 1,177 16.7 
Orthopaedic 43 4.3 425 7.0 468 6.7 
Paediatric 0 0.0 9 0.1 9 0.1 
Throat 0 0.0 6 0.1 6 0.1 
Urology 12 1.2 195 3.2 207 2.9 
 Total 992 100.0 6043 100.0 7035 100.0 
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Table 6.28: Distribution of claims in both the districts by diagnosis (private vs public) 
Disease category 
 
Patiala Yamunanagar Both Districts 
Private Public Private Public Private Public 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
No package opted 0 0.0 1 0.3 270 4.8 5 1.3 270 4.3 6 0.8 
Dental 0 0.0 1 0.3 4 0.1 0 0.0 4 0.1 1 0.1 
Ear 3 0.4 9 2.8 1 0.0 4 1.0 4 0.1 13 1.8 
Endocrine 1 0.1 1 0.3 9 0.2 0 0.0 10 0.2 1 0.1 
Endoscopic procedures 9 1.3 0 0.0 125 2.2 8 2.1 134 2.1 8 1.1 
General surgery 54 8.1 63 19.5 589 10.4 79 20.5 643 10.2 142 20.1 
Gynaecology 82 12.3 32 9.9 323 5.7 56 14.5 405 6.4 88 12.4 
Hysteroscopy 1 0.1 0 0.0 13 0.2 0 0.0 14 0.2 0 0.0 
MMD-general 272 40.7 173 53.6 1,759 31.1 157 40.8 2,031 32.1 330 46.6 
MMD-ICU 191 28.6 0 0.0 843 14.9 0 0.0 1,034 16.3 0 0.0 
Neurosurgery 0 0.0 0 0.0 7 0.1 0 0.0 7 0.1 0 0.0 
Nose 4 0.6 5 1.5 3 0.1 8 2.1 7 0.1 13 1.8 
Oncology 1 0.1 0 0.0 2 0.0 0 0.0 3 0.0 0 0.0 
Ophthalmology 21 3.1 13 4.0 1,122 19.8 21 5.5 1,143 18.1 34 4.8 
Orthopaedic 22 3.3 21 6.5 388 6.9 37 9.6 410 6.5 58 8.2 
Paediatric 0 0.0 0 0.0 9 0.2 0 0.0 9 0.1 0 0.0 
Throat 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 0.1 1 0.3 5 0.1 1 0.1 
Urology 8 1.2 4 1.2 186 3.3 9 2.3 194 3.1 13 1.8 
 Total 669 100.0 323 100.0 5,658 100.0 385 100.0 6,327 100.0 708 100.0 
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6.5.11 Length of stay in the hospital 
While analysing the length of stay in the hospital (both private and public), outliers 
were noticed in the data set for Patiala district with lengths of stay as high as 300 
days. This could probably have been due to errors in data entry and hence were 
removed from the analysis. All entries with a length of stay of more than 50 days in 
hospitals of Patiala district were deleted after discussion, on pragmatic grounds. A 
total of 162 (2.4%) such entries were noticed in the data set.  
The mean length of stay was significantly more in public hospitals compared to 
private hospitals. There were similar observations for intra-district analysis as well. 
The difference in stay between private and public hospitals was more in Patiala 
district when compared to Yamunanagar district (Table 6.29). 
Table 6.29: Length of stay (public vs private hospitals) 
    N Mean SD P Value 
Patiala 
Private 454 5.47 6.77 
0.65 
Public 218 9.39 8.25 
Yamunanagar 
Private 5,615 4.21 2.88 
0.03 
Public 383 6.51 5.80 
Both districts 
Private 6,069 4.31 3.35  
0.03 Public 601 7.55 6.92 
 
 
6.5.12 Time taken to settle the claim 
As per the contract document, the insurer has to settle all eligible claims and pay the 
sum to the provider within21 working days of receipt of the electronic claim bills. To 
assess this term of the contract, the claims database was analysed in terms of the date 
of issue of the cheque to the hospital by the insurance company and the date of 
booking the amount by the hospital. However, this data was available only for 
Yamunanagar district. About three fourths of the hospitals were not getting the 
reimbursed amount in time. There were 166 claims from private hospitals and only 
two claims from public hospitals where the claim settlement took more than six 
months (Table 6.30). 
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Table 6.30: Time taken to settle the claim amount by the insurance company 
(Yamunanagar) 
Claim settlement timings 
Private hospital Public hospital Total 
N % N % N % 
Within 21 working days 1,436 26.4% 105 28.8% 1,541 26.5% 
Within six months 3,846 70.6% 257 70.6% 4,103 70.6% 
More than six months 166 3.0% 2 0.5% 168 2.9% 
Total 5,448 100.0% 364 100.0% 5,812 100.0% 
 
 
6.6 Discussion 
6.6.1 Methodological issues 
Detailed locational information of the households enrolled under the RSBY scheme 
for the year 2011–12 could not be obtained and hence mapping of each enrolled 
household could not be done. Availability of such information could have helped in 
understanding the dynamics of scheme utilization in terms of access and distance. 
Mapping of the population was done at sub-district level and not at block level, since 
details of BPL population at block level were not available for mapping. Block level 
mapping would have helped in matching population to availability of health facilities.  
Many empanelled hospitals, more so the private hospitals, refused to participate in the 
study or provide information regarding the services available in their hospitals. They 
probably felt that providing such information might raise questions regarding their 
empanelment status. Information regarding the services available in non-empanelled 
hospitals was also not available. This information could have helped in better 
classifying the hospitals on their eligibility for empanelment under the RSBY scheme 
and in understanding the process of empanelment by the insurance companies.   
Another problem on accessibility to data pertained to availability of the enrolment 
data set. The line listing of the BPL population was not available for Yamunanagar 
district and therefore age- and sex-wise coverage of the scheme could not be assessed 
for Yamunanagar as it was done for Patiala. 
There were concerns around the quality of data. Some data were practically not 
feasible under the scheme, e.g. length of stay in the hospital of more than 300 days. 
Such data was deleted on pragmatic grounds. Since the data set used was secondary 
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data, little could be done to assess the quality of the data and improve it. The claims 
data set received from the insurance company of Patiala and Yamunanagar districts 
differed in terms of variables available for analysis. The information regarding the 
dispatch date of the cheque by the insurance companies to reimburse the claimed 
amount by the hospital was not available for Patiala district. Therefore, timely 
settlement by the insurance company of the claimed amount could not be assessed for 
Patiala district.  
6.6.2 Summary of findings and discussion  
Hospital empanelment 
Most of the RSBY beneficiaries (BPL population) are daily wage earners. Hence, 
having to visit a health facility that is far from their place of residence burdens them 
with transportation costs and loss of wages. Therefore, one important criterion for 
selecting hospitals for empanelment under the RSBY scheme is equitable 
geographical distribution within the district. In the present study, public hospitals 
were seen to be more equitability distributed throughout the district as compared to 
private facilities, which are geographically clustered around pockets at the sub-district 
level. In Patiala district, a majority of the private facilities are clustered around Patiala 
sub-district; and in Yamunanagar district, almost all the empanelled facilities were 
from the private sector and were clustered around Jagadhri sub-district. There 
appeared to be several cases of eligible facilities that were dispersed around the 
district but were not empanelled under the RSBY scheme. Such an observation raises 
questions on the selection criteria of the insurance company in terms of empanelment.  
Empanelment of more public hospitals in Patiala district and more private hospitals in 
Yamunanagar district could be due to the different regulatory authorities in the 
respective states. The regulatory body in Punjab (for Patiala) is the PHSC, which is 
under the Department of Health, while in Haryana (for Yamunanagar) the regulatory 
body is the ESIC, which is supervised by the Department of Labour and Employment. 
Since public hospitals are under the Department of Health, more public hospitals may 
have been empanelled in Patiala district. However, in Haryana the Department of 
Labour and Employment is independent of the Department of Health, which may 
have led to more private hospitals being empanelled in Yamunanagar.  
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In terms of availability of services, as per the criterion that at least one empanelled 
facility within the district should offer all pre-defined packages to RSBY 
beneficiaries, none of the public hospitals had all such facilities. In fact in Patiala 
district, not even a single empanelled facility provided all the services. In 
Yamunanagar, there were empanelled private hospitals which were providing all the 
services.     
Enrolment 
Enrolment was poor in both districts and more so for Patiala district as compared to 
Yamunanagar. The average number of family members enrolled in Patiala was also 
lower as compared to Yamunanagar (Patiala 2.37, Yamunanagar 3.56). Off-targetting 
was more likely to occur for SC/ST, illiterate or literate up to primary level and 
Yamunanagar, while it was likely for females. Leakage (non-BPL population getting 
enrolled in the RSBY scheme) was more likely to occur in Patiala district. However, it 
has to be noted that for estimation of off-target and leakage, sampled population from 
health facility was taken which may not be the ideal setting for such estimation. The 
analysis of the off-target group raised further questions on achieving of social equity 
by the scheme in relation to access to health services. The population that is ‘more 
deprived among the deprived’, i.e. lower classes and illiterate BPL population, are 
still unlikely to get enrolled under the scheme, which results in social inequality.  
The coverage of the scheme was low in Patiala district as compared to Yamunanagar. 
Only 15% of the eligible population was enrolled in the RSBY scheme in Patiala 
district compared to 40% in Yamunanagar district. There could be multiple 
explanations for this. One probable reason for low enrolment in Patiala district could 
be the overlap of the harvesting season and the enrolment period (September to 
November). During the harvesting period, entire families go to the fields in the 
morning hours and return to their homes only in the evening, by which time the 
process of enrolment by the TPAs in the villages is over. Moreover, in Patiala district 
there are more public hospitals as compared to Yamunanagar district. Public hospitals 
provide services that are either free of cost or minimal in cost. Hence the populace 
may have assumed that the RSBY scheme would not provide any added advantage to 
them as they already had relatively good access to health services at no/minimal cost. 
The difference could also be attributed to the different regulatory environment in the 
211 
 
two districts. The MoHFW may not be as efficient as MoLE in identifying and 
recording the informal sector.  Enrolment may also be affected by the fact that in 
Haryana, the State BPL list was added to the BPL list provided by the Centre, due to 
which the eligible BPL population got inflated. In Patiala only the BPL population list 
provided by the Central Government was used. The difference may also be due to the 
fact that in India, governance issues are very personality-oriented and not system 
dependent. Hence, a strong leader may provide better results at the ground level.   
The coverage of enrolment was more for the age groups above 25 years but was poor 
for below 15 years. Usually in the case of health insurance, it is assumed that both age 
groups, i.e. those at higher risk (elderly and under-5 children) and those at lower risk 
(adult population) would be enrolled. This would contribute to a sustainable and an 
effective health insurance scheme. More enrolment of the high-risk population would 
lead to adverse selection while more numbers of adults would lead to greater profit for 
the insurance companies as a high premium collection would occur against low 
utilization. Findings of the present study indicate that there was no adverse selection 
in terms of elderly enrolment in the scheme.  Another interesting finding in the 
enrolment of Patiala was that the number of females getting enrolled under the 
scheme was comparable to males, in fact in the age group of 25-64 years, they were 
more than males. The same was reflected in scheme utilization where more females 
were using the scheme in this age group. However, one reason for higher utilization of 
the scheme in this age group by females could be that this is the reproductive age 
group and females were using facilities more for gynaecological services.  
The low number of members enrolled per family is likely to be a result of the fact that 
under the scheme, payment of premiums to insurance firms is based on the total 
number of households enrolled. Within each household, the attempt by insurance 
firms is to minimize the number of members and keep it lower than the maximum 
allowed to lower the probability of use of health care.   
Trends in claims 
Looking at the population enrolled under the scheme in both the districts, it appears 
that this difference in claims is largely due to the number of people enrolled in the two 
districts. The population enrolled in Patiala is less than one third of the population 
enrolled in Yamunanagar. But when the claims per 100 enrolled population were 
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calculated for both districts, it was observed that enrolment was still lower for Patiala 
as compared to Yamunanagar. This indicates that there are other factors that 
influenced the claims in Patiala district. Accessibility to the health facility could be 
one of the factors. Other reasons could be the relationship between the insurance 
company and the private providers or the satisfaction level of the providers for the 
package rates. Particularly in Patiala, it was observed that the relationship between the 
insurance company and the private providers was not healthy. The private providers 
complained that they were not getting the reimbursed amount from the insurance 
company in time. They also felt that the package rates were not sufficient to generate 
any profit. Probably, these reasons may push providers to refuse to treat patients 
under the RSBY scheme. This would also explain the low utilization in Patiala.  
Further, in both the districts a declining trend in the number of claims was observed 
over the period October 2012 to December 2012. This declining trend could be in 
keeping with the seasonality of diseases in India. The winter season is considered to 
be a healthier season. There is less patient turnout in the hospital during this season. 
The patient load in the health facilities decreases during this season, primarily because 
of the decrease in medical cases (non-surgical). In the present study, a similar pattern 
was observed, i.e. the decline was present because of the decrease in the claims under 
the category of medically managed diseases (MMD)-general (non-surgical).  Also, the 
scheme was extended beyond September, though several facilities and beneficiaries 
were not aware that the scheme had been extended. 
Another observation in the claim analysis was that more claims were made by females 
in Patiala, though the opposite was observed in Yamunanagar, where more males 
were making claims. This can be correlated to the head of the household. Females, as 
head of the household, were more in Patiala when compared to Yamunanagar. It 
appears that the decision maker in a family plays a significant role in availing the 
services.  
Private hospital preferences 
A higher proportion of beneficiaries were visiting private facilities as compared to 
public facilities in both the districts. This high level of utilization probably reflects the 
general notion in India that the private sector offers better care. Lack of funds to 
access care had created a pent-up demand for private care which can now be met 
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through RSBY enrolment. Earlier, the only option available to the BPL population 
was public hospitals, but with the introduction of the scheme, they have access to 
private hospitals as well.  
Availing benefits 
Children and the elderly population are at a higher risk of developing diseases and 
therefore are more likely to require admission in hospitals. A similar situation was 
observed for the paediatric age group, where services availed by children was almost 
negligible. The services were mostly utilized by the 25–60 years age group who are 
the bread-earners of the family and also comprise a major chunk of the populaltion. 
Most of the claims were for the head of the household. The lower claims observed in 
the paediatric age group is an issue of both enrolment and utilization. Probably, the 
limitation of INR 30,000 (£ 302) as a maximum benefit under the scheme prioritizes 
the use of the insured amount for the important and productive members of the 
family.  
Further, the lower number of claims in the paediatric age group could be due to the 
mother’s ID being used for sick infants and neonates. This was reported by one of the 
SNA interviewees. Such an observation questions the enrolment process by the 
insurance companies, which leave out small children from being enrolled in the 
scheme despite the fact that the number of enrolled persons per family is not 
achieved.    
Clustering of patients in selected hospitals 
The clustering effect, i.e. beneficiaries going to only a few selected hospitals in the 
district was observed in both the districts. Certain hospitals may develop a reputation 
over time because of the quality of services that they deliver.  The scheme has enabled 
the poor to choose the hospital based on their preference and hence it could be that a 
majority of the beneficiaries visit the most reputed hospital of the district. Also, 
clustering is observed in the hospitals that have all facilities available under one roof. 
The health-care system in India is designed so that the patients are referred from 
primary centres to secondary centres and from secondary centres to tertiary centres. 
The burden of the patient is highest at tertiary centres, followed by secondary and 
primary centres, primarily because of a poor referral system.  
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Facilities available in the hospital may enhance the confidence of the patient in that 
hospital. The availability of larger number of treatments provided by a single facility 
would also reduce the transportation cost and inconvenience to the patients if they 
require advice from other specialists. In the present study, clustering was observed in 
big hospitals (more than 50 beds) that had almost all the specialized facilities. 
It was observed that enrolled men were more likely to visit private hospitals rather 
than public hospitals. In both districts, public hospitals were scattered throughout the 
district and hence easily accessible even in peripheral areas. However, private 
hospitals were concentrated in certain sub-districts, hence population from peripheral 
areas would have to travel a longer distance to reach these hospitals. It is 
comparatively easier for men to access the facilities that are far off from their 
residence as compared to women. This is because of the independence of males in 
terms of transportation. They may own their own transport when compared to females 
who have to depend on public transport, which may be infrequent and erratic.  
Claim amount by health facilities 
In Patiala, the amount claimed by public hospitals was more than what was claimed 
by private hospitals, whereas in Yamunanagar, the amount claimed by the private 
hospitals was more than public hospital. The reason for this could be  the greater 
length of stay in public  hospitals as compared to private hospitals.  
As can be observed from Table 6.22, once the duration of stay is taken into account in 
the regression model, the coefficient for private care changes sign from reducing 
claims to increasing claims. However, this sign change is accompanied by the 
coefficient becoming insignificant.   The sign for duration of stay is positive in Table 
6.22 and is significant. 
In Patiala, the difference between the claimed and reimbursed amount was higher as 
compared to Yamunanagar. Further, this difference was higher for private hospitals 
compared to public hospitals in Patiala. The average number of claims per hospital 
was lower in Patiala because of lower level of enrolment which was accompanied by 
lower utilization rate. Such circumstances may push the providers to inflate the claim 
amount to achieve the desired level of profit from the limited number of cases 
reimbursable through RSBY. In Yamunanagar, the average number of cases per 
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hospital was high; therefore, meeting a profit target from the volume of the claims 
was easier, thus making any inflation of costs unnecessary. 
 
6.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has provided an assessment of accessibility, availability and utilization 
patterns of health-care services under the RSBY scheme. Primary data was collected 
for accessibility and availability assessment, while secondary data was analysed for 
utilization patterns.  
Mapping of the health facilities showed that access to health facilities should be a 
concern for the beneficiaries as the number of empanelled hospitals were relatively 
few. Moreover, the geographical distribution of private facilities was clustered around 
selected sub-districts.  
The empanelment of health facilities was not adequate as most of the empanelled 
hospitals were providing limited services to the beneficiaries. In both the districts 
there were only three hospitals (all private hospitals in Yamunanagar), which were 
providing all service packages.  
Enrolment of beneficiaries is one of the most important pillars contributing to the goal 
of the scheme. However, in the present study it was found that both the coverage of 
the enrolment and the process of enrolment were inadequate, and that beneficiary 
enrolment within enrolled households was poor. Also, signs of inequity were seen 
with the presence of off-targetting for certain under privileged deprived group.  
Utilization patterns showed that most of the claims were from private hospitals and 
were clustered in a few selected hospitals. Further, few claims were made by the most 
vulnerable groups (children and elderly population). Analysis of the claims data set 
also pointed towards breach in contract by the insurance companies as they were not 
settling the claim amount of the providers in time. Moreover, in one district, overall 
income from premiums collected by the insurance company exceeded the total value 
of claims paid by a significantly large amount. 
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HEALTH CARE ACROSS PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE PROVIDERS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with evaluating the delivery of services across both public and 
private empanelled facilities for RSBY and non-RSBY beneficiaries. The questions 
asked here are: Has the pluralization of access at near-zero cost led to satisfaction 
with the care received? Did the cashless system actually provide near-free care 
through the use of private providers? Was the RSBY implementation framework in 
accordance with the contract design? Which type of facility provided better services 
to RSBY beneficiaries?  
Considering that RSBY uses contractual arrangements with a variety of stakeholders 
to facilitate implementation, it is imperative to understand the outcome of these 
arrangements by evaluating the services being provided to beneficiaries. Moreover, 
due to asymmetry of information between the health provider and BPL beneficiary, it 
is important to assess structural, process and quality aspects of care to understand the 
experience of the beneficiary while availing services in both public and private 
facilities and the implication of this for contract design. Additionally, non-RSBY 
participants were included in the sample to serve as controls. 
This chapter primarily deals with evaluating the provision of care as adapted from the 
Donabedian Framework (Donabedian, 2005, Donabedian, 1988). The aim is to assess 
various aspects of service delivery, focusing specifically on the policy guidelines and 
implementation of the contractual arrangements.  
The methodology has been discussed in detail in Chapter 4. A total of 12 facilities 
were selected, with three public and three private facilities in each of the two chosen 
districts (Patiala and Yamunanagar). Evaluation was undertaken of structural aspects 
of care, process of care and user satisfaction/perceived quality. Technical quality of 
care was excluded due to resource constraints and difficulty in accessing patient 
records, especially at private facility.  
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Data were collected from an Observational and Facility Record Checklist, Health 
Provider Checklist (self-assessment) and exit interviews with patients. A total of 751 
exit interviews were conducted. The break-up by various parameters was - 399 
participants interviewed from Patiala district and 352 from Yamunanagar district. 
Taking the two districts together, 387 were RSBY participants and 364 non-RSBY 
participants and 398 exit interviews were from private hospitals and 353 from public 
hospitals. The low number of cases in Yamunanagar was because the number of 
patients coming to hospitals, both public and private, was lessesser than expected 
during that period of time.   
 
7.2  Descriptive information of exit interview participants 
In analysing the social and demographic characteristics of the participants included in 
the study, it was observed that in both the districts the majority of study participants 
were in the age group 25–44 years (Table 7.1). The mean age of the study participants 
utilizing facilities in private hospitals was 39.8 years while it was 42.7 years for 
public hospitals. The age difference between participants utilizing private and public 
hospitals was statistically significant (on Student’s t-test, with age as a continuous 
variable), and younger ones were more likely to go to private hospitals while the older 
ones went to public hospitals (Table 7.2). It was noted that the mean age of RSBY 
participants was 43.5 years when compared to non-RSBY participants where the 
mean age was 38.7 years (Table 7.3). On Kernel Density diagram as well, the highest 
density for age was greater RSBY participants when compared to non-RSBY 
participants (Figure 7.1).  
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Table 7.1: Socio-demographic characteristics (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
 
* P value was calculated using Student’s t-Test. Age was used as a continuous variable 
#Age was not known to five participants from Patiala district 
 
  Patiala (N=399) Yamunanagar (N=352) P value 
N Percentage N Percentage 
Age category
#
 <15 yrs 17 4.3 19 5.4 
0.08 
15–24 yrs 45 11.4 62 17.6 
25–44 yrs 146 37.1 138 39.2 
45–64 yrs 126 32.0 88 25.0 
65–69 yrs 26 6.6 18 5.1 
>70 yrs 34 8.6 27 7.7 
N 394 100 352 100 
Sex Male 147 36.8 169 48.0 
<0.01 
Female 252 63.2 183 52.0 
Religion Hinduism 155 38.8 305 86.6 
<0.01 
Islam 16 4.0 29 8.2 
Sikhism 223 55.9 11 3.1 
Others 5 1.3 7 2.0 
Social class General 116 29.1 45 12.8 
<0.01 
OBC 90 22.6 126 35.8 
SC 176 44.1 167 47.4 
ST 17 4.3 14 4.0 
Education Up to Primary 204 51.1 111 31.5 
<0.01 
>Primary 195 48.9 241 68.5 
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Table 7.2: Socio-demographic characteristics (private vs public) 
    Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
Private 
(N=203) 
Public 
(N=196) 
P 
value 
 
Private 
(N=195) 
Public 
(N=157) 
P 
value 
Private 
(N=398) 
Public 
(N=353) 
P value 
 
N % N % N % N % 
 
N % N % 
 
Age 
category
#
 
<15 yrs 9 4.5 8 4.1 
0.50* 
12 6.2 7 4.5 
0.02* 
21 5.3 15 4.3 
0.03* 
15–24 yrs 21 10.6 24 12.3 36 18.5 26 16.6 57 14.5 50 14.2 
25–44 yrs 76 38.2 70 35.9 82 42.1 56 35.7 158 40.1 126 35.8 
45–64 yrs 65 32.7 61 31.3 44 22.6 44 28.0 109 27.7 105 29.8 
65–69 yrs 13 6.5 13 6.7 11 5.6 7 4.5 24 6.1 20 5.7 
>70 yrs 15 7.5 19 9.7 10 5.1 17 10.8 25 6.3 36 10.2 
Total 199 100 195 100 195 100 157 100 394 100 352 100 
Sex 
Male 75 36.9 72 36.7 
0.97 
83 42.6 86 54.8 
0.02 
158 39.7 158 44.8 
0.16 
Female 128 63.1 124 63.3 112 57.4 71 45.2 240 60.3 195 55.2 
Religion 
Hinduism 61 30.0 94 48.0 
<0.01 
171 87.7 134 85.4 
0.45 
232 58.3 228 64.6 
0.02 Islam 6 3.0 10 5.1 13 6.7 16 10.2 19 4.8 26 7.4 
Sikhism & others 136 67.0 92 46.9 11 5.6 7 4.5 147 36.9 99 28.0 
Social class 
General 86 42.4 30 15.3 
<0.01 
28 14.4 17 10.8 
0.05 
114 28.6 47 13.3 
<0.01 OBC 51 25.1 39 19.9 75 38.5 51 32.5 126 31.7 90 25.5 
SC and ST 66 32.5 127 64.8 92 47.1 89 56.7 158 39.7 216 61.2 
Education  
Up to Primary 90 44.3 114 58.2 
<0.01 
56 28.7 55 35.0 
0.20 
146 36.7 169 47.9 
0.02 
>Primary 113 55.7 82 41.8 139 71.3 102 65.0 252 63.3 184 52.1 
 
 
* P value was calculated using Student’s t-Test. Age was used as a continuous variable 
#Age was not known to five participants from Patiala district; Mean age – Participants from private facility (39.8 years), public facility (42.7 years) 
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Table 7.3: Socio-demographic characteristics (RSBY vs non-RSBY) 
 
  Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
  
RSBY N=196 
Non-RSBY 
N=203 
P value 
 
RSBY N=191 
Non-RSBY 
N=161 
P value 
RSBY  
N=387 
Non-RSBY 
N=364 
P value 
 
    N % N % N % N % 
 
N % N % 
 
Age 
category
#
 
<15 yrs 6 3.1 11 5.5 
0.01* 
 
11 5.8 8 5.0 
0.18* 
17 4.4 19 5.3 
<0.01* 
15–24 yrs 16 8.2 29 14.5 24 12.6 38 23.6 40 10.4 67 18.6 
25–44 yrs 63 32.5 83 41.5 78 40.8 60 37.3 141 36.6 143 39.6 
45–64 yrs 74 38.1 52 26.0 52 27.2 36 22.4 126 32.7 88 24.4 
65–69 yrs 16 8.2 10 5.0 12 6.3 6 3.7 28 7.3 16 4.4 
>70 yrs 19 9.8 15 7.5 14 7.3 13 8.1 33 8.6 28 7.8 
N 194 100 200 100 191 100 161 100 385 100 361 100 
Sex 
Male 70 35.7 77 37.9  
0.64 
79 41.4 90 55.9 
<0.01 
149 38.5 167 45.9 
0.04 
Female 126 64.3 126 62.1 112 58.6 71 44.1 238 61.5 197 54.1 
Religion 
Hinduism 68 34.7 87 42.9 
0.17 
163 85.3 142 88.2 
0.72 
231 59.7 229 62.9 
0.42 Islam 10 5.1 6 3.0 17 8.9 12 7.5 27 7.0 18 4.9 
Sikhism Other 118 60.2 110 54.2 11 5.7 7 4.3 129 33.3 117 32.1 
Social Class 
General 64 32.7 52 25.6 
0.45 
 
21 11.0 24 14.9 
0.04 
85 22.0 76 20.9 
0.16 OBC 43 21.9 47 23.2 73 38.2 53 32.9 116 30.0 100 27.5 
SC 89 45.4 104 51.2 97 50.8 84 52.1 186 48.0 188 51.6 
Education 
Up to Primary 110 56.1 94 46.3 
0.05 
69 36.1 42 26.1 
0.04 
179 46.3 136 37.4 
0.14 
>Primary 86 43.9 109 53.7 122 63.9 119 73.9 208 53.7 228 62.6 
 
 
* P value was calculated using Student’s t-Test. Age was used as a continuous variable 
# Age was not known to five participants from Patiala district; Mean age – RSBY Participants (43.5 years), Non-RSBY participants (38.7.7 years)
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Fig. 7.1: Kernel density diagram for RSBY and non-RSBY participants for age 
 
By gender, more females were enrolled in the study (exit interview) compared to 
males in both districts. Female participants were also more in both RSBY and non-
RSBY groups.   
Muslims constitute a minority in the selected districts. It was observed that a higher 
percentage of Muslims were availing facilities in public hospitals. In terms of social 
class, a majority of study participants belonging to the general and Other Backward 
Class (OBC) were utilizing private hospitals, whilst Scheduled Caste (SC) and 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) participants made up a higher share of those using public 
hospitals. More literate people (literacy more than primary level) were going to 
private hospitals. 
7.3 Structural aspects of care across public and private providers 
for RSBY beneficiaries in selected districts 
This section covers the structural aspects of the 12 selected empanelled hospitals in 
the two chosen districts. Structural aspect analysis was conducted with the help of the 
following tools: (i) Health Provider Checklist (self-assessment); and (ii) Observation 
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Facility Record Checklist. Observation and Facility Record Checklists were 
administered by trained data collectors with a degree in medicine while the Health 
Provider Checklist (self-assessment) was done by the hospital staff themselves.  
The Health Provider self-assessment tool and observational checklist had the 
following categories for assessment:  
 Access and facilities – whether facility could be easily reached taking into 
account distance, condition of roads, signboards, etc. and the condition of the 
facility.     
 Availability of staff – staff strength (doctors, nurses, on call specialists and 
other paramedics) 
 Hospital waste management – is biomedical waste disposed of in accordance 
with guidelines? Does the health facility have a valid license from the 
Pollution Control Board? 
 Operating department – adequacy of lighting, air conditioning, ventilation, 
sterilization and availability of OT instruments 
 Labour room – availability of instruments and proper sterilization 
 Evaluation and care of inpatients – whether patient was examined, written 
consent was taken, frequency of evaluation, prescriptions, etc.  
The Facility records had the following categories:  
 Mopping records (including toilet sanitation) 
 Records of carbolisation of OT and Labour Room after every procedure 
 Records of autoclaving of instruments and linen 
 Grievance redressal mechanism (presence of documented grievance redressal 
mechanism which is practiced) 
 List of available procedures during informed patient consent, pre-operative 
assessment and post-operative care 
 Records of laboratory services (system for registration of patients exists) 
 Records of radiology services (availability of records of protection of staff 
conforming to the BARC guidelines, information on request forms and fee 
charged) 
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 Records of evaluation and care of inpatient services (physical examination and 
its frequency, consent, availability of prescription summary) 
 Blood bank records (blood bank meets the licensing requirement of the Drugs 
and Cosmetic Act and Supreme Court rules, labelling on blood products, 
record of procurement, transfusion of blood, cross-matching, etc.). 
The observations were recorded in accordance with the Likert scale. Later, the scale 
was converted to scores. A score of one meant ‘strongly agree’ while a score of five 
meant ‘strongly disagree’. Mann-Whitney U test was used to assess the statistical 
difference between the scores of public and private hospitals as the data was non 
parametric and the outcome was taken as continuous variable. However, this 
statistical test was not applied for intra-district comparison since the sample size of 
hospitals was very small (only three hospitals in each category). A detailed analysis of 
checklists has been done in chapter 4.  
From the Health Provider Checklist assessment (self-assessment), private hospitals 
self-reported a better score than public hospitals under all categories of structural-
aspect evaluation in both districts. Private hospitals were significantly better under the 
access and facilities category, i.e. private hospitals had adequate logistics and 
equipment required for treatment (Table 7.4).In the inter-district comparison, in 
Patiala district private hospitals were again reported to be better in all structural 
aspects whereas in Yamunanagar district, public hospitals had a better score for 
labour room and care of inpatients. 
From the Observation and Facility Record Checklist, private hospitals scored better 
than public hospitals in all aspects of structural evaluation (overall). As in the 
provider self-assessment evaluation, the observation checklist also indicated a 
significantly better access to facilities in private hospitals (Table 7.5). In terms of 
availability of records, private hospitals had better records available than public 
hospitals (overall). No difference was observed in the mean score for private and 
public facilities under the categories ‘blood bank records’ ‘laboratory services’ and 
‘available procedures’ (Table 7.6). In Yamunanagar district, Observational and 
Facility Record Checklist reported almost similar structural aspect for private and 
public hospitals. 
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On triangulation of various results from the Observation and Facility Record 
Checklist, and Health Provider Checklist, it emerged that private hospitals had better 
structural aspects compared to public hospitals both in Patiala district and when 
looked at in totality. However, in Yamunanagar district, public and private hospitals 
were comparable.  However, this should be cautiously interpreted as almost none of 
these comparisons were statistically significant.  
In conclusion, private hospitals were found to be better than public hospitals in 
totality and in Patiala district specifically. However, private hospitals were quite 
similar to public hospitals in Yamunanagar district.  
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Table 7.4: Health provider checklist (self-assessment) 
 
  
  
  
Patiala Yamunanagar Total 
Private 
(N=3) 
Public 
(N=3) 
Private 
(N=3) 
Public 
(N=3) 
Private 
(N=6) 
Public 
(N=6) P 
value 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Access and facilities 1.11 0.10 1.61 0.79 1.11 0.19 2.00 -a 1.11 0.14 1.81 0.54 0.03 
Availability of staff 1.06 0.10 1.22 0.25 1.17 0.29 1.50 -a 1.11 0.20 1.36 0.22 0.07 
Hospital waste management 1.00 -a 1.33 0.58 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.17 0.41 0.32 
Operating department 1.21 0.24 1.51 0.57 1.14 0.08 1.15 0.13 1.17 0.16 1.33 0.42 0.57 
Labour room 1.00 -a 1.33 0.58 1.11 0.19 1.00 -a 1.06 0.14 1.17 0.41 0.90 
Evaluation and care of 
inpatient 
1.00 
-a 1.38 0.41 1.10 0.16 1.00 
-a 1.05 0.12 1.19 0.33 0.29 
Averaged over the categories 1.06 -a 1.40 -a 1.10 -a 1.28 -a 1.08 0.10 1.34 0.34 0.04 
-a Standard deviation could not be calculated as individual score for all facilities were same 
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Table 7.5: Observation checklist by the interviewers 
 
  
  
  
Patiala Yamunanagar Across districts  
Private 
(N=3) 
Public 
(N=3) 
Private 
(N=3) 
Public 
(N=3) 
Private 
(N=6) 
Public 
(N=6) 
P  
Value 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Access & physical facilities 1.06 0.04 1.58 0.86 1.06 0.09 1.5 -a 1.06 0.06 1.54 0.55 0.02 
Patient rights 2.08 0.14 2.17 0.28 1.08 0.14 1.0 -a 1.58 0.56 1.58 0.66 0.87 
Health & safety 1.61 0.38 2.06 0.38 1.0 0.09 1.0 -a 1.28 0.44 1.53 0.62 0.49 
Operating department 1.17 0.14 1.42 0.28 1.25 0.43 1.0 -a 1.21 0.29 1.21 0.29 0.99 
Radiology services 1.5 -a 1.67 0.28 1.83 0.76 2.5 0.85 1.67 0.51 2.08 0.49 0.17 
Labour room 1.0 -a 1.33 0.58 1.0 -a 1.0 -a 1.0 -a 1.17 0.41 0.32 
Averaged over the categories 1.4 0.07 1.73 0.45 1.19 0.17 1.33 -a 1.29 0.16 1.51 1.51 0.10 
-a  Standard deviation could not be calculated as the individual score for all facility was the same 
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Table 7.6: Availability of records 
 
 
Patiala Yamunanagar Total  
 
Private 
(N=3) 
Public 
(N=3) 
Private 
(N=3) 
Public 
(N=3) 
Private 
(N=6) 
Public 
(N=6) 
P 
Value 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Mopping of all areas  1.00 -a 1.33 0.58 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.17 0.41 0.32 
Carbolisation of the OT, Labour room  2.00 -a 2.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.50 0.55 1.50 0.55 1.00 
Mechanisms to ensure toilet sanitation 1.67 0.58 2.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.33 0.52 1.50 0.55 0.58 
Autoclaving of instruments & linen 1.00 -a 1.33 0.58 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.17 0.41 0.32 
Grievance redressal mechanism 1.67 0.58 2.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.33 0.52 1.75 0.50 0.06 
Available procedures 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a - 
Laboratory services 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a - 
Radiology services 1.53 0.69 1.76 0.50 1.13 0.33 1.13 -a 1.33 0.53 1.44 0.47 0.49 
Evaluation & care of inpatients 1.14 0.14 1.43 0.50 1.14 0.25 1.00 -a 1.14 0.18 1.21 0.39 0.93 
Blood bank 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a 1.00 -a -a 
-a standard deviation could not be calculated as individual score for all facilities were same 
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7.4  Process of service delivery for RSBY participants by public 
and private providers 
This section deals with the process of delivery of care to RSBY participants, focusing 
on the features specifically included in the policy guidelines contract document and in 
official statements issued by the Central Government. In addition, certain key aspects 
relevant to delivery have also been evaluated. The aim was to assess differences in 
delivery of care between private and public facilities and between the two selected 
districts for RSBY beneficiaries.   
What the participants experienced and reported was compared against prescribed 
actions/standards. In the first part of this section, the exit interviews of only RSBY-
enrolled participants were analysed to assess the provision of services under the 
contractual arrangement, since they specifically dealt with scheme-related questions. 
A total of 387 RSBY participants were interviewed, 196 from Patiala district and 191 
from Yamunanagar district. The distribution to private and public hospitals was 193 
interviewed in public hospitals and 194 in private hospitals. One participant from 
Patiala (private hospital) did not respond to the questions and hence was removed 
from the denominator while calculating the proportions, thus, making the total 
number 195 (N=195 for Patiala and 193 for private hospitals).  
 
In the second part of the analysis, the entire data set of exit interviews collected (both 
RSBY and non-RSBY) was analysed. A total of 751 participants were interviewed, 
which included 387 RSBY participants and 364 non-RSBY participants. 
 
7.4.1 Amount paid for registration under the scheme 
As per the guidelines of the RSBY scheme, every family has to pay INR 30 (£ 0.3) to 
get registered in the RSBY scheme. The tender document states that ‘the insurer or its 
representative(s) shall collect the registration fee of INR 30 (£ 0.3) from each RSBY 
Beneficiary Family Unit, at the time of enrolment and on delivery of the Smart Card’ 
(Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2008).  
In both the districts, all participants were registered with the scheme by paying INR 
30 (£ 0.3) as registration amount.   
230 
 
7.4.2 RSBY help desk and signage in hospitals  
As per the guidelines of the RSBY health insurance scheme and as stated in the draft 
tender document in Appendix 5 Article 3 (which relates to the MoU between the 
providers and the insurance company), it is clearly stated that ‘for the ease of the 
beneficiary, the hospital shall display the recognition and promotional material, 
network status and procedures for admission supplied by the insurer at prominent 
locations, preferably including but not limited to outside the hospital, at the reception 
and admission counter and casualty/emergency departments. The format for signage 
outside the hospital and at the reception counter will be provided by the insurance 
company.’ In addition, the tender document also states that ‘the hospital will set up a 
help desk for RSBY beneficiaries. The RSBY help desk shall be easily accessible and 
will have all the necessary hardware and software required to identify the patients.’ 
The equipments required for this were fingerprint scanner, smart card reader, 
computer and printer. 
Based on the responses of the patients during the exit interviews, it appears that 
RSBY help desk (separate RSBY help desk or common hospital help desk) was in 
place in all selected empanelled facilities. When patient’s response to the presence of 
separate RSBY help desk was analysed for each facility independently, it was 
observed that the majority of participants from the two selected empaneled facilities 
reported presence of separate RSBY help desk (Table 7.7). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that a separate RSBY help desk for RSBY beneficiaries as stipulated in the 
contract tender document was present in only two of the 12 selected facilities (one 
private hospital and one public hospital in Patiala). The instruments required 
(computer, printer, smart card reader and finger print scanner) for RSBY patient 
verification and registration were present at the help desk in all the hospitals, either at 
separate RSBY help desk or the common help desk.  
About three fourths of RSBY participants in Yamunanagar reported that they were 
guided to the RSBY help desk (hospital helpdesk or separate RSBY helpdesk) by the 
signage in the hospital; whereas in Patiala district, about two-thirds of RSBY 
participants were guided to the RSBY help desk by the hospital staff (Table 7.7).  
Almost all the hospitals were found to be satisfactory in terms of the presence of a 
help desk, the required instruments at the RSBY help desk and behaviour of staff at 
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the RSBY help desk. The absence of a separate RSBY help desk  was an issue in both 
the districts, particularly in Yamunanagar. Staff at RSBY help desk was reported to be 
helpful and polite by almost all the participants. While comparing private and public 
hospitals in terms of RSBY help desk and signage, not much difference was observed 
(Table 7.8). 
Table 7.7: RSBY help desk in hospitals (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
  
  
Patiala
#
 
(N=195) 
Yamunanagar 
(N=191) P 
value 
N % N % 
Was an RSBY help desk present?* – 
Yes 
184 94.4 191 100.0 - 
Was it a separate RSBY help desk?** – 
Yes 
82 42.1 4 2.1 <0.01 
How did the study 
participant find out about 
the RSBY help desk? 
Signboards 57 31.0 141 73.8 
<0.01 
Hospital 
staff 
113 61.4 12 6.3 
By 
themselves 
14 7.6 38 19.9 
Staff at RSBY help desk was helpful and 
polite – Yes 
186 95.4 186 97.4 0.29 
*10 participants from Patiala did not know about the presence of a RSBY help desk 
**36 participants in Patiala and 2 in Yamunanagar did not know whether it was a 
separate RSBY help desk or otherwise 
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Table 7.8: RSBY help desk in private and public hospitals 
 
*10 participants from Patiala did not know about the presence of RSBY help desk 
**36 participants in Patiala and two in Yamunanagar did not know whether there was a separate RSBY help desk or not 
 
  
  
  
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Across districts 
Private Public 
P 
value 
Private Public 
P 
value 
Private Public 
P 
value N 
(97) 
% 
N 
(98) 
% 
N 
(96) 
% 
N 
(95) 
% 
N 
(193) 
% 
N 
(193) 
% 
Was an RSBY help desk 
present?* – Yes 
94 96.9 90 91.8  96 100 95 100  190 98.4 185 95.9 - 
** Was it a separate RSBY 
help desk?** – Yes 
53 54.6 29 29.6 <0.01 2 2.1 2 2.1  55 28.5 31 16.1 <0.01 
How 
RSBY help 
desk was 
found by 
participants 
Signboards 31 33.0 26 28.9 
0.73 
69 71.9 72 75.8 
0.78 
100 52.6 98 53.0 
0.99 Hospital staff 57 60.6 56 62.2 7 7.3 5 5.3 64 33.7 61 33.0 
By themselves 6 6.4 8 8.9 20 20.8 18 18.9 26 13.7 26 14.0 
Staff at RSBY help desk was 
helpful and polite – Yes 
93 95.9 93 94.9 0.99 92 95.8 94 98.9 0.36 185 95.9 187 96.9 0.58 
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7.4.3 Waiting period for patients in the hospitals 
The usual movement of patients in the RSBY-empanelled hospitals was from RSBY 
counter to the consultation in the outpatient department and then back to the RSBY 
counter. After registration at the RSBY help desk, the patient is attended by the 
hospital staff at the inpatient department. In the present analysis, a waiting period of 
more than 15 minutes was considered to be delayed as less than 15 minute interaction 
between doctor and patient is considered to be a risk factor for appropriate 
prescription and management (Dugdale et al., 1999).  Table 7.9 shows the time that 
RSBY participants had to wait in Patiala and Yamunanagar districts. About 71% of 
the participants in Patiala reported that they waited less than 15 minutes before getting 
attended, while 85% of the participants reported the same in Yamunanagar. 
Comparing private and public hospitals, private hospitals attended to the patients 
quicker as compared to public hospitals, and this difference was statistically 
significant (Table 7.10).   
 
Table 7.9: Waiting period for RSBY participants (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
 
   
Patiala
 
N (195) 
 
Yamunanagar 
N (191)  
  N % N % P value 
<5 minutes 63 32.3 61 31.9 
<0.01 5–15 minutes 76 39.0 102 53.4 
>15 minutes 56 28.7 28 14.7 
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Table 7.10: Waiting period for RSBY participants (private vs public hospitals) 
 
 
7.4.4 Process of patient registration in hospital 
As stated in the tender document, ‘service provided by the insurer subject to 
responsibilities of the insurer as detailed in clause 12 is collectively referred to as the 
Cashless Access Service. Each empanelled hospital shall install the requisite 
machines and software to authenticate and validate the smart card, the beneficiary and 
the insurance cover. The services have to be provided to the beneficiary based on 
smart card and fingerprint authentication only with the minimum of delay for pre-
authorization (if necessary)’ (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2011c). 
Additionally, the tender document also states that ‘in case the patient is not in a 
position to give a fingerprint, any other member of the family who is enrolled under 
the scheme can verify the patient’s identity by giving his/her fingerprint’ (Ministry of 
Labour and Employment, 2011c). The patient’s fingerprint needs to be scanned each 
time before admission to the hospital for verification and registration.  
A total of 10 patients were registered in the hospitals under the RSBY scheme without 
fingerprint scan of the patient or their relatives, five each in Patiala and Yamunanagar 
(Table 7.11). In Patiala, patients’ fingerprint was taken in 96% of the cases while in 
Yamunanagar it was 77%. The major reason for not taking patients’ fingerprint was 
that that patient was not in a condition to give fingerprints (Table 7.11). In both, 
public and private hospitals, 97.4% of the participants reported that fingerprints were 
taken at the time of registration (Table 7.12)  
  Patiala  N=195 Yamunanagar N=191 Across districts 
  
Private  
N=97 
Public  
N=98  
Private  
N=96 
Public 
N=95  
Private  
N=193 
Public 
N=193 P 
 
N % N % P N % N % P N % N % 
<5 mins 33 34.0 30 30.6 
0.17 
26 27.1 35 36.8 
0.15 
59 30.6 65 33.7 
0.05 
5–15 
mins 
42 43.3 34 34.7 58 60.4 44 46.3 100 51.8 78 40.4 
>15 
mins 
22 22.7 34 34.7 12 12.5 16 16.8 34 17.6 50 25.9 
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Table 7.11: Registration through fingerprint scan of RSBY participants (Patiala 
vs Yamunanagar) 
  
  
  
  
Patiala 
N=195 
Yamunanagar  
N=191 
P 
value 
N % N %  
Fingerprint scanner used for fingerprint 
verification of patient or his/her relative 
190 97.4 186 97.4 0.97 
Whose fingerprint 
was taken at the 
time of admission? 
Patient 183/190 96.3 143/186 76.9 
<0.01 Other family 
member 
7/190 3.7 43/186 23.1 
Reasons for not 
scanning the 
patient’s 
fingerprint and 
scanning the 
relative’s 
fingerprint instead 
Patient was not in a 
condition to give 
fingerprint 
6/7 85.7 42/43 97.7 
- Patient's thumb 
was injured 
0/7 0.0 0/43 0.0 
Other reasons 1/7 14.3 1/43 2.3 
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Table 7.12: Registration through fingerprint scan of RSBY participants (private vs public) 
 
  Patiala(N=195) Yamunanagar (N=191) Across districts 
Private Public 
P 
Private Public 
P 
Private Public 
P 
N (97) % N (98) % N (96) % N (95) % N (193) % N (193) % 
Fingerprint scanner used for fingerprint 
verification of patient or his/her relative 
96 99.0 94 95.9 0.18 92 95.8 94 98.9 0.18 188 97.4 188 97.4 0.99 
Whose fingerprint 
was taken at the 
time of admission? 
Patient 90/96 93.7 93/94 98.9 
0.15 
69/92 75.0 74/94 78.7 
0.52 
159/188 84.6 167/188 88.2 
0.18 
Relative 6/96 6.3 1/94 1.1 23/92 25.0 20/94 21.3 29/188 15.4 21/188 11.8 
Reasons for not 
scanning the 
patient’s fingerprint  
 
Patient was not in a 
condition to give 
fingerprint 
5/6 83.3 1/1 100.0 
- 
22/23 95.6 20/20 100 
- 
27/29 93.1 21/21 100 
- Patient's thumb was 
injured 
0/6 0.0 0/1 0.0 0/23 0 0/20 0.0 0/29 0.0 0/21 0.0 
Other reasons 1/6 16.7 0/1 0.0 1/23 4.4 0/20 0.0 2/29 6.9 0/21 0.0 
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7.4.5 Informing enrollee of treatment costs 
The contract document between the insurance company and the empanelled hospital 
states 'both public and private empanelled hospitals should agree the cost of packages 
for each identified medical/surgical intervention/procedure as approved under the 
scheme. These package rates will include expenses incurred for consultation, 
diagnostic tests and medicines from one day before the admission of the patient and 
cost of diagnostic tests and medicine up to five days after the discharge from the 
hospital for the same ailment/surgery’ (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2011b). 
This information needs to be conveyed to the beneficiary along with the information 
on the cost of the package for which the patient is to be booked in the hospital. The 
beneficiary also needs to be informed about the amount remaining in the card at the 
RSBY help desk. Also, if sufficient amount is not available the beneficiary needs to 
be informed in advance that the extra cost incurred would have to be paid by the 
family.  
Information dissemination (cost of package, money left in the card and the sufficiency 
of the amount) to the participants was poor in both the districts, and particularly very 
poor in Yamunanagar (Table 7.13). In Patiala district, information dissemination was 
better in public hospitals compared to private hospitals. Further, in Patiala district, 
about half the participants from private hospitals did not have sufficient balance left in 
their card for the present treatment, i.e. they had exhausted the limit of INR 30,000 (£ 
302) (Table 7.14). Slightly more participants from public hospitals were informed 
about cost involved in treatment and amount left in the card, whereas slightly more 
participants in private hospitals were informed amount insufficient amount in the 
card. In private hospitals of Patiala, among those who had exhausted their limit, about 
one-fifth had received this information beforehand whereas the remaining had to pay 
OOP for the treatment without any prior information.  
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Table 7.13: Information received from RSBY help desk regarding cost of 
treatment (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
 
Patiala 
N=195 
Yamunana
gar N=191 P 
value 
N % N % 
Information about the cost involved for 
the treatment was given to the patient 
94 48.2 16 8.4 <0.01 
Patient was informed about the money left 
in the smart card  
80 41.0 20 10.5 <0.01 
Money left in the smart card was sufficient 
for the treatment  
130 66.7 185 96.9 <0.01 
If money left in the smart card was not 
sufficient, was the beneficiary informed 
by the hospital staff –Yes 
13/65 20.0 0/6 0.0 0.23 
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Table 7.14: Information received from RSBY help desk across districts regarding cost of treatment (private vs public) 
 
Patiala Yamunanagar Across districts 
 
Private N=97 Public N=98 
P 
Private N=96 Public N=95 
P 
Private N=193 Public N=193 
P 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Information about the 
cost involved for the 
treatment was given to 
the patient 
37 38.1 57 58.2 <0.01 11 11.5 5 5.3 0.12 48 24.9 62 32.1 0.11 
Patient was informed 
about the money left in 
the smart card 
34 35.1 46 46.9 0.09 9 9.4 11 11.6 0.62 43 22.3 57 29.5 0.10 
Money left in the smart 
card was sufficient for 
the treatment 
52 53.6 78 79.6 <0.01 95 99.0 90 94.7 0.09 147 76.2 168 87.0 <0.01 
If money left in the 
smart card was not 
sufficient, was the 
beneficiary informed by 
the hospital staff – Yes 
10/45 22.2 3/20 15.0 0.50 0/1 0.0 0/5 0.0 -- 10/46 21.7 3/25 12.0 0.31 
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7.4.6 Diagnostics and medicines from outside the hospital 
As stated in the contract, both public and private empanelled hospitals need to agree 
on the cost of packages for each identified medical/surgical intervention/procedure as 
approved under the scheme. These package rates would include: 
– bed charges (general ward) 
– nursing and boarding charges  
– fees of surgeons, anesthetists, medical practitioners and consultants   
– anesthesia, blood, oxygen, operation theatre charges, cost of surgical 
appliances 
– medicines and drugs  
– cost of prosthetic devices, implants  
– X-ray and other diagnostic tests 
– food to patient 
– expenses incurred for consultation, diagnostic tests and medicines from one 
day before the admission of the patient and cost of diagnostic tests and 
medicines up to five days of discharge from the hospital for the same 
ailment/surgery  
– transportation charge of INR 100 (£ 1) payable to the beneficiary at the time of 
discharge. 
Thus, the package should cover the entire cost of treatment of the patient from the 
date of reporting up to discharge from the hospital and five days thereafter, including 
any complication while in hospital, making the transaction truly cashless to the patient 
(Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2011b). 
In both the districts together, 46 (12%) of RSBY participants were paying OOP for 
medicines and 68 (17%) of RSBY participants were paying for diagnostic tests, 
despite the stipulation of cashless transaction in the contract (Table 7.15). More 
participants from Yamunanagar were asked to get medicines and diagnostics from 
outside. Further, in Yamunanagar, all (100%) of the participants who were getting 
medicines and diagnostic tests from outside had to pay for it (Table 7.15).  
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Within the districts and across the districts, more participants from private hospitals 
were asked to get medicines and diagnostics from outside the hospitals (Table 7.16).  
Table 7.15: Diagnostics and medicines from outside the hospital (Patiala and 
Yamunanagar) 
  Patiala Yamunanagar 
P 
value 
Total 
  N(195) % 
N 
(191) % 
N 
(196) 
% 
Patient was asked to get the 
diagnostic test done from 
outside the hospital  
27 13.8 41 21.5 0.05 68 17.0 
Family paid for the 
diagnostic test done outside 
the hospital 
18/27 66.7 41/41 100.0 <0.01 59/68 86.8 
Patient asked to get the 
medicines from outside the 
hospital 
15 7.7 31 16.2 0.01 46 11.9 
Family paid for the 
medicines brought from 
outside the hospital 
11/15 73.3 31/31 100.0 <0.01 42/46 91.3 
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Table 7.16: Diagnostics and medicines from outside the hospital (private vs public) 
 
  
  
  
Patiala Yamunanagar Across districts 
Private Public 
 
Private Public 
 
Private Public 
 N (97) % N (98) % P N (96) % N (95) % P N (193) % N (193) % P 
Patient was asked to 
get the diagnostic 
done from outside the 
hospital 
16 16.5 11 11.2 0.29 26 27.1 15 15.8 0.06 42 21.8 26 13.5 0.03 
Family paid for the 
diagnostic test done 
from outside the 
hospital 
11/16 68.8 7/11 63.6 0.78 26/26 100.0 15/15 100.0 -- 37/42 88.1 22/26 84.6 0.68 
Patient asked to get 
the medicines from 
outside the hospital 
10 10.3 5 5.1 0.17 20 20.8 11 11.6 0.08 30 15.5 16 8.3 0.03 
Patient’s family paid 
for the medicines 
brought from outside 
the hospital 
7/10 70.0 4/5 80.0 0.68 20/20 100.0 11/11 100.0 -- 27/30 90.0 15/16 93.8 0.67 
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7.4.7 Food and its quality 
As stated in the contract document ‘the empanelled hospital has to provide food to the 
patients during the period of admission in the hospital and the cost borne is part of the 
package’ (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2011b). 
In both the districts together, about one-fourth of RSBY participants got food in the 
hospital (Table 7.17). When patient’s response to the provision of food was analysed 
for each facility independently, it was observed that a majority of the patients from 
the three selected empaneled facilities (out of 12) reported that they were provided 
food during their hospital stay. Therefore we can conclude that of the selected 
empanelled facilities, food was not provided to the RSBY beneficiaries in nine out of 
12 facilities. Amongst these three hospitals providing food services, one was in 
Patiala (private) and two were in Yamunanagar (one private and one public). The 
most common cause for not serving food in the hospital was that ‘food services were 
not present in the hospital’. The food quality was rated as very good or good by a 
majority of the participants from one private hospital in Patiala whereas it was rated 
average by a majority of the participants of both the hospitals (one private and one 
public) in Yamunanagar. It appears that the insurance company was not ensuring that 
the facility to be empanelled had a provision for supply of food to the patients (Table 
7.18).  
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Table 7.17: Provision of food to RSBY participants during hospital stay          
(Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
  
  
  
Patiala
 
N=195 
Yamunanagar 
N=191 
 
P 
value N % N % 
Whether patient provided with food 
during hospital stay  
40 20.5 69 36.1 <0.01 
Reason for 
not providing 
food to 
patients in 
hospitals* 
Hospital staff said it 
was not a part of the 
RSBY scheme 
2/143 1.4 0/122 0.0 
- 
Hospital did not have 
food-serving facility 
115/143 80.4 121/122 99.2 
Hospital paid cash to 
patient to buy food 
2/143 1.4 1/122 0.8 
Others 24/143 16.8 0/122 0.0 
Quality of 
food** 
  
Very good 9/34 26.5 0/68 0.0 
- 
Good 19/34 55.9 12/68 17.6 
Average 6/34 17.6 55/68 80.9 
Poor  0/34 0.0 1/68 1.5 
*12 participants from Patiala did not respond to the question 
**Six participants from Patiala and one from Yamunanagar did not respond to the 
question 
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Table 7.18: Provision of food to RSBY participants during hospital stay (private vs public) 
  
  
Patiala N=195 Yamunanagar N=191 Across districts N=386 
Private Public 
 
Private Public 
 
Private Public 
 
N (97) % N (98) % P N (96) % N (95) % P N (193) % N (193) % P 
Patients provided with food 
during hospital stay 
35 36.1 5 5.1 <0.01 32 33.3 37 38.9 0.41 67 34.7 42 21.8 <0.01 
Reason for 
not 
providing 
food to 
patient in 
hospitals* 
Hospital staff said 
it was not a part of 
the RSBY scheme 
1/52 1.9 1/91 1.1 
- 
0/64 0.0 0/58 0.0 
- 
1/116 0.9 1/149 0.7 
- 
Hospital did not 
have facilities for 
providing food 
46/52 88.5 69/91 75.8 63/64 98.4 58/58 100.0 109/116 94.0 127/149 85.2 
Hospital paid cash 
to patient to buy 
food 
0/52 0.0 2/91 2.2 1/64 1.6 0/58 0.0 1/116 0.9 2/149 1.3 
Others 5/52 9.6 19/91 20.9 0/64 0.0 0/58 0.0 5/116 4.3 19/149 12.8 
Quality of 
food
**
 
Very good 9/33 27.3 0/1 0.0 
- 
0/31 0.0 0/37 0.0 
- 
9/64 14.1 0/38 0.0 
- 
Good 19/33 57.6 0/1 0.0 8/31 25.8 4/37 10.8 27/64 42.2 4/38 10.5 
Average 5/33 15.2 1/1 100.0 22/31 71.0 33/37 89.2 27/64 42.2 34/38 89.5 
Poor  0/33 0.0 0/1 0.0 1/31 3.2 0/37 0.0 1/64 1.6 0/38 0.0 
Very bad 0/33 0.0 0/1 0.0 0/31 0.0 0/37 0.0 0/64 0.0 0/38 0.0 
*12 participants from Patiala did not respond to the question (10 from private and 2 from public)  
** Six participants from Patiala and one from Yamunanagar did not respond to the question 
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7.4.8 Process followed during discharge of the RSBY beneficiary from hospital 
At the time of discharge of the beneficiary from the hospital, the following activities 
need to be monitored by the hospital staff (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 
2011b): 
– Original discharge summary, counterfoil generated at the time of discharge, 
original investigation reports, all original prescriptions and pharmacy receipts, 
etc. must not be given to the patient. These are to be forwarded to the billing 
department who will compile and keep them in the hospital. 
– The discharge card/summary must mention the duration of ailment, duration of 
other disorders like hypertension or diabetes and operative notes in case of 
surgeries. 
–  Signature or thumb impression of the patient/beneficiary on the final hospital bill 
must be obtained. 
–  Claim form of the insurer must be presented to the beneficiary for signing, and 
identification of the patient/beneficiary is to be confirmed again. 
 
A fingerprint verification of the patient is again done at the help desk so that the task 
is registered as complete. Only then can the health facility file a claim with the 
insurance company. The smart card is returned to the patient along with the 
information of the balance amount left in the card.  
Ideally, all patients must get a discharge slip at the time of discharge. Few of the 
RSBY participants (16%) in Patiala district did not receive the discharge slips (Table 
7.19), whereas all received discharge slips in Yamunanagar.  
Fingerprint verification was not done for a few participants from private (3%) and 
public (5%) hospitals at the time of discharge. In such conditions, as per the contract, 
the amount is claimed by the provider using manual mode, but to do so prior 
permission is required from the insurance company.  
Fingerprints of the family members (instead of patients) were taken in 28% cases in 
Yamunanagar district (not much difference was observed between private and public 
hospitals) (Table 7.20) as the patients were not in a condition to give their 
fingerprints.  
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The smart card was held back in more cases by public hospitals (13%) than private 
hospitals (5%). This may be because of breakdown in the equipment required for 
completion of the transaction process. In terms of information regarding the balance 
left in the card, public hospitals in Patiala were disseminating information slightly 
better as compared to private hospitals. In Yamunanagar, the overall (both private and 
public) dissemination of information was very low (Table 7.20). Information 
dissemination was almost the same in public and private hospitals with only one third 
of the participants in each group receiving information regarding the amount left in 
the card at the time of discharge.  
Table 7.19: Process followed during discharge of RSBY beneficiary from the 
hospital (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
 
Patiala Yamunanagar 
P 
value N (195) % N (191) % 
Discharge summary given to patient at 
the time of discharge 
164 84.1 191 100.0 - 
Fingerprint verification was done at 
time of discharge 
184 94.4 187 97.9 0.71 
Whose 
fingerprint 
was taken? 
Patient 176/184 95.7 135/187 72.2 
<0.01 
Relative* 8/184 4.3 52/187 27.8 
Card was given back at the time of 
discharge  
177 90.8 175 91.6 0.76 
 Reason for 
not 
returning 
the card at 
the time of 
discharge** 
  
Staff wanted money 1/17 5.9 0/16 0.0 
- 
Keep the card till 
insurance money 
claimed 
4/17 23.5 2/16 12.5 
Staff said it will remain 
deposited 
7/17 41.2 0/16 0.0 
Others 5/17 29.4 14/16 87.5 
Patient was informed about the 
balance amount in the card at the time 
of discharge  
92 47.7 39 20.4 <0.01 
* Regarding reasons for not taking patient’s fingerprint and rather using relative’s 
fingerprint for verification, only five participants responded to the question while the 
rest did not answer 
** One beneficiary from Patiala did not respond to the question  
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Table 7.20: Process during discharge of RSBY beneficiary from the hospital (private vs public) 
 
  
Patiala
#
 Yamunanagar Across districts 
Private Public 
 
Private Public 
 
Private Public 
 N (97) % N (98) % P N (96) % N (95) % P N (193) % N(193) % P 
Discharge summary given at 
the time of discharge  
77 79.4 87 88.8 0.07 96 100.0 95 100.0 --- 173 89.6 182 94.3 0.09 
Fingerprint verification was 
done at time of discharge  
91 93.8 93 94.9 0.74 96 100.0 91 95.8 0.04 187 96.9 184 95.3 0.43 
Whose 
fingerprint 
was taken?  
Patient 86/91 94.5 90/93 96.8 
0.45 
68/96 70.8 67/91 73.6 
0.67 
154/187 82.4 157/184 85.3 
0.43 
Relative* 5/91 5.5 3/93 3.2 28/96 29.2 24/91 26.4 33/187 17.6 27/184 14.7 
Card was given back at the time 
of discharge   
 
89 91.8 88 89.8 0.64 95 99.0 80 84.2 <0.01 184 95.3 168 87.0 <0.01 
Reason for 
not returning 
the card at the 
time of 
discharge**  
Staff wanted 
money 
1/8 12.5 0/9 0.0 
0.73 
0/1 0.0 0/15 0.0 
- 
1/9 11.1 0/24 0.0 
0.05 
Keep the card 
till insurance 
money claimed 
2/8 25.0 2/9 22.2 1/1 100.0 1/15 6.7 3/9 33.3 3/24 12.5 
Staff said it will 
remain 
deposited 
3/8 37.5 4/9 44.4 0/1 0.0 0/15 0.0 3/9 33.3 4/24 16.7 
Others 2/8 25.0 3/9 33.3 0/1 0.0 14/15 93.3 2/9 22.2 17/24 70.8 
Patient was informed about the 
balance amount in the card at 
the time of discharge   
43 44.8 49 50.50 0.43 22 22.9 17 17.9 0.39 65 33.9 66 34.4 0.91 
 
* Regarding reasons for not taking patient’s fingerprint and using relative’s fingerprint instead for verification – only five participants responded 
to the question while remaining participants did not answer 
** One beneficiary from Patiala did not respond to the question 
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7.4.9 Reimbursement of transportation cost to the RSBY beneficiary 
Under the RSBY scheme, all patients should be reimbursed with an amount of 
INR100 (£ 1) at the time of discharge from the hospital.  
In Yamunanagar district, none of the beneficiaries received any reimbursement for 
transportation. However, in Patiala district about half of the participants received the 
transportation amount (Table 7.21). More participants from public hospitals were 
reimbursed the transportation amount as compared to private hospitals, where about 
82% of the participants were not reimbursed (Table 7.22). The median amount of 
reimbursement was INR 100 (£ 1). Lack of information among the participants was 
the most common reason reported for the amount not being reimbursed in Patiala; 
whereas in Yamunanagar the reason reported for not reimbursing the transportation 
cost was that that the beneficiaries did not ask for it (Table 7.21).  
Those hospitals that did not pay the patient this amount could claim that they did 
more within the procedure. However, it can also be assumed that the amount was 
taken as profit. Profit seeking has remained one of the pitfalls in PPP framework 
(Alexandersson and Hultén, 2007). 
Table 7.21: Reimbursement of transportation cost to the RSBY beneficiary 
(Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
 
 
Patiala 
(N=195) 
Yamunanagar 
(N=191) 
N % N % 
Hospital did not reimburse the cost of 
transportation 
107 54.9 191 100 
Reason for not 
reimbursing the 
cost of 
transportation* 
Hospital refused to reimburse 3/99 3.0 3/187 1.6 
Beneficiary did not know that 
there was such a provision 
23/99 23.2 184/187 98.4 
Beneficiary was informed 
that hospital will give later 
1/99 1.0 0/187 0.0 
Beneficiary did not ask for it 70/99 70.7 0/187 0.0 
Others 2/99 2.0 0/187 0.0 
*Eight participants from Patiala and four from Yamunanagar did not respond to the 
question 
Note: P value was not calculated as value in one of the cell was zero 
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Table 7.22: Reimbursement of transportation cost to RSBY beneficiaries (private vs public) 
 
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
Private 
(N=97) 
Public 
(N=98) 
Private 
(N=96) 
Public 
(N=95) 
Private 
(N=193) 
Public 
(N=193) 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Hospital did not reimburse 
the cost of transportation  
62 63.9 45 45.9 96 100.0 95 100.0 158 81.9 140 72.5 
Reason 
for not 
reimbursi
ng the 
cost of 
transport
ation* 
Hospital refused 
to reimburse 
3/58 5.2 0/41 0.0 3/95 3.2 0/92 0.0 6/153 3.9 0/133 0.0 
Beneficiary did 
not know that 
there was such a 
provision 
16/58 27.6 7/41 17.1 92/95 96.8 92/92 100.0 108/153 70.6 99/133 74.4 
Beneficiary was 
informed that the 
hospital will 
give later 
0/58 0.0 1/41 2.4 - - - - 0/153 0.0 1/133 0.8 
Beneficiary did 
not ask for it 
38/58 65.5 32/41 78.0 - - - - 38/153 24.8 32/133 24.1 
Others 1/58 1.7 1/41 2.4 - - - - 1/153 0.7 1/133 0.8 
*Eight participants from Patiala and four from Yamunanagar did not respond to the question 
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7.4.10 Knowledge about post-hospitalization expenses and provision of 
medicines and diagnostics 
Under the RSBY scheme, expenses incurred for consultation, diagnostic tests and 
medicines from one day before the admission of the patient, and cost of diagnostic 
tests and medicines up to five days after discharge from the hospital for the same 
ailment/surgery, are covered.   
Information provided to the participants regarding five-day post-hospitalization 
expenses by the hospital was not adequate in both the districts and was poorer in 
Yamunanagar (Table 7.23).  
Post-hospitalization services were almost similar in public and private hospitals, 
except that slightly more were getting medicines and diagnostics from public 
hospitals (Table 7.24).  
Table 7.23: Knowledge of post-hospitalization expenses and provision of 
medicines and diagnostics (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
  Patiala Yamunanagar 
P value 
  N (195) % N (191) % 
Knew about 5-day post- 
hospitalization expenses 
59 30.3 13 6.8 <0.01 
Medicines were prescribed at the 
time of discharge 
176 90.3 180 94.2 0.14 
Medicines were provided by the 
hospital 
153 86.9 180 100.0 - 
Reasons cited 
for not 
providing 
medicine from 
the hospital* 
Family did not 
ask 
3/22 13.6 0 0.0 
- 
No reason 
provided by 
hospital 
15/22 68.2 0 0.0 
It is not part of 
RSBY 
3/22 13.6 0 0.0 
Others 1/22 4.5 0 0.0 
Prescribed test after discharge 12 6.2 2 1.0 - 
Diagnostic test was done free of 
cost**  
1/9 11.1 0/2 0.0 - 
*One participant from Patiala did not respond to the question 
**Three participants from Patiala did not respond to the question 
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Table 7.24: Knowledge of post-hospitalization expenses and provision of medicines and diagnostics (private vs public hospitals) 
 
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
Private 
(N=97) 
Public 
(N=98) 
P 
valu
e 
Private 
(N=96) 
Public 
(N=95) 
P 
value 
Private 
(N=193) 
Public 
(N=193) 
P 
value 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Knew about 5-day post-hospitalization 
expenses 
32 33.0 27 27.6 0.41 5 5.2 8 8.4 0.37 37 19.2 35 18.1 0.79 
Medicines were prescribed at the time of 
discharge 
85 87.6 91 92.9 0.21 85 88.5 95 100.0 - 170 88.1 186 96.4 0.05 
Medicines were provided by the hospital 67/85 78.8 86/91 94.5 - 85/85 100.0 95/95 100.0 - 152/170 89.4 
181/1
86 
97.3 - 
Reasons 
cited for not 
providing 
medicines 
from the 
hospital* 
Family did not ask 2/17 11.8 1/5 20.0 
- 
- - - - 
- 
2/17 11.8 1/5 20.0 
- 
No reason provided by 
hospital 
11/17 64.7 4/5 80.0 - - - - 11/17 64.7 4/5 80.0 
It is not part of RSBY 3/17 17.6 0/5 0.0 - - - - 3/17 17.6 0/5 0.0 
Others 1/17 5.9 0/5 0.0 - - - - 1/17 5.9 0/5 0.0 
Prescribed test after discharge – Yes 5 5.2 7 7.1 - 0 0.0 2 2.1 - 5 2.6 9 4.7 - 
Diagnostic test was done free of cost** – 
Yes 
0/2 0.0 1/7 14.3 - - - 0/2 0 - 0/2 0.0 1/9 11.1 - 
*One participant from Patiala did not respond to the question 
**Three participants from Patiala did not respond to the question 
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7.5 Comparison of RSBY and non-RSBY participants on choice of 
hospital, transport and diagnosis 
For this section, information was also collected from non-RSBY patients from the exit 
interviews. Hence, the total sample size was 751. Amongst them, 387 were RSBY 
participants and 364 were non-RSBY participants. A comparison was made between 
the participants of public and private hospitals, and also between RSBY and non-
RSBY participants. 
 
7.5.1 Reasons for choosing a health facility for treatment 
The prime reason given by the participants for choosing a hospital for treatment was 
proximity to their home, in the case of public hospitals (this could be due to 
transportation costs); and reputation, in the case of private hospitals (Table 7.26). It 
was observed during the intra-district analysis that in Yamunanagar district, public 
hospitals were primarily chosen because of suggestions from relatives and friends, 
whereas private hospitals were chosen because of their reputation (Table 7.26). 
The most common reason for selecting the hospital for RSBY participants was 
suggested by relatives/friends followed by preferred hospital (i.e. always go to the 
same hospital) and reputation. Whereas, the non-RSBY participants selected the 
hospital based on reputation followed by relative/friend suggestion and proximity 
(Table 7.27).   
Table 7.25: Reasons for choosing a health facility for treatment (Patiala vs 
Yamunanagar) 
 Reasons for choosing the health facility 
  
Patiala Yamunanagar 
N=399 % N=352 % 
Near to the patient’s home  152 38.1 21 6.0 
Good reputation of the facility 136 34.1 88 25.0 
On relative/friend’s suggestion 49 12.3 137 38.9 
Referred by a doctor 12 3.0 21 6.0 
Always go to this hospital  45 11.3 82 23.3 
No other RSBY-empanelled hospitals nearby 2 0.5 1 0.3 
Other reasons  3 0.8 2 0.6 
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Table 7.26: Reasons for choosing a health facility for treatment (private vs public hospitals) 
 
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar–intra-district Both districts 
Private 
(N=203) 
Public 
(N=196) 
Private 
(N=195) 
Public 
(N=157) 
Private 
(N=398) 
Public 
(N=353) 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Near to patient’s home  63 31.0 89 45.4 4 2.1 17 10.8 67 16.8 106 30.0 
Good reputation 98 48.3 38 19.4 80 41.0 8 5.1 178 44.7 46 13.0 
Relative/friend’s suggestion 28 13.8 21 10.7 68 34.9 69 43.9 96 24.1 90 25.5 
Referred by  a doctor 6 3.0 6 3.1 11 5.6 10 6.4 17 4.3 16 4.5 
Always go to this hospital 7 3.4 38 19.4 32 16.4 50 31.8 39 9.8 88 24.9 
No other RSBY-empanelled hospitals nearby 0 0.0 2 1.0 0 0.0 1 0.6 0 0.0 3 0.8 
Other reasons 1 0.5 2 1.0 0 0.0 2 1.3 1 0.3 4 1.1 
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Table 7.27: Reasons for choosing the present health facility for treatment (RSBY vs non-RSBY patients) 
 
Patiala – intra-district 
Yamunanagar–intra-
district 
Both districts 
RSBY 
(N=196) 
Non-RSBY 
(N=203) 
RSBY 
(N=191) 
Non-RSBY 
(N=161) 
RSBY 
(N=387) 
Non-RSBY 
(N=364) 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Near  patient’s home  73 37.2 79 38.9 13 6.8 8 5.0 86 22.2 87 23.9 
Good reputation  56 28.6 80 39.4 35 18.3 53 32.9 91 23.5 133 36.5 
Relative/friend’s suggestion  23 11.7 26 12.8 74 38.7 63 39.1 97 25.1 89 24.5 
Referred by a doctor 4 2.0 8 3.9 11 5.8 10 6.2 15 3.9 18 4.9 
Always go to this hospital  36 18.4 9 4.4 57 29.8 25 15.5 93 24.0 34 9.3 
No other RSBY-empanelled hospitals nearby 2 1.0 0 0.0 1 0.5 0 0.0 3 0.8 0 0.0 
Other reasons 2 1.0 1 0.5 0 0.0 2 1.2 2 0.5 3 0.8 
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7.5.2 Referrals – health facility contacted previously 
In Patiala district, a majority of the participants had not contacted any health facility 
before coming to the present one; whereas in Yamunanagar, a high percentage of the 
participants had first contacted a health facility, many of them were individual private 
practitioners (Table 7.28). Data on previous contact with a health facility across both 
districts separately for public and private facilities is given in Table 7.29. While 
comparing usage across RSBY and non-RSBY participants, it was observed in Patiala 
that slightly more than half of the participants in both groups had not contacted a 
health facility prior to being admitted to the current one. However, in Yamunanagar, 
while close to half of the non-RSBY participants had not previously contacted a 
health facility, a very large percentage of RSBY participants had in fact previously 
done so (Table 7.30).  
A direct visit to an empanelled public health-care facility at the secondary level of 
care without contacting any facility at primary level could be indicative of a weak 
referral system in the district of Patiala. Ideally, those seeking health care in public 
health facilities should first visit primary care facilities closer to their homes, which 
would refer them to secondary care hospitals, rather than directly approaching 
empanelled hospitals at the secondary level. 
Table 7.28: Health facility contacted previously by the patient (Patiala vs 
Yamunanagar) 
  
  
Patiala Yamunanagar 
N=399 % N=352 % 
Did not contact any health facility 
before coming to the current hospital 
220 55.1 98 27.8 
Contacted another public facility 59 14.8 28 8.0 
Contacted another private facility 73 18.3 72 20.5 
Contacted an individual practitioner 29 7.3 142 40.3 
Contacted a drug seller 15 3.8 8 2.3 
Contacted a traditional healer/others 3 0.8 4 1.2 
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Table 7.29: Health facility contacted previously by the patient (private vs public hospitals) 
 
Patiala – intra-district 
Yamunanagar – intra-
district 
Both the districts 
Private 
(N=203) 
Public 
(N=196) 
Private 
(N=195) 
Public 
(N=157) 
Private 
(N=398) 
Public 
(N=353) 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Did not contact any health facility before  
coming to the current hospital 
88 43.3 132 67.3 60 30.8 38 24.2 148 37.2 170 48.2 
Contacted another public facility 18 8.9 41 20.9 21 10.8 7 4.5 39 9.8 48 13.6 
Contacted another private facility 64 31.5 9 4.6 39 20.0 33 21.0 103 25.9 42 11.9 
Contacted an individual practitioner 23 11.3 6 3.1 69 35.4 73 46.5 92 23.1 79 22.4 
Contacted a drug seller 7 3.4 8 4.1 4 2.1 4 2.5 11 2.8 12 3.4 
Contacted a traditional healer/others 3 1.5 0 0.0 2 1.0 2 1.2 5 1.3 2 0.6 
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Table 7.30: Health facility previously contacted by the patient (RSBY vs non-RSBY patients) 
 
Patiala – intra-district 
Yamunanagar – intra-
district 
Both districts 
RSBY 
(N=196) 
Non-RSBY 
(N=203) 
RSBY 
(N=191) 
Non-RSBY 
(N=161) 
RSBY 
(N=387) 
Non-RSBY 
(N=364) 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Did not contact any health facility before 
coming to the current hospital 
102 52.0 118 58.1 28 14.7 70 43.5 130 33.6 188 51.6 
Contacted another public facility 31 15.8 28 13.8 11 5.8 17 10.6 42 10.9 45 12.4 
Contacted another private facility 31 15.8 42 20.7 53 27.7 19 11.8 84 21.7 61 16.8 
Contacted an individual practitioner 15 7.7 14 6.9 93 48.7 49 30.4 108 27.9 63 17.3 
Contacted a drug seller 14 7.1 1 0.5 3 1.6 5 3.1 17 4.4 6 1.6 
Contacted a traditional healer/others 3 1.5 0 0.0 3 1.6 1 0.6 6 1.6 1 0.3 
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7.5.3 Mode of transportation to hospital 
The largest share of the study participants in both the districts used three-wheelers to 
reach the hospital (Table 7.31). A bus was used more by the participants of public 
hospital when compared to private, both within the district and across the district 
(Table 7.32). A car was used more commonly by the Non-RSBY participants (Table 
7.33). 
Table 7.31: Mode of transportation to hospital (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
 
Patiala Yamunanagar 
N=397 % N=350 % 
Bus 93 23.4 77 22.0 
Metro 2 0.5 5 1.4 
Rickshaw 43 10.8 7 2.0 
Two-wheeler 28 7.1 69 19.7 
Three-wheeler 154 38.8 157 44.9 
Car 38 9.6 27 7.7 
Other 39 9.8 8 2.3 
Note: Two participants from Patiala and two from Yamunanagar did not respond to 
the question 
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Table 7.32: Mode of transportation to hospital (private vs public hospitals) 
 
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both the districts 
Private 
(N=202) 
Public 
(N=195) 
Private 
(N=195) 
Public 
(N=155) 
Private 
(N=397) 
Public 
(N=350) 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Bus 40 19.8 53 27.2 38 19.5 39 25.2 78 19.6 92 26.3 
Metro 1 0.5 1 0.5 5 2.6 0 0.0 6 1.5 1 0.3 
Rickshaw 22 10.9 21 10.8 5 2.6 2 1.3 27 6.8 23 6.6 
Two-wheeler 11 5.4 17 8.7 40 20.5 29 18.7 51 12.8 46 13.1 
Three-wheeler 96 47.5 58 29.7 84 43.1 73 47.1 180 45.3 131 37.4 
Car 16 7.9 22 11.3 20 10.3 7 4.5 36 9.1 29 8.3 
Other 16 7.9 23 11.8 3 1.5 5 3.2 19 4.8 28 8.0 
Note: Two participants from Patiala and two from Yamunanagar did not respond to the question 
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Table 7.33: Mode of transportation to hospital (RSBY vs non-RSBY patients) 
 
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both the districts 
RSBY 
(N=195) 
Non RSBY 
(N=202) 
RSBY 
(N=189) 
Non RSBY 
(N=161) 
RSBY 
(N=384) 
Non RSBY 
(N=363) 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Bus 51 26.2 42 20.8 43 22.8 34 21.1 94 24.5 76 20.9 
Metro 0 0.0 2 1.0 5 2.6 0 0.0 5 1.3 2 0.6 
Rickshaw 17 8.7 26 12.9 3 1.6 4 2.5 20 5.2 30 8.3 
Two-wheeler 12 6.2 16 7.9 37 19.6 32 19.9 49 12.8 48 13.2 
Three-wheeler 82 42.1 72 35.6 88 46.6 69 42.9 170 44.3 141 38.8 
Car 10 5.1 28 13.9 11 5.8 16 9.9 21 5.5 44 12.1 
Other 23 11.8 16 7.9 2 1.1 6 3.7 25 6.5 22 6.1 
Note: Two participants from Patiala and two from Yamunanagar did not respond to the question 
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7.5.4 Diagnosis of disease 
This section focuses on the diagnosis of the disease for which the participants sought 
hospital admission. The diagnosis was classified based on the 20 categories of 
packages under the RSBY scheme. 
Overall medically managed disease (general) was the most commonly used package 
followed by general surgery and gynaecology. While comparing the diagnosis of the 
participants in private and public hospitals, an almost similar pattern of diagnosis was 
observed, except for slightly more cases of orthopaedics in public hospitals and 
slightly more cases of urology in private hospitals (Table 7.34). Similarly, the 
diagnosis pattern of RSBY and non-RSBY participants was also almost the same 
except for slightly more cases of orthopaedics in non-RSBY and general surgery in 
RSBY (Table 7.35).  
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Table 7.34: Diagnosis of study participants (private vs public hospitals) 
  
  
  
Patiala Yamunanagar Both districts 
Private Public Private Public Private Public 
N =203 % N=196 % N=195 % N=157 % N=398 % N=353 % 
Oncology 3 1.5 5 2.6 4 2.1 1 0.6 7 1.8 6 1.7 
Urology 10 4.9 2 1.0 15 7.7 2 1.3 25 6.3 4 1.1 
Endocrinology 4 2.0 6 3.1 4 2.1 1 0.6 8 2.0 7 2.0 
Orthopaedics 6 3.0 37 18.9 31 15.9 17 10.8 37 9.3 54 15.3 
Ophthalmology 1 0.5 8 4.1 1 0.5 2 1.3 2 0.5 10 2.8 
Gynaecology 48 23.6 39 19.9 15 7.7 26 16.6 63 15.8 65 18.4 
General surgery 45 22.2 42 21.4 42 21.5 24 15.3 87 21.9 66 18.7 
Ear 1 0.5 3 1.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.3 3 0.8 
Nose 0 0.0 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.3 
Throat 0 0.0 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.3 
MMD- ICU 1 0.5 2 1.0 4 2.1 0 0.0 5 1.3 2 0.6 
MMD general 84 41.4 50 25.5 79 40.5 84 53.5 163 41.0 134 38.0 
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Table 7.35: Diagnosis of study participants (RSBY vs non-RSBY patients) 
  
  
  
Patiala Yamunanagar Both districts 
RSBY Non-RSBY RSBY Non-RSBY RSBY Non-RSBY 
N=196 % N=203 % N=191 % N=161 % N=387 % N=364 % 
Oncology 5 2.6 3 1.5 3 1.6 2 1.2 8 2.1 5 1.4 
Urology 4 2.0 8 3.9 11 5.8 6 3.7 15 3.9 14 3.8 
Endocrinology 6 3.1 4 2.0 1 0.5 4 2.5 7 1.8 8 2.2 
Orthopaedics 13 6.6 30 14.8 25 13. 23 14.3 38 9.8 53 14.6 
Ophthalmology 5 2.6 4 2.0 2 1.0 1 0.6 7 1.8 5 1.4 
Gynaecology 39 19.9 48 23.6 23 12.0 18 11.2 62 16.0 66 18.1 
General surgery 48 24.5 39 19.20 43 22.5 23 14.3 91 23.5 62 17.0 
Ear 4 2.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 1.0 0 0.0 
Nose 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.3 0 0.0 
Throat 0 0.0 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.3 
MMD – ICU 1 0.5 2 1.0 1 0.5 3 1.9 2 0.5 5 1.4 
MMD- general 70 35.7 64 31.5 82 42.9 81 50.3 152 39.3 145 39.8 
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7.6 User satisfaction in private and public facilities – RSBY and 
non-RSBY patients 
This section primarily relates to user satisfaction with health-care facilities, both 
private and public, as well as for RSBY and non-RSBY patients in the two selected 
districts. The information collected was analysed under the following categories:   
 experiences during admission 
 care from nurses 
 care from doctors 
 hospital environment 
 experiences in the hospital 
 experiences at the time of discharge 
 overall rating of the hospital. 
Experiences of 399 participants in Patiala and 352 in Yamunanagar were analysed. 
One participant from Yamunanagar did not respond to any question on the user 
satisfaction, thus the total number (N) was 351 in Yamunanagar.  
7.6.1 Experiences during admission 
Questions asked to assess the experiences of the participants at the time of admission 
were on the availability of bed at the time of admission, availability of a wheelchair 
(for those who required it) and the time taken by the nurses and doctors to attend to 
the patient. 
In both the districts, beds were made available to almost all patients at the time of 
admission to the hospital. Also, almost all patients who required a wheelchair or 
stretcher were provided with it (Table 7.36). In Patiala, a wheel chair was pushed by 
hospital staff in 88% cases while it was 65% in Yamunanagar. Taking the cut-off of 
15 minutes for delay (as discussed in section 7.4.3), nursing staff was taking less time 
in Yamunanagar when compared to Patiala, as 59% of participants were attended by 
nursing staff in <15 minutes compared to 48% in Patiala (Table 7.36). Doctors were 
taking almost similar time in both the districts. Overall, the hospital experience was 
almost similar in Patiala and Yamunanagar with Patiala was better in a wheelchair 
being pushed by staff and Yamunanagar was better in time taken by nursing staff to 
attend to the patients.  
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When comparing provision of care during admission across public and private 
hospitals, nurses and doctors were taking a longer time to attend to the admitted 
patients in public hospitals as compared to private hospitals, both within and across 
the districts (Table 7.37). 
In Patiala district, doctors were quicker to attend to the RSBY patients in comparison 
to non-RSBY patients, whereas in Yamunanagar district, doctors were taking longer 
to attend to the RSBY patients. However, overall, RSBY patients were attended 
slightly earlier than non-RSBY (Table 7.38). 
Table 7.36: Beneficiaries’ experiences during hospital admission (Patiala vs 
Yamunanagar) 
  
  
  Patiala Yamunanagar  
P value 
  N % N % 
N 399 100 351 100 
 
Was the bed made 
available as soon as 
the patient was 
advised admission? 
Yes 392 98.2 344 98.0 
0.80 Told to wait for a few 
hours/come back 
another day 
7 1.8 7 2.0 
Condition of the 
patient at the time of 
admission 
N 399 100 351 100 
 
Able to walk  245 61.4 79 22.5 
<0.001 
Able to walk with 
support 
61 15.3 218 62.1 
Needed 
stretcher/wheelchair 
93 23.3 54 15.4 
Availability of 
stretcher/wheelchair 
N 93 100 54 100 
 
Yes 90 96.8 54 100.0 
-- 
No 3 3.2 0 0.0 
Who pushed the 
stretcher/wheelchair? 
N 93 100 54 100 
 
Hospital staff 82 88.2 35 64.8 
0.001 
Relatives/others 11 11.8 19 35.2 
How long did the 
nursing staff take to 
come and check the 
patient? 
N 399 100 351 100  
Less than 15 minutes 192 48.1 206 58.7 
<0.001 15 to 30 minutes 116 29.1 133 37.9 
More than 30 minutes 91 22.8 12 3.4 
How long did the 
doctors take to come 
and check the patient? 
N 399 100 351 100 
 
Less than 15 minutes 136 34.1 111 31.6 
<0.001 15 to 30 minutes 138 34.6 182 51.9 
More than 30 minutes 125 31.3 58 16.5 
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Table 7.37: Beneficiaries’ experiences with hospital admission (private vs public hospitals) 
  
  
  
  
N 
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
Private Public P 
value 
Private Public P 
value 
Private Public P 
value N % N % N % N % N % N % 
203 100 196 100 
 
194 100 157 100 
 
397 100 353 100 
 
Was the bed made 
available as soon as 
the patient was 
advised admission?  
Yes 197 97.0 195 99.5 
0.122 
188 96.9 156 99.4 
0.136 
385 97.0 351 99.4 
0.013 Told to wait for few hrs/ come 
back another day 6 3.0 1 0.5 6 3.1 1 0.6 12 3.0 2 0.6 
Condition of the 
patient at the time of 
admission 
N 203 100 196 100  194 100 157 100  397 100 353 100  
Able to walk 117 57.6 128 65.3 
0.277 
35 18.0 44 28.0 
0.076 
152 38.3 172 48.7 
0.016 Able to walk with support 35 17.2 26 13.3 126 64.9 92 58.6 161 40.6 118 33.4 
Needed stretcher/wheelchair 51 25.1 42 21.4 33 17.0 21 13.4 84 21.2 63 17.8 
  
Availability of 
stretcher/wheelchair 
N 51 100 42 100 
 
33 100 21 100 
 
84 100 63 100 
 
Yes 50 98.0 40 95.2 
0.59 
33 100 21 100 
- 
83 98.8 61 96.8 
0.58 
No 1 2.0 2 4.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.2 2 3.2 
  
Who pushed the 
stretcher/wheelchair? 
N 51 100 42 100 
 
33 100 21 100 
 
84 100 63 100 
 
Hospital staff 46 90.2 36 85.7 
0.54 
23 69.7 12 57.1 
0.39 
69 82.1 48 76.2 
0.41 
Relatives/others 5 9.8 6 14.3 10 30.3 9 42.9 15 17.9 15 23.8 
  
How long did the 
nursing staff take to 
come and check the 
patient? 
N 203 100 196 100 
 
194 100 157 100 
 
397 100 353 100 
 
<15 minutes 103 50.7 89 45.4 
0.02 
125 64.5 81 51.6 
0.01 
228 57.4 170 48.2 
0.001 15–30 minutes 65 32.0 51 26.0 66 34.0 67 42.7 131 33.0 118 33.4 
>30 minutes 35 17.2 56 28.6 3 1.5 9 5.7 38 9.6 65 18.4 
  
How long did the 
doctors take to come 
and check the 
patient? 
N 203 100 196 100 
 
194 100 157 100 
 
397 100 353 100 
 
<15 minutes 74 36.5 62 31.6 
0.01 
73 37.6 38 24.2 
0.03 
147 37.0 100 28.3 
0.005 15–30 minutes 79 38.9 59 30.1 91 46.9 91 58.0 170 42.8 150 42.5 
>30 minutes 50 24.6 75 38.3 30 15.5 28 17.8 80 20.2 103 29.2 
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Table 7.38: Beneficiaries’ experiences with hospital admission (RSBY vs non-RSBY patients) 
  
  
  
  
 
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
RSBY Non RSBY P 
value 
RSBY Non RSBY P 
value 
RSBY Non RSBY P 
value N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Was the bed made 
available as soon as 
the patient was 
advised admission?  
N 196 100 203 100 
 
190 100 161 100 
 
386 100 364 100 
 
Yes 193 98.5 199 98.0 
1.00 
189 99.5 155 96.3 
0.05 
382 99.0 354 97.3 
0.11 Told to wait for few 
hrs/come back another day 
3 1.5 4 2.0 1 0.5 6 3.7 4 1.0 10 2.7 
  
Condition of the 
patient at the time of 
admission 
N 196 100 203 100 
 
190 100 161 100 
 
386 100 364 100 
 
Able to walk  136 69.4 109 53.7 
<0.01 
45 23.7 34 21.1 
<0.01 
181 46.9 143 39.3 
<0.01 
Able to walk with support 34 17.3 27 13.3 128 67.4 90 55.9 162 42.0 117 32.1 
Needed a 
stretcher/wheelchair 
26 13.3 67 33.0 17 8.9 37 23.0 43 11.1 104 28.6 
  
Availability of 
stretcher/wheelchair 
N 26 100 67 100 
 
17 100 37 100 
 
43 100 104 100 
 
Yes 26 100 64 95.5 
- 
17 100.0 37 100.0 
- 
43 100.0 101 97.1 
0.56 
No 0 0.0 3 4.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 2.9 
  
Who pushed the 
stretcher/wheelchair? 
N 26 100 67 100 
 
17 100 37 100 
 
43 100 104 100 
 
Hospital staff 22 84.6 60 89.6 
0.49 
14 82.4 21 56.8 
0.12 
36 83.7 81 77.9 
0.50 
Relatives/ Others 4 15.4 7 10.4 3 17.6 16 43.2 7 16.3 23 22.1 
  
How long did the 
nursing staff take to 
come and check the 
patient? 
N 196 100 203 100 
 
190 100 161 100 
 
386 100 364 100 
 
<15 minutes 104 53.1 88 43.3 
0.12 
106 55.8 100 62.1 
0.40 
210 54.4 188 51.6 
0.33 15 to 30 minute 54 27.6 62 30.5 76 40.0 57 35.4 130 33.7 119 32.7 
More than 30 minutes 38 19.4 53 26.1 8 4.2 4 2.5 46 11.9 57 15.7 
  
How long did the 
doctors take to come 
and check the 
patient? 
N 196 100 203 100 
 
190 100 161 100 
 
386 100 364 100 
 
<15 minutes 80 40.8 56 27.6 
0.01 
53 27.9 58 36.0 
0.01 
133 34.5 114 31.3 
0.22 15–30 minutes 57 29.1 81 39.9 112 58.9 70 43.5 169 43.8 151 41.5 
>30 minutes 59 30.1 66 32.5 25 13.2 33 20.5 84 21.8 99 27.2 
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7.6.2 Care from nurses 
To assess the quality of nursing care, RSBY and non-RSBY participants were 
questioned regarding the courtesy and care shown to them by nurses, whether the 
nurses listened to them, whether nurses explained things in a way that they could 
understand and whether they received help from nurses when it was required.   
Care from nurses appeared to be better in Patiala district when compared to 
Yamunanagar district (Table 7.39). When comparing private with public hospitals, in 
Patiala district, nursing care was slightly better in private hospitals compared to public 
hospitals, whereas in Yamunanagar, the quality of nursing care was significantly 
better in all aspects in private hospitals compared to public hospitals (Table 7.40).  
When comparing RSBY with non-RSBY participants, nursing care was better for 
RSBY participants in Patiala district with regard to courtesy shown to patients and for 
listening more carefully to the patients. In Yamunanagar district, not much difference 
was seen except with regard to getting help as soon as it was required, where non-
RSBY participants fared better in comparison with RSBY patients (Table 7.41). 
Conclusively, nursing care was better in Patiala when compared to Yamunanagar. 
Private hospitals provided better nursing care than public hospitals. Slightly better 
nursing care was given to RSBY patients in comparison with non-RSBY participants. 
Table 7.39: Care from nurses (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
  
 
  
Patiala Yamunanagar 
P 
value 
N 
(399) 
% 
N 
(351) 
% 
How often did nurses treat 
patients with courtesy and 
respect? 
Never/ sometimes 59 14.8 69 19.7 
0.07 
Usually/Always 340 85.2 282 80.3 
How often did nurses listen 
carefully to the patients? 
Never/ sometimes 50 12.5 59 16.8 
0.10 
Usually/ always 349 87.5 292 83.2 
How often did nurses explain 
things in a way that patients 
could understand? 
Never/ sometimes 55 13.8 86 24.5 
<0.01 
Usually/ always 344 86.2 265 75.5 
How often did a patient get help 
as soon as he/she wanted it?*  
Never/ sometimes 64 16.4 126 45.2 
<0.01 
Usually/ always 327 83.6 153 54.8 
*For Patiala N=391 and for Yamunanagar N=279, as only these many patients required help  
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Table 7.40: Care from nurses (private vs public hospitals) 
  
  
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
Private Public 
P value 
Private Public 
P value 
Private Public 
P value 
N(203) % N(196) % N(194) % N(157) % N(397) % N(353) % 
How often did 
nurses treat 
patients with 
courtesy and 
respect? 
Never/ sometimes 27 13.3 32 16.3 
0.40 
26 13.4 43 27.4 
<0.01 
53 13.4 75 21.2 
<0.01 
Usually/ always 176 86.7 164 83.7 168 86.6 114 72.6 344 86.6 278 78.8 
How often did 
nurses listen 
carefully to the 
patients? 
Never/ sometimes 21 10.3 29 14.8 
0.18 
20 10.3 39 24.8 
<0.01 
41 10.3 68 19.3 
<0.01 
Usually/ always 182 89.7 167 85.2 174 89.7 118 75.2 356 89.7 285 80.7 
How often did 
nurses explain 
things in a way 
that patients could 
understand? 
Never/ sometimes 19 9.4 36 18.4 
<0.01 
37 19.1 49 31.2 
<0.01 
56 14.1 85 24.1 
<0.01 
Usually/ always 184 90.6 160 81.6 157 80.9 108 68.8 341 85.9 268 75.9 
How often did a 
patient get help as 
soon as he/she 
wanted it?*  
Never/ sometimes 29 14.4 35 18.4 
0.29 
60 37.3 66 55.9 
<0.01 
89 24.6 101 32.8 
0.02 
Usually/ always 172 85.6 155 81.6 101 62.7 52 44.1 273 75.4 207 67.2 
*For Patiala N=391and for Yamunanagar N=279, as only these many patients required help 
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Table 7.41: Care from nurses (RSBY vs non-RSBY) 
    
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
RSBY Non RSBY 
P value 
RSBY Non RSBY 
P value 
RSBY Non RSBY 
P value 
N(196) % N(203) % N(190) % N(161) % N(386) % N(364) % 
How often did 
nurses treat 
patients with 
courtesy and 
respect? 
Never/ sometimes 20 10.2 39 19.2 
0.01 
32 16.8 37 23.0 
0.15 
52 13.5 76 20.9 
<0.01 
Usually/ always 176 89.8 164 80.8 158 83.2 124 77.0 334 86.5 288 79.1 
How often did 
nurses listen 
carefully to the 
patients? 
Never/ sometimes 17 8.7 33 16.3 
0.02 
31 16.3 28 17.4 
0.79 
48 12.4 61 16.8 
0.09 
Usually/ always 179 91.3 170 83.7 159 83.7 133 82.6 338 87.6 303 83.2 
How often did 
nurses explain 
things in a way 
that patients could 
understand? 
Never/ sometimes 23 11.7 32 15.8 
0.24 
47 24.7 39 24.2 
0.91 
70 18.1 71 19.5 
0.70 
Usually/ always 173 88.3 171 84.2 143 75.3 122 75.8 316 81.9 293 80.5 
How often did a 
patient get help as 
soon as he/she 
wanted it?*  
Never/ sometimes 33 17.5 31 15.3 
0.57 
74 51.7 52 38.2 
0.02 
107 32.2 83 24.6 
0.02 
Usually/ always 156 82.5 171 84.7 69 48.3 84 61.8 225 67.8 255 75.4 
*For Patiala N=391 and for Yamunanagar N=279 as only these many patients required help  
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7.6.3 Care from doctors 
The quality of doctors’ care for patients was assessed in terms of courtesy and respect 
given to patients by the doctors, listening carefully to the patients and responding to 
their concerns.   
Care from doctors was reported to be better from participants of Patiala district 
compared to Yamunanagar district (Table 7.42). Doctors from private hospitals 
showed significantly better care in terms of courtesy and respect, listening carefully to 
patients, and explaining things carefully compared to doctors of public hospitals 
(Table 7.43).    
While comparing doctors’ care across RSBY and non-RSBY participants, in both the 
districts, doctors’ care was reported to be slightly better for RSBY participants in 
comparison to non-RSBY participants but this difference was statistically non-
significant (Table 7.44).  
Table 7.42: Care from doctors (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
    
Patiala Yamunanagar 
P 
value 
N 
(399) 
% 
N 
(351) 
% 
How often did 
doctors treat the 
patients with 
courtesy and 
respect? 
Never/ sometimes 55 13.8 46 13.1 
0.79 
Usually/ always 344 86.2 305 86.9 
How often did 
doctors listen 
carefully to the 
patients? 
Never/ sometimes 50 12.5 63 17.9 
0.04 
Usually/ always 349 87.5 288 82.1 
How often did 
doctors explain 
things in a way 
that the patient 
could understand 
easily? 
Never/ sometimes 58 14.5 95 27.1 
<0.01 
Usually/ always 341 85.5 256 72.9 
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Table 7.43: Care from doctors (private vs public hospitals) 
    
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
Private Public 
P value 
Private Public 
P value 
Private Public 
P value 
N(203) % N(196) % N(194) % N(157) % N(397) % N(353) % 
How often did 
doctors treat 
patients with 
courtesy and 
respect? 
Never/ 
sometimes 
21 10.3 34 17.3 
0.04 
16 8.2 30 19.1 
<0.01 
37 9.3 64 18.1 
<0.01 
Usually/ 
always 
182 89.7 162 82.7 178 91.8 127 80.9 360 90.7 289 81.9 
How often did 
doctors listen 
carefully to 
patients? 
Never/ 
sometimes 
15 7.4 35 17.9 
<0.01 
22 11.3 41 26.1 
<0.01 
37 9.3 76 21.5 
<0.01 
Usually/ 
always 
188 92.6 161 82.1 172 88.7 116 73.9 360 90.7 277 78.5 
How often did 
doctors explain 
things in a way that 
patients could 
understand easily? 
Never/ 
sometimes 
21 10.3 37 18.9 
0.02 
39 20.1 56 35.7 
<0.01 
60 15.1 93 26.3 
<0.01 
Usually/ 
always 
182 89.7 159 81.1 155 79.9 101 64.3 337 84.9 260 73.7 
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Table 7.44: Care from doctors (RSBY vs non-RSBY patients) 
    
Patiala – within district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
RSBY Non-RSBY 
P 
value 
RSBY Non-RSBY 
P 
value 
RSBY Non-RSBY 
P 
value N 
(196) 
% 
N 
(203) 
% 
N 
(190) 
% 
N 
(161) 
% 
N 
(386) 
% 
N 
(364) 
% 
How often did 
doctors treat 
the patients 
with courtesy 
and respect? 
Never/ 
sometimes 
22 11.2 33 16.3 
0.14 
24 12.6 22 13.7 
0.78 
46 11.9 55 15.1 
0.20 
Usually/ 
always 
174 88.8 170 83.7 166 87.4 139 86.3 340 88.1 309 84.9 
How often did 
doctors listen 
carefully to the 
patients? 
Never/ 
sometimes 
20 10.2 30 14.8 
0.17 
35 18.4 28 17.4 
0.80 
55 14.2 58 15.9 
0.52 
Usually/ 
always 
176 89.8 173 85.2 155 81.6 133 82.6 331 85.8 306 84.1 
How often did 
doctors explain 
things in a way 
that the patient 
could 
understand 
easily? 
Never/ 
sometimes 
25 12.8 33 16.3 
0.32 
51 26.8 44 27.3 
0.92 
76 19.7 77 21.2 
0.62 
Usually/ 
always 
171 87.2 170 83.7 139 73.2 117 72.7 310 80.3 287 78.8 
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7.6.4 Hospital environment 
Hospital environment was assessed in terms of cleanliness of the surroundings as well 
as the bathrooms, and the noise level near patients’ beds at night.  
Hospitals in Yamunanagar district were found to be quieter during the night and 
cleaner when compared to hospitals in Patiala district (Table 7.45). Hospital 
environment was significantly better in private hospitals in comparison to public 
hospitals.  Similar results were observed during the intra-district comparison of 
private and public hospitals (Table 7.46).    
Overall, hospital environment was perceived slightly better by RSBY participants 
when compared to non-RSBY participants. However, the difference was statistically 
non-significant (Table 7.47). 
Conclusively, private hospitals demonstrated a better hospital environment in both the 
districts. Hospital environment was slightly better for RSBY participants when 
compared to non-RSBY participants.  
Table 7.45: Hospital environment (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
  
  
Patiala Yamunanagar 
P value 
N(399) % N(351) % 
How often was 
patients’ 
surroundings and 
bathroom area 
kept clean? 
Never/ 
sometimes 
77 19.3 52 14.8 
0.11 
Usually/always 322 80.7 299 85.2 
How often the 
area around 
patients’ beds was 
found quiet at 
night? 
Never/ 
sometimes 
87 21.8 48 13.7 
<0.01 
Usually/always 312 78.2 303 86.3 
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Table 7.46: Hospital environment (private vs public hospitals) 
    
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
Private Public 
P 
value 
Private Public 
P 
value 
Private Public 
P 
value N 
(203) 
% 
N 
(196) 
% 
N 
(194) 
% 
N 
(157) 
% 
N 
(397) 
% 
N 
(353) 
% 
How often were 
patients’ 
surroundings & 
bathroom areas 
kept clean? 
Never/ 
sometimes 
17 8.4 60 30.6 
<0.01 
12 6.2 40 25.5 
<0.01 
29 7.3 100 28.3 
<0.01 
Usually/ 
always 
186 91.6 136 69.4 182 93.8 117 74.5 368 92.7 253 71.7 
How often the 
area around 
patients’ beds 
was found quiet 
at night? 
Never/ 
sometimes 
23 11.3 64 32.7 
<0.01 
15 7.7 33 21.0 
<0.01 
38 9.6 97 27.5 
<0.01 
Usually/ 
always 
180 88.7 132 67.3 179 92.3 124 79.0 359 90.4 256 72.5 
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Table 7.47: Hospital environment (RSBY vs non-RSBY patients) 
    
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
RSBY Non RSBY 
P 
value 
RSBY Non RSBY 
P 
value 
RSBY Non RSBY 
P 
value N 
(196) 
% 
N 
(203) 
% 
N 
(190) 
% 
N 
(161) 
% 
N 
(386) 
% 
N 
(364) 
% 
How often were 
patients’ 
surroundings & 
bathroom area 
kept clean? 
Never/ 
sometimes 
39 19.9 38 18.7 
0.76 
19 10.0 33 20.5 
<0.01 
58 15.0 71 19.5 
0.10 
Usually/ 
always 
157 80.1 165 81.3 171 90.0 128 79.5 328 85.0 293 80.5 
How often the 
area around 
patients’ beds 
was found quiet 
at night? 
Never/ 
sometimes 
42 21.4 45 22.2 
0.86 
23 12.2 25 15.5 
0.35 
65 16.8 70 19.2 
0.39 
Usually/ 
always 
154 78.6 158 77.8 167 87.9 136 84.5 321 83.2 294 80.8 
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7.6.5 Experiences in the hospital 
Experiences during the hospital stay were assessed by asking questions in relation to 
help received from nurses to go to the bathroom or use a bedpan, assisting with pain 
relief and providing information to the patients about the drugs administered and their 
side-effects.   
Almost similar experiences were reported by participants from Patiala and 
Yamunanagar, except for explaining medicine and its side effects, which was 
significantly better in Patiala. When comparing public and private hospitals in the two 
districts, participants from private hospitals in Patiala district reported a better 
experience compared to public hospitals.  
Intra-district comparison of experiences during hospital stay did not show much 
difference between the RSBY and non-RSBY participants in Patiala district. In 
Yamunanagar district, RSBY patients had better experiences than non-RSBY patients 
(Table 7.49).  
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Table 7.48: Experiences in the hospital (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
 
 
Patiala Yamunanagar 
P value 
N % N % 
  
Did the patient need help from nurses or other hospital staff to go to 
the bathroom or use a bedpan? 
N 399 351 
Yes 273 68.4 116 33.0 
<0.01 
No 126 31.6 235 67.0 
How often did the patient get help to go to the bathroom or use a 
bedpan as soon as the patient required?  
N 273 116  
Never/ sometimes 75 27.5 34 29.3 
0.71 
Usually/ always 198 72.5 82 70.7 
During the hospital stay, did the patient need medicine for pain? 
N 399 351  
Yes 374 93.7 298 84.9 
<0.01 
No 25 6.3 53 15.1 
During the hospital stay, how often was patient’s pain well 
controlled? 
N 374 298  
Never/ sometimes 50 13.4 22 7.4 
0.01 
Usually/ always 324 86.6 276 92.6 
How often did the hospital staff do everything they could to help 
the patient with his pain? 
N 373 298  
Never/ sometimes 39 10.5 30 10.1 
0.86 
Usually/ always 334 89.5 268 89.9 
Before giving patient any new medicine, how often did hospital 
staff inform the patient what the medicine was for? 
N 399 351  
Never/ sometimes 92 23.1 244 69.5 
<0.01 
Usually/ always 307 76.9 107 30.5 
Before giving the patient any new medicine, how often did hospital 
staff describe possible side effects in a way that the patient could 
understand? 
N 399 351  
Never/ sometimes 112 28.1 266 75.8 
<0.01 
Usually/ always 287 71.9 85 24.2 
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Table 7.49: Experiences in the hospital (private vs public hospitals) 
   
 
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
Private Public 
P value 
Private Public 
P value 
Private Public 
P value 
N 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
203 196 194 157 397 353 
Did the patient require 
help from the hospital staff 
to go to the bathroom?  
Yes 147 72.4 126 64.3 
0.08 
77 39.7 39 24.8 
0.03 
224 56.4 165 46.7 
<0.01 
No 56 27.6 70 35.7 117 60.3 118 75.2 173 43.6 188 53.3 
How often did the patient 
get help to go to the 
bathroom or use a bedpan 
as soon as required?  
N 147 126 
 
77 39 
 
224 165 
 
Never/ sometimes 31 21.1 44 34.9 
0.01 
17 22.1 17 43.6 
0.16 
48 21.4 61 37.0 
<0.01 
Usually/ always 116 78.9 82 65.1 60 77.9 22 56.4 176 78.6 104 63.0 
Did the patient need 
medicine for pain?  
N 203 196 
 
194 157 
 
397 353 
 
Yes 197 97.0 177 90.3 
<0.01 
168 86.6 130 82.8 
0.32 
365 91.9 307 87.0 
0.02 
No 6 3.0 19 9.7 26 13.4 27 17.2 32 8.1 46 13.0 
During the hospital stay, 
how often was patient’s 
pain well controlled?  
N 197 177 
 
168 130 
 
365 307 
 
Never/ sometimes 11 5.6 39 22.0 
<0.01 
4 2.4 18 13.8 
<0.01 
15 4.1 57 18.6 
<0.01 
Usually/ always 186 94.4 138 78.0 164 97.6 112 86.2 350 95.9 250 81.4 
How often did the hospital 
staff provide help to 
reduce the patient’s pain?  
 
197 176 
 
168 130 
    
Never/ sometimes 11 5.6 28 15.9 
<0.01 
15 8.9 15 11.5 
0.49 
26 7.1 43 14.1 
<0.01 
Usually/ always 186 94.4 148 84.1 153 91.1 115 88.5 339 92.9 263 85.9 
Before giving the patient 
any new medicine, how 
often did hospital staff 
explain about the medicine 
and its side effects?  
 
203 196 
 
194 157 
 
397 353 
 
Never/ sometimes 26 12.8 66 33.7 
<0.01 
124 63.9 120 76.4 
0.01 
150 37.8 186 52.7 <0.01 
Usually/ always 177 87.2 130 66.3 70 36.1 37 23.6 247 62.2 167 47.3 
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Table 7.50: Experiences in the hospital (RSBY vs non-RSBY patients) 
   
 
Patiala – within district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
RSBY Non-RSBY 
P value 
RSBY Non-RSBY 
P value 
RSBY Non-RSBY 
P value 
N 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
196 203 190 161 386 364 
Did the patient require help 
from the hospital staff to go to 
the bathroom?  
Yes 125 63.8 148 72.9 
0.05 
66 34.7 50 31.1 
0.47 
191 49.5 198 54.4 
0.17 
No 71 36.2 55 27.1 124 65.3 111 68.9 195 50.5 166 45.6 
How often did the patient get 
help to go to the bathroom or 
use a bedpan as soon as 
required?  
N 125 148 
 
66 50 
 
191 198 
 
Never/ sometimes 34 27.2 41 27.7 
0.93 
18 27.3 16 32.0 
0.58 
52 27.2 57 28.8 
0.73 
Usually/ always 91 72.8 107 72.3 48 72.7 34 68.0 139 72.8 141 71.2 
Did the patient require 
medicine for pain?  
N 196 203 
 
190 161 
 
386 364 
 
Yes 179 91.3 195 96.1 
0.05 
153 80.5 145 90.1 
0.01 
332 86.0 340 93.4 
<0.01 
No 17 8.7 8 3.9 37 19.5 16 9.9 54 14.0 24 6.6 
During the hospital stay, how 
often was the patient’s pain 
well controlled?  
N 179 195 
 
153 145 
 
332 340 
 
Never/ sometimes 18 10.1 32 16.4 
0.07 
6 3.9 16 11.0 
0.02 
24 7.2 48 14.1 
<0.01 
Usually/ always 161 89.9 163 83.6 147 96.1 129 89.0 308 92.8 292 85.9 
How often did the hospital 
staff help to reduce the 
patient’s pain?  
N 178 195 
 
153 145 
 
331 340 
 
Never/ sometimes 17 9.6 22 11.3 
0.58 
12 7.8 18 12.4 
0.19 
29 8.8 40 11.8 
0.20 
Usually/ always 161 90.4 173 88.7 141 92.2 127 87.6 302 91.2 300 88.2 
Before giving the patient any 
new medicine, how often did 
hospital staff explain about the 
medicine and its side effects?  
N 196 203 
 
190 161 
 
386 364 
 
Never/ sometimes 50 25.5 42 20.7 
0.25 
122 64.2 122 75.8 
0.02 
172 44.6 164 45.1 
0.89 
Usually/ always 146 74.5 161 79.3 68 35.8 39 24.2 214 55.4 200 54.9 
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7.6.6 Experiences at the time of discharge  
Care at the time of discharge was assessed in terms of the place the patient would go 
to after discharge, help during discharge, health status at the time of discharge and 
follow-up suggestions given by the hospital staff. 
Overall, the discharge experiences were found to be satisfactory in all groups. In 
Patiala district, experience at the time of discharge was slightly better than 
Yamunanagar district (Table 7.51). While making an intra-district and inter-district 
comparison of private and public hospitals, private hospitals were slightly better than 
public hospitals (Table 7.52). Also, in RSBY and non-RSBY comparison, RSBY 
participants reported a slightly better experience at the time of discharge (Table 7.53). 
However, most of these differences were statistically non significant   
Table 7.51: Experiences at the time of discharge (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) 
   
 
Patiala Yamunanagar 
P 
value N 
(399) 
% 
N 
(351) 
% 
Was the patient advised where 
to go after leaving the 
hospital?  
Own home 397 99.5 347 98.9 
0.43 Someone else’s 
home/another health 
facility 
2 0.5 4 1.1 
Did doctors, nurses or other 
hospital staff enquire from the 
patient if any help was 
required by him/her at the time 
of discharge?  
Yes 396 99.2 338 96.3 
<0.01 
No 3 0.8 13 3.7 
Upon discharge, was the 
present health status of the 
patient recorded/noted?  
Improved completely/ 
partially 
383 96.0 333 94.9 
0.46 
No improvement/ 
passed away 
16 4.0 18 5.1 
Was there a suggestion for any 
follow-up?  
Yes 394 98.7 327 93.2 
<0.01 
No 5 1.3 24 6.8 
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Table 7.52: Experiences at the time of discharge interviews (private vs public hospitals) 
    
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
Private Public 
P value 
Private Public 
P value 
Private Public 
P value N 
203 
% 
N 
196 
% 
N 
194 
% 
N 
157 
% 
N 
397 
% 
N 
353 
% 
Was the patient advised 
where to go after leaving 
the hospital? 
Own home 203 100 194 99.0 
0.24 
194 100.0 153 97.5 
0.04 
397 100 347 98.3 
0.01 
Someone else’s home/ 
another health facility 
0 0.0 2 1.0 0 0.0 4 2.5 0 0.0 6 1.7 
Did doctors, nurses or other 
hospital staff enquire from 
the patient if any help was 
required by him/her at the 
time of discharge? 
Yes 
202 99.5 194 99.0 
0.62 
192 99.0 146 93.0 
<0.01 
394 99.2 340 96.3 
<0.01 
No  
1 0.5 2 1.0 2 1.0 11 7.0 3 0.8 13 3.7 
Upon discharge whether the 
present health status of 
patient was recorded/noted? 
Improved completely/ 
partially 
193 95.1 190 96.9 
0.34 
189 97.4 144 91.7 
0.02 
382 96.2 334 94.6 
0.29 No 
improvement/passed 
away 
10 4.9 6 3.1 5 2.6 13 8.3 15 3.8 19 5.4 
Was there a suggestion for 
any follow-up? 
Yes 201 99.0 193 98.5 
0.68 
185 95.4 142 90.4 
0.09 
386 97.2 335 94.9 
0.13 
No  2 1.0 3 1.5 9 4.6 15 9.6 11 2.8 18 5.1 
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Table 7.53: Experiences at the time of discharge interviews (RSBY vs non-RSBY patients) 
    
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
RSBY Non-RSBY 
P value 
RSBY Non-RSBY 
P value 
RSBY Non-RSBY 
P value N 
(196) 
% 
N 
(203) 
% 
N 
(190) 
% 
N 
(161) 
% 
N 
(386) 
% 
N 
(364) 
% 
Was the patient 
advised where to go 
after leaving the 
hospital? 
Own home 196 100 201 99.0 
0.50 
189 99.5 158 98.1 
0.34 
385 99.7 359 98.6 
0.11 Someone else’s 
home/ another health 
facility 
0 0.0 2 1.0 1 0.5 3 1.9 1 0.3 5 1.4 
Did doctors, nurses 
or other hospital staff 
enquire from the 
patient if any help 
was required by 
him/her at the time of 
discharge? 
Yes 
194 99.0 202 99.5 
0.61 
186 97.9 152 94.4 
0.10 
380 98.4 354 97.3 
0.32 
No  
2 1.0 1 0.5 4 2.1 9 5.6 6 1.6 10 2.7 
Upon discharge 
whether the present 
health status of 
patient was 
recorded/noted? 
Improved 
completely/ partially 
186 94.9 197 97.0 
0.28 
180 94.7 153 95.0 
0.90 
366 94.8 350 96.2 
0.38 
No improvement/ 
passed away 
10 5.1 6 3.0 10 5.3 8 5.0 20 5.2 14 3.8 
Was there a 
suggestion for any 
follow-up? 
Yes 193 98.5 201 99.0 
0.68 
183 96.3 144 89.4 
0.02 
376 97.4 345 94.8 
0.09 
No  
3 1.5 2 1.0 7 3.7 17 10.6 10 2.6 19 5.2 
285 
 
7.6.7 Overall rating of the hospitals 
Study participants across various groups were asked for overall rating of the hospital 
with a score ranging between 0 and 10, 0 being the lowest (poorest) and 10 being the 
highest (best) score.  
Intra-district comparison of private and public hospitals showed a better rating for 
public hospitals in Patiala whereas in Yamunanagar private hospitals were rated better 
(Table 7.54). Overall (public and private together), RSBY participants gave a lower 
rating when compared to non-RSBY participants. Almost all the participants across 
all the groups reported that they would recommend the hospital to others in future 
(Tables 7.55, 7.56 and 7.57).  
Table 7.54: Overall rating of the hospitals 
  
  N Mean SD P value 
Patiala 399 7.9 1.36 
<0.01 
Yamunanagar 351 5.5 1.53 
Patiala 
Private 203 7.7 1.42 
<0.01 
Public 196 8.1 1.27 
Yamunanagar 
Private 194 6.1 1.40 
<0.01 
Public 157 4.8 1.36 
Both districts 
Private 397 6.9 1.60 
0.05 
Public 353 6.7 2.11 
Patiala 
RSBY 196 7.8 1.50 
0.10 
Non-RSBY 203 8.0 1.22 
Yamunanagar 
RSBY 190 5.2 1.32 
<0.01 
Non-RSBY 165 5.9 1.66 
Both districts 
RSBY 386 6.5 1.91 
<0.01 
Non-RSBY 364 7.1 1.76 
 
Table 7.55: Recommend hospital to friends and family (Patiala vs 
Yamunanagar) 
  Patiala Yamunanagar P value 
N(399) % N(351) % 
No  5 1.3 7 2.0 0.42 
Yes 394 98.7 344 98.0 
 
286 
 
Table 7.56: Recommend hospital to friends and family (private vs public hospitals) 
  
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
Private Public 
P value 
Private Public 
P value 
Private Public 
P value N 
(203) 
% 
N 
(196) 
% 
N 
(194) 
% 
N 
(157) 
% 
N 
(397) 
% 
N 
(353) 
% 
No  3 1.5 2 1.0 
0.99 
2 1.0 5 3.2 
0.25 
5 1.3 7 2.0 
0.56 
Yes 200 98.5 194 99.0 192 99.0 152 96.8 392 98.7 346 98.0 
 
 
Table 7.57: Recommend hospital to friends and family (RSBY vs non-RSBY patients) 
  
Patiala – intra-district Yamunanagar – intra-district Both districts 
RSBY Non-RSBY 
P value 
RSBY Non-RSBY 
P value 
RSBY Non-RSBY 
P value N 
(196) 
% 
N 
(203) 
% 
N 
(190) 
% 
N 
(161) 
% 
N 
(386) 
% 
N 
(364) 
% 
No 2 1.0 3 1.5 
0.99 
1 0.5 6 3.7 
0.05 
3 0.8 9 2.5 
0.08 
Yes 194 99.0 200 98.5 189 99.5 155 96.3 383 99.2 355 97.5 
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7.6.8 Aggregated analysis of user satisfaction  
Aggregated analysis was done by converting the ordinal responses of the questions in 
the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) 
section of exit interviews to scores. The categories covered were—experience during 
admission, care from nurses, care from doctors, hospital environment, experience 
during stay, experience during discharge and overall rating of the hospital. Details of 
the scoring pattern have been elaborated under the data analysis plan in Chapter 4. 
The higher the score, the better was the hospital. Scores obtained under different 
heads were compared between private and public hospitals, RSBY and non-RSBY 
participants and between districts. Mean score was reported for each category. 
Student’s t-Test was applied to assess statistical differences across the groups. 
User satisfaction was better in private hospitals when compared to public hospitals. A 
higher score for private hospitals was observed in all aspects of quality of care. 
Further, the difference between the scores of private and public hospitals was also 
statistically significant for all categories of care except for experience during 
discharge and overall rating. Comparing RSBY and non-RSBY participants, the care 
to RSBY participants was judged to be slightly better compared to non-RSBY 
participants.  A better score was obtained for RSBY participants in all aspects, except 
for overall rating (Table 7.58).  
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Table 7.58: Aggregated analysis of user satisfaction  
  
  
Private (392) 
Public 
(364) P value 
RSBY 
(392) 
Non-RSBY (364) 
P value 
Patiala (399) 
Yamunanagar 
(357) P value 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
During admission 4.23 0.75 4.06 0.81 <0.01 4.18 0.76 4.11 0.82 0.20 4.08 0.85 4.22 0.70 0.02 
Care from nurses 3.76 0.94 3.46 1.07 <0.01 3.67 1.00 3.56 1.03 0.13 3.54 0.90 3.71 1.13 0.02 
Care from doctors 3.84 0.98 3.50 1.17 <0.01 3.75 1.08 3.59 1.09 0.04 3.49 0.90 3.88 1.25 <0.01 
Hospital environment 3.96 0.96 3.28 1.11 <0.01 3.73 1.06 3.52 1.10 0.01 3.30 0.98 4.00 1.08 <0.01 
Experience during stay 3.26 0.83 2.83 0.93 <0.01 3.13 0.94 2.97 0.86 0.02 3.22 0.79 2.87 0.99 <0.01 
Experience during discharge 4.76 0.38 4.72 0.57 0.17 4.78 0.41 4.70 0.55 0.03 4.84 0.39 4.63 0.54 <0.01 
Overall rating of the hospital 4.12 0.56 4.01 0.79 0.29 4.03 0.61 4.11 0.75 0.11 4.40 0.51 3.69 0.66 <0.01 
Total 27.9 3.52 25.7 4.38 <0.01 27.2 3.90 26.6 4.26 0.02 26.9 3.61 26.9 4.59 0.81 
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7.7 Financial burden 
This section brings together information on OOP expenditures collected during the 
exit interviews. The information on expenditures consists of any expenditure in the 
facility and also expenditure made elsewhere for the present illness.  
Not much difference was observed in terms of OOP expenditure between the districts. 
Expenditure in private hospitals was almost double that in public hospitals, both 
within the district and across the districts. It was expected that OOP expenditures of 
RSBY participants would be significantly less than non-RSBY participants. This was 
indeed the case in Patiala; and overall, however, in Yamunanagar the difference was 
less pronounced (Table 7.59).  
Table 7.59: Total out-of-pocket expenditure (mean) by participants 
   N Mean SD P value 
Patiala 397 7559.9 14626.9 
0.23 
Yamunanagar 349 8747.5 12642.5 
Patiala 
Private 201 9909.4 16209.6 
<0.01 
Public 196 5150.5 12388.1 
Yamunanagar 
Private 192 11927.1 15810.6 
<0.01 
Public 157 4859.0 4778.2 
Both districts 
Private 393 10895.1 16027.3 
<0.01 
Public 353 5020.9 9754.8 
Patiala 
RSBY 196 3760.1 11280.5 
<0.01 
Non-RSBY 201 11265.2 16480.3 
Yamunanagar 
RSBY 191 7788.2 5788.3 
0.12 
Non-RSBY 158 9907.0 17642.6 
Both districts 
RSBY 387 5748.1 9211.0 
<0.01 
Non-RSBY 359 10667.5 16990.9 
 
7.7.1 Determinants of out-of-pocket expenditure 
Along with the test for quality of care for those enrolled in RSBY, it is important to 
question the extent to which insurance serves to reduce the financial burden of care. 
Due to time and cost constraints, a large survey was not conducted to study the 
determinants of OOP expenditure. However, some conclusions can be derived from 
Table 7.60. As the survey was not done at the household level, any selection 
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equations would be difficult to construct without detailed household information. The 
suggestive results show the following: 
Households spent more on the aged and females, although neither of these factors was 
significant. It is likely that BPL status is correlated with RSBY status; thus this 
variable was taken out in Equation 2. Enrolment in RSBY helped reduce expenditure; 
since the variable is dichotomous the coefficient was large. For the sample of only 
BPL patients, the contribution RSBY makes towards reducing OOP expenditure falls 
while still being significant. RSBY was not statistically significant in reducing the 
expenditure in Yamunanagar, while it was so in Patiala. Even when considering only 
RSBY participants (who were insured), and restricting the sample to only BPL cases, 
availing care from public sector facilities resulted in significant reduction in OOP 
expenditure, except in the case of BPL participants from Patiala district. The result for 
Patiala when including only BPL patients may be due to a smaller sample, as the 
adjusted R-square falls dramatically from the overall sample. Although the adjusted 
R-Square is small, much of it is due to running an ordinary least square against 
dichotomous variables.   
The main conclusion drawn is that the use of public sector contributes to reduction in 
OOP expenditure, while enrolling in RSBY has some limitations in reducing OOP 
expenditure. The data shows that the non-RSBY BPL participants use the public 
sector twice as much as the private sector, while the RSBY BPL participants seem to 
use public and private sector at the same rate. For the general sample, the odds ratio of 
1.23 for RSBY use of private sector is significant at p <0.05; the odds ratio is 
statistically significant and higher for Yamunanagar (1.53). For Patiala, the odds ratio 
for use of private sector for those in RSBY is 1.05 and is not significant.  
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Table 7.60: Determinants of OOP expenditure 
 All 
Total exp 
(Eq. 1) 
 
BPL not included 
All Total exp 
(Eq. 2) 
Only BPL 
Total exp 
(Eq. 3) 
All/Patiala 
Total exp 
(Eq. 4) 
Only BPL 
Patiala 
Total exp 
(Eq. 5) 
All 
Yamunanagar 
Total exp 
(Eq. 6) 
Only BPL 
Yamunanagar 
Total exp 
(Eq. 7) 
Gender (Male) -870.4 -881.3 -1239.9 415.2 408.1 -1840.7 -1973.8 
 (-0.87) (-0.88) (-1.02) (0.28) (0.21) (-1.38) (-1.25) 
 
Facility (Public) -5599.7*** -5699.4*** -5101.4*** -4889.4*** -1551.1 -6599.5*** -7279.9*** 
 (-5.58) (-5.81) (-4.25) (-3.48) (-0.85) (-4.94) (-4.60) 
 
Age 47.86 47.44 15.42 114.8** 73.77 -14.38 -18.16 
 (1.75) (1.74) (0.46) (2.88) (1.42) (-0.40) (-0.42) 
 
District (Patiala) -1482.0 -1299.2 -3190.8**     
 (-1.40) (-1.32) (-2.61)     
 
RSBY (Yes) -4704.1*** -4988.2*** -2906.1* -8303.1*** -4446.7* -1655.8 -2493.4 
 (-4.07) (-5.04) (-2.16) (-5.79) (-1.94) (-1.24) (-1.50) 
 
BPL (Yes) -606.9       
 (-0.48)       
 
_cons 12810.4*** 12554.6*** 12860.3*** 9179.0*** 5723.0 14081.7*** 15492.0*** 
 (8.25) (8.62) (6.75) (4.64) (1.84) (7.63) (6.47) 
 
N 741 741 459 392 184 349 275 
Adj. R-squared  0.0736 0.0746 0.0515 0.1036 0.0091 0.756 0.0757 
t statistics in parentheses       
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"  RSBY= 387             RSBY (Patiala) = 184            RSBY (Y. Nagar) = 275 
Not RSBY = 359     Non-RSBY (Patiala) = 208   Non-RSBY (Yamunanagar) = 184 
Exp: Expenditure;     Eq: Equation       
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7.8 Discussion 
7.8.1 Methodological issues 
Due to logistical constraints of the study, a purposive sampling was used to select the 
RSBY empanelled hospitals in both the districts. The result of the study should hence 
be cautiously interpreted and generalized. Regarding the exit interview dataset, the 
number of exit interviews conducted was slightly less than what was planned during 
the protocol development stage. This happened because the number of non-RSBY 
patients visiting the selected empanelled hospitals in Yamunanagar was fewer than 
what had been assumed at the protocol development stage. Another issue with the 
methodology of the present chapter is that the tool used for assessing the care given in 
hospitals was a modified version of HCAHPS. Since the tool was developed in USA 
and was not validated for Indian settings, it was modified to suit the local 
environment, though the modified version was not validated in the local setting.  
As RSBY and non-RSBY participants belong to different strata of society, perception 
of the quality of care by them may differ and this could be another limitation of the 
study.  Murray and Chen reported that poor people tend to express greater satisfaction 
with health care when they get it and also that poor people say they are sick less often 
(Murray and Lincoln, 1992, Sen, 2002). Based on this, we can assume that RSBY 
beneficiaries might have given a better report for user satisfaction when compared to 
non-RSBY participants for the same type of facility.     
7.8.2 Summary of findings 
This chapter dealt with the third objective of the study, which relates to the evaluation 
of the delivery of services across both public and private empanelled facilities for 
RSBY and non-RSBY beneficiaries.  
Socio-demographic profile 
The socio-demographic profile of the study participants (exit interviews) suggests that 
it was likely that more young patients were going to private hospitals and old ones to 
public hospitals; and more women were utilizing private facilities. In terms of social 
class, general and OBC population were mainly using private hospitals, while a 
majority of the SCs and STs were utilizing the public sector. More of Muslims and 
illiterate (or literate up to primary level) were using public hospitals. The mean age of 
the RSBY participants was higher when compared to non-RSBY participants. 
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Structural aspects 
From the Health Provider Checklist Assessment (self-assessment), private hospitals 
self-reported a better score than public hospitals under all categories of structural-
aspect evaluation in both districts. From the Observation and Facility Record 
Checklist, private hospitals scored better than public hospitals in all aspects. In terms 
of availability of records, private hospitals were almost similar to public hospitals, 
except for six categories (out of ten categories) where private hospitals were slightly 
better than public hospitals. Overall, structural evaluation was found to be better for 
private, however, it should be cautiously interpreted as none of these differences were 
statistically significant. 
Service delivery 
Patiala vs Yamunanagar: In terms of presence of separate RSBY help desk, there were 
two hospitals (both in Patiala) which were having separate RSBY help desk. Waiting 
period was less in Yamunanagar when compared to Patiala. Not much difference was 
observed across both the districts in terms of process of registration. With regard to 
information provided to the participants from the RSBY help desk, Patiala was 
significantly better than Yamunanagar. Also, Patiala fared better than Yamunanagar 
in terms of diagnostics and medicines from outside since a lesser number of 
participants from Patiala were asked to get diagnostic and medicines from outside. 
Yamunanagar was better with regard to providing food to the RSBY beneficiaries, as 
there were two hospitals in Yamunanagar which were providing food as compared to 
one hospital in Patiala. Patiala district was again significantly better in terms of 
informing patients regarding the balance amount in the card. Half of the participants 
were receiving the transportation cost in Patiala as compared to none in 
Yamunanagar. In terms of post hospitalization knowledge, Patiala was better in 
providing information regarding 5 day post hospitalization services, however, 
Yamunanagar was better in terms of providing medicines from hospital. Conclusively, 
it can be interpreted that a mixed response was observed for various service delivery 
categories studied, however, overall Patiala was found to be better in most of these 
categories. 
Private vs Public: In terms of presence of a separate RSBY help desk, only one 
private and one public hospital (both in Patiala) had a separate RSBY help desk. In 
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both the hospitals (public and private), staffs were helpful and polite to almost all the 
participants. Participants had to wait less in private hospitals for being attended by the 
hospital staff. Private hospitals fared better with regard to the process of registration 
as a fingerprint scanner was used in 97% of participants in comparison to 74% in 
Public hospitals. With regard to information dissemination from RSBY help desk, a 
mixed response was observed with public hospitals fairing better in terms of 
providing information regarding treatment cost and amount left in the card, whereas 
private hospitals were better in terms of providing information regarding insufficient 
amount in the smart card. More of private hospitals were asking for diagnostics and 
medicines from outside the hospital when compared to public hospitals. Two of the 
private hospitals were providing food as compared to one public hospital. Almost 
similar observations were noted for public and private hospitals with regard to the 
process followed during discharge, however, in terms of discharge slip, public 
hospitals were slightly better. More participants from public hospitals were 
reimbursed with transportation cost when compared to private hospitals. In terms of 
post hospitalization knowledge and expenses, public hospitals were slightly better for 
medicines provided by the hospital. Conclusively, a mixed observation was noted 
between public and private hospitals in terms of service delivery with public hospitals 
being better in some aspects and private hospitals being better in others.     
Comparison of choice of hospital, transport and diagnosis 
Patiala vs Yamunanagar: In Patiala, hospitals were primarily chosen by the 
participants because of proximity whereas in Yamunanagar they were chosen on 
relatives and friends advice. In Patiala, majority of the participants had not contacted 
any health facility before coming to the present one; whereas in Yamunanagar, a high 
percentage of the participants had first contacted a health facility, many of which were 
individual private practitioners. Both in Patiala and Yamunanagar, the most common 
mode of transport was three wheelers.  
Private vs Public: Private hospitals were chosen primarily because of the reputation of 
the hospital whereas public hospitals were chosen because of proximity. About one 
third participants from private hospitals and half of the participants from public 
hospitals did not contact any health facility before coming to the current facility. For 
mode of transportation, a bus was used more commonly by the participants of public 
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hospitals when compared to private hospitals, both within the district and across the 
district. Almost similar pattern of diagnosis was observed in private and public 
hospitals, except for slightly more cases of orthopaedics in public hospitals and 
slightly more cases of urology in private hospitals. 
RSBY vs non-RSBY: The most common reason for selecting a hospital for RSBY 
participants was relative/friend suggestions followed by preferred hospital (always go 
to the same hospital) and reputation. Whereas non-RSBY participants selected the 
hospital based on reputation followed by relative/friend suggestion and proximity. 
About one third RSBY participants and half of non-RSBY participants did not contact 
any health facility before coming to the current facility. Bus and three wheelers were 
used more by the RSBY participants while car was used more by non-RSBY 
participants. The diagnosis pattern of RSBY and non-RSBY participants was almost 
the same, except for slightly more cases of orthopaedics in non-RSBY and general 
surgery in RSBY. 
User satisfaction 
Patiala vs Yamunanagar: Out of the five aspects used to assess experiences during the 
hospital admission (availability of bed, availability of wheel chair, hospital staff 
pushing wheel chair, time taken by nursing staff and doctor), Yamunanagar was better 
in terms of taking less time to attend to the patient whereas Patiala was better in terms 
of wheel chair being pushed by hospital staff. In the remaining aspect of experiences 
during admission, Patiala and Yamunanagar were almost similar. Patiala was found to 
be better in almost all the aspects of care from nurses and doctors. Yamunanagar fared 
better in terms of hospital environment. With regard to experiences during hospital 
stay, almost similar experiences were reported by participants from Patiala and 
Yamunanagar, except for one aspect (explaining medicine and its side effects) which 
was significantly better in Patiala. Overall, the discharge experiences were found to be 
better in all groups. In Patiala district, experience at the time of discharge was slightly 
better than Yamunanagar district. Overall ratings provided to the hospitals were better 
in Patiala when compared to Yamunanagar.   
Private vs Public: Out of the five aspects used to assess experiences during the 
hospital admission (availability of bed, availability of wheel chair, hospital staff 
pushing wheel chair, time taken by nursing staff and doctor), private hospitals were 
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found to be significantly better in terms of time taken by doctors and nurses to attend 
to the patient, including wheel chair being pushed by hospital staff. Whereas, for the 
remaining two aspects, private and public hospitals were almost similar. Private 
hospitals provided better nursing care than public hospitals. Doctors from private 
hospitals showed significantly better care in terms of courtesy and respect, listening 
carefully to patients, and explaining things carefully when compared to doctors of 
public hospitals. The hospital environment was significantly better in private hospitals 
in comparison to public hospitals. Participants from private hospitals in Patiala district 
reported better experience during stay when compared to public hospitals. While 
making an intra-district and inter-district comparison of private and public hospitals 
with regard to experience at the time of discharge, private hospitals were slightly 
better than public hospitals. Intra-district comparison of private and public hospitals 
showed a better rating for public hospitals in Patiala whereas in Yamunanagar private 
hospitals were rated better. Overall, almost similar ratings were given to public and 
private hospitals.  
RSBY vs Non-RSBY participants: In Patiala district, doctors were quicker to attend to the 
RSBY patients in comparison with non-RSBY patients, whereas in Yamunanagar district, 
doctors were taking longer to attend to the RSBY patients. However, overall, RSBY patients 
were attended slightly earlier than non-RSBY. The rest of the aspects of experiences during 
hospital admission was almost similar for RSBY and non-RSBY participants. Nursing care 
was better for RSBY participants in Patiala district with regard to courtesy shown to 
patients and for listening more carefully to the patients. In Yamunanagar district, not 
much difference was seen except with regard to getting help as soon as it was 
required, where non-RSBY participants fared better in comparison with RSBY 
patients. Overall, slightly better nursing care was given to RSBY participants in 
comparison with non-RSBY participants. In both the districts and across the districts, 
doctors’ care was reported to be slightly better for RSBY participants in comparison 
to non-RSBY participants. Hospital environment was perceived slightly better by 
RSBY participants when compared to non-RSBY participants. Not much difference 
was observed in terms of experiences during hospital stay between RSBY and non-
RSBY participants. RSBY participants reported a slightly better experience at the 
time of discharge when compared to non-RSBY participants. RSBY participants gave 
a lower rating to the hospitals when compared to non-RSBY participants. 
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Financial Burden 
Expenditure in private hospitals was almost double the expenditure in public 
hospitals. Not much difference was observed in OOP expenditure of RSBY 
beneficiaries and non-RSBY beneficiaries in Yamunanagar, whereas in Patiala district 
OOP expenditure of a RSBY beneficiary was significantly less when compared to a 
non-RSBY beneficiary. In terms of determinants of OOP, use of public sector 
contributes to reduction in OOP expenditure, while enrolling in RSBY has some 
limitations in reducing OOP expenditure. 
7.8.3 Discussion of findings 
Characteristics of the study participants 
Children and the geriatric population, the two extremes of age, are expected to be 
more vulnerable to diseases and hence more likely to be admitted to hospital as 
compared to the adult population. Therefore, the elderly and children were expected 
to comprise a majority of study participants in the exit interviews, but it was observed 
that most of the study participants belonged to the adult age group. It is to be kept in 
mind that as per census 2011 report (Registrar General of India, 2013), under 15 and 
elderly, together comprise 38% of the total population. However, the referenced 
population (under 15 and elderly) in the exit interviews was only 20%. If we assume 
equal risk for all age groups and equal utilization by all age groups, the proportion of 
under 15 and elderly should be around 38%. However, in the study, it was almost half 
of this. Also to be noted is that the enrolment of the elderly population under the 
scheme is comparable to the productive population. This suggests that the scheme  
could be primarily used by the productive age groups who are considered to be 
important members of the family as they are the bread winners.  Further, when this 
pattern of scheme utilization by under 15 and elderly was compared to non-RSBY 
group, no difference was observed. This could lead to the view that this usage pattern 
reflects societal factors regarding geriatric population. Regarding paedatric and 
maternal care and maternal care, it is possible that schemes under NRHM may have 
affected the enrolment of children in RSBY. Under NRHM, there are specific 
schemes for children and pregnant mothers (Janani Suraksha Yojana and Janani 
Shishu Suraksha Karyakaram) that provide free care to them and do not have any 
upper cap.     
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 People of the working age group are more likely to go to private hospitals as 
compared to those of older age groups, who were more likely to go to public 
hospitals. The working age group, being the earning members in the family, have 
greater command of family resources and are more aware that RSBY provides access 
to private care at near-free costs. This preference for RSBY scheme shows that care 
provided by this scheme is perceived to be better (as shown in the survey). RSBY 
scheme enables them to use private services that they could not have afforded without 
the scheme. People generally avail services that are better unless there are certain 
perceived barriers. Access and transportation are the major determining factors in 
selecting the type of facility and this is more so for the elderly because they are likely 
to have more limited transportation facilities available to them in comparison with the 
young.     
Amongst the study participants, more females were using the scheme in comparison 
to males. A few justifications can be assumed. It is clear that the scheme has enabled 
women, who are likely to be excluded from receiving care when care is costly (see 
Table 7.3), to utilize health-care services. The assumption is that the higher number of 
females may be utilizing care because of two reasons. First, women do not have 
access to health-care services in the initial phases of the disease (probably because it 
is not affordable to them within the weak public health system where insurance 
generally does not cover outpatient and primary care services) and therefore more 
women reach advanced stages of the disease which leads to higher utilization of 
RSBY scheme by women as it covers inpatient services. Therefore, women are 
getting access to health-care services when the disease has spread and requires 
inpatient treatment. Using South African data, Irving and Kingdon reported a 
significant pro-female bias among prime age persons (ages 16–40), i.e. their health 
expenditure was high but they received care later (Irving and Kingdon, 2008).  A 
second probable reason for high usage of the scheme by women could be the fact that 
most of the selected empanelled health facilities had gynaecology services. In terms 
of social class, among the majority groups, a significant number of the general and 
OBC participants were utilizing the private hospitals, while a majority of the SC and 
ST participants were availing services from public sector facilities.  
Such a pattern of scheme utilization where the objective of the scheme is empowering 
the poor to access private facilities, but still Muslims, SC/ST and illiterate or literate 
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up to primary level are using more of public hospitals than private hospitals may point 
towards social inequity under the scheme (indeed if private hospitals are considered to 
be better than public hospital).  
Process of service delivery 
Information to participants regarding cost of treatment and facilities available under 
the scheme was poor in both the districts and it was poorer in Yamunanagar district. 
In the present study, it appears that the implementers have simply failed to comply 
with the contract clause that specifically requires such information to be provided to 
the participants at the time of admission.  
In the present study, very few hospitals provided food to the RSBY participants and 
only a few study participants received transportation reimbursement. As perceived by 
the participants, the main reason was that the hospitals did not have the facilities to 
prepare food. At the time of empanelment, information regarding availability of such 
services was not ascertained, as this was not part of the selection criteria for 
empanelling hospitals. Moreover, accounting procedures do not require reporting of 
provision for food or transport although these costs are included in the capitation costs 
for treatment. Monitoring of the quality of food and reimbursement of costs incurred 
would require a strong monitoring and supervision mechanism. Non-existence of such 
a mechanism has been questioned in the present study.  
Facilities were selected by the participants on the basis of access and not on the basis 
of the type of care provided. Access played an important role that superseded the kind 
of care given to the beneficiaries, as the beneficiaries had limited availability of 
transportation. Proximity to the facility is an important consideration for the 
beneficiaries due to the opportunity cost of being away from work, since most of the 
beneficiaries are daily wage earners for whom a visit to the hospital may result a loss 
of daily wages. 
While making inter district comparison, Patiala was found to be doing better than 
Yamunanagar with regard to most of the aspects of service delivery. This may be 
more likely due to the difference in organizational structure of RSBY scheme in both 
the districts. SNA in Punjab is led by PHSC, whereas SNA of Haryana is led by 
ESIC. Moreover in Haryana, the scheme is implemented through hired consultants of 
the RSBY society. Since, it is the department of health in Punjab which is 
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implementing the scheme; it enables them to better manage the scheme when 
compared to Yamunanagar where management is basically contracted out to the 
Department of Labour and Employment. During Private and Public comparison, it 
was observed that public and private hospitals did not differ much in terms of service 
delivery which is a contradiction to the general perception of private being better.  
User satisfaction 
Participants from Patiala, private hospitals and RSBY reported a better user 
satisfaction. Probably, as the assessment of quality of hospital care was self-reported, 
RSBY beneficiaries who are generally deprived of care are grateful for whatever 
facilities are provided to them. This segment of the population is unaware of the 
dynamics of insurance schemes. Therefore, in terms of user satisfaction, a perception 
bias may exist for RSBY participants. This is reflected in the present study as the 
RSBY beneficiaries reported greater satisfaction for aspects that would have been the 
same as for non-RSBY participants (e.g. cleanliness, as all the patients would have 
access to the same areas in the hospitals). 
Financial protection 
Despite having enrolled into a cashless insurance scheme, RSBY beneficiaries 
incurred OOP expenditure. This was pronounced in Yamunanagar but not so in 
Patiala. The evidence of increased OOP is consistent with findings from other 
countries with regard to health insurance schemes for the poor (Acharya et al., 2012). 
The RSBY insurance scheme, an example of a PPP, was designed to take advantage 
of provider pluralisms; but it is important that the private sector does not induce 
higher costs in comparison with the public sector.  
 
7.9   Conclusions 
Socio-demographic characteristics of the participants indicate that there could be 
certain aspects of inequity in the scheme with the Muslim population, illiterates and 
SC/STs using more of public hospitals when compared to private hospitals. Private 
hospitals were better in terms of structural aspects; however the results were 
statistically non-significant. In terms of service delivery, Patiala was found to be 
slightly better when compared to Yamunanagar. Public and private hospital 
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comparison showed that both the hospitals were almost similar in terms of service 
delivery. For user satisfaction, participants from Patiala, and private hospitals were 
more satisfied in terms of services offered. User satisfaction was also reported to be 
slightly better for RSBY participants when compared to non-RSBY participants. 
Finally, it was observed that in spite of the scheme being a cashless scheme, RSBY 
beneficiaries incurred OOP expenditure, though this expenditure was less than non-
RSBY participants. Moreover, OOP expenditure was relatively high in private 
hospitals when compared to public hospitals.  
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Chapter 8 
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS  
This study focused on studying the availability, provision and use of health services in 
the implementation of RSBY and the factors that might influence it, in order to inform 
policy for improvement in scheme design. Specifically, the research focused on 
analysing the external environment (regulatory and political), institutional capacity 
and contract design of the scheme to understand its strengths and weaknesses and the 
incentive structures created by division of roles, responsibilities and relationships 
within the contracts. In addition, the research evaluated the availability and 
accessibility of services and analysed the utilization patterns. Lastly, the research 
compared the provision of health care across both public and private providers for 
RSBY beneficiaries and between RSBY and non-RSBY beneficiaries for a specific 
type of provider.The findings of the study from key stakeholder’s interviews, exit 
interviews, checklists and secondary data analysis are presented in this chapter. These 
findings are presented in accordance with the three objectives of the study.  
 
8.1 Objective 1 
To analyse the external environment (political, regulatory), institutional framework 
and contract design of the RSBY scheme, in order to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of the RSBY scheme design and incentive structures created by roles, 
responsibilities and relationships within the contracts. 
8.1.1 External environment  
Political scenario: The findings of the study indicate that the launch of RSBY scheme 
was politically driven, introduced by the then ruling party in a rush for quick political 
gains before the General Elections in India in 2009. Consequently, the scheme was 
poorly planned and may have lacked the careful attention to detail needed to sustain 
the programme and make it highly successful. The design of RSBY also requires 
political commitment at the state level, since the state government has a key role as a 
facilitator in the implementation of the scheme with a variety of players from the 
public and private sectors.   
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A comprehensive evaluation of existing schemes scattered across the states was not 
carried out. Lessons from a similar scheme, the failed UHIS, do not seem to have 
been incorporated. Some similar schemes implemented in various other countries 
such as Vietnam, Thailand and Philippines were reviewed; however, the lessons of 
these reviews do not seem to have served as guides in defining this scheme.  
In the chosen States of Punjab and Haryana that this thesis examines, for the period 
from the latter part of 2011 to the beginning of 2013, Haryana had a Congress-led 
government while the ruling party in Punjab was the Akali Dal which frequently sees 
itself as a party strongly in opposition to the Congress. It was observed in the present 
study that having the same or different ruling parties at the Central and State level did 
not affect the implementation of the scheme. 
Though changes have been introduced over time to make RSBY more functional, 
gaps still exist which need to be addressed. Interviews with key stakeholders indicate 
lapses in contract design, conflict of interest, lack of monitoring and supervision and 
accountability. 
Regulatory framework: The regulatory framework is very weak, particularly for 
private health facilities. There is minimal regulation of private practitioners, nursing 
homes and hospitals. Even that minimal regulation, as seen in Chapter 5, is not 
followed. Despite a substantial presence of private institutional providers in the 
country, information regarding their number, structure, functioning, type and quality 
of care remains grossly inadequate. Neither a listing of private health facilities nor a 
record of services being provided by them is available. On the other hand, the public 
health sector, being subject to public audit, is obliged to comply with some minimum 
requirements. For regulation of the insurance companies and the TPAs, IRDA was the 
regulating body. Guidelines for insurance companies and TPAs were mandatory, 
without which they would not get the license to provide health insurance in the 
country. A License was also necessary for an insurance company to participate in the 
bidding process of the scheme.  
8.1.2. Institutional Framework   
The study shows that no formal organizational structure supporting RSBY was put in 
place. The existing structure of the Directorate General Labour Welfare was used to 
roll out the scheme with existing government functionaries being assigned additional 
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responsibilities. This again was more a matter of expediency. The MoHFW was 
hesitant to take up the responsibility of implementing yet another health insurance 
scheme after the earlier failure of the UHIS. Thereafter, RSBY was initially located in 
the Ministry of Finance, and then moved to the MoLE, which lacked the experience to 
implement a health scheme of such complexity. 
The agencies responsible for RSBY in the two states under study are supervised by 
different government departments. In Punjab the PSHC has responsibility for the 
scheme, which is supervised by the Department of Health and Family Welfare, while 
in Haryana it is the ESIC, which is supervised by the Department of Labour and 
Employment. The Department of Health will always remain an important stakeholder 
of the scheme, as it primarily deals with health. The scheme becomes challenging in 
states like Haryana, where the implementing authority is other than the Department of 
Health. Very few human resources from the government have been provided for 
RSBY in either of the states; the existing staffs of the relevant departments have been 
assigned additional responsibilities for RSBY.  
8.1.3. Policy and Guidelines 
Designing the scheme, standardizing processes and preparing policy guidelines is the 
responsibility of the Central Government. Though state governments had the 
flexibility to amend these and introduce innovations, this was rarely done, as it needed 
the prior approval of the central government. Since RSBY has been an evolving 
model, some of the policy guidelines have been formulated after its launch in April 
2008. Depending on the feedback from the state level implementers, additional policy 
guidelines or changes to previous guidelines have also been introduced in subsequent 
years. One such example is the enrolment criteria where a household headed by a 
woman was originally not eligible to be included in the scheme. State level 
implementers confirmed that policy guidelines were updated with each subsequent 
insurance cycle.  
8.1.4. Roles and Responsibilities 
At the Central level, the Central Government has various responsibilities such as 
oversight of the scheme, financing the scheme, setting up parameters (benefits 
package, empanelment criteria, BPL criteria), hardware specifications (systems and 
smart card), financing management/training, setting rate schedules for 
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services/reimbursement rates, developing clinical information, developing systems for 
monitoring/evaluation, monitoring state level use, other patient information and 
monitoring national RSBY information and training.  
The state government, along with the Central Government, also looks at the financing 
of the scheme and the setting up of parameters like the benefits package, 
empanelment criteria and BPL criteria. Additionally, the state government has the 
responsibility of setting up the SNA, which has the overall responsibility of 
implementing the scheme. The specific role of SNAs are—contract management with 
the insurer, enrolment, training outreach and marketing to beneficiaries, financial 
planning and management, setting rate schedules for services and reimbursement, 
developing clinical information systems for monitoring/evaluation, monitoring state 
level use and other patient information and training.  Some of these functions are done 
in conjunction with the Central Government (Table 8.1).  
The roles and responsibilities of the insurance companies and TPAs relates to  
accreditation/empanelment of providers, collecting registration fees, enrolment, 
actuarial analysis, claims processing and payment, outreach/marketing to 
beneficiaries, monitoring at provider level and other patient information, customer 
service and training of hospital staff (Table 8.1).  
While enrolling the participants, the insurance company is assisted by the FKOs such 
as ASHAs and ANMs. Other activities of the insurance company include customer 
services and monitoring (Table 8.1). TPAs primarily support the insurance companies 
during the process of enrolment, empanelment and claim settlement.   
It is evident that most of the roles and responsibilities are with the central government 
and the insurance companies; while the state government plays a facilitators role.   
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Table 8.1: Roles and responsibilities of Central and State government, insurance 
companies and TPAs. 
 Central State Insurer/ 
TPA  
Oversight of scheme  X X  
Financing X X  
Setting parameters (benefits package, empanelment criteria, 
etc.)  
X   
Hardware specifications (IT Systems, Smart Card, etc.)  X   
Accreditation/Empanelment of providers     X 
Collecting Registration Fees    X 
Enrollment   X X 
Setting rate schedules for services/reimbursement rates  X   
Claims processing and payment    X 
IEC, Outreach, Marketing to beneficiaries    X 
Monitoring and Evaluation X X X 
Training X X X 
 
The contracts between the state governments and insurance companies do not mention 
the role of the TPAs. However, insurance companies in both states hired TPAs to 
facilitate enrolment and also to help with disputes arising from the management of the 
enrolment process. Notably, the TPAs did not play a role in the processing of claims. 
This could be because ICICI Lombard is a large insurance company with a high 
annual turnover of revenues and adequate human resources and could therefore 
process claims in-house. It was, however, seen in other states where there were public 
insurance companies that the role of the TPAs was significant in claim management 
as well as enrolment. 
Conclusively, RSBY is independent of the usual governance bodies that seek to 
address health and poverty issues. As most of the responsibilities were contracted to 
the insurance companies, SNAs became weak, which led to RSBY being considered 
to be more of a hospital-centric and insurer-centric scheme rather than a beneficiary-
oriented scheme.   
8.1.5 Contract Design analysis 
Formal or informal contracts exist between the six stakeholders namely, Central 
Government and state government; state government and the insurance company; 
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insurance company and public and private providers; insurance company and TPAs. 
Contracts under RSBY were standardized and states used the same contract.  
Although there is room for innovation and additions in the existing framework of 
RSBY in the agreement of the Central Government, the states under study had not 
exercised that flexibility.  
Contract design analysis was done at three levels of implementation: (i) between the 
centre and state; (ii) between the state and insurance company; and (iii) between the 
insurance company and service provider. These were part of the formal contract 
which existed in the scheme. However, an informal contract also existed between the 
insurance company and TPAs.  
The contractual agreement between the Central Government and the states was 
identical for Haryana and Punjab. The contract was not specific regarding which state 
authority would be signing the contract agreement and allowed flexibility to the states 
to assign a state implementing agency. The purpose of the contract was clearly 
outlined - to provide social security to the BPL workers and their families in the 
unorganized sector. The period of contractual agreement is not mentioned in the 
contract document. The contract clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of both 
parties involved, the Central Government and the SNA. Monitoring mechanism and 
monitoring parameters by the central government has not been stated in the contract 
document. Also, there was no mention of the empanelment criterion of the health care 
providers in the contract document. Also there was no mention of the incentive 
structure under the scheme (Table 8.2). 
The contractual agreement between the state government and the insurance company 
for the chosen districts was almost identical. Coincidentally, the insurance company 
for the selected year of study in the chosen districts was ICICI Lombard General 
Insurance Company for both states. The contract between the state government and 
the insurance company was the most comprehensive contract in RSBY with details of 
contract commencement, duration and termination clearly specified, unlike the 
contract of the Central and State Governments where the period of the contractual 
agreement was not specified. This is due to the large share of responsibility that the 
insurance company undertakes in the implementation of the scheme. There are 32 
articles listed in the contract document, supplemented by 16 annexures. The 
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empanellement criterion for the health care providers has been clearly stated in the 
contract document. One major gap in the contract design was – the monitoring 
strategy which was loosely stated in the contract document wherein the monitoring 
mechanism and parameters were not defined. There was no mention of the resources 
required for monitoring and supervision at district level and the incentive structure for 
the insurance companies under the scheme. 
Contract between the insurance company and the health provider: Two contracts were 
analysed (between the insurance company and the health provider), one for Patiala 
district in Punjab state and the other for Yamunanagar district in Haryana state. Roles 
and responsibilities of both the parties and specifications of sanctions were clearly 
defined. However, the monitoring and supervision strategy was missing, also there 
was no mention of the incentive structure for the insurance company and the 
providers in the contract document (Table 8.2).  
The contract agreement between the insurance companies and the TPAs was finalised 
without undergoing any bidding process. The TPAs were selected based on their 
reputation and previous experience with the insurance company. No parameters were 
defined for renewal of contract. 
 
Table 8.2: Contract design analysis 
  Central & 
state 
government 
State & 
insurance 
company 
Insurance 
company  & 
provider 
Ownership √ √ √ 
Objective √ √ √ 
Length of the contract X √ √ 
Payment mechanism √ √ √ 
Roles & Responsibilities √ √ √ 
Empanelment Criterion X √ NA 
Monitoring mechanisms X X X 
Specification of Sanctions X √ √ 
Incentive Structure X X X 
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Contract Implementation 
Human resources: Human resources were not sufficient for implementation of the 
scheme at the state and district levels. At the district level, the nodal officer is the only 
dedicated RSBY staff from the state government for scheme implementation. At 
hospitals, round the clock availability of support staff was necessary for RSBY work, 
which was lacking. Even the insurance companies lacked manpower, with just one 
officer at district level looking after 2-3 districts at a time, in addition to responsibility 
for other schemes. 
Insurance companies and market competition: A total of 27 health insurance 
companies were present in the market, offering health insurance coverage to the 
population. Of these, 21 were from the private sector and six belonged to the public 
sector. Some degree of market competition was present for the insurance companies 
in Patiala district and this competition, in terms of numbers, varied over the years. 
Though there were less public sector health insurance companies present in the 
market, their involvement in the bidding was comparable to the private sector in terms 
of number of bids made. Also, public sector insurance companies were more 
consistent in terms of their participation. 
Financial resources: Premiums were paid by the Central and state governments in the 
ratio of 3:1. The premiums varied from state to state, depending on the insurance 
company. The premium collected by the insurance company from each family was 
INR 30 (£ 0.3). A declining trend of premiums was observed at the national level and 
state level. 
Enrolment: The entire responsibility of enrolment of beneficiaries was outsourced by 
the state government to the insurer.  The contract between the state and insurance 
company is for one year and hence enrolment of the beneficiaries needs to be done 
every year. Yearly enrolment of the beneficiaries requires additional human and 
financial resources. This process is considered flawed by all stakeholders for several 
reasons, the primary one being that BPL listings do not change yearly. Even in 2011, 
the 2001 census list, which was the most recent year of census, was used for 
enrolment since an updated list of BPL families was not available. Secondly, due to 
the time consuming process of re-enrolment, which results in delays, a family is often 
short on enrolment cycles and loose access even though they pay for whole year.  
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Empanelment of health facilities: Empanelment of public and private facilities was 
done by the insurance company in consultation with the state nodal officers. Several 
issues were raised by various stakeholders regarding the process of enrolment. It 
appeared that the insurance firms did not start with a list of hospitals available for 
empanelment; indeed, such a list may not even have been available. Quality of care 
that a potential empanelled hospital was required to provide was not among the 
selection criteria.  
Fixed package rates: Under RSBY, there is a fixed capitation for every treatment in a 
package of care. The rates within the package (package rates) are predetermined by 
the Central Government. The state government has the authority to revise the rate at 
the state level after approval from the Central Government. However, such 
amendments were rarely practised. Private providers, especially from Patiala, were 
not satisfied with the package rates. The private providers felt strongly that package 
rates were not realistic and were set far too low. They also suggested that it was 
unviable to have the same package rates across the entire country and that these 
should be based on the local situation in each state. The programme managers were of 
the view that the process for deciding the package rates was well thought out and that 
the package rates of services provided under the scheme by the health facilities were 
at the appropriate level. On the other hand, service providers, especially private 
providers, were of the view that package rates were meagre and good quality services 
could not be provided at such rates. Package rates may have serious implications for 
the scheme. On one hand this may affect the premium, making it too expensive for the 
government; on the other, it may affect the level of incentive for the providers, which 
can further affect the quality of services.   
Monitoring and supervision: Monitoring and supervision was a weak component 
under the scheme. There were no separate financial or human resources allocated for 
these tasks nor was there any strategic framework for monitoring and supervision, 
specifically in the context of periodicity, accountability, task allocation, and 
performance indicators. The contract between the state government and the insurance 
company did not lay down a reporting schedule or a format. Monitoring and 
supervision was mainly carried out by the insurance companies (where there is likely 
to be a conflict of interest) while there was no strategy to monitor the insurance 
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company. Proper oversight was a glaring gap. At the central level, a technical cell was 
engaged in overall monitoring and supervision including data handling and 
management.  
Training: Training at the Central level was weak and the staff was mainly trained on 
the job. State level workshops were organized to train staff regarding implementation 
of the scheme. District and block level workshops were conducted where staff of all 
hospitals had been trained. The district level workshops involved the business process 
outsourcing, public relations officer, deputy commissioner and sarpanch (village 
headman), all of who confirmed that they had been given training several times. The 
insurance company in Patiala stated that they had trained both private and public 
providers regarding scheme implementation and claim reimbursements.  
Issues with equipment: The providers reported that there were several issues related to 
registration equipment at the health facilities provided by the insurance company. 
Break down were reported and repairs were not immediate.   
Awareness: The beneficiaries were not fully aware of the services available in the 
scheme or at various health facilities. The Beneficiaries did not know how to locate 
the empanelled hospitals. A different kind of absence of information was apparent 
when a provider stated that private providers were not aware of the scheme; that is 
why they were not available for empanelment.  
RSBY was meant to be a cashless scheme so that beneficiaries did not have to make 
any payment if they were admitted to a health facility as an RSBY beneficiary. Even 
the cost incurred before and after the admission (for a certain period) is to be covered 
under the scheme. However, the study shows that OOP expenditures of the 
participants were high. The families of beneficiaries were paying for medicines, 
diagnostics, food and transportation, items that are provisioned in the contract to be 
paid for by the caregiver.   
The scheme is not entirely a paperless scheme, since a parallel system of hard copies 
along with electronic copies exists (Chapter 5). Hard copies are more susceptible to 
changes by health service providers and they also run the risk of being replaced. 
Being paperless can be an advantage, as records once entered and updated in the 
electronic version cannot be altered later, thus preventing service providers from 
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indulging in fraudulent activities. On the other hand, in case of an electronic machine 
breakdown, insurance companies would gain by not getting the equipment repaired, 
which would lead to a drop in claims, since the providers would be unable to admit a 
patient under RSBY in the absence of an electronic check of the patient’s biometrics. 
Paperless schemes, if strictly implemented, can increase transparency. 
 
8.2 Objective 2 
To evaluate the availability of services through mapping the health-care providers 
including the packages offered by the empanelled health-care providers, and 
analysing the utilization patterns. 
8.2.1. Access to services under RSBY 
It is to be kept in mind that beneficiaries of the scheme are BPL families. Generally, 
these families survive on daily wages. Therefore, geographical accessibility of 
services is a priority for beneficiaries, as availing the RSBY services from a far-flung 
location would entail long travel time and affect their daily wages. 
In Patiala, the public empanelled facilities seem to be more equitably distributed 
throughout the district as opposed to private facilities, which seem to be 
geographically clustered around pockets at the sub-district level, mainly around 
Patiala sub-district. Seven private hospitals and 10 public hospitals were empanelled 
in Patiala district.  
A majority of the private facilities are clustered around Patiala sub-district. Non-
empanelled private facilities are clustered in Patiala sub-district and some in other 
sub-districts. However, there are several public non-empanelled facilities that are 
dispersed around the district. The volume of empanelment of facilities seems to be 
aligned to BPL population density. 
In Yamunanagar, very few public facilities were empanelled under RSBY. Almost all 
the empanelled facilities in the district are from the private sector and were clustered 
around the Jagadhri sub-district. 
There are several public non-empanelled facilities that are dispersed around the 
district. The private non-empanelled facilities are again clustered around Jagadhri 
sub-district. The volume of empanelment of facilities seems to be aligned to 
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population density with the highest BPL population. Therefore a majority of the 
empanelled facilities were in Jagadhri area.   
The current process of empanelment has resulted in the majority of hospitals being 
empanelled from urban areas. This is primarily because of a fewer number of 
hospitals in rural areas, and even these rarely meet the eligibility criteria. Health 
facilities providing only primary care were not empanelled under the scheme. The 
rural population therefore had to travel long distances to avail health services.  
Even in urban areas, distributions of the empanelled hospitals in the two districts were 
found to be clustered in one or two sub-districts, thereby aggravating the accessibility 
issue. Moreover, the number of hospitals empanelled under RSBY was very few. Due 
to this gap, accessibility is likely to be a major challenge for the rural population. 
8.2.2. Availability of services 
Empanelled hospitals lacked many required departments. Super-speciality 
departments were negligible in public hospitals. None of the public hospitals in either 
of the districts provided all the packages of the RSBY scheme. A few private 
hospitals in Yamunanagar provided all facilities but none of the private hospitals in 
Patiala provided all facilities. Medically managed diseases (MMD) general (surgical 
and non-surgical), obstetrics and gynaecology, and paediatrics were the departments 
available in most of the empanelled hospitals.  
8.2.3. Enrolment under RSBY Scheme 
In the present study, those enrolled under the RSBY scheme amounted to, 
respectively, 15% and 40% of the total BPL population in Patiala district and in 
Yamunanagar district. Issues such as non-availability of an accurate list of eligible 
candidates and the process of re-enrolment by the insurance companies aggravated the 
situation. The maximum number of individuals that can be enrolled per family under 
the scheme is five. The average number of individuals enrolled per family in the 
present study was slightly more than half of this. This confirms that adequate 
enrolment per family is not being done. Either the insurance company is deliberately 
not enrolling all the family members, or the family is hesitant to enrol all its members. 
It was found during the course of the research (as reflected in Chapter 6) that the 
population enrolled under the scheme mainly belong to the economically productive 
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age group. In Patiala district, the highest enrolment rate was for the age group 25–64 
years (62% of the population of this age group), while the enrolment for the elderly 
age group (>64 years of age) was only 27%. Similar data was not available for 
Yamunanagar.  
Off-targeting was more likely for SC/ST, illiterate or literate up to primary level and 
Yamunanagar, while it was likely for females. Leakage (non-BPL population getting 
enrolled in the RSBY scheme) was more likely in Patiala district. However, it is to be 
noted that for estimation of off-target and leakage, the sampled population from 
health facility was taken (exit interview) which may not be the ideal setting for such 
estimation. In Patiala district, the enrolment rate for the age group 25–64 years, and 
elderly was comparable and hence there were no signs of adverse selection. Also, the 
proportion of children enrolled under the scheme was very low. Similar data was not 
available for Yamunanagar district. Enrolment of females under the scheme was 
almost similar to the enrolment of males across all the age groups, though, it was 
slightly more than males for the age group 25 to 64 years.  
8.2.4 Scheme Utilization  
The major findings of scheme utilization are summarized in Table 8.3. A comparison 
of scheme utilization was made between the districts of study (Patiala and 
Yamunanagar) and between the providers in those districts (private vs public 
hospitals). The number of claims in Yamunanagar was almost six times the number of 
claims in Patiala district. The number of claims per 100 population enrolled was also 
twice in Yamunanagar as compared to Patiala. Higher claims in Yamunanagar may be 
attributed to better accessibility in the district because of higher number of 
empanelled hospitals. Other factors contributing to the low service utilization in 
Patiala could be the relationship between the insurance company and the private 
providers and the satisfaction level of the providers with the package rates. It was 
noted in Chapter 5 that in Patiala district, the relationship between the insurance 
company and the private providers was not healthy. Their resentment stemmed from 
the feeling that the package rates were not sufficient.  
In order to assess the effectiveness of state-level implementation, consistency across 
public and private hospitals was checked. The findings for public and private 
hospitals varied across the parameters studied in the present study. In terms of service 
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delivery, Yamunanagar was more consistent with the presence of a RSBY helpdesk, 
information received from the RSBY helpdesk, provision of food and transportation 
reimbursement. Patiala was more consistent in diagnostics and medicines organized 
from outside the hospital, the process of discharge, OOP expenditures and overall 
rating of the hospital. The high discrepancy observed in the difference of claimed 
amount and reimbursed amount in Patiala (particularly in private hospitals) is a matter 
of concern. It is noteworthy that the numbers of claims in Patiala district were low; 
however, the claimed amounts were high. Such a situation raises the possibility of 
providers trying to compensate losses due to low service utilization with higher claim 
amounts.  
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Table 8.3: Scheme utilization comparison between districts and type of facilities 
 Patiala vs Yamunanagar Private vs public hospitals 
Claims Claims made in Yamunanagar district were six 
times more than those made in Patiala district. 
However, claims per 1000 family enrolled in 
Yamunanagar were almost two times of Patiala. The 
number of claims per 1000 individuals enrolled 
under the scheme was 25.9 for Patiala district while 
it was 36.4 for Yamunanagar district. Most of the 
claims belonged to the age group 25–44 years, 
followed by the age group 45–64 years in both the 
districts. In Patiala, more females have used the 
services while in Yamunanagar, more males have 
used the services. 
Services availed the paediatric age group was very 
less. 
Most of the claims were made for the head of the 
households or their immediate relatives—spouse, 
son or daughter.  
In both the districts, more 
claims were made in private 
hospitals. This was 
significantly very high in 
Yamunanagar district. 
More males were going to 
private hospitals whereas 
more females were going to 
public hospitals. In terms of 
trend of claims over the 
month, a fluctuating trend 
was observed. 
Clustering of 
claims 
In Yamunanagar district, about half of the claims were from four hospitals (out of 
37 empanelled hospitals), all private. In Patiala district, about two thirds of the 
claims were from 3 hospitals (out of 17 empanelled hospitals) – 2 private, 1 public. 
Reimbursed 
amount by 
insurance 
companies to 
providers 
The mean amount per case reimbursed to hospitals 
by the insurance company was more in 
Yamunanagar district  as compared to Patiala 
district. 
In Yamunanagar district, reimbursed amount by the 
insurance company was almost equal to the amount 
claimed by the hospitals; whereas in Patiala district, 
the reimbursed amount was much less than what 
was lodged by the facilities with the insurance 
companies 
In Yamunanagar, about three fourths of the 
hospitals were not getting the reimbursed amount in 
time. Data was not available for Patiala.   
The reimbursed amount was 
higher for public than 
private hospitals in Patiala 
district while it was 
marginally higher for private 
hospitals in Yamunanagar. 
Difference in claim amount 
and reimbursed amount was 
primarily observed in public 
hospitals.  
 
Difference 
between 
premium and 
claim 
The difference between the premium collected and 
claims disbursed was higher for Patiala as compared 
to Yamunanagar 
Not relevant 
Diagnosis In Patiala district the most common package used 
was MMD (general) followed by MMD (ICU), 
general surgery and gynaecology. Whereas in 
Yamunanagar, the most common package was 
MMD (general) followed by ophthalmology and 
MMD (ICU). 
In private hospitals, the most 
common package was MMD 
(general) followed by 
ophthalmology and MMD 
(ICU). In public hospitals 
the most common package 
used was MMD (general) 
followed by general surgery 
and gynaecology. 
Length of stay Mean length of stay of the beneficiaries in the 
hospitals was higher for Patiala district as compared 
to Yamunanagar district.  
The mean length of stay was 
significantly more in public 
hospitals when compared to 
private hospitals. The 
difference in stay between 
private and public hospitals 
was more in Patiala district 
as compared to 
Yamunanagar district. 
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8.3 Objective 3 
To compare the provision of health care across both public and private providers for 
RSBY beneficiaries and between RSBY and non-RSBY beneficiaries for a specific type 
of provider. 
8.3.1 Socio-demographic characteristics 
Most of the study participants were in the age group of 25 to 44 years. It appears that 
younger patients tend to go to private hospitals and older ones to public hospitals. 
More females were utilizing facilities as compared to males in both public and private 
hospitals. Muslims, SC/ST, and illiterate or literate up to primary level were using 
more of the public facilities as compared to the private.  
8.3.2. Structural aspects  
From the self-assessment tool - Health Provider Checklist, private hospitals reported a 
better score than public hospitals under all categories of structural-aspect evaluation 
in both districts. These were confirmed by the Observation and Facility Record 
Checklist. For availability of records, private hospitals were almost similar to public 
hospitals, except for six categories (mopping, toilet sanitation, autoclaving, grievance 
redressal, radiology services and in-patient evaluation) where private hospitals were 
better than public hospitals. Overall, structural evaluation was found to be better for 
private hospitals. However, this should be cautiously interpreted as none of these 
differences were statistically significant. 
8.3.3. Service delivery  
The major findings of service delivery are summarized in Table 8.4, with a 
comparison between the districts (Patiala vs Yamunanagar) and between the providers 
(private vs public). A mixed response was observed for various service delivery 
categories studied, though, Patiala seemed to fare better in most of these categories 
(Table 8.4). Between public and private hospitals, service delivery in public hospitals 
was better in some aspects and private hospitals in other aspects. Registration fees 
were paid by all participants; however, the use of this registration fee was unclear. 
Insurance companies considered the registration fees to be a part of their first 
instalment, while the policymakers considered it to be for administrative charges. As 
all the participants had paid registration fees, it could be possible that insurance 
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companies ignored those eligible people who could not pay this amount. In the 
present study, most of the hospitals were not providing food to the RSBY participants, 
despite this being clearly stipulated in the contract document. Since the cost of the 
food is included in the package rate, the providers could be retaining that amount, or 
using it for cost-offsetting purposes. It was also observed that where food was not 
provided, hospitals did not have facilities to prepare food. Such a situation is 
indicative of a flaw in the empanelment process, since availability of catering services 
should have been a factor in the empanelment process or identified during monitoring 
and supervision.  
Reimbursement of transportation cost is another service that is included in the 
package rate but was not given to any participant in Yamunanagar, while only half of 
the participants in Patiala received it. This is another lacuna which works to the 
advantage of providers, and adds to their profit. 
Access to facilities played an important role in the selection of a service provider, and 
superseded the kind of care given to the beneficiaries. Proximity to the facility was an 
important consideration for the beneficiaries due to the opportunity cost of being 
away from work, since most of the beneficiaries are daily wage earners for whom a 
visit to the hospital could result in a loss of that day’s wages.  
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Table 8.4: Service delivery across district and private vs public 
  Patiala Yamunanagar Private Public 
RSBY Help desk 
Separate RSBY help desk 42.1 2.1 28.5 16.1 
Staff at RSBY help desk was helpful 
and polite 
95.4 
97.4 
95.9 96.9 
Waiting Period (<15 Min) 71.3 85.3 
82.4 
74.1 
Process of 
Registration 
Fingerprint scanner used for 
fingerprint verification 
97.4 97.4 97.4 97.4 
Information 
received from 
RSBY help desk 
Information about treatment cost given 
to the patient 
48.2 8.4 24.9 32.1 
Patient was informed about the money 
left in the smart card  
41.0 
10.5 
22.3 29.5 
Patient was informed about 
insufficient money in the card 
20.0 
0.0 
21.7 12.0 
Diagnostics and 
medicines (OOP) 
Patient asked to get diagnostic test 
from outside the hospital  
13.8 21.5 21.8 13.5 
Patient asked to get the medicines 
from outside the hospital 
7.7 
16.2 
15.5 8.3 
Food provided to patients during hospital stay  20.5 36.1 
34.7 
21.8 
Process followed 
during discharge 
Discharge summary given to patient at 
the time of discharge 
84.1 
100.0 
89.6 94.3 
Fingerprint verification at time of 
discharge 
94.4 97.9 96.9 95.3 
Patient informed about balance amount 
in card at discharge  
47.7 
20.4 
33.9 34.4 
Transportation cost reimbursed by hospital 45.1 0 
18.1 
27.5 
Post-
hospitalization 
knowledge & 
expenses 
Knew about 5-day post- 
hospitalization expenses 
30.3 6.8 19.2 18.1 
Medicines were provided by the 
hospital 
86.9 
100.0 
89.4 97.3 
Diagnostic test was done free of cost 11.1 
0 
0.0 11.1 
 
8.3.4. Comparison for choice of hospital, transport and diagnosis 
A comparison was made between the district, across private and public hospitals and 
RSBY and non-RSBY participants. Table 8.5 details the comparison including the 
reason for choosing the hospital, previous facility contacted, transportation and 
diagnosis of the participants. In Patiala district, a majority of the participants did not 
contact any health facility before coming to the present one, whereas in Yamunanagar 
a high percentage of the participants had contacted a health facility before getting 
admitted to the present one. A direct visit to an empanelled public health-care facility 
at the secondary level of care without contacting any facility at the primary level 
could be indicative of a weak referral system in the district of Patiala, or it could be 
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due to  lack of information. Ideally, those seeking health care in public health 
facilities should first visit primary care facilities closer to their homes, which would 
refer them to secondary care hospitals as needed. 
Table 8.5: Comparison for choice of hospital, transport and diagnosis 
 Patiala Vs Yamunanagar Private vs Public RSBY vs Non-RSBY 
Reason for 
choosing hospital 
In Patiala, hospitals were 
primarily chosen by the 
participants because of proximity 
whereas in Yamunanagar they 
were chosen on relatives and 
friends advice. 
Private hospitals were chosen 
primarily because of the 
reputation of the hospital 
whereas public hospitals were 
chosen because of the proximity. 
Most common reason for 
selecting the hospital for RSBY 
participants were relative/friend 
suggestions followed by 
preferred hospital (always go to 
the same hospital) and 
reputation. Whereas non-RSBY 
participants selected the hospital 
based on reputation followed by 
relative/friend suggestion and 
proximity. 
Previous facility 
contacted 
In Patiala district, majority of the 
participants had not contacted 
any health facility before coming 
to the present one; whereas in 
Yamunanagar, a high percentage 
of the participants had first 
contacted a health facility, many 
of them were individual private 
practitioners. 
About one third participants 
from private hospital and half of 
the participants from public 
hospital did not contact any 
health facility before coming to 
the current facility. 
About one third RSBY 
participants and half of non-
RSBY participants did not 
contacted any health facility 
before coming to the current 
facility. 
Transport 
Both in Patiala and 
Yamunanagar, most common 
mode of transport was three 
wheelers. 
In terms of mode of 
transportation, bus was used 
more commonly used by the 
participants of public hospital 
when compared to private 
hospitals, both within the district 
and across the district. 
Bus and three wheelers were 
used more by the RSBY 
participants while car was used 
more by non-RSBY participants. 
Diagnosis 
 Almost similar pattern of 
diagnosis was observed in 
private and public hospitals, 
except for slightly more cases of 
orthopaedics in public hospitals 
and slightly more cases of 
urology in private hospitals. 
The diagnosis pattern of RSBY 
and non-RSBY participants was 
also almost the same, except for 
slightly more cases of 
orthopaedics in non-RSBY and 
general surgery in RSBY. 
 
8.3.5 User Satisfaction 
User satisfaction relating to experience during admission, hospital stay and discharge 
including availability of wheelchair and care from nurses and doctors, was better 
among the participants of Patiala district when compared to Yamunanagar. User 
satisfaction seemed to be significantly better among the participants from private 
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facilities when compared to participants from public facilities. When comparing user 
satisfaction of RSBY participants with non-RSBY participants, the former was 
slightly better. Table 8.6 makes a comparison of user satisfaction across various 
groups studied.   
 
Table 8.6: User satisfaction 
 
 Process Patiala Yamunanagar Private Public RSBY Non 
RSBY 
Experiences 
during 
admission 
Bed made available at time 
of admission 
98.2 98.0 97.0 99.4 99.0 97.3 
Availability of Wheel chair 96.8 100 98.8 96.8 100 97.1 
Hospital Staff Pushed 
wheelchair 
88.2 64.8 82.1 76.2 83.7 77.9 
Time taken by nursing staff 
(Less than 30 min) 
77.2 96.6 90.4 81.6 88.1 84.3 
Time taken by doctors 68.7 83.5 79.8 70.8 78.2 72.8 
Care from 
nurses 
Nurses treat patients with 
courtesy and respect 
85.2 80.3 86.6 78.8 86.5 79.1 
Nurses listen carefully to 
the patients 
87.5 83.2 89.7 80.7 87.6 83.2 
Nurses explain things 
nicely 
86.2 75.5 85.9 75.9 81.9 80.5 
Patients get help as soon as 
he/she wanted it 
83.6 54.8 75.4 67.2 67.8 75.4 
Care from 
doctors 
Doctors treat the patients 
with courtesy and respect 
86.2 86.9 90.7 81.9 88.1 84.9 
Doctors listen carefully to 
the patients 
87.5 82.1 90.7 78.5 85.8 84.1 
Doctors explain things 
nicely 
85.5 72.9 84.9 73.7 80.3 78.8 
Hospital 
environment 
Patients’ surroundings & 
bathroom clean 
80.7 85.2 92.7 71.7 85.0 80.5 
Patients’ beds found quiet 
at night 
78.2 86.3 90.4 72.5 83.2 80.8 
Experiences 
in Hospital 
Patients’ get help to go to 
the bathroom or for bedpan 
72.5 70.7 78.6 63.0 72.8 71.2 
Hospital staff help to 
reduce the patient’s pain 
89.5 89.9 92.9 85.9 91.2 88.2 
Hospital staff explain about 
the medicine & SE 
71.9 24.2 62.2 47.3 55.4 54.9 
Discharge 
Experience 
Staff enquire from the 
patient if any help required  
99.2 96.3 99.2 96.3 98.4 97.3 
Suggestion for any follow-
up 
98.7 93.2 97.2 94.9 97.4 94.8 
Hospital Rating (out of 10) 7.9 5.5 6.9 6.7 6.5 7.1 
Recommend Hospital to Friends 98.7 98.0 98.7 98.0 99.2 97.5 
 
8.3.6. Out-of-pocket expenditures  
OOP expenditure incurred in private hospitals was almost double that of public 
hospitals. It was expected that OOP expenditure of RSBY beneficiaries would be 
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significantly less than non-RSBY beneficiaries. However, not much difference was 
observed in the OOP expenditure of RSBY beneficiaries and non-RSBY beneficiaries 
in Yamunanagar district, whereas in Patiala district, OOP expenditure of a RSBY 
beneficiary was significantly less when compared to a non-RSBY beneficiary. Use of 
the public sector facilities contributed to reduction in OOP expenditure. Data showed 
that non-RSBY BPL persons used the public sector at a rate twice that of the use of 
private sector, while the RSBY BPL populations seemed to use public and private 
sector at the same rate. A more detailed examination, than is possible here, would be 
required to yield a more nuanced illustration of whether the use of the public sector 
would lead to a greater reduction in OOP expenditure than being enrolled in RSBY.  
The present study points out certain gaps in the design of the scheme. Roles and 
responsibilities of various stakeholders were not judiciously assigned in the contract 
document. The insurance companies were responsible for empanelment of health 
facility and IEC activities which is questionable as it has a direct relationship with the 
revenue generation. The onus of scheme implementation is on the insurance company, 
and the state government played more of a facilitating role. The Contract design also 
lacked a robust ‘monitoring and supervision’ framework. There are in-built incentives 
for various stakeholders under the scheme. Regulation for private providers in India is 
very week which leads to variation in quality of care, in some case with little to no 
oversight. RSBY at the time of empanelment has attempted to introduce an inspection 
mechanism. However, follow up and monitoring post inspection is poor. Gaps were 
also noticed in implementation as there was shortage of designated manpower, 
package rates were debatable, accessibility to health facility was poor, and coverage 
of the scheme was inadequate. 
 
8.4.  Study Limitations 
Results of the study need to be cautiously interpreted as there were certain limitations 
associated with the study. These limitations can be divided into two types. Firstly, 
limitations associated with the data and secondly limitations associated with the study 
design. 
Data limitations: Complete contract analysis could not be undertaken because the 
contract document between the insurance company and TPAs could not be retrieved. 
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Information regarding the bidding and the negotiation process was also not available. 
The line listing of the BPL population was not available for Yamunanagar district and 
therefore age- and sex-wise coverage of the scheme could not be assessed for 
Yamunanagar as it was done for Patiala. About 43% of the empanelled hospitals 
(Patiala 5, Yamunanagar 18) did not provide any data on the services available in 
their hospitals. This information would have helped in understanding their eligibility 
and the process of empanelment. The beneficiaries were mapped at sub-district level 
and not below that because of the limitation of availability of GIS data at block level, 
which was a further limitation. Market analysis could not be done for Yamunanagar 
district as the insurance bidding information, over the years, was missing for 
Yamunanagar district.   
Secondary data analysis was carried out for the second objective; however, the quality 
of the data available for the secondary data analysis could not be verified in the 
present study. There was no separate source available to cross-check the data. In 
India, private hospitals range from small nursing homes to big super-speciality centres 
with varying degrees of quality of services (Thamba et al., 2012). One of the 
limitations associated with the study was in the context of data analysis. While 
making a public vs private comparison, data from all private facilities was managed 
irrespective of the type of private facility with regard to quality, bed strength, 
availability of services, etc. 
Study design limitations: In relation to the design of the study, the RSBY beneficiaries 
were identified from selected hospitals, though ideally both RSBY and non-RSBY 
beneficiaries should have been identified through household surveys. Moreover, the 
views of the beneficiaries regarding the scheme design were not collected in the 
present study. Feedback information from the beneficiaries would have taken us 
closer to the gaps. Qualitative methods (focus group discussions or in-depth 
interviews) to obtain in-depth perceptions of the beneficiaries would have better 
reflected the gaps in the scheme. Due to logistical constraints of the study, a purposive 
sampling was used to select the RSBY empaneled hospitals in both the districts. The 
result of the study should hence be cautiously interpreted and generalized. 
Another limitation relates to the study area, since the study was conducted only in two 
states. Moreover, the insurance company (ICICI Lombard) was the same in both the 
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selected districts and hence a comparison of the impact of the insurance company on 
scheme implementation could not be studied. Majority of the RSBY participants 
belong to the BPL population while non-RSBY participants may or may not. The 
RSBY participants avail services without paying, while non-RSBY participants need 
to pay for the same services.  For these reasons, perceptions of the quality of care by 
them may differ. It is likely that RSBY beneficiaries may be more favourable in their 
judgement of the quality of care compared to non-RSBY participants, for the same 
facility. 
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Chapter 9 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The findings of the study in accordance with the three objectives have been 
enumerated in the previous chapter. This chapter takes the discussion further on 
government failure including New Public Management and PPPs, and market failure 
and PPPs (9.1), response of RSBY to equity concerns (9.2), examining the gaps in 
RSBY as a PPP model (9.3), influence of contractual arrangements in meeting 
RSBY’s aims (9.4) and concluding with recommendations for policy (9.5). 
 
9.1 Government Failure  
By 2000, several sources suggested that the public delivery of health services in India 
was in crisis (Hammer et al., 2007). High absenteeism, low quality of clinical care, 
low satisfaction level, corruption, high out-of-pocket expenditures, poorly maintained, 
understaffed and ill equipped buildings, long waiting hours and indifferent attitude of 
the health workforce in public facilities resulted in inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and 
underutilization of services.  As the public health delivery system failed, a private 
sector emerged which could meet the demands for those better off.  The inefficiencies 
of the public sector affected particularly the poor.  
This section broadly highlights four important aspects where the role of the public 
sector was less than satisfactory which RSBY helped address through adopting 
several different strategies. These strategies were: engaging heavily with the private 
sector and thus bringing in market forces, providing subsidized health insurance for 
the BPL population of India, and attempts to improve quality of services for the poor 
through introduction of competition.  The intention was to curtail catastrophic out of 
pocket expenditure for health care though cashless provision of services and to 
increase accessibility to care which the public sector had become unable to ensure. 
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New Public Management and PPPs 
The need for reforms in India’s health sector has been widely discussed and addressed 
by successive plan documents, the national health policy and by several national and 
international experts and agencies. Reform proposals would include greater 
decentralization and autonomy for the providers of health care, with the government 
providing an enabling environment through planning, financing and regulating health 
services and involving the private or non-state sector in provision of services. This 
new approach, as discussed below, reflects New Public Management (NPM) 
elements, elaborated in the Chapter 2 literature review, which advocates inter alia 
competition (Walsh, 1995), efficiency through contracting the private sector (Heard et 
al., 2011) minimal government, de-bureaucratization, decentralization and 
privatization (Kalimullah et al., 2012). Some of these elements of New Public 
Management were implemented in RSBY which includes the private sector in health 
care delivery in an innovative way through a public private partnership model.  
Partnership with the private sector has emerged as a favored approach to reforms, in 
part due to this “new managerialism” and also because of resource constraints in the 
public sector across the world (Michell-Weaver and Manning, 1992). There is a 
growing realization that public and private sectors in health can potentially gain from 
one another (Bloom et al., 2000, Raman and Björkman, 2008, Agha et al., 2003). 
Involvement of the private sector is, in part, linked to the wider belief that public 
sector bureaucracies are inefficient and unresponsive and that market mechanisms 
will promote efficiency and ensure cost effective, good quality services (Diarra, 
2001). RSBY reduces public sector engagement through a PPP model, harnessing the 
private sectors’ energy and creating competition for the public sector.  
Polidano rightly reports that many developing countries have taken up elements of the 
NPM agenda, but have not adopted anything remotely near the entire package 
(Polidano, 1999). There are arguments that the new public management (NPM) is not 
appropriate to developing countries on account of problems such as corruption and 
low administrative and regulative capacity (Polidano, 1999). The outcome of 
individual initiatives depends on localized contingency factors rather than any general 
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national characteristics (Kumar, 2013). Though RSBY is modelled on a Public-
Private Partnership, which is reminiscent of NPM, the design of the scheme has not 
completely adopted the NPM principles.  
Hood (1994) has outlined seven principles of new public management for the public 
sector, which are: professional management of public organizations; private-sector 
styles of management practice; greater competition; explicit standards and measures 
of performance; greater emphasis on output controls; greater discipline and economy 
in public sector resource use and a shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector 
(Hood, 1994). NPM envisages hands-on professional management of a public 
organization where managers at the top level have clear assigned responsibilities 
while limiting or eliminating vague diffusion of power. Such an arrangement can lead 
to processes where those assigned responsibilities can be made accountable. However, 
the present study on RSBY shows that managers ostensively held responsible for 
implementation (head of the state nodal agencies) did not have complete authority. 
For any change in the scheme, permission of the central government had to be taken. 
This diffusion of power led to erosion of accountability. Accountability was also 
compromised due to an absence of fixing clear roles and responsibilities of various 
stakeholders. The state governments had outsourced most of their responsibilities to 
the insurance firms and had thus reduced their own role.   
RSBY was launched without putting in place any formal organizational structure. A 
key element of NPM, disaggregation of the public sector into corporatized units of 
activity, with devolved budgets, was not seen. Though the RSBY design allowed a 
separate entity/structure for scheme implementation, this flexibility was left to the 
states. Certain states adopted an independent trust to manage the scheme. But in the 
two states of the present study, Punjab and Haryana, there was no separate 
institutional structure established for implementation of the scheme. The existing 
structure at the central level (the Directorate General Labour Welfare) and state levels 
was used to roll out the scheme. This added extra work to the existing responsibilities 
of the public servants, with no shifting of existing responsibilities or creation of 
additional posts. The Nodal officer was the only dedicated RSBY staff at the district 
level for implementation. This resulted in overloading the staff with new 
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responsibilities, for which no extra remuneration or any other incentive was given to 
them. This was done more as a matter of expediency.  
An important principle of NPM is performance management (Kalimullah et al., 2012). 
However, RSBY does not have explicit standards and measures of performance. 
Defined and measurable goals and targets are missing in the scheme. No monitoring 
indicators have been included rendering it difficult to measure performance in a 
quantitative or qualitative manner. In fact, quality of care was not taken into 
consideration at any stage of the contractual engagement nor was it envisaged as an 
outcome, although one of the objectives of the scheme was to provide quality care to 
the poor. Monitoring of the scheme with regard to out-of-pocket expenditures, quality 
of care and accessibility to services was missing. There was no mention of incentive 
structures, based on performance, for any of the stakeholders (public or private) in the 
contract document. The emphasis was more on implementation aspects such as 
enrolment, empanelment of hospitals, IEC, service utilization, etc. 
A model of bureaucracy is offered within public choice theory, resting on the belief 
that public sector bureaucrats have little or no incentive to promote technical 
efficiency (Bennett et al., 1997). They are seen as self-seeking, motivated only by 
such factors as ‘salary, prerequisites of the office, public reputation, power, and 
patronage’ (Niskanen, 1973). Public system actors, the property rights theorists argue, 
lack ownership, as within the public system there is weakening of property rights.  
There is lack of any obvious threat to the employment of the staff, resulting in a lack 
of incentive for efficient performance.  It is to be noted that the public cadre in India 
is based on fixed salary, where employment is permanent. The property rights is 
further weakened also in the state governments’ contracting most of the activities to 
the insurance company with themselves primarily playing a facilitators’ role.  
However, a shift to greater competition in the public sector, a key aspect of NPM, was 
built in the scheme. Competition was introduced in the market within the private 
providers and also with the public providers. There was a move towards term 
contracts, public tendering procedures and introduction of market disciplines in the 
public sector. This aspect of NPM brings in competition which is seen as a key 
strategy to lower costs and provide better standards. Partnerships were based on 
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contractual arrangements. Some of them were fixed term. The bidding process for 
contracting an insurance company was also based on public tendering.  
 
In the states the study found that market competition, although weak, was present. 
There were four public sector insurance companies who bid for the scheme 
continuously for four years. The participation of the private sector varied and there 
was only one private company which participated in the bidding process for all the 
five years. As far as the providers were concerned, especially private providers, most 
of them were concentrated in certain areas.  
There was some degree of attention to private-sector styles of management in the 
scheme as advocated by NPM. RSBY applied private sector management tools to a 
publicly financed scheme. The scheme was designed so as to allow the private 
insurance companies and TPAs (Third Party Administrators) to manage the process of 
enrolment, empanelment and IEC. The insurance company had flexibility for 
contracting the TPAs. The scheme, in reality, was managed by private insurance 
companies and TPAs. The private providers managed the medical cases as per their 
own protocols.   
Stress on greater discipline and achieving economy in public sector resource use was 
partially visible in the scheme. Payments to the providers were standardized. Based on 
the package rates, a fixed payment was reimbursed to the providers for the services 
provided by them to the beneficiaries of the scheme.  
Package rates under the scheme were extensively discussed with various stakeholders 
during the course of the study (chapter 5). Package rates are like a double edged 
sword – high package rates would mean more profit for the providers, but higher 
premiums from the government to insurance companies would adversely affect the 
affordability of the scheme. On the other hand, low package rates would be a poor 
incentive to provide adequate services to the poor by the private providers. Incorrect 
fixing of package rates is a risk factor which can adversely affect the scheme. A 
balance is, therefore, essential so that the providers are satisfied and the burden of 
premium on government is sustainable. However, in the present study, it was apparent 
that the two states have not yet found the best balance.  
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RSBY has thus adopted some of the elements of the NPM but where adopted, this has 
been done only to some extent. Certain key elements of NPM were missing, as 
reflected in diffusion of power with no clear lines of authority for managers; unclear 
roles and responsibilities and lack of complete authority; lack of corporatized units of 
activity with devolved budgets; no explicit standards and measure of performance, 
and lack of monitoring. If these were present, it could have enhanced implementation 
performance. 
Financial protection for the poor  
Even though health outcomes in India have improved over time, distribution of health 
achievements   continue to be strongly patterned along such dimensions  as gender, 
caste, wealth, education, and geography (Joe et al., 2009, Balarajan and Villamor, 
2009, Sen et al., 2002). Amongst these, difference in health care services between rich 
and poor has been a major concern for the government. In India, many among the 
poor experience bad health, not infrequently as result of the low-level of income and 
social marginalization (Deogankar, 2004). 
It has been widely recognized that health insurance is one way of providing protection 
to poor households against the risk of health spending leading to poverty. The poor 
are usually unable or unwilling to take up un-subsidized health insurance because of 
its cost, or lack of perceived benefits (RSBY, 2014b). Organizing and administering 
health insurance, especially in rural areas, is also difficult. RSBY was introduced to 
fill this gap and provide security from such risks to the poor. The scheme has made 
provisions to take care of the health needs of a much neglected section of the 
population which had limited access to care. BPL beneficiaries now have a choice to 
obtain services with a fixed amount of subsidy from a private or public facility. The 
exit interviews of the participants show satisfaction with the care and attention meeted 
out to them in health facilities (Chapter 7). It is noteworthy that it is not the poor who 
have to reach out to the insurance company; but it is the insurance company which 
reaches out to the poor, although somewhat imperfectly as we noted. RSBY has 
therefore helped to address the deficiencies of the public sector with respect to 
helping the poor to access care.  
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Quality of care 
Quantity rather than quality of health services has been the focus historically in 
developing countries. Ample evidence suggests that quality of care (or the lack of it) 
must be at the center of every discussion about better health (Peabody et al., 2006). In 
India, nearly 30% at families are below the poverty line. Hence they can only access 
government hospitals due to the free treatment provided. But Government hospitals 
are known for their lack of sanitation and basic infrastructure like beds, qualified 
doctors, sufficient medicines, inadequate quantity and quality of staff, underpaid and 
unhappy staff, etc (Ramya, 2012). The attitude of employees is also not up to standard 
in some hospitals. Timely services and presence of staff is one of the major concerns 
in these hospitals. Infrastructure and the 3M (Material, Manpower & Money supply) 
in Government hospitals is also a big concern. Although the government provides free 
medicines, improper storage in unhygienic conditions is commonly seen (Ramya, 
2012). Quantitative improvements in service provision have been achieved in a 
majority of the states; but quality of care still needs improvement. A disproportionate 
increase in quantity without a proportionate increase in human resources and  
adherence to acceptable standards has led to a compromise in quality (Sharma, 2012). 
RSBY provided an opportunity for healthcare in the private sector to serve the poor. 
The strength of the scheme lies in the fact that it is a social welfare scheme in the PPP 
mode with inbuilt incentives for various stakeholders to motivate them to provide 
quality services to the poor. The scheme has enabled the beneficiaries to use private 
facilities, which are perceived to provide more services and better quality care, at no 
extra cost. However, it is to be kept in mind that there are variations in levels of cost, 
pricing, transactional conveniences and quality of services among private health 
facilities. The scheme is so designed, that the beneficiary has the option to choose the 
facility based on the quality of services, although there may be some practical barriers 
to exercise such a choice. This study has shown that RSBY, according beneficiaries’ 
perception, has provided acceptable quality of health care, especially in private 
facilities.  
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Out-of-pocket expenditures 
Many low-income countries in all regions spend much less on health care than higher-
income countries and depend much more on private expenditures, mostly directly out 
of pocket. The basic pattern of low health spending, heavy reliance on out-of-pocket 
financing, and limited domestic resource mobilization holds for India as well (Gottret 
and Schieber, 2006).  
Several studies of Indian villages to determine why households descend into poverty 
(Krishna et al., 2005, Krishna, 2006) have found that in a majority of cases of decline 
into poverty, three principal factors are at work: health expenses, high-interest private 
debt, and social and customary expenses. Despite a government owned free health 
care delivery chain, 64% of the poorest populations in India are in debt every year to 
pay for the medical care they need (Basu, 2011). During the period of the launch of 
the scheme, national health accounts data revealed that the government sector (centre, 
state and local) together accounted for only 20% of all health expenditures and 78% 
were out-of-pocket payments – one of the highest percentages in the world (Ministry 
of Health and Family Welfare, 2006). 
Health Insurance is one way of providing protection to poor households by reducing 
OOPs and improving access to health care. One of the objectives of RSBY was to 
provide financial protection to BPL families against catastrophic health costs by 
reducing out of pocket expenditures for hospitalization. The scheme was meant to be 
cashless so that beneficiaries did not have to make payments while admitted. 
However, families of beneficiaries were paying for medicines, diagnostics, food and 
transportation items that are provisioned in the contract to be paid by the care giver. 
Thus RSBY did not fully meet its financial protection aim.  
 
9. 2 Equity Concerns in Health Insurance 
Access to health care in an unregulated market depends on ability and willingness to 
pay which leads to distributional inequity (Wolfe, 1993). The vulnerable and the 
disadvantaged would suffer on the basis of age, disability, and gender. The 
egalitarians argue that it is inappropriate that health care should be determined by 
ability to pay. A strong profit making motive can create supplier induced demand 
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which can involve paying for a great deal of unneeded care.  Given that the poor are 
already stretched, the impact of a profit making health sector can be devastating.   
Bennett et al. and Rosenthal identified  unethical practices among private organization  
to maximize profit, and  lack of concerns regarding public health goals (Bennett et al., 
1994, Rosenthal, 2000). In the private sector, the basic motivation of the stakeholders 
is profit, resulting theoretically in a strong thrust on the efficient use of resources 
(Bennett et al., 1997). While private insurance companies can, at times, be overly 
motivated by profit and therefore be subject to legitimate criticism, it is also necessary 
to objectively look at the capacities of government agencies for enforcement of any 
norm under political pressure (RSBY Committee, 2014). As a general rule, the private 
sector is less interested in the poor who are not able to pay the full cost of services and 
focus their attention on the wealthy. Although this should not be a concern when the 
government forms a partnership with the private sector through purchase of services, 
there remains a concern that the private sector may attempt to maximize its profits by 
providing lesser quality services to the poor (Mitchell, 2000) 
Generally when markets fail to achieve efficiency economists note such occurrences 
as market failure. Due to asymmetric information health insurance markets may fail to 
materialize, requiring second best solutions either initiated by the government or some 
other institutions. In the context of health insurance, there are several types of 
problem relevant to equity: accessibility specially failure to reach remote places; 
equality - poorest population excluded from private health insurance and 
ineffectiveness - cream skimming by the insurance companies where those ill may go 
untreated. 
Failure to reach remote places: Rural residents often experience barriers to healthcare 
that limit their ability to get the care they need. Governments at various levels have 
not been very successful in providing appropriate infrastructure in the rural areas 
which sustain 70% of the Indian population. There are also other social and 
environmental factors such as inadequate sanitation, unsafe water, unhealthy 
environment, illiteracy etc., which result in poor health outcomes. Moreover, 
ineffectiveness of the primary health care system which should serve as an entry point 
in the rural areas results in a breach in the referral system (Singh and Badaya, 2014). 
Utilization of services has been shown to be educational level and residence 
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dependent, with 70% of illiterates receiving no ANC care; and 43% of rural women 
less likely to receive ANC services when compared with their urban counterparts 
(Singh and Badaya, 2014).   
In addition to having an inadequate supply of healthcare services in the community, 
lack of health insurance or availability of quality free care further reduces access to 
healthcare services. According to a 2008 report on health disparities, there are a larger 
percentage of rural residents who do not have health insurance compared to urban 
residents (Bennett et al., 2008). Rural uninsured are more likely to delay or forgo 
medical care because of the cost of care compared to those with insurance (Rural 
Health Information Hub, 2014). RSBY, by providing health insurance to the BPL 
population, has increased access to healthcare services for the rural poor. However, 
findings of the study show that, even though it was hoped that the new market of 
entitled BPL beneficiaries available in the rural areas would incentivize the private 
providers to open shop in remote areas that has not yet been the case. Most of the 
private providers are clustered around urban areas.  
Private Health Insurance and the poor  
The private health sector in India has grown in an unregulated fashion, as there has 
been virtually no effective guidance on the location, scope of practice, and effective 
standards for quality of care or public disclosure on practices and pricing (Desai, 
2011). Development of health insurance should result in an improvement in the 
services provided by the private sector. As part of the liberalisation of the economy in 
the early 1990s, the Indian government opened insurance (including health insurance) 
to the private sector. With the advent of Private Health Insurance, the possibility to 
access quality care from private tertiary care facilities opened for the higher income 
groups. This provided financial risk protection to a relatively small segment of the 
society. However, on the flip side, private health insurance resulted in cost escalation, 
inequity in health financing patterns and raised questions on the cost-effectiveness of 
healthcare. This is likely to be the case in a country that depends heavily on fee-for-
service and a large  and unregulated private sector (Reddy et al., 2011b). Private 
insurance also leaves out the low-income individuals, who may not be able to afford 
the premium (Ahuja, 2004). The poor population had not been part of private health 
insurance schemes, especially in developing countries, for a long time (Sekhri and 
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Savedoff, 2004). Providing health insurance to the poor, who are considered to be at 
high risk of disease, at a low premium, would mean a loss to the private insurance 
companies. Such gaps can only be filled by social security schemes of the 
government, such as RSBY.  The strength of the RSBY lies in the fact that it is a 
social welfare scheme, which offers financial protection while at the same time using 
the profit made by the various stakeholders acts as a catalyst (Swaroop, 2012). It is a 
scheme in which private partners have as much a stake as the government. 
Cream Skimming and Provider Induced Payment 
Adequate risk pooling is necessary for market sustenance of health insurance. Two 
forms of cream skimming can be seen in health insurance. One is cream skimming by 
the insurance company, where the insurance company would enroll the healthier 
population (Acharya et al., 2012).   In such situations there needs to be the second 
best solution of mandated risk-pooling through compulsory enrolment of all in a 
population pool. Another form of cream skimming occurs when medical 
professionals, under capitation payment systems, favor easier caseloads over more 
complicated cases (Levaggi and Montefiori, 2003).  
The poor rarely can afford to pay for insurance; and further the likelihood of 
becoming ill may be greater among the poor.  Thus, RSBY sought to rectify the 
inherent cream skimming that leads to non-existence of insurance markets for the 
poor. Elderly, children, females and lower caste population are at higher risk of health 
ailments and can under RSBY use the scheme. In the present study, cream skimming 
by the insurer was partially evident as the enrolment of children and lower caste was 
relatively lower when compared to their share of the population. However, enrolment 
of elderly and females were comparable to other age groups and males respectively. 
The enrolment of these high risk groups is discussed in detail in later part of this 
section. Das and Leino have also showed little evidence of “cream-skimming” by the 
insurer in RSBY (Das and Leino, 2011). 
In this study there was some suggestive evidence that private providers were focusing 
on some conditions with higher profit margins. For example it was clearly evident that 
private hospitals were treating more ophthalmology cases, particularly in Patiala. The 
cost involved in ophthalmological interventions (which primarily consists of cataract 
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surgery) is low with a high profit margin (Shiva, 2010). Another high profit margin 
intervention was ICU care, which again was high for the private sector in the present 
study. Both of the above findings indicate providers might have induced services that 
are unlikely to be needed. This may point towards possible horizontal cream 
skimming, i.e. treating only patients with specific diseases. Further, there is evidence 
in the present study that the regulations for the private sector were weak and providers 
(private) were not happy with the fixed package rates. Thus, they had an incentive for 
choosing easier caseloads and recommending unneeded services where little work 
would be undertaken. This could point towards vertical cream skimming, i.e. opting 
for specific patient types within the same ailment group. However, this study was not 
able to examine vertical cream skimming.   
 
9.3  Gaps in RSBY as a PPP model 
This section covers scheme inception including external environment (political and 
regulatory) and the institutional structure. It also examines the gaps in scheme design 
and implementation. 
Scheme Inception: External Environment and Institutional Structure 
The external environment that has an implication on the effective implementation of 
RSBY primarily constitutes the political environment and regulatory framework. 
India is a federal parliamentary democratic republic, wherein the President is the head 
of the state and Prime Minister is the executive head of the government. India follows 
a federal system, which consists of a strong government at the centre, and state 
governments at the secondary level. The political environment plays a significant role 
in the outcome of any scheme. The RSBY Committee report of 2014 mentions 
political interference as one of the most important reasons why the social welfare 
schemes flounder and lose track (RSBY Committee, 2014). Key stakeholder 
interviewers in the study stated that since RSBY was one of the flagship initiatives of 
the then political party in power, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA), there was a significant push to launch the scheme before the General Elections 
in 2009 to garner votes. A similar conclusion was drawn by a study in Maharashtra, 
which surmised that such schemes are usually announced during the election time for 
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political gains (Thakur, 2015).This research also confirms that since the scheme was 
launched in a great rush due to political pressure, adequate attention was not given to 
efficient design of the scheme. Best practices from around the world were not 
adequately reviewed. The design of RSBY requires political commitment at the state 
level, since the state government has a key role as a facilitator in the implementation 
of the scheme with a variety of players from the public and private sectors. Rai (2012) 
from the Asian Development Bank reported that one of the strengths of RSBY was 
that it was implemented by states with different political parties at the helm of affairs. 
Another study by Rai and Rai observed that even though the scheme was politically 
motivated (as the hurried roll-out of the scheme suggests), it had not been inhibited by 
political ideologies (Rai and Rai, 2010). In the present study, during the period from 
the latter part of 2011 to the beginning of 2013, Haryana had a Congress-led 
government while the ruling party in Punjab was the Akali Dal, which strongly 
opposed the ruling party at the Centre, the Congress. However, it was extremely clear 
during key stakeholder interviews that the political differences in ruling parties at the 
Central and state level did not affect the implementation of the scheme.  
The RSBY Committee report points out that there is enormous pressure on politicians 
from their constituencies asking for favours, because of which governments are 
increasingly looking for external private agencies to act as a buffer against such 
pressures. The Committee pointed out that several state governments have initiated 
health insurance schemes through private insurance companies, which act as the 
interface with the public at large. While private insurance companies can, at times, be 
overly motivated by profit and therefore be subject to legitimate criticism, it is also 
necessary to objectively look at the capacities of government agencies for 
enforcement of any norm under political pressure (RSBY Committee, 2014).  
Strong regulation is crucial for good governance. The literature review stated that 
PPPs do not necessarily decrease the work of government, but on the contrary, they 
may well increase the workload since they entail a greater need for regulation 
(Regional Training Institute, 2014). Regulation often entails a mechanism of checks 
and balances in order to create the right incentives and penalties to ensure successful 
implementation of a scheme. At its most basic level, regulation seeks to manage 
behaviour in order to produce desired outcomes (Coglianese, 2012). In the present 
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study, it was observed that even though a complex regulatory framework exists in 
India, with an extensive set of legal instruments such as the Indian Penal Code, the 
Indian Contract Act and the Law of Torts, effective enforcement and implementation 
remains problematic (Gupta and Rani, 2004, Peters and Muraleedharan, 2008). The 
regulatory framework for the Insurance companies and TPAs under IRDA is robust; 
however, the regulation of private providers and nursing homes remains challenging, 
both politically and practically. A weak regulatory framework of health providers has 
a serious impact on RSBY implementation, which was evident in the findings of the 
present study. Firstly, the voluntary nature of registration of the private health 
facilities under the state registering authority limits the pool of health facilities that 
can be empanelled under the scheme, as there are many hospitals that do not get 
themselves registered. This results in low-level empanelment, which in turn 
exacerbates accessibility to health care by the beneficiaries. Secondly, a weak 
regulatory framework can also result in a poor monitoring and supervision structure 
that leads to inaction against the erring health facilities. This affects successful 
implementation, as is evident in the present study. Although there were several 
incidences of breach in contract, there was still no evidence of any action being taken 
against the errant stakeholder. 
The impact of the institutional framework in scheme implementation is enormous and 
can be seen in the present study. RSBY was launched without putting in place any 
formal organizational structure, and the existing structure of the Directorate General 
Labour Welfare at the central level was used to roll out the scheme. Again, this was 
more a matter of expediency. The agencies responsible for RSBY in the two states 
under study are supervised by different government departments. In Punjab, the 
PSHC has responsibility for the scheme, which is supervised by the Department of 
Health and Family Welfare, while in Haryana it is the ESIC, which is supervised by 
the Department of Labour and Employment. The effect of the difference in 
organizational structure in the two states can be perceived in scheme implementation. 
Since the Department of Health engages closely with hospitals and health issues, it is 
likely to be better placed to deliver health care services than the Department of 
Labour. However, the Department of Labour is better equipped to enrol the poor for 
deeper penetration of the scheme as it deals more closely with the functioning of the 
informal sector. The need for engagement across Ministries for more efficient scheme 
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implementation is shown by a study in the state of Gujarat where an interdepartmental 
task force consisting of Labour, Health and Rural Development Ministries has been 
set up (Seshadri et al., 2011). The results from the present study show that the 
Department of Health in Punjab was better in terms of service delivery, transportation 
reimbursement, higher empanelment of public facilities and over all user satisfaction 
(Table 7.61). In addition, overall user satisfaction by the participants for the hospital 
in Patiala was 7.9 (out of 10), while it was 5.5 in Yamunanagar. However, the 
Department of Labour and Employment in Haryana was better at enrolment, 
empanelment and number of claims. Key stakeholders interviewed felt that it was 
easier to work with the Health Department (Punjab) rather than the Labour 
Department (Haryana). 
Interestingly, on 1
st
 April 2015 the Central Government has transferred RSBY from 
the MoLE to the MoHFW. This could have been done pursuant to the Government’s 
decision to make RSBY a part of the National Health Assurance Mission (Press Trust 
of India, 2015), which falls under the mandate of the MoHFW. The Government 
believes that the provision of health services is the core competence of the MoHFW 
and the issuance of insurance cards has to be separated from service delivery to 
capitalize on expertize of different ministries.  
Scheme Design and Implementation 
The first major challenge with the scheme is the design of the scheme itself. There are 
certain glaring gaps in the design which were apparent after review of key documents 
in addition to key stakeholder and exit interviews. As pointed out previously, 
immense political pressure to launch the scheme on a hurried timeline is the possible 
reason for these gaps. Major gaps that exist primarily relate to the allocation of roles 
and responsibilities, enrollment of beneficiaries, empanelment of hospitals and 
monitoring and evaluation. We have already discussed the challenges that presented 
due to the institutional frameworks or lack thereof. In retrospect, this institutional 
flexibility afforded to states, on where to house the scheme, could be viewed as a 
double edged sword. On the one hand, it afforded easier buy-in from the states to 
absorb the scheme within existing structures thus increasing adoption of the scheme 
pan India and promoting a more integrative approach. On the other hand, the weak 
capacity of the states to handle such a sophisticated scheme was never addressed from 
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the start by providing supporting institutional frameworks with associated budgets and 
training. 
Allocation of roles and responsibilities was done loosely for the various stakeholders 
involved and compromised accountability. The understanding of contracting model 
and the responsibilities associated with it was lacking on the part of the regulators at 
the state and the district level especially relating to the transaction costs. Various 
literature has reported that contracting out services increases transaction costs, e.g. 
costs involved in negotiating and monitoring contracts and servicing of contractual 
commitments (Saltman and Otter, 1992, Robinson, 1990). In the present study, it was 
found that the transaction costs were not considered in depth in terms of planning and 
implementation. It is worth noting that the scheme was designed by the central 
government and was presented to the state governments for implementation with the 
responsibility to make changes as per the needs of the differing states. But the state 
governments rarely practised any such authorization, primarily because of the 
transaction costs involved and the lack of capacity at state level to introduce changes. 
One glaring example of this concerned the revision of package rates. During key 
stakeholder interviews with the private providers it was evident that the private 
providers were extremely dissatisfied with the package rates and insisted that annual 
cost of inflation and variation in cost of care between states and within rural and 
urban areas be considered in determining package rates. However, probably due to the 
high transaction costs involved, the state governments did not actively engage in 
revision of package rates at the state level and adopted the centrally determined 
package rates.  
In terms of scheme design vis-à-vis enrolment, there are two aspects that need to be 
considered. First is the frequency of enrolment i.e. annual enrolment and the problems 
associated with it and second is the coverage of enrolment relating to adoption of the 
scheme. Findings of the present study validate the conclusions of Das, who believes 
that a major factor that affects regular access to health care is the yearly renewal of 
the contracts of insurance companies (Kannan and Varinder, 2012). The contract 
between the state and insurance company is for one year and hence enrolment of the 
beneficiaries needs to be done every year. Key Stakeholders when interviewed clearly 
stated that yearly enrolment of the beneficiaries requires immense human and 
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financial resources and is considered burdensome and redundant because BPL listings 
do not change yearly. In addition, the enrolment cycle is interrupted annually because 
it takes three months to reissue the insurance smart cards and this process becomes 
more challenging when the insurance contract is given to different companies in 
successive years. Das supports this finding and states that in Orissa considerable time 
was wasted in implementing the insurance contract for a new company (Kannan and 
Varinder, 2012). Moreover, the entire enrolment process has to be repeated when a 
different company is given a contract for the second year and results in the 
beneficiaries being deprived of coverage during that time. It is likely that awarding 
longer-term contracts with insurance firms with proven track records and moving 
away from contracting annually would reduce a large amount of transaction costs. As 
pointed out by Das (Kannan and Varinder, 2012), this arrangement will also provide 
coverage to those patients whose card expires while they are in the hospital.  
Coverage of RSBY in terms of enrolment of the beneficiaries is the primary 
responsibility of the insurance company. The low state wide enrolment rate of 60% 
and 28% in the states of Haryana and Punjab, respectively, reported by Kannan and 
Varinder (2012) is similar to the findings of the present study which only looks at one 
district in each state and confirms an enrolment under the scheme at 42% in 
Yamunanagar (Haryana) and 15% in Patiala (Punjab).  Even though the scheme had 
been operational in the selected districts for several years, the enrolment stood at less 
than half in both districts. Evidence from other studies show that awareness of public 
programmes and trust in them, distance to health-care facilities and institutional 
rigidities within the health-care system can play a major role in limiting insurance 
enrolment (Basinga et al., 2010, Wagstaff, 2007). Review of literature on the 
assessment of IEC activities points to other studies, that show that there was 
ineffective IEC under the RSBY scheme (Trivedi and Saxena, 2013, Mahadevia, 
2012). In the present study, interviews with the stakeholders also confirm that 
possible reasons behind this poor enrolment could be poor IEC activity by the 
insurance company or non-engagement of the local bodies such as Panchayats or self-
help groups. Other literature supports this finding and points out that the enrolment 
could be better if some of the activities were delegated to the Panchayats such as 
provision of suitable place for registration, crowd management, standby arrangement 
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in case of power failure, late delivery of smart cards, etc. (Kunhikannan and 
Aravindan, 2012).  
In terms of scheme design vis-à-vis empanelment of facilities, the main issues 
concern the lack of sufficient empanelment of hospitals, geographical clustering of 
facilities in the district and availability of few services at the empaneled hospitals.  
In studying the empanelment under the scheme, poor access to health facilities due to 
low empanelment, is noticeable in both districts. Literature shows that non-
availability of RSBY empaneled hospitals in the vicinity has reduced the scheme’s 
acceptance in some areas (Health Inc Consortium, 2014).  In the present study the 
data shows that in Patiala, out of the total number of 115 facilities only 17 were 
empanelled and in Yamunanagar, out of 123 facilities only 37 got empanelled. Of the 
empanelled hospitals, the 37 empanelled hospitals in Yamunanagar district were to 
provide services to a population of 165,809 enrolled under RSBY and in Patiala, only 
17 hospitals were empaneled to serve a population of 38,278 enrolled under the 
scheme. Similar findings have also been reported from other states such as Karnataka 
(Rajasekhar et al., 2011). There could be several reasons for the low number of 
empaneled hospitals observed under the scheme. Misalignment of incentives might be 
a plausible reason where insurance companies are empaneling fewer hospitals in order 
to reduce accessibility and thus hope to minimize claims in order to increase their 
profit. Review of other studies show that insurance companies try to suspend or de-
empanel hospitals for small infractions, and even for unintentional mistakes (Khurana 
and Dave, 2016). Another reason for low number of empaneled hospitals could be the 
poor understanding of empanelment guidelines by the doctors or administrative heads 
as was the case in Chhattisgarh in a study done by the Council of Tribal and Rural 
Development (Council of Tribal and Rural Development, 2013).  
 
Moreover, the current process of empanelment has resulted in the majority of 
hospitals being empaneled from urban areas. This is primarily because the number of 
hospitals in rural areas is small, and these hospitals rarely meet the eligibility criteria 
of empanelment under the scheme. This raises concerns around the strong possibility 
of the rural population having to travel long distances to reach urban areas in order to 
avail health services under the scheme. It would also be prudent to keep in mind that 
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beneficiaries of the scheme are BPL families who generally survive on daily wages. 
Therefore, geographical accessibility of services is a priority for the beneficiaries as 
commuting from a far flung location would entail longer travel time and affect their 
daily wages. Other studies confirm that reduced accessibility due to unequal 
geographic distribution of hospitals and quality health care facilities is a strong reason 
for reduced claim and utilization rates of the scheme (Mayberry et al., 2006). 
However, it is also important to keep in mind that in enhancing people’s geographical 
access to hospital care, one also needs to balance the need to empanel hospitals that 
provide quality care and are properly managed (Devadasan et al., 2013).   
 
Turning to capacity of empanelled facilities, we find empaneled hospitals lacked 
many required departments. Super-specialty departments were negligible in public 
hospitals. None of the public hospitals in either of the districts provided all the 
packages of the RSBY scheme. A few private hospitals (only 3) in Yamunanagar 
provided facilities for all the care provisions within RSBY, but none of the private 
hospitals in Patiala provided all required services. Similar findings have also been 
reported by a study by Sethi et al. (2011) 
In studying empanelment relating to accessibility and availability, attention is drawn 
to another finding of the study, which deals with clustering of claims in a few selected 
hospitals. In Yamunanagar district, about half (2,791) of the claims were reported by 
four (all private) out of 37 empaneled hospitals, whereas in Patiala district, about two 
thirds (673) of the claims were reported by three out of 17 empaneled hospitals. This 
clustering of claims in a few selected hospitals may also be indicative of poor 
availability and accessibility to healthcare services under the RSBY. However, there 
could be several other reasons for such clustering, such as preference for private 
hospitals, preference for treatment from bigger hospitals, etc.  
Monitoring and supervision is one of the pillars of effective implementation of a 
public private partnership through contracting. Williamson (1985) clearly points out 
that weak monitoring and supervision will certainly hamper the implementation of 
any kind of social scheme by the government (Williamson, 1985).  Examination of 
the contract documents under the present study clearly shows that the contract lacked 
a comprehensive plan for monitoring and supervision at the design stage, both at the 
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state and district level. The process for monitoring and supervision was not clearly 
articulated and there was no mention of the periodicity of monitoring or 
accountability of the stakeholders. There were no dedicated human resources for 
monitoring and neither was there any earmarked budget for it. Effective oversight 
from the state governments is crucial to implementation of the scheme, but results 
from the study show that it was conspicuously lacking, especially during the process 
of enrolment of beneficiaries, empanelment of health facilities, awareness building 
and facilitating implementation. Most of the activities were undertaken primarily by 
the insurance company, where the incentives might have been misaligned or even in 
conflict. Additionally the importance of monitoring is further heightened in the 
contractual arrangements, where the contracts are of short duration and trust is an 
issue between the stakeholders (Ojo, 2014). Inputs from key informants clearly point 
to the fact that trust was still developing between the stakeholders and was in nascent 
stages, given these new public private partnerships that came into play.  Yet, it is 
possible if there is to be renewal of contracts they are honored more strictly.   
Results of the study show that weak monitoring was apparent in several instances 
where there was a clear breach of contract, for example, delayed reimbursement of the 
claimed amount by the insurance company, non-payment of transportation cost to the 
beneficiaries, no provision of food to the beneficiaries in the hospitals, and lack of 
information dissemination to the beneficiaries in the hospitals. The cashless system 
somehow further managed to induce high OOP expenditure for the beneficiaries. In 
addition, a separate RSBY helpdesk was observed in only 2 of the 12 selected 
hospitals which were in direct breach of the contractual document. Also, signage for 
RSBY at the facility level could be improved. The present study also shows that 
providers, both public and private, are not sharing information regarding the cost of 
treatment, money remaining on the smart card during admission and discharge, in 
addition to pre and post hospitalizations benefits etc. Further, exit interview analysis 
clearly shows that some ‘leakages’ were happening in the scheme, i.e. 15% of the 
participants enrolled under the scheme were non-BPL.  
Extensive literature review points towards the importance of relational contracting 
which views contracts as relations rather than transactional (MacNeil, 1974). Such 
contracts are “based on a relationship of trust between the parties. The explicit terms 
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of the contract are an outline as there are implicit terms and understandings which 
determine the behavior of the parties”. In the present study, the contracts lean towards 
relational contracting as part of the PPP framework. They adopt an approach of 
harmonizing conflict and preserving relationships between the insurance companies 
and the SNA’s and TPAs. Even though there were several instances of breach of 
contract - this did not lead to sanctions. This is in concordance with what MacNeil 
had stated regarding relational contracts that “…the primary need is of harmonizing 
conflict and preserving the relationship (MacNeil, 1974, MacNeil, 1978). To take 
recourse to legal proceedings for failings of stakeholders is perceived to be very 
harmful to long-term relations between the stakeholders (Deakin and Wilkinson, 
1995, Arrighetti et al., 1996, Williamson, 1985). In the present study, central level 
policy makers were keenly aware of the need to nurture and build trust amongst 
stakeholders for the long term success of the scheme. But the downside of this was 
that contract observance was not well monitored or regulated, and monitoring and 
supervision was very weak. A critical point is that the implementation of contracts in 
India is very different from where the institutional and regulatory environment is 
much stronger.  Monitoring and supervision systems are likely to be more critical, the 
weaker is the institutional and regulatory environment. 
Finally, we need to consider effective risk pooling in the interest of long term 
sustainability of the scheme. Risk pooling in a voluntary social health insurance 
scheme such as RSBY can prove to be a challenge because it involves both the poor 
and the less educated. Individuals from the low income strata may opt out of the 
scheme as they have to pay a registration fee, even though it may be a small amount. 
There is evidence that shows that even getting photographs can be a substantial 
financial burden for poor families, as in the case of Indonesia (Sparrow, 2008). It is 
also likely that the beneficiaries of the scheme, because of their poor educational 
status, may not fully appreciate the full entitlement that the scheme offers and hence 
may not get enrolled. There is evidence that shows that families headed by the more 
educated households are the ones that are more likely to participate in insurance 
schemes (Chankova et al., 2008, Giné et al., 2008). However, there can also be 
adverse selection into the insurance with higher risk individuals making up the most 
of the enrolees.   
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Results around effective risk pooling under RSBY are mixed. In the present study, out 
of 247,998 and 393,304 eligible BPL population in Patiala and Yamunanagar 
(respectively), only 38,278 in Patiala (15%) and 165,809 in Yamunanagar (42%) were 
enrolled under the scheme.   
According to this study in Patiala, enrollment pools of individuals under RSBY were 
made up of the elderly population (> 64 years) which was 27.2% of the eligible 
population in that age group. Those enrolled aged 25 – 44 years and 45 – 64 years 
were 25.95% and 35.65% of the eligible population in that age group. Enrolment of 
females was comparable to that of males (Chapter 6). These numbers by themselves 
are of concern; the enrolment role is low for all age groups. However, the utilization 
rates for the enrolled elderly population i.e. > 64 years (chapter 8) was less when 
compared to other groups aged 25 – 44 years and 45 – 64 years. In addition, taking 
scheme utilization into context, out of 38,278 and 165,809 individuals enrolled in 
Patiala and Yamunanagar (respectively), 494 (1%) individuals in Patiala and 4252 
(3%) individuals in Yamunanagar filed claims under RSBY. At least in terms of 
claims, we do not find adverse selection. Further, it was observed in the present study 
that there seems to be financial viability to the insurance company after all claims 
have been paid.    
 
9.4 RSBY – influence of contractual arrangements in meeting its 
aims 
This section summarizes to what extent contractual arrangements help RSBY to meet 
the aims it might have been expected to achieve. This is considered under the 
headings of equity, efficiency and incentives. 
Equity  
A report published by DFID in 2004 (England, 2004) mentions equity can be 
effectively addressed with three strategies (1) establishing contractual arrangements 
that specifically encourage providers to serve the poor and underserved; (2) 
contracting with private providers in areas that are predominantly poor (geographic 
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targeting); and (3) contracting out services that are of most benefit to the poor and 
underserved.  
RSBY addresses the first issue through contractual arrangements with providers to 
address the health needs of the poor. RSBY, as we show below, through its 
contracting mechanism has improved equity; yet, much more can be done.  The 
scheme does enroll the most vulnerable sections of society though it leaves out the 
non BPL population. Some states, however, like Kerala and Himachal Pradesh are 
providing services to non BPL families which primarily include migrants, who are 
vulnerable to a fall below the poverty line in case of catastrophic expenditures (Das, 
2012).  
Taking into account the goal of universal health coverage and a robust private sector 
providing a majority of services in India, the scheme is playing a vital role in shifting 
a proportion of burden of the public hospitals to the private hospitals mostly likely 
without reducing the former’s allocations from the government. This controlled 
burden, along with the funds generated through the scheme, may further help in 
enhancing the quality of services in public hospitals, thereby addressing the equity 
dimension in service delivery for those not qualifying for RSBY. 
However, there are certain gaps in scheme implementation such as low enrolment, 
low package rates, low claim rate, poor quality and range of services, some charging 
of services, and OOP expenditures which could affect the equity factor.  
The scheme showed poor enrolment with illiterates and SC/ST population less likely 
to get enrolled.   
Private providers are incentivized to make profits and lack of motivation regarding 
patient well-being might lead them to turn away patients under the scheme.  
 The minority groups (SC/STs and Muslims) were using public facilities more when 
compared to private facilities, even though the scheme makes it possible for 
beneficiaries to use private facilities, which are perceived to provide a greater range of 
services and better quality care.  So the most vulnerable group among the BPL 
population continues to use facilities which are perceived not to be of very high 
standards, raising questions regarding equity under the scheme. Similar findings were 
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also reported by Thakur (2015) where through qualitative means, the author observed 
that the scheme did not reach the intended beneficiaries in some areas, mainly, 
illiterates, and excluded groups such as SC/ST and minorities, for example, the 
Muslim population  (Thakur, 2015).  
In addition, due to many empanelled facilities not having the complete set of required 
services, the poor may have had to turn to non-empanelled private facilities and incur 
out-of-pocket expenditure.  
With regard to contracting private providers in predominantly poor areas, RSBY did 
not perform well which led to poor accessibility. The hospitals present in the rural 
areas primarily consist of small private hospitals or primary health centres. The 
empanelment criterion under RSBY is such that the hospitals present in the rural area 
or in the hard to reach areas are not eligible to get enrolled, as it is very unlikely for 
such hospitals to have laboratory facilities or in-patient facilities. As a result, hospitals 
are clustered around the urban and sub-urban areas. Also, the exit interview data 
suggests that about one-fourth of the participants would choose a health facility based 
on distance from their homes, so access may have discouraged enrolment and use 
(Itoli, 2013).  
With regard to contracting out services that are of most beneficial to the poor as 
propounded by DFID (three strategies stated above), RSBY contracted for in-patient 
care only. Out-patient care was completely omitted from the contract. Literature 
shows that most out-of-pocket expenditures are incurred for out-patient care, 
particularly from purchasing drugs (Saksena et al., 2010).    Though the scheme has 
succeeded, to some extent, in providing quality services to the vulnerable groups, 
clearly more needs to be done.  
Efficiency in service delivery 
Contracts in RSBY helped ensure efficiency by contracting private providers at a 
fixed price and enabled rapid scaling up of health care services and user satisfaction.  
Package rates were defined in the contract document between the insurance company 
and the provider. Thus, enabling the provision of private services at a fixed price. 
Since, the providers have to give services within the same package rates, variation in 
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quality of services was observed. Rigorous monitoring and supervision could have 
ensured greater standardization of quality of services under the scheme.   
The RSBY insurance scheme, as a PPP arrangement, was designed to take advantage 
of provider pluralism; but in involving the private sector, care has to be taken that this 
does not induce higher costs to beneficiaries when compared with the public sector. 
The study findings show that RSBY beneficiaries did incur OOP expenditure; though 
it was less than incurred by the non-RSBY beneficiaries most of whom were non 
BPL. This is consistent with findings from the literature review in Chapter 2, where 
there is mixed evidence of OOP expenditures from other countries with regard to 
health insurance schemes for the poor (Acharya et al., 2012).  
Within the country, findings from this study are consistent with what was reported by 
Selvaraj et al. in a study conducted in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu for RSBY and 
Rajiv Aarogyasri Scheme. It can be surmised that RSBY and other state government 
based insurance schemes have failed to provide adequate financial risk protection 
(Selvaraj and Karan, 2012).  Reasons for incurring OOP could be that providers 
sought payments that they were not supposed to, not many procedures are covered 
and, further that, many of the expenditures that families incur during hospitalization 
of a family member such as staying nearby the ill person are not covered.  
The private health sector is growing rapidly across the developing world. People 
increasingly rely on private health care organizations to address their health needs 
(International Finance Group, 2011), making it important for the public sector to 
engage with the private sector in order to rapidly scale up services. It was observed in 
the present study that the private hospitals outnumbered the public hospitals. Thus 
contracting with the private facilities under the scheme had rapidly enhanced access to 
services. However, this was only up to a certain extent, as it was observed - 
particularly in Patiala - that the number of hospitals contracted under the scheme was 
few.   
For user satisfaction, RSBY participants reported slightly better satisfaction when 
compared to non-RSBY participants. There could be two reasons for better user 
satisfaction expressed by RSBY participants. Firstly, as the assessment of quality of 
hospital care was self-reported, RSBY beneficiaries who are generally deprived of 
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care may be grateful for whatever facilities are provided to them. This is reflected in 
the present study as the RSBY beneficiaries reported greater satisfaction for aspects 
that would have been the same for non-RSBY participants (e.g. cleanliness, as all the 
patients would have access to the same areas in the hospitals). The second reason 
could be in conformity with what was stated by Devadasan et al. that the insurance 
scheme might have negotiated for better quality of care for its members and so the 
insured would have received better quality of care and thereby would be more 
satisfied (Devadasan et al., 2011).  
Incentives 
RSBY extensively relied on incentives within its various contracts to ensure desired 
outcomes. However, the study shows that at times there was absence of proper 
incentives within the contractual arrangement, and in some instances, there were 
disincentives with respect to assignment of roles and responsibilities built into the 
design. 
 According to the centre - state contract in RSBY, the states were responsible for 
paying 25% of premium. This could deter some poorer states from participation.  
Most of the responsibilities for implementing the scheme lay with insurance 
companies, while the state government played merely a facilitation role, with limited 
accountability. This also acted as an incentive for the state governments to adopt the 
scheme. The insurance companies were also clearly incentivized to capture a large 
segment of the previously untapped market. In addition, the premiums were collected 
per family regardless of the number of family members enrolled. The incentive for the 
service providers was clearly monetary by being presented with an additional revenue 
stream.  The additional revenue, coming from patients who did not generate revenue 
before, has helped public providers in supplementing their under-resourced budgets, 
thus  maintaining their equipment or meeting day to day expenditures in running the 
facility. The private providers have captured a new segment of the market, resulting in 
increased volume of patients and in turn higher profits. This is said to have resulted in 
smaller hospitals adding rooms and new hospitals being established due to increased 
demand (Swaroop, 2012). 
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 In the contracts of RSBY, there were omissions of certain types of incentives for the 
stakeholders.  These posed challenges. RSBY responsibilities were additional 
responsibilities for state and district officials without any incentive for this increased 
workload. This directly affected scheme implementation. Absence of sanctions for 
poor implementation and similarly lack of incentives for effective scheme 
implementation led to poor monitoring and supervision of the scheme.  
Price was the only contractual arrangement with providers; rarely was any quantity 
target associated either with enrolment or with claims filed vis-à-vis premium 
collected in the contract document.   A standard approach in principal agent theory is 
to offer a schedule of price and quantity (or even quality) to which the agent 
responds (Biglaiser and Ma, 1995).  This approach was clearly missing when 
incentivizing the agent in many of the principal-agent interactions.  
Enrolment of beneficiaries and issuance of smart cards was the responsibility of the 
insurance company. However, insurance companies were disincentivized to enroll up 
to a maximum of five members in a beneficiary family, as allowed under the scheme 
design, because the premium is determined per family and not on an individual basis. 
An increase in enrolled individuals could lead to higher number of claims thus 
reducing the profits of the insurance companies. This has also been documented in a 
study by Sethi (2015).    
There are also disincentives for adequate IEC by the insurance companies, which is 
one of their primary responsibilities according to the contract document. Better 
awareness of the scheme among the community could increase claims, which would 
lead to a higher reimbursed amount. There was alarming evidence of poor 
understanding of empaneled hospitals by the beneficiaries, knowledge of services 
covered under the scheme and the facilities therein, which calls for an examination of 
the strategies adopted by the enrolling agencies in the states with respect to RSBY 
(Health Inc Consortium, 2014). 
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9.5  Conclusions and Recommendations 
RSBY has provided heavily subsidized health insurance to more than 110 million 
people (almost 10% of India’s population) (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 
2014) and has become one of the world’s largest health insurance schemes (Ministry 
of Labour and Employment, 2012b). The scheme is based on a Public-Private 
Partnerships model governed through a series of contracts  which enables the poor to 
access private health services, which otherwise were unaffordable for them. The 
strength of the scheme lies in the fact that it is a social welfare scheme with inbuilt 
incentives for various stakeholders to motivate them to provide quality services to the 
poor. Another feature of the scheme is that there is no age limit for beneficiaries of 
the scheme. The fact that private service providers are interested in participating in 
RSBY indicates that it is also a successful business model. RSBY today is also seen 
as a successful PPP model in the context of its outreach and sustainability.  
The present study identified certain gaps in scheme design, its implementation 
relating to enrolment of beneficiaries, empanelment of health facilities, role of 
insurance companies, contracting and regulation which affect the implementation of 
the scheme. It also needs to be borne in mind that though the interviews were 
conducted at national and state levels, the empirical data comes from just two districts 
and the recommendations are on the basis of those findings.  
RSBY is based on a PPP model and all the stakeholders, public and private, are 
equally important for successful implementation of the scheme. Health care is an 
important concern of the people of the country and is enshrined in the Constitution of 
India (Articles 38, 39 and 47) and listed in the Directive Principles of State Policy 
(Jacob, 2012). Provision of universal health care should be the mandate of the 
government and not just of a ruling party. There has to be political unanimity for 
health-care provision. Welfare of the beneficiaries has to be a top priority rather than 
a means of political opportunism.   
The MoHFW appears to be the most appropriate department for implementation of 
the scheme, since RSBY is primarily concerned with providing good quality of 
health-care services to the poor.  MoLE is more oriented towards the identification of 
the informal sector; enrolment of the beneficiaries by them could complement 
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MoHFW. An interdepartmental task force could be set up to enhance this 
coordination.  
State governments rarely make modifications to the contract design provided to them 
by the Central Government. It has to be realized by the state governments that one 
size does not fit all. The contract needs to be modified at the state level and if 
possible, even at the district level in order to meet the requirements of local 
conditions, which might vary from one setting to another. For this to occur, the states 
need to commit additional manpower at a high level of administration; perhaps 
capacity development may also be needed for pricing, monitoring and improving 
contract specifications.    
The functioning of RSBY should be more transparent. Important documents, 
including contract documents, must be available in the public domain and there 
should be an opportunity for the public to comment on the contract design.  The role 
of civil society has not been noted in most studies.  Citizen health system monitoring 
capacity may be an important missing element. 
Fixing of roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders is an absolute necessity. 
The state governments have outsourced most of their responsibilities to the insurance 
firms and have thus reduced their own role. They presently only identify the insurance 
companies on the basis of competitive bidding and provide them with a list of BPL 
households. More active participation is required from the state governments, 
especially during the process of enrolment, empanelment and awareness building.  
Engaging Panchayat members (PRIs) and NGOs in the scheme could enhance 
accountability (Whinney and Madiath, 2011) and boost the process of community 
mobilization. Here, citizen monitoring may play an important role.  
Since the process of enrolment consumes considerable time and manpower, yearly 
enrolment of the same beneficiaries should be abandoned; instead, a provision for 
addition or subtraction of a family member’s name from the smart card can be 
initiated. Further, enrolment coverage should be strictly monitored so that there is an 
increase in persons being covered under the scheme.  
There should be a thorough appraisal and periodic revision of the BPL list by the 
Government, although this issue goes beyond RSBY. The BPL database should be 
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centrally available. This would eliminate discrepancies in the BPL lists that are 
provided to insurance companies at the time of enrolment and would enable better 
identification of households. India’s rollout of the unique identification number (UID) 
can also help in the process of enrollment. Since UID contains biometric 
identification, it could speed up the process of enrolment and would also strengthen 
the accuracy of the information. Additionally, it can supplement the centrally 
available BPL records. 
A provision for inclusion of individuals just above the poverty line should be formally 
incorporated in the scheme. This section of the population cannot be neglected as they 
are at high risk of slipping below the poverty line due to catastrophic medical illness. 
The state governments can extend the coverage to the APL population by using their 
own resources for providing cover over and above the RSBY cap. Perhaps there can 
be some graduated premium payment from the users near the poverty line; such 
schemes always need to be balanced by weighing implementation costs and costs 
recovery. 
Empanelled hospitals are few in number and are clustered in urban areas. There needs 
to be a larger review as to whether this is a general problem or an issue in the studied 
districts. In the case of rural areas, the eligibility criteria are such that many hospitals 
cannot be empanelled under the scheme. A conscious effort needs to be made to 
empanel more hospitals under the scheme without affecting the quality of services. 
Inclusion of primary health-care facilities under the scheme could be helpful for 
access and cost cutting. Rural facilities, mostly public, need to be strengthened to 
secondary level facilities, so that they can be empanelled. Such a policy could be cost-
prohibitive and it may not be possible to include in the current health budget.  
An awareness drive regarding the scheme, which highlights the benefits of the 
business model, is warranted. It has to be ensured that coverage of the packages, that 
is the services offered as part of the insurance package, are more comprehensive. This 
can be done by empanelling more multi-specialty hospitals that have a track record of 
good quality service. Care should be taken that the empanelled hospitals are spread 
throughout the district rather than being clustered together in a sub-district.    
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Providers, especially private providers, expressed dissatisfaction with the package 
rates, which calls for a revision. Annual cost inflation needs to be factored in while 
estimating the package rates. It is also suggested that it may not be necessary to have 
a uniform pan-India package rate. Package rates may vary from place to place 
depending on the local settings. Uniform pricing can be a deterrent for providers to 
participate in metropolitan areas where operating costs are likely to be higher.     
To encourage improvements in quality, package rates could be linked to the 
evaluation of the empanelled hospitals. One of the important components of this 
evaluation could be the quality of service provided by the provider. By doing so, 
package rates can be linked to the quality of services provided, i.e. higher rates for 
higher quality of services. This will also enable and motivate multi-specialty private 
hospitals with the highest quality of services to seek empanelment under the scheme.  
One should caution that quality indicators are difficult to enumerate as well as being 
difficult to observe. 
The process of claim settlement should be streamlined so that private partners can 
develop trust in the government process and are motivated to participate. The gap 
between the date of claim application and reimbursement date should be strictly 
monitored. Insurance companies should be penalized for failing to reimburse the 
claimed amount to providers within the stipulated time period. There needs to be 
transparency with respect to the amounts reimbursed to the providers. The reasons for 
not reimbursing the claimed amounts must be provided as this would help in 
reviewing the facilities of the provider. 
The public hospitals have access to the reimbursed funds under RSBY. However, 
there are no clear cut guidelines for the use of these funds. Hence, guidelines should 
be established for the public hospitals to use the reimbursed amount in the interest of 
improving the quality of services provided at these hospitals.  
In order to provide adequate access to health care along with good quality of services 
at different levels of health care, complementary approaches and inter linkages are 
needed. An appropriate referral mechanism can be considered. These linkages and 
referrals could also help to reduce the clustering of utilization in specific higher-level 
facilities. There is an important lesson here from Thailand’s Universal Coverage 
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Scheme (UCS). If a beneficiary does not respect the referral system s/he loses the 
right to free services. Use of a referral system should be encouraged and incentivized.   
In the implementation cycle, defining, designing and planning of the programme 
holds the key to successful implementation for achieving desired outcomes. A strong 
monitoring and evaluation framework and plan needs to be incorporated in the 
contract design with a separate financial budget and dedicated human resources. Third 
party monitoring would be helpful and can bring significant quality improvements. 
Provision for action against the erring companies/individuals should be included as 
part of the monitoring and supervision plan. This could entail blacklisting of erring 
companies for certain periods of time and termination of contracts, if found guilty. 
Key indicators should be developed for regular monitoring. These indicators could be 
based on the inputs, processes and outputs of the scheme. MIS data generated by the 
providers must be regularly monitored. Regular internal and external audits of 
insurance companies as well as the health service providers would add value. Regular 
external evaluation of the scheme should become a part of the contract design.  
For regulation of private sector hospitals stricter enforcement is required. Moreover, 
clear guidelines are needed to register and monitor the quality of services being 
provided by the health facilities. Hospitals can be graded in different categories 
depending on the quality of services provided by them. This categorization will not 
only be helpful at different levels of scheme implementation of RSBY, but will also 
be helpful to the beneficiaries in selecting health-care facilities. It is recommended 
that regular medical and social audits of the providers be conducted and sanctions be 
imposed on the providers who do not follow the norms. A transparent public bidding 
of contracts would be prudent. Contracts need to be signed after the bidding process, 
which would include contracting of TPAs. The evaluation of quality of services being 
offered by the providers (care from doctors and staff, hospital environment, admission 
and discharge facility, and information dissemination) must be an important factor in 
the process of contracting. This would ensure better quality of services from private 
stakeholders. Given the problems with monitoring in health care, it would be better to 
work with trusted insurance companies for a longer duration rather than signing a new 
contract with a new company every year. There is a strong case for moving away 
from an annual contract system to a longer term contract with insurance companies 
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who have a proven track record of good services.  Penalties for failure to meet 
contract requirements should be a part of these contracts. In case of breach of contract 
by the stakeholders, appropriate penalties in the form of refund of premium or other 
such fines can be imposed. Such penalties can be levied and welfare enhancing only if 
there are clear monitoring indicators which actually reflect performance.  It was 
observed in the present study that mostly the monitoring indicators were not clear and 
when clear, enforcement was difficult.    
Capacity building of the lower level staff, who are in direct contact with the 
beneficiaries, is highly recommended. Better training of lower health functionaries 
can reduce barriers for the poor visiting a private facility. Capacity building of various 
other staff, such as staff of SNAs, nodal officers, FKOs and others on different 
aspects of the process of RSBY would be helpful. 
IEC activities must be strengthened. Awareness about the benefits of social health 
insurance and what constitutes good quality of health care should be imparted to the 
entire community by means of an effective communication campaign. Capacity 
building for those delivering IEC can be strengthened through enhancement of IEC 
communication material, as this is crucial for spreading awareness among the 
marginalized sections of the population. Socio-cultural issues need to be kept in mind. 
For example, banners and posters will not benefit a population that is illiterate. 
Therefore, a move away from the traditional methods of IEC to innovative strategies – 
one that takes into account alternate media channels for targeting the poor and other 
vulnerable groups, is recommended.  Awareness among beneficiaries would also 
improve the quality of services rendered by health service providers as the informed 
beneficiary will demand better service.  
RSBY is a scheme that promises cashless transaction for the beneficiaries. However, 
this remains an unfulfilled goal, considering the high OOP expenditures incurred by 
beneficiaries. Strict monitoring and supervision of providers would play a significant 
role in cutting down the OOP expenditures of RSBY beneficiaries.  
Increasing the reimbursement cap to more than INR 30,000 (£ 302) may play a 
significant role in providing adequate social security and also increase the enrolment 
rate. This may well be possible given the government spending on health is among the 
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lowest level of public spending in the world at less than 2% of GDP. Further, the 
present cap under RSBY appears quite low when compared to other schemes such as 
Rajiv Aarogyasri, which offers benefits to the extent of over five times that of RSBY. 
However, these state level schemes are more focused on providing tertiary care while 
completely omitting primary and secondary levels of care. Increasing of the cap above 
INR 30,000 (£ 302) and incorporation of outpatient care can be tried on a pilot basis. 
If the pilot is financially viable, it can be scaled up. 
In terms of facilities under the scheme, the inclusion of outpatient care could 
significantly increase the financial protection of households. Most of the OOP 
expenditure is incurred on outpatient care, and particularly on medicines (Saksena et 
al., 2010). If it is not feasible to take care of the entire outpatient care, then it is 
desirable to cover at least the cost of medicines under the scheme. This is because 
empirical evidence suggests that almost 60% of outpatient care costs are on drugs 
(Saksena et al., 2010). 
A well-functioning health system has a need of a balanced mix of both public and 
private health care delivery facilities. This increases people’s choices. The World 
Development Report 1991 argued that “competitive markets are the best way yet 
found for efficiently organizing the production of goods and services” (World Bank, 
1991). However it goes on to say that the State must step in where markets prove 
inadequate or fail altogether. The equity issue can remain unaddressed by markets. 
Public goods can get ignored. The preventive and promotive aspects of health care 
can be neglected.  
Realities of development make it relevant to explore effective PPP models that 
introduce market principles in public services to provide effective healthcare for the 
poor. RSBY was initiated by Government of India as one such model which explores 
a new partnership paradigm between markets and government to provide quality 
health care. While it has had marked successes, the recommendations here would 
further improve it.  
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ANNEXURE 1: LIST OF PACKAGES 
COVERED UNDER RSBY 
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ANNEXURE 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW 
GUIDE FOR KEY STAKEHOLDERS  
 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY STAKEHOLDER 
PART I – POLITICAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONEMNT  
 Formal policy guidelines for PPP (Request copy of any government notification, 
circulars, orders, policy document etc.?) 
- Central level 
- State level 
- If already promulgated, salient features of the policy  
- If there is no such policy and if the Government proposes to have formal 
policy, salient features of the proposed policy 
 While formulating your policy guidelines towards public-private partnerships in 
RSBY, have you considered or reviewed or studied similar policies? What are the 
unique features or improvisations you have made  
- Incentives 
- Eligibility conditions 
- Risk etc 
 How has been the support from other Ministries in launching and sustaining RSBY?  
 Political environment in launching and sustaining the RSBY  
- Central Level 
- State Level 
- Private Sector Engagement 
- Budget Allocation 
- Coalition Government 
 What regulations govern the contractsat central level? 
 Insurance companies 
 NGO 
 TPA 
 Providers (public and private) 
 What is the regulatory environment at the state level? 
 Insurance Companies 
 NGO 
 TPA 
 Providers (public and private) 
 What is the regulatory environment at the district level?  
 Insurance Companies 
 NGO 
 TPA 
 Providers (public and private) 
 Based on your experience in the form of such partnerships, how would you assess the 
overall benefits of such partnerships?  
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PART II – INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
1. Human Resources solely dedicated to RSBY 
Permanent Contract Specialist Training 
Number of administrative staff 
Number of technical staff 
Number of support [including translators,  
secretarial, and other staff] 
2. Physical Resources solely dedicated to RSBY 
For each item below please describe the location, extent/number, age, suitability and 
condition 
Premises 
Utilities: Power/Water/Phone 
Vehicles 
Communications Equipment 
Computer Equipment 
Specialist Equipment 
3. Annual Financial Resources (Please provide whatever information is available) 
2009  2010  2011 
Pay/Salaries Permanent 
Pay/Salaries Contract 
Pensions 
Total  
Building/repairs 
Utility Bills 
Transportation/travel 
Equipment 
Training 
Publications 
Consultants 
Supplies 
Other 
Total  
Total Liabilities 
Central government 
State government 
Other income sources 
Total income 
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4. What is the allocation of role and responsibility 
 Position/title: 
 Office or Department: 
 Reporting relationship to supervisor 
 Principal areas of responsibility: 
 Who reports directly to you? How often? About what? 
 Principal documents referred to for: 
 Legislation 
 Policies 
 Objectives 
 Strategies 
 Procedures 
 What are the main administrative tasks that occupy the majority of your 
time? 
 What are the main technical activities [if any] that your section 
administers? 
 What are the other ministries and agencies that you communicate with 
about RSBY issues? 
 What are the most urgent/important tasks that you believe should be 
addressed by your section? 
 What do you anticipate will be the biggest new challenges for your 
section over the next five years? 
 What are the biggest difficulties encountered by your section? Are they: 
 Insufficient legal authority? [Do you work with out-of-date legislation 
that does not address the realities of your main challenges? What is 
missing? What needs to be improved?] 
 Poorly defined standards/guidelines? [Are there clear criteria that allow 
you to make decisions?] 
 Poorly Defined Administrative Roles? [such as need for clearer roles or 
responsibilities, better communications or reporting structure] 
 Insufficient Information? [Is there sufficient data available for your 
section? Is it incomplete? Is it out of date? Be as specific as possible] 
 Insufficient Resources? Human Resources [what additional staff are 
required? What are they needed for? What additional skills or training are 
needed?] 
 Physical Resources? [what additional/improved premises, utilities, 
equipment are needed to allow your section to perform more effectively. 
What improvements would occur?] 
 Financial Resources? [What are the five biggest financial obstacles that 
reduce the effectiveness of your section?] 
5. Training: Have you received any specific training for your job? If so when did you 
last receive training? What additional training would help you to do your job better? 
6. Is there any independent body which supervises the functions and the effectiveness of 
RSBY? 
 
PART III – MARKET AND DEGREE OF COMPETITION 
Refer to Section VI - Contract Details 
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PART IV – DEGREE OF TRUST 
1. What role does trust play in selection and provision of services? (Insurance 
companies → health providers, TPA, Smart card provider, NGO etc? State → 
insurance company for contract renewal? Beneficiary → Provider) 
 
PART V – SERVICE DELIVERY 
1. How do you feel about case-based pre-negotiated fixed payment for an RSBY 
beneficiary? 
2. Can the pre-negotiated payments for RSBY for certain procedures lead to higher 
profit margins? (cataract as opposed to complicated c-section)  
3. Are beneficiaries availing facilities outside the district or state? Why? 
4. In your opinion, is BPL population utilizing facilities which are closest to them, or are 
they having or choosing to travel further to avail benefits and the reasons behind that 
choice? 
5. How are facilities empanelled by the insurance company and what criterion are used 
for empanelment? (Proximity to BPL population) 
6. Is attention paid to insure that a beneficiary has access to all packages he is entitled to 
under scheme and the range of services/packages covered by the empanelled 
facilities? 
 
PART VI – CONTRACT DETAILS (Questionnaire) 
1. Type and nature of services under partnership (on contract) 
2. Who initiated and when was the decision taken for partnership? 
3. Steps followed (from initiating stages till operational implementation)? 
4. Time taken for installation and commencement of operations? 
5. No. of bidders (who applied for this contract)? Was the market contestable and what 
was competition in awarding contracts? 
6. Pre Bid Seminar – Purpose of the seminar/what information was provided to private 
agency? Collect a copy of advertisement/notification 
7. Criteria laid out; no. of bidders; open or closed screening meeting? 
8. Criteria for short listing the final list of private agencies? 
9. Items negotiated, if any 
10. Finalization of contract clauses: Legal consultation, if any? 
11. Whether in legal affidavit/whether in front of witnesses, and other procedures 
followed? 
12. Who gave the final approval for contracting partnership? 
13. What is the incentive structure for various partners/stakeholders in design of the 
contract? 
14. Are there any specific pre conditions for renewal of the contract? 
15. Is there a limit on the maximum no. of contracts allowed to the private agency? 
16. Billing and reimbursement procedures for the services provided 
A. Reimbursed (claim) amount as revenue for the last 3 years. 
(a) Year I  
(b) Year II 
(c) Year III  
B. Verification of claims (who verifies/certifies? Before reimbursement) 
17. What is the composition of the board that oversees the contracts, who are they?   
18. Does the contract specify the periodicity of performance review and the parameters of 
performance review?  
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19. What approach is adopted for cost overruns, overuse and disputes that may involve 
legal costs for the parties involved? 
20. What mechanisms exist for settling disputes between parties? Is there a governing 
body for these transactions?  
21. Is there a system to periodically evaluate the feedback/complaints from the patients? 
22. Could provision on sanctions in contract design influence outcome of contracts? (If 
any, in the contract design in the selected states) 
23. What are some of the actual conflicts going on currently?  
DETAILS COLLECTED FROM REVIEW OF BID NOTIFICATION/CONTRACT 
A. Private Agency Details 
i) Eligibility conditions for the private agency: 
(a) Required legal status of the private agency (whether registered 
society/foundation/trust, etc) 
(b) Bidding (through single bid or bids on technical and financial bid 
separately) 
(c) Eligibility conditions (e.g. minimum capital or turnover of the agency) 
ii) Minimum experience of the private agency (in the related area of services) 
(a) In other services/business 
(b) In health sector 
iii) Infrastructure related pre conditions (including staff) 
iv) Minimum financial or material surety (in the form of movable/immovable assets) 
v) Explicit non eligible conditions (for those agencies that does not qualify) 
vi) Any other eligibility conditions/criteria 
B. Tender application procedure followed  - Pre-bid briefing/formalities (if any) 
C. Contract details (Information to be collected from TOR contract deed/agreement 
document) 
a. List of service (s) covered under partnership (including timing of the 
services) 
b. Minimum and maximum duration of the contract offer 
c. Technical bid details to be submitted (details to be enclosed) 
i. Earnest money for the bid 
ii. Technical details to be compiled from agreement 
d. Financial commercial bid details 
i. Rate/tariffs per service 
ii. Validity period for the offered tariff 
e. Maximum period with in which the agency must commence the service 
operations 
f. Time limit to accept or reject the contract and execute the contract 
g. Penalty for the delay (or) if the agency do not commence the operations at all. 
h. How service charges (tariff/fee has been fixed, calculated)  
i. Monitoring and supervising mechanisms to oversee the functioning of the 
private agency 
j. Terms and conditions of performance standards, quality control, etc. 
k. If the contract is to be terminated prematurely, under what circumstances it 
could be done? 
l. Under what circumstances the private agency may withdraw/exit/terminate 
the services? 
m. The penalties for non performance or penalties for non adherence to the 
contract clauses  
n. Pre-conditions, if the private agency wishes to exit or terminate the contract 
i. Minimum notification period 
ii. Obligation / penalties of the private agency if exit is premature. 
iii. Obligation of the parties if the termination is mutually agreed 
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iv. Penalty for the private agency if the contractor unilaterally 
suspends/terminates, based on performance deficiency 
v. Recourse to either of the agency, if any grievance/complaint 
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ANNEXURE 3: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR 
AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES OFFERED 
AT EMPANELLED FACILITIES  
SNo. 1 2 3  4 5 
Hospital Name           
Distt           
Bed Size           
Neo Natal Care           
Burns           
Snake Bite           
Oncology           
Urology           
Endocrine           
Paediatric           
Orthopaedic           
Ophthalmology           
Neurosurgery           
Hysteroscopic           
Endoscopic Procedures           
Gynaecology           
General Surgery           
Throat           
Nose           
Ear           
Dental           
Medical General Ward ICU           
Medical General Ward Non Surgical           
Medical General Ward Surgical(Not included in package rates)           
ICU           
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ANNEXURE 4: OBSERVATIONAL AND 
FACILITY RECORDS CHECKLIST 
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ANNEXURE 5: HEALTH PROVIDER 
CHECKLIST 
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ANNEXURE 6: EXIT PATIENT INTERVIEW 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
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